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INTRODUCTION
Juris Rozenvalds
Democracy at a crossroads
‘Democracy’ has been one of the most frequently used words in the political discourse for the 
last two centuries. Recognition of the value of democracy has become common in the modern world, 
and it has become a generally accepted standard in the West. In many countries of the world people 
wish to live in a democracy regardless of their cultural background. According to the World Values 
Survey (WVS) conducted between 2010 and 2014, the majority of respondents in Egypt (98.7 %), 
Germany (94.1 %), Sweden (93.1 %), Kazakhstan (87 %), Belarus and Ukraine (85.3 %), Estonia 
(79.2 %), China (70.5 %) and Russia (67.3 %) (see WVS) appreciate democracy as a political system 
(Latvia did not participate in this ‘sixth polling round’). When asked to evaluate the importance 
of democracy on a scale from 1–10, respondents from Sweden give it an average of 9.29 points, 
respondents from Egypt – 8.95 whereas the average evaluation given by respondents from Germany 
is 8.94, Kazakhstan – 8.62, China – 8.43, Estonia – 8.30, and Ukraine – 7.83 points. Respondents 
from Belarus and Russia give the lowest average points for the importance of democracy – 7.48 
and 7.42 respectively. 
Having said this, one must take into account that, more often than not, the respondents of 
such surveys tend to understand this highly appreciated democracy rather differently. Ranging 
from 9.25 points in Sweden to 7.52 points in China, the opportunity to elect political leaders in 
open elections is considered more or less equally in all of the aforementioned countries as an 
important element of democracy. Respondents from countries that are considered as mature and 
stable democracies give a relatively higher importance to the assurance of civic rights whereas 
respondents coming from countries which have significant room for growth in terms of achieving 
real democracy are more prone to emphasize the importance of democracy in the area of ensuring 
equal income. They also express willingness to sacrifice one of the fundamental values of liberal 
democracy, i.e. the right to dissent from and criticize those in power. For example, obedience to a 
leader as an important element of democracy is evaluated with 2.42 points in Germany, 3.55 points 
in Sweden and 4.83 in Estonia whereas the average points given for this statement by respondents 
in Russia is 6.53, with 6.59 in Kazakhstan and 6.60 in China. Similarly, when asked to what 
extent the special role of religious leaders in interpreting laws should be considered as important, 
responses differ greatly from one country to another: Swedish respondents give it 2.06 points, 
German respondents – 2.19 points, whereas the situation in Egypt is completely different, i.e. the 
role of religious leaders in democracy is evaluated with 6.19 points (WVS 2014). 
‘Democracy’ is not only one of the most central notions in modern politics, it is also one of the 
most disputed and variously interpreted. One can find a wide variety of answers to the seemingly 
simple question ‘What is democracy?’ in everyday perceptions and academic literature. The various 
approaches to understanding democracy differ in at least three important areas. 
Firstly, it is about opposition between recognition of the existing situation, on the one hand, 
and emphasis on the ideal – the perception of what democracy should be, based on certain moral 
or theoretical principles – on the other. In other words, the relation between the normative and 
empirical components of how one understands democracy. Clearly, no definition of democracy 
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can be completely free from either of these components; however, relations may differ greatly. 
Therefore, those who emphasize that complete democracy has not been precedented in the past, and 
that it can be found nowhere today, and who claim that all democratic systems are incomplete and 
only partial embodiments of the idea of democracy might may be right. Similarly, those who stress 
that sufficiently clear and widely recognized criteria exist for distinguishing democratic political 
systems from non-democratic ones and for measuring how close (or far) they are from the ideal 
democracy may be equally right. 
Secondly, various definitions of democracy can be distinguished by identifying how broad 
a range of matters can be considered to be subject to democratic procedures or, at least, falling 
within the scope of democracy. From this perspective, the minimalist understanding of democracy, 
emphasizing that the fundamentals of democracy are contestation and participation, as per Austrian 
American economist and political scientist Joseph Schumpeter during WWII, represents one 
‘approach’. It guarantees the public an opportunity to select representatives who will adopt the 
most important political decisions by means of competition and electoral choice. Such a definition 
of democracy can be referred to as ‘formal democracy’ because it focuses mainly on the ‘form’ of 
democratic processes, emphasizing the procedural features of democracy (the ‘rules of the game’); 
it stresses the importance of fair and regular elections, a multi-party system, free mass media as 
well as freedom of speech, conscience, association and other fundamental freedoms (Schumpeter 
1976, 270–271). 
Within the scope of this approach, social equality and fair distribution of public benefit are 
honourable public ideals, yet they have little to do with the functioning of democracy. In the modern 
world, broader definitions are becoming increasingly popular. These definitions are based on the 
understanding that strengthening feedback between the bearers of power and the population as 
well as representing the interests of all groups within a society are the cornerstones of democracy. 
Alongside individuals’ participation in selecting political leaders, this understanding also emphasizes 
the necessity to create such a set of circumstances in the society as makes political participation 
possible and full-fledged. This, in turn, provides for the elimination of excessive socio-economic 
inequality because severe inequality is not only anti-democratic, it also jeopardizes socio-economic 
development. Such type of understanding of democracy also provides certain guarantees for 
individuals in terms of their social welfare and educational opportunities. These guarantees in no 
way preclude discussion about the level of social aid necessary in order to provide individuals with 
opportunities for full-fledged participation whilst refraining from making them dependent upon 
public support and thus curtailing their self-initiative. 
Thirdly, definitions of democracy differ according to the role given to ordinary citizens in 
implementing public administration. The intuitive understanding of democracy based on the literal 
translation of the ancient Greek compound word demos + kratos – ‘the power of the people’, ‘people’s 
government’ – is widespread in modern society, especially in the context of  everyday life. This 
‘etymological’ understanding of democracy, based on the literal explanation of the compound word, 
was behind the famous words uttered by U.S. President Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg address 
of 1863 during the American Civil War. He characterized democracy as follows: ‘government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people’ (Lincoln 1863). In other words, democracy is described 
as political power originating from the people, self-government of the people and government in 
the interest of the people. 
Despite the fact that this approach may seem self-evident, the attempt to turn it into a foundation 
for scientific analysis of democracy calls for additional explanations. Firstly, it is necessary to explain 
what the word ‘people’ means. Political scientist Giovanni Sartori discusses several meanings of the 
word ‘people’ (for example, ‘people’ as all members of a society, ‘people’ as the ordinary members 
of the society as opposed to the ‘elite’, etc.), and points out that only the notion of ‘people’ as 
the majority of the society which limits itself through observing the rights of minorities, is the 
relevant one for the modern perception of democracy (Sartori 1987, 21–22). In this sense, democracy 
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conflictingly combines, on the one hand, procedures and mechanisms aimed at the majority in order 
to bring its will to life and, on the other, procedures and mechanisms which ensure the minority’s 
rights to express its opinion and oppose the majority’s arbitrariness. Such a conflicting combination 
cannot exist based only on formal rules. Democracy theorist Chantal Mouffe argues that, in the 
modern pluralistic society, democracy provides for a consensus on the ethical-political principles 
taking the shape of an agreement on the core principles of the relationships between social groups 
and individuals which are, first and foremost, freedom and equality (Mouffe 2000, 103). In other 
words, democracy is not merely a body of rules and procedures; to a no lesser extent, democracy 
is also about the prevailing mood in the society, openness towards the existence of various opinions 
and compromises between demands and viewpoints of different social groups. At the same time, 
the principles mentioned above are frequently interpreted differently; therefore, the ethical-political 
consensus is not free from conflict. 
Furthermore, the notion ‘power’ leaves room for significantly diverse interpretations depending 
on the character of political participation and the framework of democratic governance. Moreover, 
attempts to interpret ‘people’s self-governance’ as the direct engagement of ordinary citizens in 
solving all of the most important matters apparently does not match the opportunities and practices 
of modern complex societies. Thus, one of the key problems of democracy in the context of today’s 
large-scale society is the relationship between the ordinary participants in the political process, on 
one hand, and the political, bureaucratic and intellectual elite, on the other. 
The quality of the elite, its ability to formulate important matters for the society and to offer 
respective solutions is of immense importance in the democratic process. In their book dedicated to 
American politics (published 16 times), U.S. researchers L. Schubert, T. Dye and H. Zeigler write 
the following: ‘Democracy is ‘people’s power’ but the elite is responsible for democracy’s survival. 
Elites must govern wisely so that ‘people’s power’ can exist’ (Schubert et al. 2013, 1). Modern 
democracy is forced to leap between the Scylla of elitism and Charybdis of ochlocracy (mob rule). 
In an era when general voting rights have become an obvious standard and any discussions about 
any type of qualification (property, education, etc.) seem to be inappropriate, the overarching task 
of modern democracy is to avoid a situation when citizens perceive rights as self-evident, when 
civic duty is put on the back burner in people’s minds, and, instead of debating, all citizens rely on 
television which manipulates minds and feelings by means of one-way communication. 
Several of the above-mentioned matters have been discussed in one form or another since the 
times when political theory evolved within ancient philosophy as a critical and rational view of 
politics; yet theoretical problems have been analysed extensively especially since the 19th century 
when democracy transformed from a more or less theoretical idea into part of the political routine in 
the Western countries. However, it is the last quarter of the 20th century in particular that stands out 
in this regard. This can be explained by the dramatic changes witnessed by a great part of the globe 
during this time period. The year 2014 marks the 25th anniversary since the collapse of the communist 
system. The collapse began with transformation processes in Hungary and Poland. In this context, it 
is especially important to mention the beginning of ‘Round Table Talks’ in Warsaw in February 1989 
and the subsequent wave of revolutions in other countries of the so-called ‘socialist camp’.
The restructuring of 1989 had its pre-history in Eastern Europe in the events that took place 
in the Soviet Union within the scope of the glasnost (‘openness’) and perestroika (‘restructuring’) 
policy initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, in the ‘singing revolutions’ in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Not only did the former Eastern European satellites break away from the Soviet Empire as a result, 
but the Soviet Union ceased to exist at the end of 1991 as well. If one observes the events of 1989 
from this perspective, then the period between 1987 and 1991 may certainly be considered as the 
most important time of change in world history after WWII. The consequences of these events 
reached into all areas of people’s lives, including the way they perceived democracy. 
The most important feature of the bipolar world that had existed for 70 years was the contrast 
between the ‘free world’ and the ‘socialist system’. The collapse of this bipolar world became one 
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of the key factors that fuelled a sharp increase of interest in the theoretical matters of democracy 
of the last 25 years of the previous century. A plethora of publications were written covering both 
traditional topics of the theory of democracy and matters that became topical only during the last 
decades – ranging from plurality of identities to democracy in the world wide web context.1
This avalanche-like increase of interest in the topic can be largely explained by the fact that 
the negative example of the ‘real socialism’ served as a strong reason for legitimizing Western 
democracy among citizens of Western countries during the Cold War. Along with the collapse of 
‘real socialism’, Western democracy required new arguments for substantiating itself. Against the 
backdrop of the events that took place in 1989, American democracy theorist Francis Fukuyama 
declared that ‘the end of history’ set in when the communist system collapsed (Fukuyama 1989). 
Fukuyama came up with quite a free interpretation of Hegel’s idea about the ‘goal of history’ 
(Hegel 1914, xxxix) which is the rising of the Spirit above the limited understanding of freedom 
(‘one is free’, ‘some are free’) up to a universal understanding of freedom which manifests itself in 
the idea that everyone is free (Hegel 1914, 58–59). Certainly, Fukuyama, similarly to Hegel, was 
not trying to claim that nothing considerable was going to take place in human lives from now 
on. Hegel argued that it is an accomplishment of modern society that, for the first time in history, 
political conclusions were drawn based on the Christian truth that all people are equal and free by 
nature and that freedom of spirit is the key feature of a human being. Fukuyama’s main idea (and 
hope) was related to unlimited domination of liberal democracy in people’s minds and in political 
practice since its last remaining principal opponent (following the collapse of totalitarianism as a 
result of WWII), i.e. Soviet-style communism, had been sent into oblivion. 
Historically, democracy evolved in its non-liberal form. For example, ancient democracy 
considered equality of citizens and political participation as the highest values, viewing the ‘common 
good’ of the city-state (polis) as the highest manifestation of an individual’s moral perfection. 
However, the idea about citizens’ individual freedom and their inalienable rights was unfamiliar 
in ancient democracy. The brightest example of ancient democracy – Athenian democracy – was 
unsurpassed in terms of the political engagement opportunities the free citizens had. However, it 
provided no political rights for women, slaves or immigrants from other city-states. In other words, 
democracy was the instrument of power in the hands of the privileged minority. In the modern 
world, the dominant concept of democracy (at least in the West) closely links democracy with liberal 
values. Even though various perceptions of democracy (‘models’) exist in contemporary Western 
political theory, its point of departure is and will remain the inalienable rights of individuals as well 
as the totality of institutions which ensure these rights. In this sense, all influential modern models 
of Western democracy may be considered as subspecies of liberal democracy. 
However, 25 years after Fukuyama came up with his prophecy one must acknowledge that it 
has not come true. Positions of liberal democracy nowadays do not seem all that imperturbable. 
Quite on the contrary, the list of threats to liberal democracy, compared to the situation at the end 
of the 20th century, has been significantly extended due to internal and external factors. 
1 Birch, A. H. (1993). The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy. London: Routledge; Christiano, Th. 
(ed.) (2002). Philosophy and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Crouch, C. (2004). Post-democracy. 
Cambridge: Polity Press; Dahl, R. A. (2000). On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press; Gutmann, A., 
Thompson, D. (2002). Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton: Princeton University Press; Halperin, M. H., 
Siegle, J. T., Weinstein, M. M. (2005). The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and 
Peace. New York: Routledge (rev. ed. 20110); Held, D. (ed.) (1993). Prospects for Democracy. North, South, 
East, West. Cambridge: Polity Press; Hoeffe, O. (2002). Demokratie in Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Muenchen: 
C.H. Beck; Keane, J. (2009). The Life and Death of Democracy. London: Simon & Schuster; Nolte, P. (2012). 
Was ist Demokratie? Geschichte und Gegenwart. Muenchen: C. H. Beck; Ringen, S. (2007). What Democracy 
Is For: On Freedom and Moral Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Roemer, J. E. (1993). 
The Idea of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Young, I. (1993). Justice and the Politics 
of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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In its Democracy Index 2008, the Economist Intelligence Unit indicated that a global ebb had 
set in after the optimistic predictions regarding the development of democracy made in the 1990s, 
the spreading of democracy has halted in the world, and the stagnation of democracy has been the 
dominant trend during the recent years (the Economist 2008, 1). Alongside the public discontent 
regarding austerity measures introduced due to the financial and economic crisis, democratic regimes 
are witnessing certain destabilization and political polarization whereas radical political groups are 
becoming increasingly popular in the West. The Freedom House democracy index 2012 pointed 
out that democracy was facing stagnation in the new EU countries (Nations in Transit 2012, 1).
Nowadays it is becoming increasingly apparent that liberal democracy is no longer as attractive 
outside the Western world as it used to be only some 20 years ago. Economic success achieved by 
authoritarian regimes (the most vivid examples are China, Singapore and several other ‘tigers’ of the 
Far East) during recent decades acquires a significant role here. Calls to act in a similar manner are 
voiced even at the EU member state level – the commitment of Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister 
of Hungary, to consider the path taken by China, Singapore, Turkey and Russia as a role model has 
generated quite a wide range of responses. 
The ‘competitive authoritarianism’ regimes, which frequently exploit democracy only as a 
slogan, have become rather common during recent decades. Elections take place but they change 
nothing in terms of the distribution of power. Several television channels are broadcast in the 
country but the government controls all of them and all channels report the same things. Integrated 
opposition exists within the system, however, it does not even attempt to threaten those who hold the 
actual power. In turn, the opposition that exists outside the system is weak and fragmented. Society 
is consolidated in a ‘top-down’ manner, but this does not take place based on democratic values. 
Recent events in the Middle East and North Africa have challenged liberal democracy in yet 
another way. The widespread engagement of the people in the ‘Arab Spring’ events which started 
in Tunisia in December 2010, covering more or less the entire Middle East and North Africa, 
did not turn out to be the triumph of liberal democracy. Quite on the contrary: large masses of 
people engaged in political processes, however, it was not the values of individual freedom, social 
compromise and tolerance that they treasured, it was the belligerent religious fundamentalism that 
motivated them instead. The ‘Arab Spring’ was largely followed by the ‘Islamist Winter’, i.e. large-
scale violence and general instability in the region, economic and demographic decline as well as 
religious wars between Sunnis and Shiites. In such a situation, the assuming of office by the armed 
forces turned out to be the lesser of all evils in several Arab countries. 
Does this mean that liberal democracy is irreversibly losing its influence and appeal in the 
modern world? Paraphrasing the words of Mark Twain, one can say that reports of the death 
of liberal democracy are greatly exaggerated. Without doubt, liberal democracies are the leaders 
in the quality of life in the modern world – they have succeeded in ensuring this for the widest 
range of their citizens’ social groups. Moreover, and more importantly, they boldly assume leading 
positions in terms of scientific progress and, accordingly, in developing and introducing state-of-
the-art technologies. This, in turn, is directly connected to individuals’ level of freedom, level of 
tolerance and critical self-assessment, which, in principle, only liberal democracy can ensure. 
How does one measure and assess democracy?
Attempts to measure and assess the quality of democracy have become some of the most 
important forms of liberal democracy’s self-criticism in the modern world (Diamond, Morlino 
2004, 20). Hardly anyone would disagree that, for example, the UK or Sweden in the 21st century are 
democratic countries whereas Nazi Germany or Franco’s Spain or, say, the ‘real socialism’ countries 
of the 1970s–80s were not democratic. Much greater challenges arise when such a juxtaposition 
is replaced with a task of assessing the level of a democracy’s development, the unsolved issues 
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and improvement opportunities in the modern developed democratic countries or countries that 
are in the process of consolidating their democracy. Therefore, assessments of the various levels 
of democratic development have become quite common during recent decades. These studies 
may be both comparative and directed at assessing a given society. They may also be focused on 
quantitative indicators or concentrated around emphasizing the priority of qualitative assessment of 
the democratization process. Considering the limited length of this Introduction, let us look at only 
a few of the most typical and well-known studies especially emphasizing the studies that focus on 
democratization processes in post-Communist countries, including Latvia. 
The U.S. based NGO Freedom House publishes regular overviews: Nations in Transit, (www.
freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm) which assess the development of 27 post-Communist 
countries. In the Freedom House approach the democracy development level is assessed from the 
following aspects: elections and political parties, the rule of law, development of the civic society, 
the role of the media in the society, composition and the nature of operation of the government 
and public administration system, combatting corruption and the involvement of the general public 
in developing its democracy level. In other words, Freedom House assessments emphasize the 
relevance of political and civic rights, yet they do not include social and economic rights concerns 
despite the fact that the democracy assessments contain such elements as the existence of the free 
market institutions, which is considered to be a precondition of democracy rather than a feature. 
Freedom House overviews rank Latvia among the top countries of all of those included in its studies. 
For example, in the 2014 overview (1 being the highest mark and 7 being the lowest) our country 
scored 2.07 enabling only Slovenia (1.93) and Estonia (1.96) to rank higher, and leaving all the 
other post-Communist countries behind (see Table 1). 
Latvia does not score equally high in overviews based on a broader understanding of democracy. 
For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (http://www.eiu.com/public/), 
has become widely popular during recent years. This index assesses democracy in 167 countries, 
except for microstates. It evaluates the state of democracy according to 60 indicators: election process 
and pluralism, civic freedoms, functioning of the public administration, political participation and 
political culture. Alongside the quantitative assessment of democracy on a scale from 1–10, this 
index also evaluates the performance of countries by their affiliation to one of four types of regimes: 
full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime and authoritarian regime. 
Table 1. Democracy level in the post-Socialism countries and former Soviet Republics from 
2006–2012 according to Freedom House ‘Nations in Transit’ assessment 
(Scale: 1 [highest] to 7 [lowest])
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Estonia 1.96 1.93 1.96 1.93 1.96
Latvia 2.07 2.07 2.18 2.11 2.07
Lithuania 2.21 2.25 2.25 2.29 2.36
Belarus 6.71 6.71 6.50 6.68 6.71
Russia 5.75 5.96 6.14 6.18 6.29
Ukraine 4.21 4.25 4.39 4.82 4.93
Poland 2.14 2.39 2.32 2.14 2.18
Hungary 2.00 2.14 2.39 2.86 2.96
Slovenia 1.75 1.86 1.93 1.89 1.93
Czech Republic 2.25 2.14 2.21 2.18 2.25
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The index was first published in 2006 and it is updated once every two years. The most recent 
update of the index for 2012 – the Democracy at a Standstill study – states that there are 25 full 
democracies (where 11.3 % of the world’s population live), 54 flawed democracies (with 37.2 % of 
the world’s population), 37 countries are hybrid regimes (with 14.4 % of the world’s population), 
and 51 states, according to the assessment of the Economist magazine, are authoritarian regimes 
(37.1 % of the world’s population). The index for 2012 indicates a fall in the democracy level in 
Eastern Europe where 10 out of 28 of the assessed states have witnessed a decline in the previously 
achieved democracy level. The index also pointed to a gradual drop in the quality of democracy in 
all of the Baltic States, compared to 2006. The only fact that has remained the same is that Latvia 
typically receives a lower score for its achievements of democratic processes than Estonia, Lithuania 
and the majority of post-Communist countries (see Table 2). 
Similar trends exist in another democracy assessment that has also become highly popular 
during recent years. This is the Munich University based Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI, 
http://www.bti–project.org/bti–home/). In the mid 1990s, a group of prominent experts developed 
a conceptual framework for assessing development and transition processes, including such factors 
as the initial stage of the transition process, its level of difficulty and the development status of 
individual countries. Altogether 128 countries were selected as the object of assessment; according 
to the authors, these countries were in the transition process from a centralized economy to a 
market economy, and from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. BTI assesses the results 
of political and economic development as well as the management level of these processes. It 
applies three groups of criteria for this purpose in order to assess the implementation of the idea 
of the rule of law, the degree of social responsibility of the economy and the management level of 
transformation processes. The first group of criteria assesses the stability of statehood, the degree 
of political participation, the role of law in social processes, the stability of institutions as well 
as the degree of the society’s political and social integration. The socially responsible economy 
criteria group assesses the development level of a socially responsible economy and economic 
performance, market competition layout and protection of private property rights, currency and price 
stability, scope of individual social rights and the mechanism for protecting them, and, finally, the 
sustainability of social development. In the area of transformation processes, the degree of difficulty 
of transformations, the elite’s ability to determine the way towards development, the efficiency of 
using resources and the elite’s ability to reach public consensus regarding the ways and means 
for development are assessed. Last but not least, this group of criteria also assesses the state’s 
Table 2. Democracy level in separate countries from 2006–2012 according to the Economist 
magazine index (scale: 1–10, including ranking)
2006 2008 2010 2012
Norway 9.55 (4) 9.68 (2) 9.8 (1) 9.93 (1)
Finland 9.25 (6) 9.25 (6) 9.19 (7) 9.06 (9)
Germany 8.82 (13) 8.82 (13) 8.39 (14) 8.34 (14)
Estonia 7.74 (33) 7.68 (37) 7.68 (33) 7.61 (34)
Latvia 7.37 (43) 7.23 (46) 7.05 (48) 7.05 (47)
Lithuania 7.43 (39) 7.36 (42) 7.24 (41) 7.24 (42)
Poland 7.30 (46) 7.30 (45) 7.05 (48) 7.12 (44)
Hungary 7.53 (38) 7.44 (40) 7.21 (4) 6.96 (49)
Ukraine 6.94 (52) 6.94 (53) 6.30 (67) 5.91 (80)
Russia 5.02 (102) 4.48 (107) 4.26 (107) 3.74 (122)
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international cooperation efficiency in terms of solving development-related matters. As a result 
of summarizing these assessments, two indexes – status (S) and management (M) – are shaped 
within BTI. The status index consists of political transformation and socially responsible economics 
criteria. The Baltic States, including Latvia, have ranked at the top of the list ever since this index 
has been published, however, our country typically finds itself in lower positions as opposed to our 
neighbouring countries (see Table 3).
Considering the fact that the various above-mentioned democracy indexes are based on different 
ideas of democracy and employ different assessment methods, attempts to provide more complex 
assessments of the quality of democracy based on combining the assessments acquired from various 
Table 3. Assessment of the transformation processes which took place from 2003–2014; 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (scale: 1–10, including ranking)
2003 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
S M S M S M S M S M S M
Estonia 9.5
(6)
7.9
(1)
9.3
(2)
7.3
(7)
9.42
(3)
7.43
(2)
9.34
(4)
7.33
(3)
9.4
(3)
7.3
(4)
9.4
(7)
7.3
(4)
Latvia 8.7
(12)
6.3
(21)
8.2
(14)
6.8
(16)
8.6
(13)
6.86
(10)
8.51
(13)
6.68
(13)
8.4 
(12)
6.8
(12)
8.4
(12)
6.8
(12)
Lithuania 9.6
(2)
7.7
(2)
9.0
(7)
7.0
(9)
9.16
(6)
6.76
(15)
9.04
(7)
6.91
(10)
9.0
(7)
7.1
(8)
9.0
(7)
7.1
(8)
Hungary 9.7
(1)
6.7
(12)
9.16
(5)
6.81
(15)
9.18
(5)
6.67
(18)
9.00
(8)
6.51
(20)
8.5
(12)
5.5
(48)
8.05
(16)
4.96
(65)
Poland 9.4
(7)
6.6
(14)
8.90
(9)
6.36
(23)
8.76
(11)
5.27
(53)
8.86
(10)
6.52
(19)
9.1
(6)
6.8
(13)
9.16
(5)
7.21
(6)
Ukraine 5.9
(41)
5.1
(39)
6.96
(32)
4.69
(65)
6.93
(35)
5.21
(55)
6.55
(37)
4.92
(66)
6.0
(55)
4.6 
(76)
5.89
(57)
4.25
(87)
Russia 6.0
(41)
5.5
(31)
6.18
(47)
3.84
(87)
5.74
(59)
3.84
(98)
5.70
(65)
3.41
(107)
5.7
(60)
4.0
(99)
5.24
(77)
3.9
(104)
Table 4. Dynamics of the quality of democracy from 2008–2012 from the Global Democracy 
Ranking Project perspective
2008–2009 2011–2012 Rank change 
2008–2012Score Rank Score Rank
Finland 86.0 3 86.7 3 0
UK 80.1 10 79.9 14 -4
Estonia 73.3 22 73.2 22 0
Latvia 69.8 34 69.3 33 +1
Lithuania 71.1 28 71.3 28 0
Poland 70.3 30 71.1 30 0
Moldova 54.4 57 57.8 52 +5
Russia 45.0 90 45.8 95 -5
Ukraine 57.3 53 54.5 63 -10
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indexes have evolved during the recent years. One of the most characteristic examples of this 
approach is the Global Democracy Ranking Project implemented by the University of Klagenfurt 
(http://democracyranking.org/). The index developed within the framework of this project combines 
evaluation of the state of freedom carried out by the Freedom House with the UN Human Development 
Index. The Global Democracy Ranking assesses six dimensions of human life from the democracy 
point of view, focusing on politics (50 % of the assessment) and simultaneously including five other 
areas of human life on a similar basis: equality, economic life, access to knowledge, health and 
environment protection. Each of these dimensions constitutes 10 % of the total assessment. The total 
assessment ranges in a scale from 1–100, where 100 is the highest number of points possible. The 
Global Democracy Ranking Project especially focuses on the changes in the quality of democracy 
within a period of one year. The Democracy Improvement Ranking is therefore an integral part of 
the Project for it ranks countries according to how quickly the quality of its democracy changes, 
for better or worse. Dynamics of the quality of democracy in Latvia and several other European 
countries from the Global Democracy Ranking Project perspective are given in Table 4.
The present Audit of Democracy (AoD) of Latvia offered to the reader is based on another 
methodology as opposed to indexes designed for measuring the quality of democracy mentioned 
above which are global (or include a very large number of countries) and quantitative. This AoD was 
developed applying International IDEA methodology that is used for assessing democratic processes 
in separate countries by means of employing qualitative assessment methods. This methodology was 
developed at the beginning of the 21st century as a result of British researchers’ – David Beetham 
and Stuart Weir – cooperation with the Centre for Democratisation Studies of the University of 
Leeds and the Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex. It was pioneered for a democratic 
audit in the UK. The UK’s Audit of Democracy has gradually evolved from a one-off publication 
to a network of mutually linked structures which continuously engages a wide range of experts and 
representatives of the society in the assessment of the state of democracy. DA methodology attracted 
international attention from the sart, and it became the basis of the assessments of democracy 
performed and supported by the Stockholm-based intergovernmental organization the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), established in 1995. 
IDEA methodology has been applied for assessing the state of democracy in 25 countries since 
the mid-1990s. It has been used for evaluating the situation in countries which differ greatly in terms 
of historical traditions, cultural heritage, size and socio-economic development, such as Italy and 
Kenya, Peru and Bangladesh, Mongolia and New Zealand, El Salvador and India, etc.
IDEA methodology is based on four key premises:
• democracy is a continuous and endless process. Societies with long-standing democratic 
traditions and societies that have set out on the democratic development path recently have 
common orientation and values, and they face similar challenges. These challenges may be 
relevant in one country and more acute in others;
• a common idea of democracy exists and the level of its implementation can be determined 
according to several criteria that are relevant regardless of the level of a society’s 
development and specific features of cultural traditions;
• local residents and experts are the ones who can judge the state of democracy in their 
country for they know and understand best its culture, traditions and thinking. The key 
aim of performing a democratic audit is to stimulate discussion amongst the public on 
democracy matters and thus facilitate democratization processes;
• in contrast to the methodologies mentioned above, this approach does not compare various 
societies and countries on the basis of some quantitative indicators. Instead, its aim is provide 
an ‘insider’s’ assessment of democratic processes emphasizing quantitative evaluation, 
revealing both achievements and shortcomings in the society’s democratic processes, as 
well as outlining the areas in which these processes are not taking place at a sufficient pace. 
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Criteria in this evaluation are of essential importance when making quality-oriented assessments. 
DA combines ‘internal’ and ‘external’ criteria. ‘Internal’ criteria in this case means the ‘frame of 
references’ which has been shaped within a society; it consists of a comparison with the situation that 
existed in the previous years, residents’ hopes and expectations in relation to public institutions and 
procedures, as well as the goals for improving administration processes determined by authorities. 
‘External’ criteria means the comparison with other countries where successful and internationally 
recognized policy is exercised in respective areas yielding convincing results, as well as criteria 
formulated in the documents of international organizations. The aim of the assessment is to both 
provide a ‘snapshot’ of the state of democracy and outline development trends. 
AoD should not be considered as a purely academic activity since the key aim of the audit is to 
provide the general public and the people professionally engaged in politics with an insight into the 
challenges the particular society is facing in terms of its democracy’s development, leaving the study 
of causes and effects to in-depth scientific research. Therefore, at the end of each chapter, experts 
evaluate all of the discussed matters in a scale from 1–5 (from ‘very poor’ to ‘very good’), and 
give their summary on the set of the addressed issues, formulating their opinion about the greatest 
achievements and most serious problems as well as offering recommendations for improving the 
situation in the particular area.
The AoD ‘How Democratic is Latvia’ published a decade ago was the first systemic assessment 
of democracy to be performed in any of the post-Communist or post-Soviet countries during the 
period from the late 1980s to the fundamental transformations which took place in the early 1990s. 
Financially aided by the newly established Strategic Analysis Committee, an expert group formed 
back then under the auspices of the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI)  of 
the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Latvia engaging well-known political scientists, 
human rights and media professionals, lawyers, economists and sociologists. A sociological survey 
was organized by prof. B. Zepa and carried out by the Baltic Institute of Social Studies within the 
scope of the audit. This survey served as an important source of information and support for the 
experts’ needs. For the first time in our country’s history, a systemic and analytic overview of the 
state of Latvia’s democracy was performed within the scope of this AoD. Its aim was to establish 
and formulate democratic trends, provide a comparatively extensive description of the situation and 
to outline practical recommendations for improving the situation. Symbolically, this ‘inventory’ of 
democracy was launched during the year that was of crucial importance for our country: in 2004, 
Latvia became a fully-fledged member state of NATO and the European Union. The AoD results 
were published in a separate book in Latvian (Rozenvalds 2005a) in the spring of 2005 and several 
months later it was also published in English (Rozenvalds 2005b).
The Latvian DA carried out by Latvian researchers acquired recognition both in Latvia and 
abroad. Parliamentary groups of the eighth Parliament – the Saeima – of the Republic of Latvia 
were presented with the results of the audit; the conclusions made in the AoD received extensive 
comments in the Latvian media. Likewise, the copies of the published book did not stay on bookstore 
shelves for long. Results of the audit are widely used by Latvian social scientists locally and abroad 
and pupils as well as students in various fields take interest in them. The audit serves as an important 
source of unbiased information about Latvia in our country’s diplomatic missions abroad and as 
substantial reference material for foreign researchers and diplomats accredited in Latvia.
Two years after publishing the unabridged and voluminous Latvian AoD, a significantly smaller 
democracy monitoring was carried out and published in Latvian (Rozenvalds 2007a and English 
(Rozenvalds 2007b). The aim of this less extensive monitoring was to study the course of democracy 
processes in a shorter period, establish the areas in which the level of the society’s democratization 
has increased, remained the same or deteriorated during the two years after publishing the AoD.
AoD methodology is continuously being developed along with the acquisition of experience in 
performing assessments. An international seminar took place in Stockholm in March 2007 and the 
author of this preface participated. The seminar encompassed discussion on the experience of several 
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of the countries which had carried out the assessment and the summarizing of recommendations for 
improving methodology. As a result, David Beetham, Edzia Carvalho, Todd Landman, and Stuart 
Weir prepared a new version of the assessment methodology published by International IDEA in 
2008 (Beetham 2008). The new version of methodology maintained the guidelines set forth in 
the previous version, simultaneously replacing some chapters, and increasing the total number of 
chapters. 
The new AoD methodology includes 75 questions on various areas of social life, and we have 
developed the Audit of Democracy of Latvia 2014 based on this methodology. Two fundamental 
principles shape the understanding of democracy applied in this assessment: people’s control over 
socially significant decisions and political equality, i.e. individuals’ opportunities to exercise their 
civic rights do not depend on their level of welfare, affiliation to one social group or another, sex or 
ethnic or religious background. In today’s society, these principles are implemented through several 
mediated values (participation, authorizing elected representatives to act on behalf of individuals, 
representation, officials’ accountability, openness, responsiveness of public authorities as well as 
solidarity between individuals and social groups). Corresponding procedures and institutions exist 
in democratic societies for implementing these values. In accordance with such an understanding 
of democracy, IDEA methodology provides for the assessment of the level of democracy in four 
interlinked blocks. 
The first block ‘Citizenship, law and rights’ includes matters related to the political nation and 
citizenship (Chapter 1), rule of law (Chapter 2), civic and political rights (Chapter 3), and economic 
and social rights (Chapter 4). 
The second block ‘Representative and Responsible Governance’ is dedicated to free and fair 
elections (Chapter 5), the role of political parties in democracy (Chapter 6), efficient and responsible 
governance (Chapter 7), democratic efficiency of the parliament (Chapter 8), civic control over the 
armed forces and police (Chapter 9) and integrity (honesty) in social life (Chapter 10). 
The third block of the audit ‘Civic Society and People’s Participation’ addresses matters related to 
the role of media in the society (Chapter 11), political participation (Chapter 12) and decentralization 
of public administration (Chapter 13). 
AoD methodology is suitable for assessing the state of democracy in various countries with 
different histories, cultural traditions and different socio-economic development levels. However, 
its global applicability also presents threats: it is possible that certain matters important for a 
particular society are not reflected in this generalized approach. Such ‘blind spots’ were established 
during the course of our previous assessment and in later democracy studies. Therefore, the AoD 
of 2014 is supplemented with a Sub-Chapter on the totality of individuals’ values, attitudes and 
convictions which shape the basis for the functioning of a political system and which are referred to 
as ‘political culture’ in literature (Chapter 14). Democracy is not only about democratic institutions 
and procedures. Democracy cannot function efficiently if it is not rooted in citizens’ conviction. In 
other words, democracy is not viable without democrats, without people who are convinced that they 
are capable of influencing political processes in the society, who are willing to respect the rights 
of other individuals and who are ready for reasonable compromises. The relationship between the 
two large ethno-linguistic groups in Latvia, i.e. the groups which are mainly distinguished by the 
language used in everyday life (Latvian or Russian), goes beyond the question of the relationship 
between the majority of the society and the ethno-cultural, religious and other minorities traditional 
to democratic theory. Therefore, the Sub-Chapter dedicated to political culture focuses especially 
on how the reciprocal perception and attitudes of both these groups influence democratic processes 
in the Latvian state and society. 
Considering the continuously increasing impact of international factors on democratic 
development, assessment of the democracy’s international dimensions is an integral part of the 
AoD. It includes matters related to the influence of external factors on state policy and state support 
for democratic development abroad (Chapter 15).
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS LATVIA?16
A public opinion poll based on evaluation questions (carried out by public opinion research 
centre SKDS) was conducted within the scope of the project from March–April 2014 as a supplement 
to the expert assessment. 
Funded by the National Research Program ‘National Identity’, an expert group was formed 
under the auspices of the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI)   of the Faculty 
of Social Sciences (SZF) of the University of Latvia for preparing chapters of AoD 2014. In addition 
to researchers from the SZF, this group also included experts from the Latvian Centre for Human 
Rights, Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS, Faculty of Economics and Management of the 
University of Latvia, and Vidzeme University of Applied Sciences. 
Democracy in Latvia: a ten years balance sheet
AoD of 2014 assesses democracy in Latvia over the ten-year period spent as a member state of 
NATO and the EU. Today it is obvious that both international organizations played a decisive role 
in the democratization of Latvia’s society; this was most explicit when Latvia was still a candidate 
state and diligently working on implementing Western partners’ recommendations for improving 
democratic institutions and procedures. Today one can assert that one of the conclusions drawn in 
the first AoD of Latvia has been fully confirmed, i.e. that joining NATO and the EU has significantly 
decreased the influence of negative external factors on the domestic political processes taking place 
in Latvia. After joining the EU and NATO in 2004, the pace of democratization in Latvia has become 
significantly slower (the same also holds true for the other participants of the ‘big bang expansion’) 
for several reasons.
Firstly, the principal work in terms of laying the foundations of democratic procedures and 
establishing democratic institutions had to be completed before the ‘ribbon-cutting’ in 2004; Latvia 
succeeded in completing it. 
Secondly, democratization requirements of the EU and NATO – such as the commonly known 
‘Copenhagen criteria’2 – are related to the procedural and institutional aspects of democracy. Latvia 
and other new member states of the EU and NATO still have a lot to do to transform their societies’ 
attitudes and value-orientation in order to adhere to Western standards. This process, in turn, is 
much slower and complicated.
Thirdly, joining of ‘the club’ inevitably changed the attitude of the political elite and of a large 
part of the society in Latvia towards suggestions from the outside and also reduced their openness 
to recommendations coming from Western partners. 
According to expert assessments, during recent years Latvia has made progress towards 
democratization in several domains. Continuous progress is being made in terms of achieving greater 
openness on the part of the legislator, government and public authorities towards the society, which 
was emphasized ten years ago, thoroughly regulating the society’s opportunities to participate in 
public administration and ensuring people’s rights to receive information from public authorities. 
Courts in Latvia are independent from interference in administration of justice, and the lengthiness 
of court proceedings has ceased to be the uncontested weak spot of the entire judicial system. Slowly 
but surely, the society’s trust in courts is increasing. The population in Latvia does not encounter 
unreasonable restrictions in terms of freedom of assembly and expressing their opinions. This is 
strengthened by the positive judicial practice in these matters. 
The state of Latvia has made significant progress in the field of aligning its legislation with the 
European standards in various areas of life: notable achievements have been made in improving the 
2 In 1993, the EU Summit in Copenhagen formulated the criteria that all the countries which wish to join the 
EU must meet. These rules, inter alia, provide for respecting stable democratic institutions, the rule of law, 
and human and minority rights. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press–release_DOC–93–3_en.htm?locale=en
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regulatory framework related to pre-election campaigns and political party funding; anti-corruption 
legislation has been designed in accordance with international standards. In general, Latvia has 
strong municipalities which enjoy a comparatively high level of trust from the society, and a wide, 
active and dynamic spectrum of NGOs. During recent years, important steps have been made 
towards strengthening civic ties with those residents of Latvia who were born in non-citizen families 
as well as towards permitting the acquisition of dual citizenship for those who have chosen to leave 
for Western countries in order to seek a better life. 
Experts engaged in the assessment also identified a range of problems and shortcomings in the 
course of democratic processes. As already mentioned, Latvia has made significant investments 
during the recent years in strengthening the formal and institutional framework of its democracy as 
well as in strengthening the judicial system and the rule of law. However, there is still much room 
for growth. Certain shortcomings existing in the legislation enable political parties to circumvent 
the restrictions of activity set forth in laws using other organizations for purely political purposes. 
Unlawful aiding of political parties from abroad has not been eliminated. Police brutality against 
detainees and non-compliant conditions in outdated penal institutions are still current issues. Latvia 
still has not established an independent state authority for monitoring enforcement institutions 
and eliminating potential human rights violations within these institutions. The inability to litigate 
complicated criminal actions on corruption within a reasonable timeframe undermines the prestige 
of enforcement institutions. An excessively large regulatory framework on the autonomous 
competencies of municipalities exists, and it is constantly increasing. In general, assessments of 
the effects of policies and programming documents are carried out formally and insufficiently. As 
a result, policy shapers and the society do not have access to comprehensive information about 
the successes and failures the implemented policies have faced. Finally, disparities evolve in the 
relationships between the major Latvian state institutions. They take the shape of the Parliament’s 
increasing dependence on the executive power which, as a result, decreases the legislator’s 
autonomy.
During the ten years of being a member state of the EU and NATO, Latvia has still not made the 
expected progress in solving at least three fundamentally important issues for the society in Latvia.
Firstly, the disproportionately large socio-economic inequality, which  has increased dramatically 
after the re-instatement of independence and resulted in only a small part of the society being able to 
fully enjoy the achievements of the Latvian society’s modernization process. The state lacks strategic 
approach to solving social issues. Political decision making in terms of determining social benefits, 
minimum pensions and wages takes place in a situational and voluntary manner, instead of being 
based on methodologically grounded criteria. State funding in the field of public health protection 
is inadequate. Uncertainty about the funding mechanism in the healthcare system has persisted for 
a catastrophic length of time amongst both population and healthcare professionals. 
Secondly, alienation between the holders of power and the general public still exists. Estrangement 
from democratic institutions is increasing in a significant part of the society. Participation in 
elections has decreased notably. This, in turn, gives rise to the question of the level of legitimacy 
of the political regime existing in Latvia. The effects of the recently completed administrative 
territory reforms which resulted in a significant decrease of the number of municipalities whilst 
simultaneously increasing their size, cannot be evaluated unequivocally from a democratic point of 
view. Polls suggest that the number of residents in Latvia who think they can influence the decisions 
adopted by municipalities has notably decreased during recent years. Relying on the influence of a 
strong leader generally dominates in the society, and, in relation to self-assessment in terms of the 
effectiveness of public participation, this manifests itself in the perception that democracy is exercised 
as an asymmetric communication process in which the public has vast opportunities to express its 
opinion, yet where no feedback follows from the political elite. Therefore, faith in one’s abilities 
decreases and the residents’ desire and willingness to participate in politics reduces accordingly. 
Only one tenth of the respondents who participated in the poll necessary for the assessment admitted 
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that, apart from voting in elections and referendums, they also engage in other attempts to influence 
political decisions. 
Thirdly, the state has not succeeded in settling relations between the major ethno-linguistic 
groups in Latvia during the last ten years. The number of permanent residents who possess neither 
the Latvian nor another country’s citizenship is disproportionately high in Latvia. Furthermore, 
the vast majority of these residents belong to the Russian-speaking ethno-linguistic group. Little 
has been done during the recent years to facilitate constructive political participation among the 
representatives of this group (for example, through participation in municipal elections, rights to 
collective applications, etc.). The state’s insufficient attention to providing a flow of information 
aimed at the Russian-speaking residents of Latvia, in combination with the increase of the influence 
of private and state-controlled Russian media in the Latvian information space, deepens the formerly 
identified co-existence of two information spaces in Latvia. According to the results of the poll 
conducted for the purpose of the assessment, 77.8 % of the respondents who speak Latvian at 
home watch either only Latvian television channels or they watch Latvian television channels more 
frequently than Russian ones. Conversely, such a practice is characteristic of only 8.7 % of the 
Russian-speaking respondents. The poll suggests that 84.1 % of the Russian-speaking respondents 
watch only Russian television channels or they watch Russian television channels more frequently 
than Latvian ones. The proportion of Latvian-speaking respondents with such television watching 
habits is 15.2 % (DA 2014). Results of the poll also give grounds to claim that the society’s mood 
in terms of mutual relations between the ethno-linguistic communities is more moderate and aimed 
towards compromise than the mood existing in the political elite. Use of the breakdown of the political 
spectrum according to ethnic features in order to achieve political goals has become regular practice 
in the political elite. This, in turn, raises the question of the political elite’s accountability before the 
public regarding such an ethno-political arrangement in Latvia which would ensure preservation and 
development of the Latvian culture, simultaneously facilitating civic peace. Considering the recent 
events in and around Ukraine, implementation of such a task becomes a substantial condition in 
the context of Latvia’s security. 
To conclude this brief insight into the conclusions made by the experts of Latvia’s Audit of 
Democracy 2014, one must point out two other sets of issues that are essential for successful 
development of modern democracy. 
Firstly, it is the media which are sometimes referred to as ‘the fourth estate’: they play an 
important role in controlling the holders of power and keeping up a democratic discourse in the 
public. The authors of the audit point out that a broad range of opinions exists in the media system 
in Latvia. Meanwhile, several trends raise concerns. Information retrieved on the internet and 
especially twitter and social media, frequently lacks the depth of analysis and reliability of sources. 
Clashes between radically opposite opinions do not leave room for a rational dialogue based on 
arguments and deliberative discussions. Hate speech and informative noise reduce the opportunities 
to discuss and analyse issues and opposite opinions rationally. Simultaneously, existing changes in 
the structure of the media owners in Latvia and the decrease in the number of periodicals reduce 
the pluralism of opinions in mass media. It is difficult to cover the costs of creating high quality 
content and investigative journalism in the small market conditions that exist in Latvia, therefore 
active audiences do not have sufficient access to this type of content. Conversely, lack of high 
quality, socially active, political information may negatively influence the formation of ‘enlightened 
understanding’ (expression used by democracy theorist Robert Dahl who died this year at the age 
of 98) among voters, politicians and administrative bodies (Dahl, 1989, 111–112).
The next group of issues is the international dimension of democracy where the interlinked 
aspect of democracy assessments manifests itself in terms of how external policy decisions are 
accepted by the public, how important solidarity values are for the society and how willing it is 
to invest means and effort in supporting democracy in other countries. During the past ten years, 
substantial progress has been made in decreasing the gap between external policy makers and the 
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public and in reducing the external policy’s isolation from other areas of life (economy, culture, 
social sphere). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia exercises public diplomacy 
and uses social media to inform the public about current foreign policy matters to a significantly 
greater extent than previously. Along with establishing the tradition of foreign policy debates, public 
discussions about foreign policy matters have become more regular thus informing the public and 
contributing to strengthening uniformity of the foreign policy. At the same time, it must be pointed 
out that although supporting democracy in other countries has become an important priority of the 
Latvian foreign policy during the last ten years, practical support has not always been sufficient 
and the bilateral development aid provided by Latvia substantially falls behind the performance of 
Estonia and Lithuania in this regard. The importance of supporting democracy in non-democratic 
countries where Latvian entrepreneurs have businesses is still under-valued. Acceptance of the 
authoritarian regimes’ ‘rules of the game’ may result in a rebound in the long-run which may be 
harmful for both the entrepreneurs’ interests and the image of Latvia as a democratic country.
The authors of the second Audit of Democracy of Latvia hereby deliver their study to the 
readers. Although this book has turned out to be voluminous, the experts are aware that it was 
impossible to include all nuances of the society’s democratization process in Latvia. Moreover, at 
the end of the day, it is not necessary. We will consider our task accomplished if the chapters of the 
audit and the appended sociological survey materials encourage discussions, deepen awareness and 
facilitate synergies between citizens in order to promote democratization of the society in Latvia.
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CITIZENSHIP, 
LAW AND RIGHTS

1. NATIONHOOD AND CITIZENSHIP
Sigita Zankovska-Odiņa, Boriss Kolčanovs
Is there public agreement on a common citizenship without discrimination?
1.1. How inclusive is the political nation and state citizenship of all who live 
within the territory?
In Latvia, the Citizenship Law of 1994 sets forth the scope of citizens and the procedure for 
acquiring citizenship (through registration, naturalization or on special merit). The Law had not 
been amended since 1998 when, as a result of a referendum, amendments were introduced bringing 
an end to ‘naturalization windows’ and establishing the right of non-citizens’ children born after 
21 August 1991 to be registered as citizens (LR Saeima (Saeima of the Republic of Latvia) 1998). 
Therefore, the amendments to the Citizenship Law adopted on 9 May 2013 are considered to be the 
most extensive ones in the history of this Law and, considering the development trends in Europe, 
they substantially expanded the scope of applicability regarding dual citizenship, and facilitated the 
registration procedure of non-citizens’ children.
The Law on the Status of Former USSR Citizens Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other 
State establishes a special non-citizen status for the persons whose place of residence before 1 July 
1992 was the territory of Latvia; the Law applied the same status to the children of these persons if 
they did not have any other citizenship (LR Saeima 1995). On 1 January 2014, the number of non-
citizens was 282 876, i.e. 13.0 % of all of the population of Latvia (LR PMLP (Office of Citizenship 
and Migration Affairs of the Republic of Latvia) 2014a).
The Immigration Law defines the status of the persons who are not citizens of Latvia or who 
are non-citizens of Latvia and who have the right to permanent residence in Latvia. This law 
lays down principal procedural provisions for foreigners’ entry and residence. Passed on 22 April 
2010, amendments to the Immigration Law introduced the following regulations: citizens of third 
countries are eligible for temporary residence permits of up to five years if they invest a certain 
amount of funds (in business ventures, real estate or credit institutions). These amendments caused 
considerable discussion among political actors. Altogether 72 581 foreigners were registered in 
Latvia as of 1 January 2014; 48,724 of them possessed permanent residence permits and another 
23 857 had been granted temporary residence permits, including 7 367 persons who had used the 
opportunity to acquire temporary residence permits through making investments (LR PMLP 2014b). 
However, the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (PMLP) points out that only 10–15 % of 
all investors stay in Latvia as permanent residents (Luksa 2014).
The rights of persons to claim asylum, acquire refugee status or alternative status, or receive 
temporary protection in the Republic of Latvia are set forth in the Asylum Law (LR Saeima 2009a). 
In turn, the Law on Stateless Persons defines the legal status of stateless individuals and lays 
down their rights and obligations (LR Saeima 2004). Of the 935 persons who had applied for 
asylum in Latvia during the reporting period (i.e., 2005–2014), 54 individuals were granted refugee 
status and 95 individuals were granted alternative status (LR PMLP 2014c). As of 1 January 2014, 
176 individuals had been granted the stateless person’s status in Latvia (LR PMLP 2014a). 
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Amendments to the Citizenship Law
A working group from the Ministry of Justice (2005) and the political party TB/LNNK (in 
2006) drafted proposals for the amendments to the Citizenship Law stipulating that citizenship 
would be granted only on individual basis and through individual parliamentary decisions. These 
amendments also specified that non-citizens’ children would be registered as citizens only if they 
acquired education in the Latvian language. Still, the amendments to the Citizenship Law developed 
by the Ministry of Justice, stating that one of the criteria for assessing the persons who wish to 
acquire citizenship through naturalization must be loyalty towards the state, generated the most 
heated debates among lawyers, experts as well as minority population and Russian-speaking media. 
Similarly, these amendments prescribed that the government be the institution to decide upon 
the rejection of citizenship applications and that this decision would be considered as a political 
resolution, therefore not eligible for appeal in court. If such amendments were adopted, they would 
contradict the European Convention on Nationality adopted by the Council of Europe. According 
to the Convention, decisions on the rejection of citizenship must be substantiated in writing and 
appealable (EP 1997) thus reducing the role of subjective factors in terms of the executive power’s 
institutions’ influence on the content of decisions. None of the previously mentioned amendments 
was adopted. Importantly, the amendments were drafted when, in 2004, for the first time in the 
history of naturalization, citizenship was refused to Yuri Petropavlovsky, leader of the Russian 
School Defence Staff (political party ‘For Human Rights in United Latvia’). The rejection was 
substantiated with the fact that ‘Petropavlovsky’s conduct does not comply with the oath of loyalty 
towards Latvia’ (LETA 2004). Being unable to achieve revocation of the decision in Latvian courts 
(LR AT 2006), Petropavlovsky filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights which 
has not yet ruled on the case (ECHR 2008).
Along with mass emigration of the population and demographic changes in Latvia, the matter 
of maintaining and increasing the number of citizens became increasingly relevant. Considering that 
the Latvian Citizenship Law was based on the principle of prohibiting dual citizenship (LR Saeima 
1994), the existing Law was incapable of ensuring maintenance of an efficient legal link between 
Latvia and emigrant citizens and their offspring who had been born abroad and acquired citizenship 
of another country (Krūma 2006). Several legal experts have stated that, in this regard, the Latvian 
Citizenship Law corresponded neither to the socio-economic reality nor to the developments of 
the regulatory framework in citizenship matters in Europe where the number of jurisdictions that 
provide for automatic loss of citizenship in the event of voluntarily acquiring citizenship in another 
country shows a steadily decreasing trend. Such a trend is especially clear in the countries that have 
witnessed mass emigration (Litvins, Pleps 2012). Similarly, in its judgement of 13 May 2010, the 
Constitutional Court expressed a positive stance towards admissibility of dual citizenship. However, 
it also pointed out that ‘the issue of dual citizenship is essentially political and it is not an issue 
whose resolution can be based on legal considerations’ (ST 2010).
Another issue that remained topical was the necessity to review the provisions which regulated 
the recognition of non-citizens’ children born after 21 August 1991 as citizens. Organizations such 
as the Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
have also pointed out to Latvia that tackling the issue of children who are non-citizens should be 
a priority. Automatic granting of citizenship to the children of stateless persons and non-citizens 
would comply with the requirements set forth in both the UN Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; the latter specifies that children 
are entitled to acquire citizenship from the moment they are born (UNHCR 2012). Even though 
the UN Human Rights Committee has confirmed that the state does not have the responsibility to 
grant citizenship to every child born in its territory, countries are nevertheless obliged to employ 
any reasonable measures – internally or in cooperation with other countries – to ensure that children 
have citizenship after their birth (UNHRC 1989). Thus, children constitute a special group that is 
eligible to a more favourable treatment in terms of acquiring citizenship (NEP 2012, 8).
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In 2011, in order to address both of these matters, Valdis Zatlers, the then president of Latvia, 
as well as two of the parliamentary parties (National Alliance ‘All for Latvia!’ – ‘For Fatherland 
and Freedom/LNNK’ (Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai’ – ‘Tēvzemei un Brīvībai’/LNNK’) and the 
Unity Party (Vienotība)), submitted amendments to the Citizenship Law to the Saeima (the Latvian 
Parliament). Unlike the parties’ proposals which only provided for extending the list of cases when 
the state of Latvia permits its citizens to have dual citizenship, the amendments proposed by the 
president also included automatic granting of citizenship to the children of stateless persons and 
non-citizens born after 21 August 1991. The latter would thus replace the obligation to submit 
an application for citizenship with the right to give up another citizenship in accordance with the 
procedure established by the Cabinet of Ministers (LR Valsts prezidenta kanceleja 2011).
After two years of work, the amendments to the Citizenship Law ware adopted by the Saeima 
on 9 May 2013 (LR Saeima 2013). The Law was supplemented with Article 1 laying down the aim 
of the Law that had previously not been defined before. Along with the adoption of amendments, 
the Citizenship Law became the first and, so far, the only Law which enshrines the concept of 
an indigenous majority population. Until then, the concept of the indigenous majority population 
was included in the Guidelines for National Identity, Civil society and Integration for 2012–2018 
(Guidelines) adopted on 20 October 2011. In accordance with the Guidelines, the indigenous majority 
population is the ‘nation which has established its nation-state and determines its national cultural 
identity. Latvians are the indigenous majority population of Latvia’ (Guidelines 2011). Furthermore, 
the Guidelines state that the Latvian indigenous majority population form the Latvian nation together 
with minorities, and the Latvian identity – i.e. the Latvian language, culture and social memory – 
unify the entire Latvian nation (more information on Guidelines is provided in Section 1.2 How far 
are cultural differences acknowledged, and how well are the minorities protected?).
In the context of dual citizenship, these amendments allow for Latvian citizenship to be 
maintained for the citizens who acquire citizenship of a member state of the European Union 
(EU), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), NATO, or of Australia, New Zealand or Brazil. 
Similarly, those citizens who acquire citizenship of a country with whom Latvia has concluded 
an agreement on the recognition of dual citizenship are eligible for dual citizenship. Despite the 
Harmony Centre Party (Saskaņas Centrs) proposing, during the review of the amendments, to 
replace EFTA with the Council of Europe, thus also including Russia, Ukraine and Georgia in the 
list of recognized countries, other parliamentary groups did not support this proposal (LETA 2012a). 
The persons who acquire citizenship of countries not mentioned previously would also be able to 
preserve Latvian citizenship if they receive a permission of the Cabinet of Ministers to maintain 
their citizenship in relation to substantial interests of the state. Likewise, the amendments detail 
that ethnic Latvians and Livs would also be recognized as citizens of Latvia if they can prove the 
following: 1) their ancestor permanently lived in the territory of Latvia in 1881 or later; 2) their 
Latvian language skills; 3) their affiliation to the indigenous majority population or autochthons 
population. Latvia’s exiles and their offsprings can also register as citizens of Latvia.
As a result of the introduced amendments, non-citizens’ children are not granted citizenship 
automatically. However, recognizing a child as a citizen of Latvia takes place simultaneously with 
the registration of the child’s birth on the basis of the will expressed by one of the parents. This 
condition strengthened the procedure established in the Cabinet Regulations adopted on 5 July 
2011; these Regulations stated that applications for the recognition of a child as a citizen of Latvia 
may henceforth be submitted with the territorial division of the Office of Citizenship and Migration 
Affairs (PMLP) as well as at the registry office when registering a child’s birth (LR MK 2011a). If a 
child is not registered as a citizen on the basis of the will of one of the parents at the same time as 
its birth is registered, then it is still possible to register the child as a citizen up to its 15th birthday. 
This was the means of minimizing one of the major obstacles which had previously restricted 
children’s opportunities to acquire Latvian citizenship where both parents are identified on the birth 
certificate but at least one of the following conditions exists regarding one of the parents: he/she 
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refuses to sign the application, is abroad or his/her place of residence is unknown. Conversely, after 
reaching the age of 15, children can apply by themselves to be recognized as citizens of Latvia.
Although the Reform Party (Reformu partija) and the Harmony Centre party initially attempted 
to achieve automatic granting of citizenship to non-citizens’ children, the remaining three parties 
represented at the Saeima did not support this initiative. At the same time, the Saeima put an end to 
the requirement for non-citizens to ‘confirm that they will commit to helping their children acquire 
the Latvian language as the official language and instil in them respect and loyalty towards Latvia’ 
which had been approved in the second reading. The Saeima Legal Affairs Committee abrogated 
this requirement after receiving a request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs with respect to the 
letter received from Knut Vollebaek, High Commissioner on National Minorities (LETA 2012c). 
The Minister pointed out that ‘the parents of these children face legally unverifiable requirements 
which no other group of citizenship applicants or citizens have to face’ (TVNET 2012). 
While the new amendments substantially ease registration of children, they do not lay down 
other measures for reducing the still substantial number of non-citizen children in the state. As of 
1 January 2014, 9,000 non-citizen children under 18 years of age, i.e. 0.4 % of the population, 
were registered in Latvia. Conversely, the total number of non-citizen children born after 21 August 
1991 was 12 600 as of 1 January 2014 (PMLP 2014). Although the data of the Naturalization 
Board suggests that the number of citizens among the non-citizens’ new-born children has increased 
significantly following the introduction of the amendments (for example, during the first two months 
of 2014, 88 % of non-citizens’ new-born children were registered citizens of Latvia [PMLP 2014]), 
the state should think about ways to facilitate the acquisition of citizenship for the more than 
7000 children who are currently younger than 15 and who may be registered as Latvian citizens, 
provided that they permanently live in Latvia and that their parents wish to apply for it.
The amendments also clarify the procedure for revocation and renewal of Latvian citizenship, 
refusal of citizenship and naturalization. Likewise, the amendments lay down new naturalization 
restrictions and set forth broader governmental powers in relation to decisions that result in a refusal 
to grant citizenship. For example, it is stated that admission to Latvian citizenship is refused to 
persons if they have failed to settle their tax payments or other payment liabilities towards the state 
of Latvia, or if they are linked to money laundering. Conversely, the Cabinet of Ministers may 
refuse to grant citizenship to a person who ‘by his or her behaviour or actions causes threats to the 
security of the State of Latvia and the public order, democratic constitutional order of the State, 
independence and territorial immunity of the state.  The Cabinet decision shall not be subject to 
appeal’ (LR Saeima 1994, Section 17, Paragraph 6). Thus, decisions on refusing citizenship, adopted 
by courts in accordance with the previous legislation, are now adopted by the government, and they 
cannot be appealed. The Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe expressed criticism towards 
such an approach (EP 2013, 15). In its recitals concerning the amendments to the Citizenship Law 
of Latvia, the International and European Legal Expert Council previously pointed out that Latvia 
has signed the European Convention on Nationality which lays down opportunities to appeal and 
specifies that decisions must be legally grounded, therefore ‘the Citizenship Law should find balance 
between the freedom of action and individuals’ abilities to defend their rights against arbitrary 
decisions’ (NEP 2012, 4). 
Referendum on the amendments to the Citizenship Law
In early 2012, the movement For Equal Rights (Par vienlīdzīgām tiesībām) started collecting 
residents’ signatures in order to introduce amendments to the Citizenship Law that would provide 
for the granting of citizenship to all non-citizens. The amendments prepared by the movement stated 
that citizens who do not submit an application on the preservation of a non-citizen’s status before 30 
November 2013 in accordance with the procedure established by the Cabinet of Ministers shall be 
considered as citizens of Latvia from 1 January 2014 onwards. Likewise, the transitional provisions 
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declare that the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs shall send people special confirmations 
which certify that they have become citizens, and as of 1 January 2014 non-citizens’ passports 
shall be treated as Latvian citizens’ passports if their holders can present such certificates (CVK 
2012a). The necessary number of signatures (12 686 signatures instead of the minimum requirement 
of 10 000) was collected by September, and the draft law was submitted to the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) on 4 September in order to organize the second round of collecting signatures. 
This was not the first time that a political actor had attempted to obtain granting of citizenship 
to all non-citizens. On 11 December 2008, the Saeima rejected the draft law on recognizing non-
citizens as Latvian citizens prepared by the political organization ‘For Human Rights in United 
Latvia’ („Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā’) (PCTVL). MPs from the PCTVL party called for 
recognizing as citizens those non-citizens who were born in Latvia or the non-citizens who had 
reached the age of 60. 
The initiative on collecting signatures stirred up extensive discussions among politicians and 
experts about both – the compliance of the drafted amendments with Article 78 of the Latvian 
Constitution – Satversme,1 which specifies that draft amendments to laws must be developed fully, 
as well as the compliance of the proposed amendments with the principle of Latvia’s continuity and 
with the core of the Constitution. Being aware of the political sensitivity of this matter, subsequently 
amplified by the referendum of 18 February 2012 on the Russian language as the second official 
language (for more detailed information on this topic, see Section 1.3 How much consensus is 
there on state boundaries and constitutional arrangements?), and considering the discussions about 
the necessity to define the unamendable core of the Constitution, the Central Election Committee 
(CEC), having received the collected signatures, resolved to turn to several state institutions and 
universities requesting them2 to provide an opinion on whether the draft law ‘Amendments to the 
Citizenship Law’ on granting citizenship automatically to non-citizens submitted by the voters 
should be considered as fully developed and whether there was due reason for initiating a collection 
of signatures. 
This was the first time that the expression ‘fully developed’ was to be assessed not from a 
quality perspective, i.e. does it state clearly what should be changed in which law, but from a 
substance perspective, i.e. whether it jeopardizes Latvia’s statehood and whether it contradicts the 
interests of Latvia. The majority of opinions stated that the draft law could not be regarded as fully 
developed, and thus it does not meet the requirements set forth in Article 78 of the Constitution. 
Similarly, several institutions pointed out that the submitted amendments are in conflict with the 
doctrine of continuity of state and, correspondingly, contradict Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution 
as well as Latvia’s international rights (CVK 2012b). Based on the opinions received, CEC made 
the decision to refrain from announcing the second round of signature collection on 1 November 
2012 stating that the proposal ‘has not been developed fully’. Another argument why amendments 
to the law were not submitted to referendum was that they were alleged to be non-compliant with 
Article 2 of the Constitution and with the Declaration of 4 May 1990; moreover, they would also 
substantially expand the scope of citizens and would prompt one to question the continuity of the 
Republic of Latvia (CVK 2012d). Several experts have admitted that the actions of CEC in assessing 
1 Article 78 of the Constitution lays down: ‘Not less than one-tenth of the electors shall have the right to 
submit to the President of State a fully elaborated draft for the amendment of the Constitution or the draft 
law, which shall be submitted to the Saeima by the President.  If the Saeima does not adopt this draft law 
without substantial amendments, it shall be submitted to a referendum.’ Source: http://www.likumi.lv/doc.
php?id=57980
2 Chancery of the President, Saeima Legal Affairs Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ombudsman, Constitutional Law Department of the Faculty of Law of the University 
of Latvia, International and European Law Department of the Faculty of Law of the University of Latvia, 
Faculty of Law of the Rīga Stradiņš University, Riga Graduate School of Law, international law expert Mārtiņš 
Paparinskis.
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the submitted draft law on its merits (content) and the subsequently adopted decision have created 
a precedent that, in the future, may restrict any citizens’ initiative that creates controversy in the 
society and among the politicians (LETA 2012b; BNS 2012). 
Several individuals filed claims in court to contest the decision of CEC. On 12 February 2014, 
the Department of Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court passed a judgement dismissing the 
application requesting to render the resolution of the CEC of 1 November 2012 null and void, and 
recognizing non-conformity of the draft law with the Constitution and the doctrine of continuity. 
The court acknowledged that ‘Latvia has, so far, abided consistently by the doctrine of continuity in 
terms of settling the matter on Latvian citizenship and on the status of the nationals of the occupying 
state who arrived in Latvia as a result of occupation, and remained there after the state had been 
restored. In other words, citizenship has been acknowledged regarding the individuals who belonged 
to the initial composition of Latvian citizens that continued to exist despite occupation. Conversely, 
citizenship was not granted to those residents (mainly citizens of the former USSR) who did not 
belong to the initial composition of Latvian citizens. However, they are granted a special and secure 
status which meets the international and Latvian human rights standards, as well as the right to be 
naturalized through a general naturalization procedure’   (LR AT 2014).
The course of naturalization
According to the Population Register data, as of 1 January 2014, 83.6 % of Latvia’s residents 
were Latvian citizens, whereas the number of non-citizens was 282 876, i.e. 13.0 % of the entire 
population of Latvia. For the sake of comparison – in 1995, when the naturalization process 
was launched, the number of non-citizens was approximately 730 000 (29 %). According to the 
information summarized by the Naturalization Board (NP), the number of non-citizens decreased 
by 15 000 per year between 2009 and 2014. However, only 19–29 % of them have become 
Latvian citizens. Considering that the largest proportion of non-citizens are aged 51 or older, one 
of the factors that has influenced the decrease of the proportion of non-citizens is death. Similarly, 
emigration and acquiring citizenship of another country has influenced the decrease in the number 
of non-citizens (PMLP 2014b). Thus, out of 5,972 residents who submitted their applications for 
renouncing their non-citizen’s status in 2010, 5,763 had become citizens of Russia. Although the 
number of non-citizens who acquire citizenship of another country decreased during the following 
years, this trend still exists, and PMLP continues to review approximately 3,000 applications every 
year from individuals, including Latvian citizens, who have acquired citizenship of another country.3 
Such a rapid increase mainly in the number of citizens of Russia raises questions on the efficiency 
of the naturalization policy and the influence of the recently dominant national political rhetoric 
about non-citizens’ opting for the citizenship of another country. Likewise, the issue of the increase 
in the number of citizens of Russia, especially after the events in Ukraine, should be viewed in the 
context of national security.
Up to 1 January 2014, 141 618 persons, of which 14 288 of their underage children, had acquired 
Latvian citizenship through naturalization. Between 1999 and 2006, the number of naturalized 
individuals exceeded 10 000–15 000 per year (19 169 in 2005) whereas the number of citizens of 
the Republic of Latvia who acquired citizenship through naturalization reached its lowest point in 
2013 when the number of naturalized persons was below two thousand (1 732). The number of 
applications received in 2013 was also by far the lowest at only 1 939 (PMLP (Office of Citizenship 
and Migration Affairs – OCMA) 2014c). Thus, insufficient motivation on the part of non-citizens 
to acquire Latvian citizenship should still be considered as a serious obstacle for addressing the 
3 According to the data of PMLP, 3 134 persons had given up their status as a non-citizen of Latvia (incl. 
2 884 who had acquired the citizenship of Russia) in 2011; 2 964 persons (incl. 2 964 who had acquired the 
citizenship of Russia) in 2012; 3 217 persons (incl. 3 068 who had acquired the citizenship of Russia). Source: 
Information provided to Latvian Centre for Human Rights by OCMA on 14 April 2014. 
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issue of citizenship. According to the study conducted by OCMA in 2014, non-citizens’ contentment 
with their current status has increased, and non-citizens are still hoping that the naturalization 
process will be made easier (PMLP 2014d). Naturalization applications are mostly submitted by 
young people aged 18–30 (on average, 33.5 % of all applicants for citizenship; 39.5 % in 2013) 
whereas they are least frequently submitted by residents aged over 60 (on average, 6.6 % of all 
applicants for citizenship; 7.6 % in 2013). Similarly, women (an average of 63.1 % of all applicants 
for citizenship), Russians (an average of 68.1 % of all applicants for citizenship), and people who 
have acquired secondary education (an average of 50.7 % of all applicants for citizenship) have 
submitted significantly so far. Since launching the naturalization process, 830 persons have been 
refused Latvian citizenship mainly because they had been convicted for criminal offences. 
In general, one must conclude that the legislation in Latvia in the field of citizenship complies 
with international standards and development trends existing in Europe, thus allowing for the 
population of Latvian citizens to remain stable in a climate of continuously increasing mobility. 
However, the notable number of non-citizens and the low prestige of citizenship (which, in separate 
cases, is not facilitated by the politicians’ exclusionary rhetoric on the lack of loyalty among the new 
citizens) suggests that part of the society in Latvia is still denied fully-fledged political participation 
opportunities.
1.2. How far are cultural differences acknowledged, and how well are the 
minorities and vulnerable social groups protected?
The 2011 Census data shows that representatives of more than 170 nationalities live in Latvia, 
yet the majority of the population (96.7 %) belongs to the five largest ethnic groups: Latvians 
(62.1 %), Russians (26.9 %), Belarussians (3.3 %), Ukrainians (2.2 %) and Poles (2.2 %) (LR CSP 
(Central Statistical Bureau of the Republic of Latvia) 2012). Compared to the previous Census, 
Latvians are the only ethnic group whose proportion has increased from 57.7 % in 2000 to 62.1 % 
in 2011. Considering that Russian is the mother tongue of a large part of ethnic minorities, including 
Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Jews, etc., ethno-linguistic background frequently plays a 
much greater role than nationality in public integration and collective identity shaping processes. 
According to the data acquired during the Census, 62.1 % of the population mostly speak Latvian 
whereas 37.2 % speak Russian, and only 0.7 % speak another language (Belarusian, Ukrainian, 
Polish, Lithuanian, etc.) at home. In turn, the Latvian vernacular – Latgalian – is used by 8.8 % of 
the population in everyday life (LR CSP 2013).
The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities
Provisions for the recognition and guarantee of minority rights are included in both the 
Constitution (Article 114) and a special law adopted in 1990 (LR AP 1991). However, the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities ratified by the Council of Europe in 2005 plays 
a greater role in protecting minorities’ rights (LR Saeima 2005; the Latvian government signed the 
Convention on 11 May 1995). 
The Convention is the first legally binding extensive document dedicated to the general protection 
of national minorities in the history of protecting national minorities’ rights. The Convention includes 
program-type provisions that cannot be observed directly. Thus, countries enjoy freedom in terms 
of achieving pre-established goals as well as observing their specific conditions and needs. Since 
neither the effective legislation of Latvia nor the Convention defines the term ‘national minorities’, 
the Saeima resolved that only those citizens who have traditionally lived in Latvia for generations 
consider themselves affiliated to the Latvian state and society and wish to preserve and develop 
their culture, religion and language can belong to minority nationalities. This definition narrows 
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the range of people who formally belong to national minorities since it does not include non-
citizens, and it distinguishes pre-war citizens and their offspring from those who acquire citizenship 
through naturalization. At the same time, the state recognizes that individuals who belong to national 
minorities, and identify themselves as national minorities in accordance with this definition, may 
exercise the rights stated in the Convention, unless the law lays down exclusions. Although the 
Advisory Committee responsible for the implementation of the Convention welcomed Latvia’s 
flexible approach, it stated the following in its first report on Latvia: ‘Given Latvia’s historical and 
political background, the Advisory Committee is of the opinion that the citizenship criterion, which 
was introduced to define the scope of the rights granted to persons belonging to national minorities, 
raises more problems than in other national situations and could therefore be replaced by other 
criteria, such as permanent and legal residence in the country’ (EP 2008, 16). 
The Advisory Committee expressed a similar opinion about the declaration submitted by 
Estonia that, similarly to Latvia, acknowledged as national minorities only those Estonian citizens 
who maintain long-term and consistent links with Estonia. When ratifying the above mentioned 
Convention, the Saeima also adopted two declarations that Latvia shall consider binding: Article 10 
Paragraph 2 (on the use of minority language in relations with the local administrative authorities) 
and Article 11 Paragraph 3 (displaying topographical indications and street names in minority 
languages), which regulate separate domains of the minority language use, only as far as they are 
not in conflict with Constitution and other laws and regulations on the use of the official language 
effective in the Republic of Latvia.
Up to now, Latvia has submitted two reports on the implementation of the Convention: in 
2006 and in 2012. Both reports emphasize that ‘Latvia’s integration policy ensures full protection 
of national minorities’ rights as well as implementation of their culture, language and traditions. 
Likewise, engagement of national minorities’ representatives and implementation of their interests 
during policy shaping and decision-making processes are facilitated also through the currently 
existing five state-level consultancy boards’ (EP 2014, 2). Conversely, in its second opinion on 
Latvia, the Advisory Committee stated: although Latvia ‘provides considerable support to the 
cultural activities of minority communities’ and ‘minority language education continues to be benefit 
from state funding’, ‘the public debate related to national minorities has become more polarised in 
recent years. Discussions among the public related to the rights of national minorities, in particular 
language rights, is often linked to questions of loyalty towards the state and willingness, or lack 
thereof, to integrate, which is unhelpful for the formation of social cohesion’ (EP 2013, Summary). 
Institutional monitoring of the integration policy
In order to coordinate observation of minority rights and state policy in the field of integration, 
the Secretariat of the Minister for Special Assignments on Society Integration Affairs (SMSASIA) 
was established in 2002. Considering the broad interpretation of the social integration question, 
the priorities of the Secretariat differed considerably during the course of its existence. Frequently, 
the interests of the particular Minister and the political situation in the state defined the priorities. 
When the state faced an economic crisis, the utility of the Secretariat’s existence was increasingly 
discussed. Finally, in the autumn of 2008, a decision was adopted to liquidate it despite opposition 
from several minority organizations (Zankovska–Odiņa 2008).
 The functions of the Secretariat were split up between several ministries and one can claim 
that from then on integration matters rapidly disappeared from the political discourse. A large 
number of employees who had worked with integration matters were dismissed due to repeated 
reorganization and the funding necessary for performing the functions (including government budget 
funding for implementing integration projects) was significantly reduced. This seriously affected the 
implementation of the social integration policy. As Juris Rozenvalds concluded, ‘integration policy in 
Latvia over the past 25 years has always been the ‘unloved child’ of the Latvian political elite: high 
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tides alternated with low tides. It was mainly due to external pressure the policy came into being 
despite the fact that the source and direction of the pressure substantially changed during the course 
of time’ (Rozenvalds 2013, 60). Society consolidation matters re-appeared on the political agenda 
only after the parliamentary elections of 2010 when the Harmony Centre Party won the second largest 
number of seats in the Saeima and the governing coalition adopted the decision that development 
and implementation of the integration policy must be handed over to the Ministry of Culture. 
Guidelines on National Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy 
Considering that the state program ‘Society Integration in Latvia’ approved in 2001 was still 
effective, and recognizing the need to adjust the integration policy, work on developing a new 
document was launched in 2005. However, none of the proposed drafts (three different versions 
of guidelines were developed from 2005 to 2010) was adopted due to various political and other 
reasons. In 2011, on the initiative of the then Minister for Culture, Sarmīte Ēlerte (Unity Party), 
work on new Guidelines on National Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy (Guidelines) 
was started. Unlike in Estonia, where experts, representatives of various target audiences and the 
general public were engaged in the development of the new integration strategy through different 
participation channels (Asari 2013; Uus 2013), drafting of the document in Latvia was entrusted 
to authors selected by the Minister, and a special advisory board was set up for discussing it. The 
advisory board included separate representatives of national minorities. However, it did not include 
any minority organizations. The engagement of the advisory board itself in the preparation of the 
document was of a purely formal character. Public discussion of the document was organized in 
August 2011, which coincided with the pre-election campaign period. Many of the proposals or 
objections expressed by NGOs and state institutions were not included in the final version of the 
document (LCC 2013, 17). In order to ensure adoption of this document, its approval was included 
in the last meeting of the current government on 11 October 2011 (LR MK 2011b).
During the drafting and discussion phase of the document, several integration experts and 
NGOs expressed substantial objections towards the definition of terms used in the document. For 
example, indigenous majority population (valstsnācija) was perceived as putting ethnic Latvians in 
a privileged position; immigrants combined Latvian non-citizens, residents possessing permanent 
residence permits and the new immigrants who had arrived in Latvia recently (generally three 
separate groups of immigrants). Similarly, objections were voiced against the conceptual stance due 
to its explicitly ethno-centric approach ‘putting an increasingly larger emphasis on the priority of 
the Latvian ethnic values as the key precondition for the development of the society’s sustainability’ 
(Rozenvalds 2013, 63). Unlike the integration program of 2001 which, emphasizing the importance 
of the Latvian language and culture, still focused on civic values, the new document largely 
concentrated on a strong national identity shaped through the Latvian language and Latvian cultural 
space, as well as on common social memory. Several experts pointed out that the document insists 
on the primary role of the indigenous majority population, i.e. Latvians, in determining values and 
cultural and historic memory (Kreile 2011). Thus, integration, which was mostly ‘based on the 
Latvian ethnic values and civic engagement, did not become a substantial precondition for and an 
element of integration processes. Instead, it was a derivation of the integration that had already 
taken place’ (Rozenvalds 2013, 63). For the first time, the Guidelines defined ‘open Latvianness’ 
as one of the core principles of the integration policy, laying down the following: ‘The Latvian 
indigenous majority population is inclusive. Its obligation is to strengthen its identity whilst being 
open towards those who wish to join. This means that one may not only be born as a Latvian, 
but may also deliberately become one. It is the choice of every person as to whether they wish to 
preserve their national uniqueness, their minority identity alongside their Latvian identity and this 
is a common choice made (LR MK 2011b, 9).
A poll suggested that substantial differences exist between the views of Latvians and those of 
minorities regarding the central statement in the Guidelines about social integration: ‘the unity of 
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the Latvian society must be based on the Latvian language and culture’. 90.9 % Latvians, 43.1 % 
Russians and 60.9 % of representatives of other nationalities supported this. When choosing between 
the three ethno-cultural development models for Latvia, 71.5 % respondents claimed that the state 
must ensure the development of the Latvian language and culture as a priority and provide support 
for the development of other languages and cultures at the same time. 8.8 % respondents supported 
the idea of a Latvian Latvia whereas 19.7 % supported the ‘melting pot’ model, which encompasses 
shaping a relationship between languages and cultures based on free competition (LU SZF 2013, 
105–106).
Minority NGOs harshly criticized the elaborated document. References were made to the 
estranging and even insulting effect of the document that would facilitate fragmentation of the 
society, instead of consolidating it. Minority NGOs claimed that the program was aimed at complete 
assimilation of national minorities because, for the first time, the executive authority had proposed 
the integration of national minorities into the Latvian society, not the society of Latvia. Similarly, 
it was pointed out that the new integration program was excessively politicized and that it was 
too insensitive towards the national minorities (LCC 2013, 18). None of the integration policy 
documents had triggered such harsh public criticism so far. Unlike the document itself, its Action 
Plan is more consistent with the situation in Latvia and with the integration needs of various target 
groups. Although experts and representatives of national minorities have repeatedly called upon the 
Ministry of Culture to review the Guidelines and the terms used within, the Ministry has stated that 
the political stance in the document will remain unchanged and that the core principles set forth in 
the document comply with the EU’s common basic integration principles (EP 2014, 11).
On 29 May 2012, in reaction to the 18 February 2012 referendum on Russian as the second 
official language and the subsequent discussions on the results of the integration policy pursued 
hitherto, the government approved the ‘Informative Report on the Consolidation of the Society 
and Strengthening of the National Identity and the Position of the Official Language’ (MK 2012a). 
Among other things, it outlined the priority measures for consolidating the society and strengthening 
national identity that are to be supported by the government budget. The priority measures were 
mainly aimed at securing common social memory and information space, learning the Latvian 
language and provision of access to Latvian culture and education for the children of the citizens 
who have left Latvia. Although the list of supportable priorities included shaping of a direct dialogue 
with national minority NGOs, the planned measures were aimed only at strengthening cultural 
identity. After several years of disruption, significant funding was allocated for society integration 
measures from the government budget (approximately 2 million lats for 2012–2013). However, one 
must acknowledge that the government is still unable to find the appetite and the opportunities for 
carrying out a serious assessment of what the referendum of 18 February 2012 was actually about. 
Several experts have pointed out that the referendum was not about the language; it was about 
recognition, affiliation and constructive dialogue through which the concerned parties could reach 
a reasonable compromise.
Minority education
The language referendum and the subsequent discussions about the desirable directions of the 
integration policy brought the issue of the curriculum language in national minority pre-schools and 
general education schools into the centre of political discussions. Immediately after the referendum, 
National Alliance All for Latvia! – For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK (VL-TB/LNNK) came 
up with an appeal to create a unified system of pre-school education institutions and to announce 
that learning must take place in the official language in all kindergartens, while simultaneously 
retaining ethnic and cultural identity orientation in the groups which include children from families 
representing various ethnic backgrounds (DELFI 2012a). Considering the sensitivity of this matter 
and the potential consequences if the proposal were supported (the society ‘Native Language’ had 
already announced that it would organize mass protests in such a case), the Coalition Council 
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agreed to hold discussions with experts and parents thus ensuring that the possible changes would 
be scientifically substantiated, not politically. New Cabinet Regulations were adopted as a result of 
the discussions; they laid down substantial changes in the samples of minority pre-school curricula, 
including a significant increase in the number of playroom lessons in Latvian (LR MK 2012b).
In 2005, the Constitutional Court concluded (ST 2005) that the language proportion in secondary 
schools (60 % in Latvian and 40 % in minority languages) set forth in the Education Law ensured 
balance between society integration goals and national minorities’ rights to preserve their identity. 
Nevertheless, in early 2014, the new government coalition, suddenly and without broader discussion, 
agreed to support the proposal of VL-TB/LNNK and to develop legislative framework in order to 
start delivering all education programs at municipal national minority educational institutions in 
Latvian as of 1 September 2018. As early as in 2011, the National Unity Party had attempted to 
introduce constitutional amendments through supplementing Article 112 of the Constitution with a 
precondition that ‘the state shall provide the opportunity to acquire primary education and secondary 
education in the official language free of charge’ determining that ‘learning shall take place in 
Latvian at all state and municipal schools, starting from the first grade, as of 1 September 2012’ 
(CVK 2012f). At that time, signature collecting was criticized by several parties represented at the 
Saeima, the President and the Prime Minister of Latvia as well as the existing and former ministers 
claiming that the then existing minority education system was well considered and that it served 
its purpose: Latvian language skills of 12th grade graduates were improving from year to year 
(Delfi.lv 2011). The results of the centralized secondary school exams also suggest that no significant 
differences exist in terms of the progress of Latvian and minority secondary school graduates. 
Similarly, experts point out that none of the officials who support the appeal for schools to switch to 
learning only in Latvian have provided data- and research-based substantiation for such an initiative 
(Kamenska 2014). Although Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma and the Minister for Education 
and Science Ina Druviete have confirmed that no reforms are planned in minority education while 
the current government is in office (LSM.LV 2014), and that minority education programs will 
be preserved (LR IZM (Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia) 2014), the 
resolution of the government coalition and its controversial and unclear interpretation in the public 
space has caused new protests which run a great risk of amplifying in certain political situations. 
Thus, political parties have repeatedly confirmed that decisions on sensitive and important matters 
for society integration are adopted subject to the political situation determined by the process of 
formation of the government and the proximity of elections, instead of through in-depth studies, 
research of target audiences’ needs and discussion between the affected parties.
Overall, it can be concluded that the regulatory framework ensures recognition of the differences 
of minorities’ cultures and guarantees their rights. However, no political dialogue with national 
minorities exists on the matters that are relevant to them, including the goals and means of integration, 
as well as on educational matters. Furthermore, Latvian ethnic values are increasingly emphasized 
as the basis of the society’s integration. This polarizes the society and facilitates national minorities’ 
estrangement from the state.
1.3. How much consensus is there on state boundaries and constitutional 
arrangements? 
Agreement on the state border between Latvia and Russia
The issue of the border agreement between Latvia and Russia was settled more than 15 years 
after the restoration of independence. On 4 May 1990, upon the promulgation of the Declaration ‘On 
the Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Latvia’, continuity of the Republic of Latvia was 
emphasized: it was stated that the restored independent Latvia was the continuation of the Republic 
of Latvia established in 1918, being a subject of international law, and that its Constitution, adopted 
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in 1922, had never lost validity de jure. Thus, the transition period of restoration of independence 
of the Republic of Latvia was complete de facto along with the adoption of the Constitutional Law 
on the Statehood of the Republic of Latvia on 21 August 1991. However, the actual borderline of 
the restored independent state differed from the one that had existed before the war. In accordance 
with the Peace Treaty concluded between Latvia and Soviet Russia on 11 August 1920, Abrene was 
part of the territory of Latvia. In 1944, the town of Abrene and six of the 15 parishes of the district 
of Abrene were included in the territory of the Russian Federation. 
On 27 March 2007, Prime Minister Aigars Kalvītis and Mikhail Fradkov, Prime Minister of 
the Russian Federation, signed the Latvian-Russian Border Treaty in Moscow (LR ĀM (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia) 2007). The Saeima ratified this Treaty on 17 May 2007 
by passing the ‘The Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation Treaty On the State Border of 
Latvia and Russia‘; the law became effective on 30 May 2007 (LR Saeima 2007b). 
Several members of parliament filed applications with the Constitutional Court challenging 
the legality of the Latvian-Russian Border Treaty. After the Saeima opted to support the draft law 
on the ratification of the Latvian-Russian Border Treaty, all members of the Saeima (MPs) from 
the New Era Party (Jaunais laiks) and three coalition MPs filed a request with the Constitutional 
Court to review the conformity of the Treaty with Article 3 of the Constitution which states that 
‘the territory of the State of Latvia, within the borders established by international agreements, 
consists of Vidzeme, Latgale, Kurzeme and Zemgale’. The Constitutional Court initiated another 
case on 17 July on the basis of an application received from 21 members of the Parliament (MPs) 
regarding the conformity of the ‘The Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation Treaty On 
the State Border of Latvia and Russia‘ with Article 3 of the Constitution and the compliance of 
the expression ‘considering the principle of invariability of borders adopted by the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe’ used in Article 1 of the ‘The Republic of Latvia and the 
Russian Federation Treaty On the State Border of Latvia and Russia‘ with the Preamble and Article 
9 of the Declaration ‘On the Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Latvia’ of 4 May 1990 
(LR ST 2007a). 
ST merged both cases, and announced judgement on 29 November 2007. The Court found 
that the loss of Abrene district did not affect the continuity of the state of Latvia, and conceded 
that the Cabinet of Ministers possessed legal authority to sign the draft Border Treaty. It also 
conceded that the Latvian-Russian Border Treaty and its Ratification law in Latvia was consistent 
with Article 3 of the Constitution. The Court also ruled that the expression ‘considering the principle 
of invariability of borders adopted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’ 
used in the Ratification Law did not comply with the constitutional law of Latvia; therefore, the 
Court declared it invalid from the moment of the publication of the judgement (LR ST 2007b). 
The Constitution 
Since restoration of independence in the early 1990s, a certain consensus has formed in the 
Latvian society regarding the constitutional foundations of the state, particularly about the role of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia of 1922. The Constitution that was adopted in 1922 laid 
down the foundations of the state system: general rules of the state, as well as provisions in relation 
to the forming of the Saeima, the President and the Cabinet of Ministers, and to their activity Special 
laws regulate sectorial matters. 
Since 2004, several attempts have been made to introduce new norms in the Constitution that 
would influence important determinations of the Latvian society. 
In 2011, the representatives of the political union All for Latvia! (Visu Latvijai!) proposed to 
supplement Article 112 of the Constitution which lays down the rights of the residents of Latvia 
to education, with the words ‘in Latvian’. On 29 March 2011, a draft law ‘On Amendments to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Latvia’ was submitted to the CEC and appended with supporting 
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signatures of more than 10,000 voters. The draft law provided for the following wording of 
Article 112: ‘Everyone has the right to education. The state shall ensure that everyone may acquire 
primary and secondary education in Latvian free of charge. Primary education shall be compulsory.’ 
It also provided that ‘learning shall take place in Latvian at all state and municipal schools, starting 
from the first grade, as of 1 September 2012’. The CEC organized signature collecting on proposing 
the draft law on Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia from 11 May until 9 June 
2011. According to the data of CEC, 120 433 Latvian citizens eligible to vote supported submission 
of this draft law to the Saeima. Thus, the draft law did not receive the number of voters necessary 
for pursuing submission to the Saeima (at least one tenth of the voters who participated in the most 
recent Parliamentary elections, i.e. 153 232 voters) (CVK 2011a). 
Considering the protests that took place in 2003 and 2004 against the language reform in 
national minority schools, this draft law and signature collecting significantly increased tension 
in the society, especially among minorities. If the amendments proposed by ‘All for Latvia!’ were 
approved, they would affect 99 schools with Russian language of instruction, and 65 schools with 
two language streams (LCC 2013). The amendments were also criticized by the political parties 
represented in the Saeima, by the President and the Prime Minister, as well as by the existing and 
former ministers. It was pointed out that the existing national minority education system was well 
considered and that it served its purpose since Latvian language skills among 12th grade graduates 
improved gradually from year to year whereas the proposed amendments might lead to a reduction 
in the level of knowledge and deepen the divide in the society (LCC 2013). 
The former National Bolshevik Vladimir Linderman made use of the tension that existed in 
the society in relation to the proposals tabled by All for Latvia! He declared that ‘the chaps from 
Mr. Dzintar’s team have overstepped the red line. This is an attack. I perceive it as a declaration 
of war,’ and announced that Russians had no choice but to defend their interests and opportunities 
(Вести сегодня 2011). 
In reaction to the initiative of All for Latvia!, the United Latvia organization as well as 
Vladimir Linderman and Yevgeny Osipov (the former Head of the Latvian Branch of the Russian 
Radical-Nationalist Movement) started collecting signatures in order to propose amendments to the 
Constitution (Articles 4, 18, 21, 101 and 104) which provided for granting official language status to 
the Russian language in Latvia. An organization Native Language (Dzimtā Valoda) was established 
with the goal of popularizing amendments and collecting signatures. 
On 9 September 2011, activists from the organization ‘Native Language’ submitted signatures of 
12 533 electors to the CEC in relation to the above mentioned draft law on amendments; the second 
phase of collecting signatures took place from 1 until 30 November 2011. 187 378 signatures of 
electors, i.e. 12.14 % of the number of electors who participated in the most recent Parliamentary 
elections, were collected during both phases of signature collecting in relation to the amendments 
to the Constitution (CVK 2011b). The Saeima rejected this draft law on 22 December 2011, 
and a referendum on granting the official language status to the Russian language took place on 
18 February 2012. Altogether 1 098 921 electors (71.13 %) took part in the referendum, 821 722 
(74.8 %) voted ‘against’ the proposal for Russian to become the second official language whereas 
273 347 (24.88 %) voted ‘for’ this draft law (CVK 2012a). 
The referendum on granting official language status to the Russian language significantly 
polarized the society along ethnic and linguistic lines. This was demonstrated most explicitly shortly 
before the referendum: newspapers published in Latvian language and politicians for whom mainly 
ethnic Latvians vote expressed opinions that differed considerably from the opinions expressed in 
newspapers published in Russian language and by politicians whose main electorate were national 
minorities. Ethnic division trends could also be clearly observed in the results of the referendum: 
the proposal on the Russian language as the second official language acquired greater support in 
districts inhabited by a greater proportion of minority electors. The only region where the majority 
of electors (55.57 %) voted for this draft law was Latgale (CVK 2012b). Similarly, in Daugavpils, 
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Rēzekne and five municipalities in the Eastern part of Latvia the majority of electors voted for the 
Russian language as the second official language. 
Preamble / Introduction to the Constitution 
In relation to the referendum on the Russian language as the second official language, which 
took place in February 2012, discussions evolved around the core of the Constitution, its values and 
its unamendable Articles. The President Andris Bērziņš asked the Constitutional Law Commission 
(KTK) to prepare an opinion on the foundations of the state of Latvia, and to assess whether certain 
Articles should be unamendable (Delfi 2012b). In September 2012 the KTK made its proposals 
public; one of them was to expand the Preamble of the Constitution and to include statements about 
the goals, purpose and, possibly, future vision of the establishment of the state. It was announced 
that wider public discussions are necessary before developing specific proposals to supplement the 
Preamble. 
In September 2013, Egils Levits, honorary professor of the Riga Graduate School of Law 
and judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union, published his proposal on expanding the 
Preamble of the Constitution in the official journal Jurista Vārds accompanied by his comments on 
the draft (Levits 2013). MPs representing the Saeima Legal Affairs Committee were also presented 
with the proposal. The opinion of E. Levits was as follows: the Preamble of the Constitution must 
provide an answer to the question ‘What is the state of Latvia?’ 
One should point out that, contrary to the initial intentions, wider public debates never took 
place before developing the draft, and prof. Levits drafted the proposal for expanding the Preamble 
of the Constitution on his own. The proposals would have had greater legitimacy, had they been 
the product of Commission on Constitutional Law. 
Many different opinions about the necessity to expand the Preamble, its drafting process, as 
well as its content, including the use of the term ‘indigenous majority population’ were expressed by 
the general public, amongst legal scholars and politicians. The process of developing the Preamble 
was criticized due to the fact that such an important document had been drafted hastily and by 
a narrow community of coalition politicians and experts, instead of through extensive public 
discussion. Concerns were also voiced about the draft introduction splitting the people in Latvia 
(Jurista Vārds 2014), being insufficiently inclusive and shaping ‘hierarchic, vertical’ relationships 
between communities (Hanovs, 30). The draft introduction was shortened and revised (for example, 
the term ‘indigenous majority population’ was replaced with a description of its concept) in early 
2014 as a result of political discussion. 
On 19 June 2014, the Saeima adopted the Preamble of the Constitution in the third and final 
reading. The Preamble lays down that the state of Latvia was established ‘upon the unamendable 
will of the Latvian nation for its own state and its inalienable right to self-determination in order 
to guarantee the existence of the Latvian nation through the ages, preservation and development of 
the Latvian language and culture, and prosperity of every human being and people of Latvia as a 
whole’. The Preamble perpetuates the historical experience of the 20th century and the restoration of 
independence; Latvia is characterized as a socially responsible national state that respects the principles 
of democracy and the rule of law which protects human rights and honours national minorities. The 
Preamble also emphasizes Latvian and Liv traditions, the Latvian life wisdom, the Latvian language, 
human and Christian values, as well as Latvia’s identity in the European cultural space. 
On the whole, one can conclude that there are no controversies within the society regarding the 
state borders and the constitutional arrangements. Possible uncertainties regarding state borders were 
solved when the Saeima ratified the Border Treaty with Russia, and when the Constitutional Court 
adopted the decision on the Border Treaty’s conformity with the Constitution and the concept of 
the continuity of the state. Similarly, there are no current controversies within the society regarding 
the constitutional arrangements established in the 1920s. 
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1.4. How far do constitutional and political arrangements enable major 
societal divisions to be moderated or reconciled?
The constitutional provisions of the Republic of Latvia and the political decision-making 
mechanisms are generally neutral and impartial. They neither increase nor reduce the society’s 
schisms per se: they neither provide advantages for one ethnic group or another, nor do they facili-
tate the inclusion and influence of insufficiently represented groups in social and political processes. 
At the same time, Latvia lacks efficient mechanisms for encouraging a constructive dialogue 
and ensuring the protection and realisation of the interests of various social groups – including 
minorities – especially in matters that directly affect them. In the beginning of 2013, four state-
level advisory boards existed. Their goal was to facilitate national minorities’ participation and 
to solve problems; several municipal-level integration boards or commissions also existed (LCC 
(Latvian Centre for Human Rights) 2013). After summarizing interviews with representatives of 
various state and municipal authorities and NGOs engaged in the functioning of these dialogue and 
participation mechanisms, it was concluded that the mechanisms were generally ineffective. The 
following were named as the weaknesses of the mechanisms: formal character, unclear principles 
of activity, functions and competencies, obscure criteria for selecting participants as well as lack of 
interest on the part of politicians and officials. 
Two problems can be pointed out in relation to the functioning of the existing constitutional 
provisions and political decision-making mechanisms in practice: firstly, inadequate opportunities for 
the Latvian minority citizens and their representatives to influence decision-making, and secondly, 
the large number of Latvian non-citizens. These problems hinder the reduction of the divisions that 
exist in the society. 
Inclusion of Latvian minority citizens and their representatives in the functioning 
of the state 
Political representation in the Saeima does not correspond to the ethnic composition of the 
Latvian people; however, national minorities are adequately represented in the Latvian parliament, 
compared to the ethnic composition of the Latvian citizens. Ethnic divisions are still a typical 
characteristic of the political party system in Latvia, and parties that are mostly elected by the 
Latvian minority citizens usually end up in the opposition. 
The Harmony Centre and For Human Rights in United Latvia (PCTVL) are the two parties that 
traditionally have received the largest support from the national minority electors; several members 
and deputies of these parties represent national minorities themselves. According to the election 
results available to CEC, the Harmony Centre acquired 17 seats whereas PCTVL acquired six seats 
in the 9th Saeima (2006); the Harmony Centre acquired 29 seats in the 10th Saeima (2010) and 31 
seats (largest political group) in the 11th Saeima (2011). According to CSP data, 18 MPs counted 
themselves as national minorities in the ninth Saeima, whereas the number of national minority 
representatives in the 10th and 11th Saeima was 15 MPs.
A noteworthy fact: even when the ‘Harmony Centre’ became a formal winner of the 2011 
elections, it was not included in the new governing coalition. The Unity Party and Zatler’s Reform 
Party (ZRP) took the initiative of forming the coalition. On 1 October 2011, the Board of ZRP 
adopted a decision on forming a coalition with the Harmony Centre and the Unity Party (Reformu 
partija 2011). Several experts characterized this as a step towards consolidation of the society and 
emphasized that this would be the first time that the largest party representing national minorities 
was included in forming the government (TVNET 2011; LETA 2011). However, the Unity Party 
opposed the formation of such a coalition, and the discussions resulted in ZRP, Unity Party and 
National Union forming the government. 
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For many national minority electors, this came as a harsh blow. The reaction to such a decision 
took the form of a public announcement ‘No to ethnic discrimination!’ in the Russian-language 
media, and it called for the President of state to stop ethnic discrimination and to show that ‘all 
citizens of Latvia have equal rights’ (Apollo 2011). 
Thus, one must conclude the following: representatives of national minorities in Saeima may 
participate in the legislative process, and publicly raise questions directly related to their electors’ 
interests. However, the votes of the MPs who represent national minorities typically cannot influence 
the decisions of the Saeima, and the governing coalition has every opportunity to ignore the interests 
of these electors because Saeima’s decisions are usually adopted through a coalition majority. 
Non-citizens’ inclusion in social and political life 
The fact that a considerable proportion of permanent residents of Latvia continues not to have 
citizenship creates additional challenges to the narrowing of the society’s divisions. Compared to 
citizens, rights and opportunities in several areas of life are prohibited for Latvian non-citizens: 
• employment in the public sector (officials, judges, policemen, etc.) and partly in the private 
sector (mostly in matters related to the judiciary); 
• political rights (the right to elect and be elected, establish political parties); 
• other social rights (when calculating the length of service in order to determine the amount 
of earned pension) and economic rights (to property – a permit to acquire land is necessary; 
fewer privatization certificates are granted). 
Latvian non-citizens’ voting rights in municipal elections
Unlike several other member states of the European Union, individuals who permanently reside 
in Latvia, but do not have citizenship of Latvia or another EU country, have no voting rights in 
municipal elections. Latvia and Estonia are similar in many ways (historical processes in the 20th 
century, proportion of national minorities, number of permanent non-citizen residents); however, 
permanently residing non-citizens of Estonia have the right to participate in municipal elections. 
Several international organizations have recommended that Latvia grant non-citizens the right to 
vote in municipal elections: UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, the European Parliament, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, OSCE Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of 
the Council of Europe and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. 
The fact that Latvian non-citizens do not have municipal voting rights also has a negative 
effect on the existing divide because citizens of other EU member states do enjoy such rights in 
Latvia. As noted by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities of the European Council, the ‘EU citizens’ rights in Latvia are simultaneously 
increased, including access to jobs in the public sector and participation in municipal elections. This 
enhances the feeling of inequality among non-citizens because they have a hard time understanding 
that Latvian citizenship is considered as a precondition for a steadily increasing number of positions 
and rights even though the same does not apply to other non-citizens who frequently have weaker 
links with Latvia and who have lawfully resided in the state for a shorter period’ (EP 2013, 15). 
The above-mentioned Committee encouraged Latvia to consider granting municipal election rights 
to non-citizens in both its first (2008) and second (2013) statement (EP 2008, 50-51; EP 2013, 
40). However Latvia’s position regarding non-citizens’ municipal voting rights remains unchanged: 
‘voting rights are part of being a citizen. Granting municipal voting rights to non-citizens would 
draw citizenship status closer to non-citizenship status thus reducing non-citizens’ motivation to go 
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through naturalization, and it would only prolong this indeterminate situation and the non-citizens’ 
special legal status’ (EP 2014, 2).
Non-Citizens’ Congress
After the CEC adopted the decision not to launch the second round of collecting signatures 
concerning the amendments to the Citizenship Law which provided for granting citizenship to all 
non-citizens, the activist group announced the establishment of the social movement Non-Citizens’ 
Congress (Nepilsoņu congress – NC). The aim of this movement was to represent non-citizens’ 
interests at the local, national and international level, and to abolish the non-citizen status (NK 
2012b). Up to May 2014, 7 867 persons had registered on NK’s website www.kongress.lv the 
majority of whom represented Riga and Riga district (5 766). To become a member of NC, one 
must be of age, support the aims of NC and live permanently in Latvia, or be a Latvian citizen 
or non-citizen who lives abroad (NK 2013a). A summary of the data on the first 1 357 registered 
members of NC suggests that 64 % of them were non-citizens, 31 % were citizens, and another 
5 % were citizens of other countries (NK 2012a). 
Elections of the Non-Represented Parliament took place on 1 June 2013 simultaneously with 
the official municipal elections. According to the information provided by NK, ‘Latvian citizens, 
non-citizens and permanent residents who possess a personal identity number and who have reached 
the age of 18 on the Election Day’ could participate in these elections. People could vote online 
starting from as early as 25 May whereas voting at especially established polling stations took place 
from 1 until 11 June. Altogether 15 134 people participated in the elections of the Non-Represented 
Parliament; 30 out of 60 candidates were elected as Members of the Non-Represented Parliament 
(NK 2013b). The first session of the Non-Represented Parliament took place on 15 June 2013. 
‘Appeal to the President, Cabinet of Ministers and Municipalities of Latvia’ was adopted during 
this session (NK 2013c). In its ‘Appeal’, NK announced that it had voluntarily assumed ‘the duty 
of compensating the deficit of democracy’ (exclusion of part of the population of Latvia from the 
state’s political life), reminded that its aim was: ‘to free the Latvian society of [..] the non-citizen 
status [..] and to create a united political nation of Latvia’. Additionally, NK emphasized that 
mass non-citizenship was a problem of the entire society: it lowered human rights standards and it 
needed to be solved for the sake of Latvia’s successful development. It also called for ‘launching 
constructive cooperation’ and delegated ‘its representatives to participate in governmental and 
municipal decision-making through civic society engagement mechanisms’ (NK 2013c).
NK sessions encompassed discussing possible actions for achieving the movement’s goals 
(including dissemination of information and public campaigns) as well as other topical matters 
for the national minorities, for example, the decision to support the proposal of VL-TB/LNNK on 
adopting the Latvian language as the curriculum language of state and municipal schools adopted 
by the governing coalition (NK 2014a). Protests were organized in front of the government building, 
the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ombudsman’s Office. On 24 April 2014, Riga City 
Council prohibited NC from organizing a concert titled We Want Changes (Mēs gribam pārmaiņas) 
(NK 2014b) based on the opinion of the Security Police (SecP) that the aim of the concert was 
to encourage ethnic tension (LETA 2014). In the SecP’s public annual report for 2013 (published 
in May 2014) the activity of NC was included in the section dedicated to the protection of the 
constitutional order, particularly pointing to the following activities: in order to promote the issue 
of non-citizens, NC has turned to several international organizations, established a website, visited 
several embassies, organized events and attempted to acquire support from the Latvian audience 
by means of disseminating information in Latvian and engaging in debates on domestic policy; 
according to the SecP’s opinion, these actions are related to the interests of the Russian Federation 
(DP 2014). Images of NC’s activists were also published in the SecP’s public report. According 
to Elizabete Krivcova, NC Chairperson, the activity of the Congress should be considered as a 
democratic initiative and the protection of national minorities’ rights (NK 2014c).
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As a whole, Latvia’s constitutional provisions are neutral regarding the schisms that exist in 
the society – they neither diminish, nor facilitate the divide. No steps are made to solve two current 
issues related to the fragmentation of the society. Firstly, minority citizens and their representatives 
cannot influence decision-making in Latvia, this includes matters that directly affect their rights and 
interests. Secondly, non-citizens of the Republic of Latvia form a substantial part of Latvian society. 
This part of the society is excluded from making decisions that are important for the public. Contrary 
to Estonia’s successful experience and despite recommendations from international organizations, 
Latvian non-citizens do not have municipal voting rights. The Non-Citizens’ Congress and the Non-
Represented Parliament highlight this problem of exclusion. 
1.5. How impartial and inclusive are the procedures for amending 
the Constitution?
Article 76 of the Constitution states that the Saeima may amend the fundamental law of the 
Republic of Latvia ‘in sittings at which at least two-thirds of the members of the Saeima participate. 
The amendments shall be passed in three readings by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the 
members present.’ Article 77 of the Constitution, in turn, establishes another special procedure in 
cases when fundamental principles of the state and democracy included in the Constitution, such 
as ‘Latvia is an independent democratic republic’ (Article 1), and ‘The sovereign power of the 
State of Latvia is vested in the people of Latvia’ (Article 2) are amended. The special procedure 
also applies to the Articles that define the territory of the state in accordance with international 
treaties (Article 3), the official language and flag (Article 4) that which sets forth general, equal, 
direct elections and by secret ballot based on proportional representation, as well as the Article that 
establishes this special procedure (Article 77). If Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 77 of the Constitution 
are amended, then such amendments can become effective only through a national referendum. All 
citizens of Latvia who have the right to vote in elections of the Saeima may participate in national 
referendums (Article 80). At least than one-tenth of the electors have the right to submit to the 
President of State a fully elaborated draft for the amendment of the Constitution or the draft law, 
which the President must submit to the Saeima. If the Saeima does not adopt this draft law without 
substantial amendments, it must be submitted for a referendum (Article 78). An amendment to the 
Constitution submitted for a national referendum is considered adopted if at least half the electorate 
has voted in favour of it (Article 79). 
Since 2004, the Saeima has passed amendments to the Constitution four times: in 2006, 2007, 
2009 and 2013. The amendments set forth that marriage is a union between a man and a woman (LR 
Saeima 2005b), revoke the authority of the Cabinet of Ministers to pass regulations with the force 
of law between parliamentary sessions (LR Saeima 2007a), and grant the right to initiate a national 
referendum regarding recalling of the Saeima to at least than one-tenth of electors (considering the 
Saeima recalled if the majority of voters and at least two-thirds of the number of the voters who 
participated in the last elections of the Saeima vote for it in the national referendum) (LR Saeima 
2009b). The most recent amendments to the Constitution revoked the election of the judges of the 
Constitutional Court through secret ballot at the Saeima (LR Saeima 2013b). The Constitution has 
been amended 13 times since the restoration of independence. 
On 8 November 2012, Saeima adopted amendments to the Law on National Referendums, 
Legislative Initiatives and European Citizens’ Initiative (LR Saeima 2012b). These amendments 
substantially changed the former procedure for the legislative initiatives proposed by the people. 
Starting from 1 January 2015, the initiative group will have to collect at least 10 %, or approximately 
154 000 certified elector’s signatures in the first round to initiate a national referendum. The law 
lays down a transition period: until 2015, initiative groups will need to collect 30 000 signatures 
themselves during the first round in order to initiate a national referendum. The number of necessary 
signatures that must be collected by initiative groups themselves to initiate recalling of the Saeima 
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will be 10 000. If the necessary number of certified electors’ signatures is successfully collected 
during the first round, then CEC must organize voters’ signature collecting at the state’s expense 
in order to collect at least 10 %, or approximately 154 000, of the signatures necessary to initiate 
a referendum during both rounds. 
These amendments were criticized for the fact that they substantially limit citizens’ democratic 
participation opportunities. 
Overall, one must conclude that procedures for introducing amendments to the Constitution are 
clearly defined, neutral and efficient. Citizens also have the opportunity to initiate amendments to 
the Constitution. At the same time, it needs to be pointed out that a 15-fold increase in the number 
of required signatures as early as in the first round has an adverse effect particularly on the ability 
of numerically small groups (including national minorities) and groups without significant financial 
or administrative resources to influence democratic processes. 
Summary: progress during the past 10 years
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
1.1. X* X**
1.2. X
1.3. X*** X
1.4. X* X**
1.5. X
* Legislative framework. 
** Actual situation. 
*** Border matters settled with Russia. 
Suggested improvements
Amendments to the Citizenship Law which in terms of procedures significantly ease the 
recognition of non-citizens’ children as Latvian citizens and ensure preservation of the legal link 
between the state of Latvia and emigrated citizens and their offspring.
Most serious problem
The still disproportionally large number of permanent residents in Latvia who have no citizenship 
(neither Latvian nor of another country), and their lack of efficient political participation. The 
drafting process and content of the integration guidelines as well as discussions and initiatives 
on amendments to the Constitution (in the area of education and language) have polarized and 
radicalized the society thus significantly hampering the dialogue both between various social groups 
and between the political actors and the society. 
Suggested improvements
Facilitate the acquisition of Latvian citizenship, especially among the parents of non-citizen 
children thus ensuring inclusive rhetoric on the part of politicians and media. Review political 
stances on social integration through strengthening civic values as the basis for integrating Latvian 
society. Shape a constructive dialogue, including minority groups, and ensure observation of various 
social groups’ rights and interests when adopting decisions, especially regarding matters that directly 
affect these groups. This will prevent the society’s estrangement from the state and potential further 
radicalization. 
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2. RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Gatis Litvins
Are state and society consistently subject to the law?
2.1. How far is the rule of law operative throughout the territory?
The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia (Satversme) and other laws and regulations state 
that public authorities are obliged to abide by the law. However, public authorities must not only 
observe laws and regulations adopted in relation to their own foundation (Cabinet Regulations, 
binding municipality regulations, internal regulations) but also general principles of law (the 
principle of justice, equality, proportionality, a socially responsible state, etc.). After reinstatement 
of independence, Latvia renounced the concept of legal positivism, where law means only the 
effective laws and regulations adopted by the legislator in writing, replacing it with the concept of 
natural law, where law means laws and regulations adopted by the legislator in writing as well as 
general principles of law. Authorities and courts must not refuse to adopt a decision on a matter on 
the grounds that it is not regulated by law or other external legislation. For example, the Supreme 
Court has stated that it is the duty of the state to recognize a person’s sex change regardless of 
whether legislation lays down, or does not lay down, criteria according to which the sex change 
can be established or lays down the procedure for establishing it. If legislation does not regulate the 
respective matter in detail, then authorities and courts must apply general principles of law. Thus, 
application of law in accordance with the concept of natural law is more complex because special 
methodological skills are required from the body applying the law (AT 2008).
Part of general principles of law are listed in Articles 4–141 of the Administrative Procedure Law, 
however the general principles of law not mentioned therein are disclosed, derived or developed 
through institutional practice or case law, as well as through jurisprudence. The science of law 
must preventively study and solve legal issues relevant to the state in order to channel subsequent 
state-level decisions as well as judgements and judicial decisions (jointly referred to as court rulings) 
in a legally correct direction. Sufficiently developed science thus decreases the ratio of erroneous 
state decisions and court rulings and subsequently reduces the costs of compensation of losses for 
the state (Levits 2010, 4). 
The science of law in Latvia fails to perform its task fully due to lack of development plans and 
funding. As a result, authorities and courts are forced to solve matters characteristic of jurisprudence. 
Therefore, the decision of the President of State to discontinue the activity of the Constitutional 
Law Commission (founded in 2007) adopted on 28 October 2013, without offering any alternatives, 
should be regarded as a mistake. The Commission provided independent academic opinions on 
important constitutional law matters which public authorities and courts subsequently used for 
substantiating their decisions. 
Similarly, law is the key tool for regulating the most important relationships between persons 
according to the concept of natural law. The rule of law is ensured by availability of laws and 
regulations, clarity and predictability of their content, consistence with the Constitution and by 
efficient court proceedings, availability of court rulings, and efficient enforcement thereof. 
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Progress has been made over the course of 10 years, and laws and other external regulations are 
available in a comprehensible and convenient manner as a result. The official publication ‘Latvijas 
Vēstnesis’ as been published electronically on www.vestnesis.lv website since 2012. Systematized 
legislation, including international laws to which Latvia is bound as of 1 July 2014, and updated 
information on amendments thereto is available free of charge on the www.likumi.lv website. 
Provision of such availability did not take place in an obvious way. Entrepreneurs pushed for 
handing the official publishing of laws over to private individuals. The Saeima rejected this idea by 
adopting the Law on Official Publications and Legal Information because the state must have direct 
control over the execution of official publications, and this is not possible if a private individual 
carries out the official publishing (Jarinovska 2009, 15–17). Moreover, the Latvian national system 
of law has already been existing in parallel to that of the European Union (EU) for 10 years. EU 
legislation is published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and the www.eur-lex.europa.
eu website provides access, free of charge, to EU legislation and other unclassified documents in 
the 24 official languages of the EU, including Latvian. 
It is not only the accessibility of the legislation that is important – of equally great 
importance is the fact that individuals are able to get around the massive volumes of laws and 
regulations and understand their content. This is what determines how correctly and successfully 
individuals choose for their behaviour to remain within the bounds of law. The number of laws 
and regulations adopted in Latvia has increased over the last 10 years (see image 2.1).
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Image 2.1. Changes in the number of laws and regulations
Source: TM (Ministry of Justice) 2014.
For example, 1500 laws and 3700 Cabinet Regulations (excluding amendments to laws and 
Cabinet Regulations) were effective in 2014 (TM 2014). With the existence of such a number of 
laws and regulations, and amendments thereto, individuals’ ability to freely navigate the system 
of legislation and manage the content of the regulatory framework decreases. Such a situation is 
the result of the legislator’s choice to solve problems by adopting new laws and regulations, or 
amending the existing ones, instead of allowing those who apply the law to solve them through 
legal interpretation. A superfluous regulatory framework must be removed from the legal system, 
and amending laws and regulations upon first request should be avoided in the future. Educating 
those who draft and apply legislation in the field of law-making and legal interpretation is necessary 
(TM 2014). The legislator adopts a casuistic regulatory framework in order to compensate for the 
inability on the part of those who apply the laws to interpret laws on their merits, instead of through 
a formal interpretation. Therefore, lawyers with insufficient knowledge and skills for applying law 
undermine the rule of law. Unfortunately, discussions on the need to introduce a common state exam 
to law faculty graduates have yielded no results (Jurista Vārds 2012, 6–10).
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Another important matter apart from the publishing and accessibility of laws is for laws and 
lower-ranking regulations to be consistent with hierarchically higher-ranking laws and regulations. 
The Constitutional Court controls the compliance of laws and other legislation with the Constitution. 
This is ensured through initiating court proceedings on the basis of applications filed by institutions 
and private individuals defined in the Constitutional Court Law. The role of the Constitutional 
Court has significantly contributed to strengthening the rule of law since publishing DA 2005. From 
28 June 1996 until 1 November 2004 (i.e., for a period of eight years), the Constitutional Court 
had passed judgements in 69 cases, and adopted decisions on the termination of proceedings in 
32 cases. Conversely, from 1 November 2004 until 18 March 2014 (i.e. for a period of approximately 
10 years), the Constitutional Court passed judgements in 171 cases, and adopted 70 decisions 
on the termination of proceedings. The Constitutional Court especially strengthened its positions 
during the economic crisis (2007–2012) when it passed several substantial judgements in the area 
of social law, independence of the judiciary, budgeting procedures for independent authorities 
(Chancery of the President of Latvia, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, State Audit Office and 
the Ombudsman) and legislative power of the people. The field of the Constitutional Court’s activity 
should be extended in the future in order to be able to delegate the Court’s competence to assess the 
consistency of supreme authorities’ decisions or actions with the Constitution (for example, rulings 
of the Supreme Court in a case of doubt regarding their consistency with the Constitution), and 
to provide statements on the conformity of the senior state officials’ conduct with the Constitution 
through impeachment processes (ECHR 2012). Extension of the Court’s competence would require 
the state to grant additional funding to the Constitutional Court and increase its number of judges. 
Such changes, however, would trigger supremacy of law in the state.
The opportunity to turn to the Court in case of a breach of law is a strong mechanism for 
ensuring the rule of law. Lack of confidence in the judiciary and the lengthiness of court proceedings 
was a topical issue in 2004 and remains so in 2014. During the period of analysis, the legislator 
has sought solutions for improving the performance of courts. However, targets have not been fully 
reached (see Sections 2.4 and 2.6). 
The practice of applying laws and regulations is of great importance in ensuring the rule of law. 
It is the courts that largely determine the content of laws and regulations in each particular case. 
In 2004, only the judgements of the Constitutional Court were accessible, and separate judgements 
of the Supreme Court were available on its website and in the annually published book of selected 
judgements. Accessibility of court rulings has increased over the past decade. In 2013, the Saeima 
passed amendments to the Law on Judicial Power, requiring courts to publish all judgements which 
are passed in open sessions. This has since become effective also in relation to their publication on 
the internet making them easily accessible and free of charge (www.tiesas.lv). 
However, not only court judgements determine substantial rights of individuals, they are also 
determined by court rulings. It is specifically by court ruling that an individual is granted accessibility 
to the court (court proceedings initiated, suspended or terminated, or refused to be initiated, etc.). 
Court rulings are currently not available on the internet. Likewise, decisions of the Constitutional 
Court on rejection to initiate proceedings are not freely accessible on the internet. This prevents 
one from finding out how the Constitutional Court applies the statutory requirements the applicant 
must perform upon submitting an application, and why cases are initiated in only a few cases. The 
Constitutional Court received 404 claims in 2013, 164 of them were recognized as being obviously 
not within its jurisdiction; 240 claims were registered as applications and handed over for review 
in Constitutional Court Divisions, and the Constitutional Court initiated only 21 proceedings as a 
result (ST 2014a). The number of proceedings initiated by the Constitutional Court is low compared 
to the number of the claims received. Therefore, the rulings of courts and the Constitutional Court 
that address the matter of  accessibility of the judiciary should be published in the future. 
Similarly, the duty of the state is to ensure access to the rulings of the EU Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The findings of both of these international courts should 
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be taken into account when interpreting the laws and regulations of Latvia and the international law 
it is bound by. The EU Court translates part of its rulings into Latvian, and the translated texts are 
available online (www.curia.europa.eu) whereas the rulings of the ECHR, even the ones that are 
directly related to Latvia, are not available in full in Latvian (Mits 2012). 
Enforcement of court judgements is yet another substantial aspect of the rule of law. DA 2005 
identified problems related to judgements on civil claims in criminal proceedings and enforcement of 
civil judgements. These problems still exist even 10 years later. The number of enforcement actions 
is increasing every year whereas the number of actions completed within one year is not high. 
The number of actions where enforcement has not been completed or has been terminated without 
recovery is comparatively significant. Activity of bailiffs, as well as circumstances independent of 
their activity, influence the efficiency of the enforcement process. Bailiffs are the most criticized 
professionals in the entire judicial system. The conduct of individual bailiffs in relation to ethics and 
conformity with the law is the subject of extensive discussion within the society. Bailiffs frequently 
show a lack of interest and even avoid cooperation in recovery actions where comparatively small 
sums of money are involved. In turn, bailiffs act promptly and show interest in financially significant 
recovery actions (Šņitņikovs, Kārkliņa 2013, 49). Similarly, dishonest behaviour on the part of 
debtors that may take the shape of concealment of income and acquiring undeclared income, which 
are difficult for bailiffs to establish, reduces the efficacy of debt recovery. Cases when individuals 
are deprived of their liberty during criminal proceedings also lead to difficult situations. Convicted 
individuals have limited opportunities to gain income during confinement and to channel part of it 
into compensation for their victims (Kronberga et al. 2013, 119–123).
In comparison to 2004, additional problems related to failure to enforce court rulings in 
administrative cases have evolved. Execution of sentences for road traffic offences is efficient 
because penalty default gives grounds for refusal to register motor vehicles or to undergo technical 
inspection (receive a public service), but unfortunately such a procedure is not applicable to other 
types of violations. An important reason for this is the high cost of enforcement that the state or 
municipal authorities must pay initially if they request bailiffs to execute court rulings; however, the 
chances are that the enforcement will be unsuccessful and enforcement costs will not be recovered. 
Moreover, the costs are frequently higher than the administrative fine that needs to be recovered. 
The problems associated with the execution of administrative court judgements are not as 
substantial as the ones related to the execution of other court rulings. However, in practice, cases 
where public authorities ignore their statutory duty to enforce administrative court rulings do exist.
The general conclusion is that the rule of law is in force in the territory of Latvia. The situation 
has not changed significantly over the past 10 years. Only some of the problems identified in 
DA 2005 have been solved, and more problems have evolved.
2.2. To what extent are all public officials subject to the rule of law and to 
transparent rules in the fulfillment  of their functions?
Subordination of public officials to the rule of law means that officials must act within the 
competence granted to them in legislation. Public officials must be open towards the society and 
towards private individuals, they must observe data protection, execution of fair procedures within a 
reasonable time frame as well as other provisions whose aim is to ensure that public administration 
observes private individuals’ rights and lawful interests. Private individuals must be able to rely 
on lawful and consistent conduct of the state. Opposing assumptions cannot exist in a country 
where the rule of law exists. However, in practice, officials’ conduct is not always lawful, and a 
range of cases exists (organizing public procurements, insolvency matters, Judicial Disciplinary 
Committee’s unwillingness to punish judges for administrative violations) when public officials’ 
actions undermine the authority of law in the society (Kalniņš 2011, 67). Several cases have been 
confirmed where policemen, whose task is to signal violations of the law, haved failed to abide by 
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the law themselves. Some of the examples are as follows: running a cyclist over with a car and 
leaving him without assistance (LETA 2012b), falsification of blood test results in order to save a 
colleague from being held responsible for running over a child (Stirāne 2012), giving instructions to 
reduce an administrative penalty for particular individuals or to release them from it (LETA 2014b), 
drunk driving (LSM (Latvian Public Media) 2014a). 
Given the above, the state has set up a monitoring system which aims to ensure that public 
officials are subject to the rule of law. Both authorities that adopt legally binding decisions, such 
as the Prosecutor’s Office and the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (CPCB), and 
institutions whose decisions are of an advisory character, i.e. the Ombudsman and the State Audit 
Office, monitor the lawfulness of public officials’ conduct in Latvia. 
Since 2004, the Administrative Court, which consists of the District Administrative Court, 
Regional Administrative Court and Department of Administrative Cases of the Senate of the 
Supreme Court, has contributed substantially to monitoring the subordination of public officials to 
the rule of law during their office. Over the past 10 years, the Administrative Court has significantly 
improved the protection of private individuals’ rights, raised the quality of public officials’ work, and 
reinforced their accountability. In 2005, 2 140 cases were completed in the District Administrative 
Court and private individuals’ claims were satisfied in 690 cases (32 % of the cases) whereas in 
2009, the number of completed cases increased to 3 704 and claims were satisfied in 846 cases 
(23 % of cases). In turn, 4 560 cases were completed in 2013, and claims were satisfied in 528 of 
them (12 % of cases) (Tiesu administrācija (Court Administration) 2014). In order for the monitoring 
to be even more efficient, the administrative court procedure must become quicker (in 2013, the 
average time of reviewing cases were as follows: District Administrative Court – 11 months, 
Regional Administrative Court – 13 months, Department of Administrative Cases of the Senate 
of the Supreme Court – 3 months) (Court Administration 2014), and disciplinary or even criminal 
liability must be imposed on public officials for violating the law.
Over the past 10 years, launching the activity of the administrative court has significantly 
improved awareness about accessibility of information and ensured availability of information in cases 
when public officials refused to provide it without due reason. The Department of Administrative 
Cases of the Senate of the Supreme Court has pointed to the society’s rights to acquire information 
about corporations fully or partly owned by the state (AT (Supreme Court) 2014), the right to receive 
information about persons employed by the state (AT 2012), transparency regarding the procedure 
of granting access to state secrets (AT 2011). Administrative court judgements have shaped the basis 
for improving practices of authorities as well as laws and regulations. 
The Prosecutor’s Office monitors the lawfulness of public officials’ conduct during criminal 
proceedings as well as through issuing warnings and submitting claims to public officials about 
decisions that are inconsistent with the law (LETA 2014a). Poor material supplies undermine the 
efficiency of the work of the Prosecutors Office. As is the case with other authorities, the Prosecutor’s 
Office faces the problem of failure to ensure full staffing due to the poor skills of the candidates 
for positions. Public authorities are in an unenviable situation: they can either refrain from hiring 
candidates who do not meet the corresponding requirements and thus work at a slower pace, or 
risk failure to observe the principle of the rule of law by hiring such candidates in the hope that 
their skills will improve.
The activity of the CPCB has contributed to the rule of law in the state. At the same time, 
the cases that have repercussions in the society are investigated for long periods of time (Delna 
2014). Furthermore, scandals within the CPCB have decreased the efficiency of its performance. 
The society’s trust in the performance of this institution is low which, in turn, encourages some 
politicians to talk about liquidating the CPCB. Veronika Krūmiņa, Chairperson of the Department of 
Administrative Cases of the Senate of the Supreme Court, points out that the current situation where 
officials of the CPCB are in labour relations with the employer, instead of being civil servants, is 
inappropriate (Litvins 2014, 15–19). The employees of CPCB who perform public administration 
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tasks must be civil servants of the state. Civil servants are admitted to the civil service by means of 
a directive and in accordance with the State Civil Service Law. Laws and regulations that regulate 
labour relations do not apply to civil servants. For example, termination of employment does not 
require consent from trade unions. Currently, CPCB employees are hired on the basis of a labour 
agreement and in accordance with the Labour Law. The private law status of CPCB employees 
hampers efficient management of the institution.
Partial solving of the problems identified in DA 2005 related to transparency and control of 
political parties’ funding and pre-election campaigning is a positive development. The regulatory 
framework lays down clear and comprehensive disclosure of information on political parties’ income 
and expenditure, and parties prepare and submit this information on a regular basis.
The above-mentioned supervising authorities accept legally binding decisions regarding public 
officials whereas the Ombudsman and State Audit Office formulate their conclusions on particular 
matters in the shape of opinions and recommendations in order for public officials to improve their 
performance.
The Ombudsman’s Office was established in 2007 to replace the National Human Rights Office, 
and it was given broader competence than the previous institution (LR MK 2005). According to 
the Ombudsman Law, the authority’s core function is to monitor implementation of state power 
and to protect human rights. Initially, the activity of the Ombudsman was invisible to the public. 
Its work has become more visible since Juris Jansons was approved as the Ombudsman, however 
the procedure of appointing the Ombudsman and the way it communicates with public authorities 
and the society have failed to guarantee the institution the authority it ought to have (LSM 2014b). 
Unlike in other European countries, public officials in Latvia do not recognize legally non-binding 
opinions, in terms of authority and competence, as equivalent to judicial rulings (Tiesībsarga birojs 
(Ombudsman’s Office) 2009; Кутрис 2007). Conversely, in advanced democratic societies, such as 
Sweden and Denmark, the Ombudsman’s recommendations are implemented in almost all cases 
(ECT 1987). The Ombudsman in Latvia has been given the difficult task of ensuring that its legally 
non-binding recommendations are implemented in the society and in the legal system which, in 
the latter’s case, is accustomed to observing only mandatory directives. Additionally, the economic 
crisis changed the Ombudsman’s performance potential for the worse, as was the case for other law 
enforcement institutions. In order for the Ombudsman’s Office to perform its functions efficiently, it 
must be provided with the necessary funding and human resources. It should be stressed that even 
the UN Human Rights Committee has indicated these shortcomings (HRC 2014).
The activity of the State Audit Office has been commendable throughout the past decade. In 2013, 
VK issued 439 recommendations, and authorities implemented 354 (81 %) of them. The positive 
indicator mostly reflects the level of introducing recommendations in ministries and other central 
authorities of the state. The attitude and willingness to improve has been lower among municipalities: 
local governments were able to implement only 42 % of the provided recommendations (Matule 
2014b, 6–9). Therefore, solutions for strengthening municipal officials’ subordination to the rule 
of law should be sought. 
The State Audit Office has concluded that breaches of office were related to inefficient manage-
ment, a superficial attitude towards state property, incompetent decision-making, and postponement 
or faulty execution of decisions. Whilst not all breaches were criminal offences, they  nevertheless 
considerably influenced the society’s trust in state power, and left a general impact on the state financial 
system and business environment. Decisions adopted by officials are ‘untraceable’, and they speak 
volumes for the politicians’ and officials’ inability to think about long-term consequences of their 
activity. Politicians put pressure on officials whose activity or inactivity is justified in such cases of 
influence. Furthermore, the State Audit Office has established that officials who hold higher positions 
are reluctant to evaluate the activity of their subordinates in cases of violation, inefficient activity or 
inactivity, and they seek justification and excuses instead of correcting mistakes (Matule 2014b, 6–9). 
Therefore, the State Civil Service Administration, reorganized in 2008, should be restored in the future.
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In order to be able to acknowledge that the rule of law exsts, society must be convinced that 
the process of passing laws takes place in its interests. The level of transparency in the Saeima is 
high; it is even higher than required by laws and regulations (Kalniņš 2011, 38). Engagement of 
NGOs’ representatives and experts in legislative processes is commendable. Amendments to the 
Constitution transparency and to the legislator’s accountability. On 19 January 2012, the Saeima 
adopted amendments to the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure which sets the rules for the election, 
approval, appointment, dismissal or termination, through open balloting, of office of the State Auditor, 
judges, Head of the Constitution Protection Bureau, Prosecutor General, Head of CPCB, Head of 
the Central Election Commission and other public officials. On 19 September 2013, amendments to 
the Constitution were introduced; they stipulated that judges of the Constitutional Court must also 
be approved in office through open balloting.
The fact that draft law summaries are prepared in accordance with the wording of the draft 
law, adopted by the Saeima in the first reading, whereas amendments to the draft law, introduced 
by the Saeima during the second and third reading, are not reflected in the summary deserves 
criticism. Therefore, the Saeima must either update the content of the summary or issue a separate 
explanatory note after passing a law in order for one to be able to clearly establish the legislative 
intent. Commissions’ Minutes of Meeting reflecting discussions on draft decisions must be available 
on the Saeima’s and municipalities’ websites (Delna 2012b). One can follow the progress of draft 
laws and Cabinet Regulations online. Unfortunately, the same does not hold true for municipality 
draft regulations – the process of adopting these regulations lacks transparency. Still, traceability 
of draft legislation does not prevent adoption of laws and regulations, or attempts thereof, in the 
interests of separate individuals instead of the entire society. The bill on lobbying has still not been 
passed (Delna 2012a). 
In general, officials are subject to the rule of law, and the situation has improved over the past 
10 years. Public officials are still frequently prone to applying legislation formally due either to their 
acting in bad faith or to a lack of skills and knowledge. However, the Administrative Court, the State 
Audit Office and the Ombudsman’s Office have requested public officials to improve the quality of 
their work. The legislative process has also become more transparent. In the future, pre-legislative or 
ex ante assessments, as well as post-legislative or ex post assessments, of legal provisions must be 
introduced into the legislative process in order to improve the quality of the content of legislation.
2.3. How independent are the courts and the judiciary from the executive, 
and how free are they from all kinds of interference?
Articles 83 and 84 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms lay down the principle of the independence of 
judges. Institutional independence of the judiciary and judges means that the administration of 
justice is dissociated from other estates (for example, when determining the procedure for approving 
judges, as well as social and material guarantees) and from participants of the adjudicated case. The 
European Commission has acknowledged that the general indicator of the perception of independence 
of the judiciary has slightly decreased in Latvia: its global ranking was 61 in 2013 as opposed to 
64 in 2014 (EC 2014).
DA (Audit of Democracy) 2005 evaluations indicated that government and parliament 
representatives periodically intervened or put pressure on courts regarding the adjudication 
of certain cases, thus influencing independent and objective administration (of justice. Similar 
situations have occurred less frequently during the course of the past 10 years; additionally, 
realisation that such conduct is inappropriate and inadmissible has evolved. No individuals have 
been punished for influencing the work of judges (Article 295 of the Criminal Law) during recent 
years. Therefore, external intervention in the reviewing of cases cannot currently be considered as 
a significant problem in our country. 
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Cases of external intervention in particular court proceedings are not known by the general 
public, however risks to independence in the field of court administration do exist. Some of the 
problems mentioned in DA 2005 are persist today. The problem related to the representation of the 
judiciary was solved in 2010 through establishing the Judiciary Council, a collegial body involved 
in policy-making and strategy development as well as in improving the operation of the judicial 
system. Furthermore, a system for selecting candidates for appointments as judges was established 
enabling the assessment of the professional aptitude of candidates prior to approval. Even though 
improvements have been made, the regulatory framework still permits excessive involvement of 
the executive and legislative powers in the work of the judiciary. Just as it was a decade ago, 
shortcomings in the independent character of courts are caused by systematic problems related to 
court budgeting and to the career advancement of judges. 
Responsibility for staff record management, budgeting as well as planning and supply (admin-
istration) of material and technical resources for district (city) administrative courts falls to the au-
thority subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, i.e. the Court Administration. The Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Court, in turn, have established their own management institutions. The result is 
that there is no single management approach employed across the judicial system. The Democracy 
Audit published in 2005 predicted that the Court Administration would become an independent in-
stitution in 2005; however this never happened. Edvīns Balševics, the current Director of the Court 
Administration, indicates that by implication and according to the principle of the separation of 
powers, the Court Administration belongs to the judicial power, not the executive power. At the same 
time, there are currently no grounds for concluding that the present subordination prevents it from 
functioning efficiently and proficiently (Matule 2014a, 6–12). In practice, the status of the Court 
Administration does not currently cause problems; however, it must be shaped as an independent 
institution in order to ensure sustainable stability. This requires separating the judicial power from 
the executive power in terms of administrating all of the judicial system’s institutions.
The Supreme Court and the Constitutional court presently organize their work independently of 
the executive power, and they submit their draft budgets for the next year to the Cabinet of Ministers. 
Despite this, risks to independence nevertheless exist in the Supreme Court’s and the Constitutional 
Court’s budgeting process. The Constitutional Court ruled in case No 2011-18-01 that the Supreme 
Court and the Constitutional Court cannot express a completely developed opinion about the funding 
necessary for their functioning because they cannot submit adjustments and corrections to the 
Minutes of Meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers. These Minutes would subsequently be appended 
to the explanatory note to the government budget draft law and be sent to the Saeima. Therefore, 
there is a risk that the Saeima may receive an incomplete opinion from both institutions regarding 
the funding that is necessary for performing their functions. During the trial, the Saeima agreed to 
introduce amendments to the legislation related to the procedure for developing the government 
budget; however, the Constitutional Court pointed to another problem, i.e. that the responsible 
officials who represent the executive power apply laws and regulations in bad faith.
As regards the budgeting for the judicial system, experts point out that failure to include im-
provement of courts in the National Development Plan prevents courts (the judiciary) from preparing 
new policy initiatives and planning the development of courts and their budgets (Tieslietu padome 
(Judiciary Council) 2012, 46). Experts also draw attention to the threats regarding judges’ independ-
ence; these threats are related to the ‘alignment’ of judges’ wages with the ones of public authority 
employees. In accordance with Article 4 Paragraph 9 of the Law on Remuneration of Officials and 
Employees of State and Municipal Authorities, monthly salaries of judges must be determined by 
using them as a benchmark to the monthly salary of highly qualified lawyers of public administration 
authorities and applying corresponding coefficients. In the case of such alignment, the remuneration 
system does not provide (and maintain) the actual value of judges’ salaries. Furthermore, social 
guarantees for judges have been reduced (Tieslietu padome 2012, 46).
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The executive power and the legislative power can also influence decisions regarding approval 
of judges and further advancement of their careers. There have been cases during the past 10 years 
when the Saeima did not approve the appointment of several candidates for appointment as judges 
regardless of the fact that they complied with the respective requirements and had successfully 
completed all phases of candidate selection (AT 2010).
The Law on Judicial Power stipulates that the Minister for Justice nominates candidates for 
appointment as judges, and the Saeima votes for their appointment or approval. Furthermore, 
the Minister for Justice adopts a decision on the appointment, dismissal and replacement of the 
Chairperson (and Deputy Chairperson) of the District (City) Court and the Regional Court. The 
executive power thus has an opportunity to directly influence the appointment of judges and the 
organization of the functioning of courts. 
The risk regarding the independence of judges is due to the fact that the Saeima appoints district 
(city) court judges for a period of three years. After three years of service, judges are approved for 
an indefinite term or re-appointed for a period of up to two years. The problem related to the fact 
that a lifetime appointment of judges depends on the votes of politicians was already indicated in 
DA 2005. Therefore, either the three-year trial period applied to judges should be renounced or, if it 
is preserved, then the law should clearly stipulate that judges who are not nominated for a lifetime 
appointment have the right to appeal such a decision in court. The law should also provide that the 
Saeima only approves decisions on lifetime appointments of judges whereas the Judiciary Council 
adopts decisions related to further advancement of judges’ careers, such as decisions on transferring 
judges to a court of a higher level. The Saeima’s competence of approving the Chairperson of the 
Supreme Court should also be transferred to the Judiciary Council (Tieslietu padome 2012, 46).
Today, the decision to revoke the prohibition for judges to be members of political organizations 
would present threats to the judiciary’s independence.  In case No. 2012-16-01, the Constitutional 
Court found that the prohibition for judges to be engaged in political parties and other political 
organizations stated in the Law on Judicial Power guarantees the functioning of a fair, independent 
and impartial judiciary. The Constitutional Court also concluded that, in the future, the legislator 
should perhaps assess the need for such a prohibition in a democratic society. Various standards 
exist in other countries – ranging from the prohibition to engage in all political activities to quite 
a wide range of permitted activities in political parties. In Lithuania, (Seimas 1994, 44 (3); 48 (5)) 
and Estonia (Riigikogu 2002, 49 (2)) judges are prohibited, by law, from being members of political 
parties. In Canada ‘all political activities must end when the judge acquires office’. Conversely, 
in Italy judges are permitted to engage in the functioning of political parties and to express their 
political opinions publicly (it is prohibited to take part in pre-election campaigns) (Kalniņš, Kažoka, 
Litvins 2008: 148). Also, in some USA states judges are permitted to be members of political parties 
(Forward 2010). Thus, the right of judges to be members of political parties in Latvia currently has the 
status of ‘dormant right’. Judges might be permitted to be members of political parties if the political 
culture in Latvia did not jeopardize the functioning of a fair, independent and impartial judiciary.
Overall the independence of the judiciary is observed in Latvia. Nonetheless, problems with 
the independence of the judiciary exist in relation to the administration of the court system and the 
advancement of judges’ careers. Some of the problems have existed since 2004. The situation has 
not changed significantly during the past 10 years.
2.4. How equitable and secure is the access of citizens to justice, to due 
process and to redress in the event of maladministration?
Latvian legislation and binding international agreements lay down the state’s obligation to 
ensure equal and secure access to fair and timely trial as well as the right to receive compensation 
for public administration errors. Access to justice is one of the most fundamental elements of a fair 
trial; in its absence, other guarantees arising from the right to a fair trial, such as due process of 
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law, openness of proceedings, and the right to a reasoned judgement, become meaningless because 
individuals are not able to benefit from them if they do not have an opportunity to turn to the court 
(Briede et al 2011, 129). 
State-provided legal aid guarantees equal access to justice. The Law on State Legal Aid became 
effective on 1 June 2005. Its aim was to provide state-guaranteed financial aid for receiving legal aid 
in cases when individuals would otherwise have no access to justice. The problem related to the fail-
ure on the part of the state to duly ensure legal aid to individuals was already identified in DA 2005. 
A similar problem exists now. Latvia provides legal aid in criminal cases and, to a comparatively 
limited extent, in civil cases whereas no assistance is offered in administrative cases (except for 
those relative to appeals for asylum). Compared to other countries, little funding is allocated to legal 
aid in Latvia. In 2010, public funding earmarked for legal aid in European countries was 6.8 euros 
per capita on average whereas the funds allocated for this purpose in Latvia was only 0.4 euros 
per capita (Council of Europe 2012, 76). Furthermore, doubts exist regarding the efficiency of the 
state-offered legal aid. Barristers do not wish to engage in providing legal aid because the number of 
remunerated consultation hours and procedural documents is insufficient. The state should increase 
the number of eligible types of legal aid and remuneration rates for those who provide legal aid.
The judgement in case No 2003-04-01, adopted by the Constitutional Court in 2003, was 
presented in DA 2005 as a success. In this case, the Constitutional Court recognized that the monopoly 
barristers enjoy in civil proceedings is in conflict with the right to fair trial. Therefore, in the courts 
of cassation, similarly to the courts of first instance and appeal, individuals must be permitted 
to conduct proceedings either themselves or through authorized representatives. Furthermore, any 
physical person may be the authorized representative. Ten years later, on 9 December 2013, the 
Saeima amended the Civil Procedure Law and determined that individuals may choose to conduct 
proceedings at the court of cassation themselves or through the intermediary of a barrister. Having 
analysed the arguments stated by the Constitutional Court in 2003 and the amendments to the 
Civil Procedure Law introduced in 2013, one must admit that these amendments were a positive 
development as they aligned the society’s interests with individuals’ right to be free to choose their 
representatives thus allowing for a better quality of proceedings at the court of cassation. Similarly, 
in its judgement in case No. 2013-04-01 adopted in 2014, the Constitutional Court recognized that 
the use of legal aid provided by a barrister facilitates optimum cost-efficiency of trials and promotes 
achievement of a fairer result. Therefore, where there is a favourable judgement, it is reasonable 
to request the other party to compensate only such proceedings-related expenses that are related to 
hiring a barrister instead of a regular attorney. Thus, the Constitutional Court ruled that barristers 
may be given advantages during civil proceedings, compared to other providers of legal aid, if 
such advantages have a legitimate purpose and proportionality is ensured between the interests of 
an individual and those of the society.
Such conditions as geographical distance between an individual’s place of residence and the 
court also influence equal access to justice. Not all residents have personal means of transport, and 
the current public transport network does not ensure efficient access to courts. The administrative 
court began to adjudicate on administrative violation cases in 2004, and courts of general jurisdiction 
started to adjudicate on them in 2013. The Administrative District Court consists of five court 
buildings and there is only one Administrative Regional Court (in Riga); in turn, 34 district (city) 
courts of general jurisdiction and five regional courts of general jurisdiction exist. Courts of general 
jurisdiction cover the entire territory of the state. Thus, the access to justice in administrative 
violation cases has increased substantially since 2013 because courts are closer to individuals’ place 
of residence. Similarly, jurisdiction from administrative courts to the courts of general jurisdiction, 
and vice versa, should be changed for several other categories of cases (Kalniņš et al 2013, 52–100).
Stability of court rulings ensures secure access to fair and timely justice, i.e. the number of 
appeal and cassation petitions satisfied (rulings of courts of lower instances amended or annulled, 
cases sent for repeated review). The proportion of appealed judgements and amended or annulled 
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judgements is comparatively high in Latvia (AT 2013a). The Saeima’s resolution to liquidate the 
Chamber of Civil Cases (as of 2017) and the Chamber of Criminal Cases (as of 2015) of the 
Supreme Court, and to establish three ‘pure’ court instances instead, will ensure more secure access 
to justice. District (city) courts will hear all civil and criminal cases at the first instance, regional 
courts will deal with cases of appeal, and the Supreme Court will review cassation petitions. In 
practice, it is often not clear for individuals which of the courts is the court of first instance and at 
which court they should file their petitions – the district (city) court or the regional court.
Fair courts must not only be impartial and independent, they must also be knowledgeable. The 
European Commission has concluded that the training available for judges in Latvia is mediocre (EC 
2014). Similarly to other member states of the Council of Europe (Jagland 2014, 23), training for 
judges must be a high priority and sufficient funds from the government budget must be allocated 
for this purpose.
Timely courts are courts that adopt their rulings within a reasonable time frame considering both 
the complexity of the case in question and the general workload of the court. Legislation does not 
lay down a time limit beyond which it is automatically recognized that the particular case was heard 
within an essentially unreasonable time frame. Circumstances and the acceptability of the length 
of proceedings are assessed separately in each case (Briede et al 2011, 140). The right to a hearing 
within a reasonable time frame (prompt and efficient process) is one of the core elements of the 
right to fair trial particularly emphasized in relation to criminal proceedings. The problem outlined 
in DA 2005, namely protracted proceedings and delayed hearing of cases, is still relevant today. 
On average, court hearings in Latvia are lengthy compared to other EU member states. It is in 
Denmark where cases are reviewed most promptly – 15 days on average; 180 days are necessary 
in Latvia whereas in Portugal it is 810 days. On a positive note, currently Latvian courts hear more 
cases than they receive, thus they are able to reduce the number of accrued cases needing to be 
heard (EC 2014). Concerns regarding the timeliness of reviewing cases arise from the workloads of 
separate courts and the length of proceedings. During the first quarter of 2014, criminal cases at the 
court of first instance were reviewed within the following time periods: an average of 65.5 months 
at Kurzeme Regional Court, 44.7 months at Zemgale Regional Court, and 23.9 months at Vidzeme 
Regional Court. In the court of appeal, especially lengthy proceedings are reported at the Chamber 
of Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court (an average of 20.9 months) and Administrative Regional 
Court (an average of 18 months). In the court of cassation the lengthiest proceedings are reported 
at the Chamber of Civil Cases of the Supreme Court, i.e. 14.8 months on average (for the sake of 
comparison: at the Department of Criminal Cases – 1.3 months, and 2.6 months at the Department 
of Administrative Cases) (Tiesu administrācija 2014). Thus, the length of proceedings is not a 
problem in general. However, where there are unreasonably lengthy proceedings, solutions should 
be sought individually in each court.
Similarly, professors Ārija Melikaša and Kristīne Strada–Rozenberga indicate that, in general, 
positive trends are observed in terms of decreasing the lengthiness of criminal proceedings at Latvian 
courts. The circumstance that does raise concerns is the still comparatively large number of court 
hearings that have been postponed or have not taken place. The figures have not decreased during 
the recent years. This problem requires a complex solution that is mainly related to the improvement 
of managing court hearings (Meikališa, Strada–Rozenberga 2013).
Sufficient funding for the court to be able to implement its functions efficiently also influences 
access to timely justice. Of all of the EU member states, the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria 
are the countries that allocate the smallest government funds to courts. Latvia spends just over 
20 euros per capita per year for courts’ needs. The countries that spend the most for this purpose 
are Luxembourg (over 140 euros) and Germany (over 100 euros) (EC 2014). Similar problems exist 
in terms of the lack of resources at Latvian courts. Judges are overloaded with work, and salaries 
of judicial clerks do not correspond to their level of expertise and the amount of work they do 
(Kalniņš 2011, 60–61).
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The law guarantees individuals’ rights to receive compensation for the errors made by public 
authorities. The Law on the Compensation of Damages Caused by Public Authorities ensures the 
right to adequate compensation in the legally specified amount guaranteed to individuals in the 
Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Law. The Supreme Court has nevertheless recognized 
that, when determining compensation, courts must compare the compensation determined by the 
ECHR in similar cases and they must not only consider the economic opportunities in Latvia but 
also bear in mind that compensation for non-pecuniary damages must not be significantly lower than 
the minimum determined by the ECHR (AT 2013b). No clear and stable criteria for determining the 
amount of compensation have been established in judicial practice, and the amount of compensation 
determined by the courts does not always correspond to the practice of the ECHR. 
No regulatory framework currently exists for regulating individuals’ rights to compensation 
for damage caused by applying inadequate national or EU laws, or for not reviewing a case within 
a reasonable time frame. Only the Criminal Procedure Law lays down a partial compensation 
mechanism which provides that individuals may be released from criminal liability if it is established 
that their rights to completion of criminal proceedings within a reasonable time frame have been 
violated. Court rulings frequently show flaws in terms of reasoning as to whether, upon the completion 
of criminal proceedings, a given offence has been recognized within a reasonable time frame, and, 
if so, why the court acted in a particular way (Meikališa, Strada-Rozenberga 2013).
In general, the situation is better today than it was in 2004. However, the state still does not 
ensure sufficient legal aid, and court proceedings in separate courts are unreasonably long. Individuals 
are eligible for compensation for the errors made by public authorities. However, no regulatory 
framework exists regarding receiving compensation for the damage caused by courts.
2.5. How far do the criminal justice and penal systems observe due rules of 
impartial and equitable treatment in their operations?
National legislation (the Constitution, Criminal Procedure Law and the Sentence Execution 
Code of Latvia) as well as international human rights treaties to which Latvia is bound (European 
Convention on Human Rights, UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, etc.) provide for impartiality 
and equal treatment of all parties regarding criminal proceedings and the penal system. Thus, the 
legislative framework is indubitably required to ensure impartiality and equal treatment. 
The key goal, i.e. restoration of victims’ rights and compensation for damages, is not fully ob-
served in criminal proceedings and execution of sentence. Sentencing and penalization of the alleged 
offender is erroneously determined as the goal. The legal status of victims in criminal cases is such 
that the focus of facilitating the sentencing of the criminal offender rather than restoring the victims’ 
rights to how they were prior to the offence is seen to be the purpose of the proceedings. Considering 
that facilitating the sentencing of the criminal is erroneously assumed to be the purpose of criminal 
proceedings, the alleged offender has more access to state-provided legal aid than the victim, whereas 
the process of compensating damages is bureaucratic and thus effectively unavailable to the majority 
of victims. Furthermore, the scope of victims’ rights and obligations is defined only in the criminal 
proceedings up to the point when the conviction becomes effective; in addition to this, the regulation 
is of a rather formal character. The victim has no role during the process of execution of the sentence. 
The remark made in DA 2005 regarding the absence of sufficient guarantees for ensuring legal 
aid during criminal proceedings is still of relevance (see Section 2.4).
Risks of an unequal and biased attitude towards one of the parties exist in all matters where 
courts have a relatively high degree of discretion. Courts enjoy a comparatively high degree of 
freedom in criminal proceedings and in the penal system. Criminal offences that correspond in 
content to an Article of the Criminal Law differ in terms of injuriousness and degree of guilt. 
Taking these differences into account, the law leaves determination of punishment up to the court. 
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Similarly, courts enjoy a rather high degree of discretion in terms of evaluating evidence. However, it 
will never be possible to eliminate the risks that arise from a flexible system of penal sanctions and 
evaluation of evidence through amendments to the law. If this were so, the courts’ degree of freedom 
in imposing punishment and evaluating evidence would be considerably limited which, in turn, is 
incompatible with the principle of guilt and fair punishment. In order to establish whether the court 
uses its free discretion in determining punishment and evaluating evidence equally, it is necessary 
to analyse case law and identify what factors decrease or amplify individuals’ responsibility and 
recognize standards for evaluating evidence. Currently such analyses are performed rarely; therefore 
it is impossible to claim that consistent and predictable judicial practice exists, ensuring equal 
treatment towards all parties. 
The ECHR has recognized Latvia’s liability in several cases when the prohibition on torture 
or cruel/humiliating treatment was violated. The violations were related to the poor state of the 
infrastructure in police stations and prisons as well as to insufficient professionalism on the part 
of officials. Therefore, in order to prevent similar violations, the state has committed to building 
new prisons (LR MK 2013). Special attention should be paid particularly to convicts who are 
serving lifetime imprisonment; effectiveness and pace of pre-trial criminal proceedings must also be 
improved. At present, there is an unreasonably long wait before judgements in criminal proceedings 
become effective (HRC 2014).
Another fact that contributes to unfair treatment is that no independent and impartial rights’ 
protection mechanisms exist for assessing public officials’ offences committed in psychiatric hospi-
tals, police stations and prisons. Internal investigation authorities are not entirely independent, and 
investigations are inefficient. Officials’ violations are investigated incompletely, and the responsible 
individuals do not always face prosecution (HEC 2014).
Similarly, cases have been established where information was unlawfully leaked from law 
enforcement institutions for the benefit of separate individuals, thus giving them advantages, without 
any grounds for doing so, as well as hampering the progress of criminal proceedings and the 
ascertainment of the truth (LETA 2012a, 2013a). Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has found 
that judges frequently fail to observe due diligence when assessing whether it is reasonable to take 
somebody into custody during pre-trial criminal proceedings and when evaluating parties’ equal 
access to the criminal case files (ST 2014b). An order must be established where, on one hand, 
unlawful leakage of information is eliminated, and on the other, information may be given to 
individuals when the law provides for disclosure.
Different treatment is justifiable in individual cases during criminal proceedings. On 29 May 
2014, the Saeima, based on good reasons, adopted amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law 
stipulating that criminal proceedings in which the defendant is a public official who holds a res-
ponsible position must have priority over other criminal proceedings in terms of ensuring proceedings 
within a reasonable time frame. The amendments to the law are justified by the legitimate aim of 
terminating a situation where the defendant is an official who in separate cases even preserves the 
right to adopt decisions in matters important for the society. Continuous uncertainty undermines the 
authority of public administration, judiciary and municipalities, and reduces people’s trust in justice 
and the state. For example, judge of the Constitutional Court Vineta Muižniece was dismissed from 
her duties at the end of 2011 but the judgement on her case only became effective mid- 2014. Even 
though V. Muižniece did not take part in the work of the Constitutional Court during the proceedings, 
she maintained her position of judge and her salary, receiving a total of over 80 000 euros over the 
period during which she was suspended (LETA 2014c).
Generally speaking, one can conclude that restoration of victim’s rights and compensation for 
damages have wrongfully not been determined as the key goal in criminal proceedings and in the 
penal system. By and large, the situation has not changed since 2004. Positive trends, facilitated 
in the main by the ECHR’s report on the regulatory framework and judicial practice in Latvia, are 
nonetheless observed.
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2.6. How much confidence do people have in the legal system to deliver fair 
and effective justice?
Courts cannot perform their tasks if the legitimacy and soundness of their rulings are questioned. 
People’s distrust in the judicial system has been a continuous problem, already identified in DA 2005. 
Several factors influence the society’s trust and opinion regarding the fairness of courts. One of 
them is the society’s negative attitude towards the political power in general because the sovereign 
has not enjoyed a continuous and high level of public trust. This has contributed to the formation 
of a negative attitude towards the judicial system. Nonetheless, exceptions exist: the society trusts 
separate public authorities. Unfortunately, courts are not one of these. A public poll conducted by 
the research agency Latvijas Fakti in 2012 reveals that 34.1 % of respondents characterized courts 
as ‘very or rather unfair in terms of corruption’ (Šņitņikovs, Kārkliņa 2013, 10). These indicators are 
better than the ones given for the Saeima and the Cabinet of Ministers (over 40 % of the population 
of Latvia questioned the fairness of these authorities’ activity) whereas they were much lower than 
those of the State Audit Office (Šņitņikovs, Kārkliņa 2013, 10).
Laws and courts ensures that parties have equal opportunities to participate in the trial and prove 
their case. However the perception that the judicial system is inefficient, ponderous and slow is 
rooted deeply in the society. Not much evidence exists regarding corruption and acting in bad faith 
on the part of judges, however prominent scandals and various circumstances shape the general 
impression of the judicial system. 
Possible telephone conversations between barristers and judges published in the book ‘Tiesāšanās 
kā ķēķis’ (Litigation as a Kitchen) influenced and still continue to influence the image of courts 
(2007). The Prosecutor General’s Office established breaches in the conduct of several judges of 
the Supreme Court and the Riga Regional Court, however criminal proceedings never followed. 
Some of the judges related to the above-mentioned telephone conversations left their positions after 
the scandal, however this case has left a sense of incompleteness. The inability to find solutions to 
problems or the protracted seeking of solutions has left an impact on the society’s attitude. 
Conditions such as publicly known cases which in one instance lasted for several years, cases 
at the European Court of Human Rights being regularly lost, unethical behaviour of judges (being at 
work in a state of inebriation and aggressive behaviour towards journalists) (Libeka 2013), alleged 
dishonest and unlawful cooperation between judges and insolvency administrators (LETA 2013b), as 
well as proceedings on an increase in their salary launched at the Constitutional Court by judges and 
prosecutors while other public officials’ salaries were being cut, negatively influence the image of 
the judicial system. Adequate and prompt explanations from the officials of the judicial system were 
necessary in these cases. Furthermore, the judicial system has been at the centre of public attention 
for the past five years. The judicial system’s institutional authority has decreased, and journalists 
view the work of judges, politicians and other public officials equally critically. 
One can conclude from public polls carried out throughout the past 10 years that honesty of 
court employees is appraised much more positively than the judicial system in general. Moreover, 
individuals who have had personal encounters with judicial authorities have a more positive attitude 
towards the judicial system than those who have never had any dealings with courts (Kalniņš, 
Austere 2010). In its poll conducted in 2012, SKDS concluded that almost half of those who have 
had encounters with courts ‘fully trust’ or ‘quite trust’ courts (48 %) whereas 44 % ‘do not really 
trust’ or ‘have no trust’ in courts. In the general public these indicators are in turn significantly 
different: only 30 % claim they trust (‘fully trust’ or ‘quite trust’) courts whereas almost a half the 
respondents were sceptical and admitted they do not trust courts (48 % ‘do not really trust’ or ‘have 
no trust’ in courts) (Šņitņikovs, Kārkliņa 2013, 11). 
Nevertheless, positive changes are also observed: in 2007, 14 % of Latvia’s population were of 
the opinion that courts are were honest (a similar proportion of favourable responses was reported 
in 1999 when 15.9 % of the population considered courts to be honest) whereas as many as 28.5 % 
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of the population shared this opinion in 2012 (Šņitņikovs, Kārkliņa 2013, 11). Public trust in courts 
has increased during the recent years. Similar trends were revealed in the poll conducted by the 
SKDS public opinion research centre in 2011: for the first time in the last decade courts had positive 
trust ratings, i.e. +1 point. This rating was much lower in 2010 (-12 points) and even lower in 2000 
(-26 points) (Šņitņikovs, Kārkliņa 2013, 11). Improvements in ratings might be related to the fact 
that increasing the efficiency of court proceedings has been one of the legislator’s priorities during 
recent years. The Judiciary Council launched its activity in 2010, and amendments to the Law on 
Judicial Power and other laws and regulations related to court proceedings were adopted.
Even though positive trends are observed and public trust in the judicial system has increased 
over the past 10 years, it is still at an insufficient level. Substantiating court rulings with clear 
and convincing arguments is the most effective way to increase the society’s trust. Administrative 
institutions of the judicial system must explain the competence of courts and restrictions to their 
activity to the society, adopt decisions about judges’ liability in a fair and transparent way in 
cases when they act unlawfully and unethically, as well as take the initiative to define challenges 
related to the judicial system and propose solutions to these challenges to the Saeima. Additionally, 
between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2016, the Judicial Qualifications Committee must assess 
judges’ professional activity and select the ones whose professional qualifications are below the 
level defined by law. Considering that assessments were launched only recently, it will be possible 
to analyse the results only after they are completed. 
In general, society’s trust towards the judicial system has slightly increased over the past 10 years. 
However, this trust is still at a low level, therefore, it is necessary to improve the performance of 
courts and to explain the role and specific character of courts to the public.
Summary: progress over the past 10 years
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
2.1. X
2.2. X
2.3. X
2.4. X
2.5. X
2.6. X
Best features
Courts are independent from intervening in the administration of justice and, albeit slowly, the 
society’s trust in courts is increasing. Lengthiness of legal proceedings is not a general problem, it 
is a problem of individual courts.
Most serious problem
Applying laws formally and in bad faith on the part of public officials and other members of 
society as well as conditions in penal institutions and police stations; improper investigation of 
breaches of office. 
Recommendations
1. Free online availability of the decisions adopted by the Constitutional Court must be ensured. 
2. Independent and objective internal investigations concerning violations in psychiatric hospitals, 
places of detention and police stations  must be ensured.
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3. Victims must be provided with greater access to legal and other types of assistance during 
criminal proceedings. 
4. More substantial funds and greater access to state-provided legal aid must be ensured.
References
AT (2008). Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas Administratīvo lietu departamenta spriedums lietā Nr. SKA-
5/2008. Source: www.at.gov.lv [this and many other electronic resources used in this chapter were last viewed 
in March 2014].
AT (2010). Saeima neapstiprina Andreju Judinu par Augstākās tiesas tiesnesi. Source: http://at.gov.lv/lv/
pazinojumi-presei/par-notikumiem/2010/decembris/185-saeima-neapstiprina-andreju-judinu-par-augstakas-
tiesas-tiesnesi/ 
AT (2011). Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas Administratīvo lietu departamenta spriedums lietā Nr. SKA-
166/2011. Source: www.at.gov.lv 
AT (2012). Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas Administratīvo lietu departamenta spriedums lietā Nr. SKA-
606/2012. Source: www.at.gov.lv 
AT (2013a). Publiskais pārskats par Augstākās tiesas darbu 2012. gadā. Augstākās tiesas Biļetens, Nr. 6, 
91.–116. lpp.
AT (2013b). Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas Administratīvo lietu departamenta spriedums lietā Nr. SKA-
161/2011. Source: www.at.gov.lv 
AT (2014). Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas Administratīvo lietu departamenta spriedums lietā Nr. SKA-
10/2014. Source: www.at.gov.lv 
Briede, J., Višķere, I., Litvins, G., Bitāns, A., Danovskis, E. (2011). Tiesības uz taisnīgu tiesu. No: Latvijas 
Republikas Satversmes komentāri. VIII nodaļa. Cilvēka pamattiesības. Red. R. Balodis. Rīga: Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 119.–164. lpp.
Council of Europe (2012). European judicial systems. Edition 2012 (2010 data). Efficiency and quality justice. 
Source: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2012/Rapport_en.pdf 
DA (2005). Rozenvalds J. (red.). Cik demokrātiska ir Latvija: Demokrātijas audits. Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais 
apgāds. 
Delna (2012a). Sabiedrība par atklātību – Delna. Lobēšanas tiesiskais regulējums. Source: http://delna.lv/
publikacijas/ 
Delna (2012b). Sabiedrība par atklātību – Delna. Priekšlikumi Saeimas darba atklātības veicināšanai. Source: 
http://delna.lv/publikacijas/ 
Delna (2014). Sabiedrība par atklātību – Delna. Iedzīvotāju neiecietība pret korupciju pieaugusi. Source: HTTP://
DELNA.LV/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/2014/03/20140326_DELNA_GADA-APSKATS_2013-2014-1.
PDF 
EC (2014). The 2014 EU justice scoreboard. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/justice_
scoreboard_2014_en.pdf 
ECHR (2012). How can we ensure greater involvement of national courts in the Convention system? Source: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2012_ENG.pdf 
ECT (1987). Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesas spriedums lietā Nr. 9248/81 Leander v. Sweden.
Forward, J. (2010). Federal appeals court says Wisconsin judges can announce political party membership. 
Source: http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=News&CONTENTID=93706&TEMPLATE=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm 
HRC (2014). Human Rights Committee. Concluding observations of the third report of Latvia. Source: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCCPR% 
2FCOC%2FLVA%2F16837&Lang=en 
Gatis Litvins. THE RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 63
Jagland, T. (2014). State of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Europe. An analysis of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Europe, based on the findings ofthe Council of Europe 
monitoring mechanisms and bodies. Council of Europe. Source: http://hub.coe.int/c/document_library/get_
file?uuid=5df90407-7663-4361-b5fb-1bbcc84c9fa0&groupId=10227 [last viewed: 23.04.2014.].
Jarinovska, K. (2009). Oficiāla publikācija ir valsts funkcija, ko nevar nodot privātpersonas kompetence. 
Jurista Vārds, Nr. 16, 5.–6. lpp.
Jurista Vārds (2012). Vai juristiem būtu jākārto vienots eksāmens: tēzes un viedokļi. Jurista Vārds, Nr. 25.
Kalniņš, V. (2011). Latvijas valstiskā godaprāta sistēmas novērtējums. Rīga: Sabiedrība par atklātību – Delna. 
Source: http://delna.lv/publikacijas/ 
Kalniņš, V., Austere, L. (2010). Ētikas jautājumi un korupcijas riski Rīgas apgabaltiesā. Rīga: Providus. 
Source: http://www.providus.lv/public/27407.html 
Kalniņš, V., Kažoka, I., Litvins, G. (2008). Tiesnešu ētika, kvalifikācija un atbildība Latvijā: kā neapstāties 
pie sasniegtā? Rīga: Providus. Source: http://politika.lv/article_files/1903/original/Zinojums_FINAL.
pdf?1339440792 
Kalniņš, V., Litvins, G., Danovskis, E., Aperāne, K., Lešinska, A., Neilande, L., Kore, K., Baltiņa, I. 
(2013). Administratīvā procesa likuma ieviešanas ietekmes izvērtējums un efektivizēšanas priekšlikumi. 
Rīga: SAFEGE Baltija”, Providus. Source: http://www.mk.gov.lv/lv/esstrukturfondi/vk-realizetie-projekti/
aktivitate1512/petijumi/ 
Kronberga, I., Litvins, G., Sīle, S., Dzenovska, I. (2013). Mehānismi cietušo kompensācijai kriminālprocesā 
Eiropas Savienībā. Rīga: Providus. Source: http://www.providus.lv/upload_file/Projekti/Kriminalitesibas/
Meh.ciet.kompens..pdf [last viewed: 12.04.2014].
LETA (2012a). Materiālu noplūšanu no KNAB izmeklēs Ģenerālprokuratūra. Apollo, 25. apr. Source: http://
www.apollo.lv/zinas/materialu-noplusanu-no-knab-izmekles-generalprokuratura/513880 
LETA (2012b). Policistam par velosipēdista notriekšanu un palīdzības nesniegšanu būs jāiet cietumā. 
NRA.lv, 13. nov. Source: http://nra.lv/latvija/kriminalzinas/83455-policistam-par-velosipedista-notrieksanu-
un-palidzibas-nesniegsanu-bus-jaiet-cietuma.htm?cnr=1 
LETA (2013a). KNAB pārbauda iespējamu informācijas noplūdi VID amatpersonu kukuļošanas lietas 
izmeklēšanā. NRA.lv, 17. sept. Source: http://nra.lv/latvija/102406-knab-parbauda-iespejamu-informacijas-
nopludi-vid-amatpersonu-kukulosanas-lietas-izmeklesana.htm 
LETA (2013b). Sākt kriminālprocesu pret „Danske Bank“ par dokumentu viltošanu. NRA.lv, 18. okt. Source: 
http://nra.lv/latvija/104312-sakt-kriminalprocesu-pret-danske-bank-par-dokumentu-viltosanu.htm?cnr=1 [last 
viewed: 13.05.2014].
LETA (2014a). Ģenerālprokurors brīdina Auguli par vēršanos pret “ziņotājiem”. TVNET, 3. jūn. Source: 
http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/latvija/512834-generalprokurors_bridina_auguli_par_versanos_pret_zinotajiem 
[last viewed: 28.06.2014].
LETA (2014b). KNAB sāk kriminālprocesu pret Ventspils policijas iecirkņa priekšnieku Kokinu. Diena.lv, 
31. marts. Source: http://www.diena.lv/latvija/kriminalzinas/papildinats-14-42-knab-sak-kriminalprocesu-
pret-ventspils-policijas-iecirkna-prieksnieku-kokinu-14050305 
LETA (2014c). Muižniece pēdējos divus gadus par darbu ST saņēmusi 81 192 eiro. Delfi, 19. jūn. Source: 
http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/muizniece-pedejos-divus-gadus-par-darbu-st-sanemusi-81-192-
eiro.d?id=44635698 [last viewed: 12.04.2014].
Levits, E. (2010). Par valsts pienākumu nodrošināt visiem iedzīvotājiem brīvu un ērtu pieeju normatīvajiem 
aktiem un nodrošināt periodisku un citu tiesībskaidrojošu publikāciju izdošanu. Jurista Vārds, Nr. 13, 
8.–12. lpp.
Libeka, M. (2013). Par iereibušo tiesnešu atcelšanu no amata nerunā. Source: http://www.la.lv/par-iereibuso-
tiesnesu-atcelsanu-no-amata-neruna-3/ 
Litvins, G. (2014). Administratīvās tiesas juridiskās kultūras telpā. Intervija ar Augstākās tiesas 
Administratīvo lietu departamenta priekšsēdētāju Veroniku Krūmiņu. Jurista Vārds, Nr. 5, 15.–19. lpp.
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS LATVIA?64
LR MK (2005). Latvijas Republikas Ministru kabinets. Likumprojekta “Tiesībsarga biroja likums” anotācija. 
Source: http://www.mk.gov.lv/lv/mk/tap/?pid=30196672 
LR MK (2013). Ministru kabineta rīkojums Nr. 50 “Ieslodzījuma vietu infrastruktūras attīstības koncepcija”. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr, 32, 14. febr.
LR TM (2014). Latvijas Republikas Tieslietu ministrija. Informatīvais ziņojums „Priekšlikumi ārējo normatīvo 
aktu grozījumu skaita un apjoma samazināšanai”. Source: www.mk.gov.lv/doc/2005/TMInfo_121113_
VP7.2016.docx
LSM (2014a). Latvijas sabiedriskais medijs. Aizkraukles policijas priekšnieku tur aizdomās par braukšanu 
dzērumā. Source: http://www.lsm.lv/lv/raksts/latvija/zinas/aizkraukles-policijas-priekshnieku-tur-aizdomas-
par-braukshanu-d.a81922/ 
LSM (2014b). Kareivīgais tiesībsargs. Source: http://www.lsm.lv/lv/raksts/arpus-etera/arpus-etera/karlis-
streips-kareiviigais-tiesiibsargs.a76070/ 
Matule, S. (2014a). Tiesu administrācija: esam tiesu palīgs, nevis priekšnieks. Jurista Vārds, Nr. 17, 
6.–12. lpp.
Matule, S. (2014b). Valsts kontrole pastiprina darbu sabiedrības interešu vārdā. Jurista Vārds, Nr. 13, 
6.–9. lpp.
Meikališa, Ā., Strada-Rozenberga, K. (2013). Tiesu prakse par tiesībām uz kriminālprocesa pabeigšanu 
saprātīgā termiņā un soda noteikšanā, ja nav ievērotas tiesības uz kriminālprocesa pabeigšanu saprātīgā 
termiņā. Rīga: Augstākā tiesa. Source: www.at.gov.lv 
Mits, M. (2012). Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesas judikatūra Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas nolēmumos. 
Rīga: Augstākā tiesa. Source: http://at.gov.lv/lv/judikatura/tiesu-prakses-apkopojumi/citi/ 
Riigikogu (2002). Riigikogu of the Republic of Estonia. Courts Act. Source: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/
eli/ee/Riigikogu/act/514022014001/consolide 
Seimas (1994). Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. Lietuvos Respublikos Teismų įstatymas. Source: http://
www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_e?p_id=465353&p_tr2=2 
ST (2014a). Pārskats par Satversmes tiesas darbu 2013.gadā. Source: http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/upload/
Parskats_2013.pdf 
ST (2014b). Satversmes tiesas lēmumu lietā Nr.2013-11-01. Source: http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/upload/
Tiesv_izbeig_2013-11-01.pdf [last viewed: 12.04.2014].
Stirāne, D. (2012). Augstākā tiesa attaisnoja asins analīžu viltošanā apsūdzētos Balvu policistus. Source: 
http://banga.latvijasradio.lv/zinas/anketa2.sqt?aID=51175&aGR=0 
Šņitņikovs, A., Kārkliņa, I. (2013). Tiesu uzticamība un korupcijas uztvere tiesu darbībā Latvijā. Rīga: 
Socioloģisko pētījumu institūts. Nepublicēts.
Tiesībsarga birojs (2009). Tiesībsarga biroja 2008. gada ziņojums. Source: http://www.tiesibsargs.lv/lat/
publikacijas/gada_zinojumi/ 
Tieslietu padome (2012). Tiesnešu neatkarības nodrošināšana spēkā esošajos normatīvajos aktos. Teorētiskā 
pamatojuma izstrāde nepieciešamajām izmaiņām. Rīga: Tieslietu padome. Source: www.at.gov.lv [last viewed: 
21.04.2014].
Tiesu administrācija (2014). Tiesu informācijas sistēmas statistika. Source: https://tis.ta.gov.lv/
tisreal?Form=TIS_STAT_O&SessionId=B398EECA5C04A916DF4FAB30095FB2C1 
Кутрис, Г. (2007). Защита прав человека – существенная функция Конституционнго суда и Право-
защитника Латвии. In: Constitutional Justice in the New Millenium: Almanac. Erevan: Njhar, pp. 74–77.
3. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
Anhelita Kamenska
Are civil rights and political rights equally ensured for all?
3.1. How free are all people from physical violation of their person, and  
from fear of it?
The prohibition of violence in Latvia is laid down at the constitutional level and in several 
domestic laws, including the regulation of the responsibility of the law enforcement authorities, 
if violence is used in the line of duty, and by prohibiting violence amongst civilians. This is also 
prescribed in international treaties ratified by the Republic of Latvia (RL) (Brands-Kehre, Pūce 
2005, 45).
Over the last 10 years, criminal liability has been strengthened in several legal instruments 
for certain types of violence, including unlawful conduct by officials in the performance of their 
professional duties. On 19 November 2009, the Saeima included the definition of torture in the 
Criminal Law (CL),1 by increasing the liability of officials for coercing testimony, exceeding the 
scope of their official powers etc. (LR Saeima (the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia) 2009). 
The issue of police ill-treatment remains topical, along with the effective investigation of 
such offences and punishment against the perpetrators. The Council of Europe Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment criticised Latvia about 
it in its 2007, 2009, and 2011 reports (CPT 2009; CPT 2013). However, since 2012, there has been 
an increase in the number of cases heard against Latvia, whereby the individuals have complained 
about the alleged ill-treatment by the police and prison staff lack of effective investigation into 
such complaints, and the number of cases in which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has found a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights (prohibition of 
torture).2 In response to the criticism, in 2013 the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) drafted a policy 
document prescribing the transformation of the Internal Security Service of the State Police (key 
police complaints body) and its transfer under the authority of the Minister of the Interior (LR IeM 
(Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Latvia) (see Chapter 9 for more information).
With regard to violence among civilians, the number of grave violent crimes (homicides, 
intentional grievous bodily injuries) between 2004 and 2013, compared to the preceding years, 
has decreased (LR CSP (Central Statistical Bureau of the Republic of Latvia) 2013). The average 
homicide ratio (per 100,000 inhabitants) in Latvia has decreased by half – from 6.22 (in 2002) 
to 3.11 (in 2010). Of all the European countries, this indicator is the highest in Russia (10.19), 
Lithuania (6.59), Estonia (5.22), whereas the indicator is considerably lower in Slovenia (0.76) 
and Sweden (0.97) (UN ODCIHS 2011). One of the reasons behind the decrease in homicides is a 
considerable decrease of the population due to emigration, especially during the economic crisis.
1 Deliberate repeated or continued action or inaction of a person, by inflicting physical pain or psychological 
suffering upon another, or a deliberate one-off action or inaction of a person, by inflicting severe physical or 
psychological suffering upon another in order to affect the conscience or will of another.
2 See Chapter 9 for a list of judgements of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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Source: CSB 2013.
Victimisation surveys are amongst the sources of information that help determine the actual 
share of crime victims. In a 2000 survey, 16 % of respondents claimed that they had fallen victim 
to crime. Over the last decade, the annual proportion of crime victims on average has ranged from 
8–12 % (SKDS 2012). A considerable percentage of victims do not report violence or threats of 
violence – 69 % did not report to the police if the perpetrator was somebody they knew, whereas in 
81 % of cases the victim did not report when the perpetrator was unknown (Zavackis et al 2013). 
Thus, the surveys reveal a much higher proportion of crime victims than shown by the official 
statistics.
Human trafficking remains a concern in Latvia, and data on human trafficking is incomplete. 
However, in recent years, the most widespread form of human trafficking among the inhabitants 
of Latvia is brokered marriages with third country nationals abroad (LETA 2013b) – the marriage 
is entered into due to financial considerations, and it is not infrequent that the person is subjected 
to violence in the new family. On 13 December 2012, the Saeima amended the Criminal Law, 
whereby criminal liability was introduced for organising brokered marriages (Section 2852), if 
the aim is to obtain a residence permit in Latvia, another EU member state, in a country of the 
European Economic Area, or the Swiss Confederation (LR Saeima 2012b). Furthermore, several 
policy documents have been adopted to prevent human trafficking (LR MK (Cabinet of Ministers 
of the Republic of Latvia) 2014), and NGOs organise campaigns on a regular basis to raise public 
awareness about the risks of human trafficking (Patvērums 2011). As Latvian inhabitants leave the 
country to seek work in other EU member states, there have been an increasing number of reports 
of labour exploitation of women and men in the United Kingdom and Ireland (BT 2011).
In the 2013 report on human trafficking, the US Department of State identified Latvia as a country 
of origin and destination of victims of human trafficking. The report states that the government of 
Latvia does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking, in 
spite of the considerable efforts invested in order to meet them. The report describes law enforcement 
authorities as the weakest sector in combating human trafficking – the number of adjudicated cases 
is low, and only few of the convicted individuals receive a prison sentence (US DS) 2013). During 
2005–2013, there have been only few cases where the human trafficking provision was applied, 
when a person became a crime victim as a result of violence, threats, deception etc. Therefore, 
international organisations describe Latvia’s performance as modest. In 2006, the Supreme Court 
(SC) recognised “the sending of a person for purposes of commercial sexual exploitation with 
person’s consent” as a type of human trafficking (LR AT (Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia) 
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2006, 4), and in Latvia, unlike other EU member states, criminal liability is prescribed for such 
conduct. 31 criminal proceedings were initiated for this crime in 2009, 28 – in 2010, 21 in 2011 
and 13 in 2012. Latvia is nevertheless criticised for sentences that are often too lenient. 
Since 2006, victims of human trafficking are entitled to receive state-paid social rehabilitation, 
and the number of recipients of such services has increased from 2 in 2007 to 33 in 2013. Most 
often, the residents of Latvia have become victims of human trafficking in the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Cyprus, Sweden, the USA, Switzerland, 
and Russia (LETA 2013).
In 2005, the issue of hate crimes became more topical in Latvia. For the first time, racially 
motivated violence (as well as threats of violence) was officially registered, including against the head 
of the NGO Afrolat, a staff member of the US embassy, the rabbi of the Riga Jewish Community. 
In 2007, the first racially motivated crime was registered against the Roma. In 2005, the first Riga 
Pride took place under close police supervision. An especially intolerant and aggressive attitude 
by the public was observed in 2006, when the Riga City Council banned the Pride. No racially 
motivated cases of violence were recorded by the law enforcement authorities from 2008 until 2012. 
According to unofficial sources, such cases nonetheless exist, but the victims do not report them. 
In 2006, the Saeima included racist motive among aggravating circumstances. However, the CL 
does not criminalise offences against persons because of their sexual orientation, although various 
LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender) - related events, as well as surveys point to high 
levels of intolerance and there is anecdotal evidence of cases of violence against sexual minorities 
(LETA 2014a). In 2013, discussions started on the need to improve the legislation as Riga will host 
the Europride 2015. No initiative, however, had gained any support from the legislators by the spring 
of 2014. 
After joining the European Union (EU), Latvia strengthened its legislation related to child 
safety concerning the rights and obligations of the competent authorities when the child’s health, 
safety, or development is under serious threat. The definition of violence has been elaborated, the 
concept of emotional abuse of children has been expanded and all professional groups requiring 
special knowledge about the matters of the protection of children’s rights have been discerned 
(LR Saeima 1998a). The Saeima has also raised sanctions for the sexual abuse of children (LR 
Saeima 1998b). The number of abused children who receive social rehabilitation has increased: in 
2005 – 2,142 children, in 2010 – 2,646, in 2011 – 2,738 children (CSB 2013). Meanwhile, survey 
results indicate a high prevalence of violence in schools, and the number of complaints has steadily 
increased; every fourth child in Latvia has suffered from violence in school (Diena 2012). Even 
though the understanding about child abuse has increased among specialists, preventive measures 
and a timely and co-ordinated response remain inadequate.
A survey conducted by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights suggests that Latvia has one 
of the highest incidences in the EU of violence against women. 39 % of women in Latvia (the EU 
average 33 %) have been subjected to sexual and/or physical violence, 31 % of women in Latvia 
(the EU average 20 %) have suffered from physical violence inflicted by their partner (EU FRA 
2014). Changes with regard to domestic violence in Latvia have been very slow and have taken 
place only in recent years. Unlike in other countries, absence of a strong women’s movement in 
Latvia has hindered awareness raising on domestic violence, and domestic violence has not been 
perceived as a human rights issue, but rather as a private problem to be addressed within the home.
The addressing of domestic violence has also been hindered by the narrow understanding of 
the concept of family. As a result, the police have often perceived domestic violence to be mainly 
violence between the spouses. On 21 October 2010, the Criminal Law was amended to include an 
expanded concept of family, comprising also unregistered partnerships, as well as common single 
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household.3 In March 2014, extensive amendments to the Civil Procedure Law (LR Saeima 2014a) 
and to the Law on Police took effect. They strengthened the protection of a victim in domestic 
violence cases namely, police powers were expanded to include authorisation to immediately separate 
the victim from the perpetrator, and prescribed the possibility for the courts to impose long-term 
obligations on the perpetrators, such as a restraining order, prohibition from contact etc. (2014b). 
Thereby Latvia has made a considerable step towards aligning its legislation for the protection of 
domestic violence victims with that in place in many EU countries. 
Since mid-2006, the EU Directive on compensation to crime victims has enabled victims, 
who have suffered from intentional violent crimes in Latvia, to receive state compensation. It can 
be received, if, as a result of an intentional crime, a person has died, received grievous or serious 
bodily injuries, become a victim of sexual abuse, a victim of human trafficking, or they have been 
deliberately infected with HIV, hepatitis B or C. Even though the maximum statutory compensation 
was set at 10 times the minimum monthly wage, in reality, the biggest compensation to date has 
been half that amount. 
For a long time, Latvia had no official statistics on the number of crime victims, as no register 
of crime victims existed. International organisations (including the UN) have pointed to a systematic 
lack of disaggregated data about crime victims (gender, age, nationality etc.). Since 1 January 2011, 
the Information Centre of the Ministry of the Interior has been operating a data base, which also 
includes detailed information about crime victims (LR MK 2010). In 2011, the number of victims in 
Latvia was 15,403, in 2012 – 12,600, and in 2013 – 11,789. Unfortunately, data about crime victims 
(anonymized) in general and disaggregated data are not publicly available, and are available for a 
fee only (LR IeM (Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Latvia) 2012).
Latvia remains one of the six EU member states without a state-financed national crime victim 
support organisation for adults; support is provided mostly by NGOs, with foreign, and less often, 
state or local government funding. Social rehabilitation services for adult crime victims were to be 
provided from 1 January 2010, however, due to the economic crisis and, possibly, due to continued 
lack of political will, they were postponed until 1 January 2015.
The decade has seen the strengthening of legislation concerning different forms of violence, 
improved support to crime victims, and gradual improvement of data collection. However, problems 
remain concerning the training of law enforcement about different types of violence, such as domestic 
violence, hate crimes, as well as a timely and coordinated response from the responsible authorities in 
cases of child abuse. One of the most serious problems is the absence of an independent complaints 
body that would examine cases of ill-treatment by law enforcement representatives. The overall 
situation is assessed as satisfactory.
3.2. How effective and equal is the protection of the freedoms of  
movement, expression, association and assembly?
Freedom of movement
On 21 December 2007, the Schengen area was expanded, and border controls were removed at 
land and sea borders. In 2008, border control at airports was lifted for flights within the Schengen 
area. These changes affected Latvia as well.
3 Section 48 Aggravating circumstances. (1) The following may be considered to be aggravating circumstances: 
[…] (15) a criminal offence related to violence or threats of violence committed against a person, to whom 
the perpetrator is related in the first or the second degree of kinship, against a spouse or a former spouse, or 
against a person with whom the perpetrator is or has been in an unregistered marital relationship, or against a 
person with whom the perpetrator has a joint (single) household.
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With the accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004, the EU labour market was gradually 
opened for eight Eastern European countries, including Latvia. On 1 May 2007, the Netherlands 
opened its labour markets for citizens of these countries, Germany and Austria following suit in 
May 2011. In 2012, 8.5 % of the Latvian nationals were working in one of the EU member states, 
and only Lithuanian, Romanian, Portuguese, and Spanish nationals were more active; the Latvian 
indicator was two and a half times higher than the EU average (3.1 %) (EC 2013). Some countries 
have introduced various administrative obstacles to accessing the labour market of member states, 
such as quotas of accepting foreign nationals, imposing various labour rules and conditions for 
foreign nationals, divergent access to social benefits, non-recognition of professional qualifications 
acquired in another country. Reports from the European Commission mention Latvia ‘with regard to 
provisions of registering vehicles, which can lead to a practical obstacle of obtaining a job, as well 
as restricted access to educational establishment for foreign nationals’ (LBAS (Free Trade Union 
Confederation of Latvia) 2013, 12). 
Before joining the EU, there were considerable differences between visa requirements for the 
citizens and the non-citizens of Latvia. At times this has been perceived as an unjustified restriction 
to the freedom of movement, as the non-citizens enjoyed a visa-free regime with seven countries 
compared to 67 countries for the citizens. On 19 January 2007, the Council Regulation No 1932/2006 
of 19 January 2007 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement came into 
force. Pursuant to the Regulation, the non-citizens of Latvia may travel without a visa to Norway, 
Iceland, and all EU member states, except for the United Kingdom and Ireland, who opted out of the 
Regulation (EU OV (EU OJ) 2006). In 2012, an agreement on this matter was concluded between 
the EU and Switzerland. The citizens of the Republic of Latvia now enjoy a visa-free regime with 
77 countries, 30 of which the non-citizens can also enter without a visa, thus the differences have 
been reduced since the accession to the EU. Since 2007, non-citizens enjoy visa free travel to 
Russian Federation, while Latvian citizens require a visa. 
One of the pressing issues in the European Union is the question of permanent residency in 
its member states of LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender) people. While the legal 
regulation of LGBT cohabitation varies within the EU, previously obstacles existed for LGBT 
partners to reside in Latvia. As from 30 August 2011, the government regulations prescribe the 
procedure of how EU citizens can travel to and settle in Latvia together with their family members. 
Pursuant to the definition of the EU Directive, these regulations recognise a partner, with whom an 
EU citizen has had at least a two-year long or registered partnership, as an extended family member, 
thereby also covering LGBT persons (LR MK 2011). 
Freedom of assembly
Legal framework
Freedom of assembly is enshrined in the Constitution, in the Associations and Foundations Law, 
as well as in the Law on Political Parties passed on 22 June 2006. Any individual or legal entity 
may establish an association or a foundation (at least two founders), whereas to establish a party 
at least 200 citizens of Latvia are required. Latvian citizens, Latvian non-citizens, and EU citizens, 
who are not Latvian citizens, but reside in Latvia, may be party members. A party must have at 
least 200 members, but in a party of more than 400 members, at least half of the members must be 
citizens of Latvia (LR Saeima 2006). 
The European Commission (EC) has criticised Latvia for allowing political parties to be 
established only by the citizens of Latvia. This is contrary to the EU laws and principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. According to this principle, EU citizens should be able 
to exercise their rights on the same conditions applicable to the citizens of the given country. In 
April 2014, the EC announced that it would send a reasoned opinion to Latvia (EC 2014). 
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Current situation
There have been only few cases, when the registration of an association or a political party has 
been refused or their activity has been suspended. In 2009, the Register of Enterprises (RE) refused to 
register the NGO the Communist Support Movement in Latvia (Komunisma atbalsta kustība Latvijā), 
whereas the notary public of the RE (UR (Register of Enterprises) 2013) refused to register the name 
of the political party Linderman’s party – in support of the native language (Lindermana partija – 
par dzimto valodu) and changes in the party programme. In the former case, RE established that the 
name of the society and its aims indicated in the articles of the association “referred to a link with the 
popularisation of the criminal communist ideology” and is contrary to the law and the Constitution. In 
the latter case, the aims indicated in the party programme served as the grounds for refusal, according 
to the notary posing threat to what is known as the core of the Constitution (the fundamental values 
of the Republic of Latvia, including turning against the Latvian language as the only official language 
and territorial integrity of the state). As a result of the refusal to register the society for the support 
of the communist movement, two individuals filed a complaint with the ECtHR. 
The ECtHR case law has set a high threshold for restricting the freedom of association, by 
justifying the restrictions only in a few cases, e.g., in cases where the protection of national security 
and territorial integrity of the state is concerned. Countries may restrict the activity of parties, whose 
leaders incite to violence, propose policy aimed at the destruction of democracy or the flouting of 
the rights and freedoms protected by democracy (ECtHR 2001). However, the ECtHR has also ruled 
that a party cannot be prohibited due to its name alone (ECtHR 1998a), a critical attitude towards the 
government’s approaches in the matters of protection of minority rights (ECtHR 2002) or because 
it represents an opinion that is contrary to the law or constitution. Likewise, if the registration of 
an association is refused, the probability of an actual threat which might arise if it is registered 
should be considered. 
Several social movements have refrained from official registration, including the Non-citizen 
Congress established in 2013 (Diena 2013). Regardless of the conflicting perceptions of the Congress’ 
activities, public institutions in Latvia, as in the earlier case of the Headquarters for the Protection 
of Russian Schools, have not openly opposed this approach (Brands Kehre, Pūce 2005, 50), thus 
abiding by the principles of freedom of association. 
Trade unions are developing, and since the accession to the EU, their engagement in the social 
dialogue with employer organisations has intensified. However, unlike in many developed countries, 
they are not sufficiently effective in protecting the interests of their members. Restrictions on the 
joining of trade unions in some professions were lifted – for fire-fighters (in 1999), police (2005), 
and in 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that the ban for border guards to join trade unions was 
unconstitutional (LR ST (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia) 2014). 
Freedom of speech
During the reporting period, the number of cases when freedom of speech was restricted has 
increased. Most of them concerned media freedom – politicians and state officials filing claims 
against journalists for defamation in mass media in public interest cases, law enforcement authorities, 
referring to the protection of confidential information, attempted to compel journalists to disclose 
their sources of information, also in public interest cases. Several freedom of speech cases involving 
journalists reached the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which on three occasions found 
the restrictions of freedom of speech as disproportionate. The Security Police overreacted in the 
case of academics who had voiced an alternative opinion on the national currency Lats during 
the economic crisis. Several times, there have been attempts to put forth the protection of the 
rights of others as the grounds for restricting the freedom of speech, especially in an attempt to 
restrict ‘homosexual propaganda’. Extensive discussions on disproportionate restrictions in relation 
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to freedom of speech were triggered by legislative amendments prescribing criminal liability for 
contesting certain historical facts, such as the occupation of Latvia. 
Legal framework
During the decade, legislation was amended several times, which from the perspective of 
freedom of speech may be regarded as positive, as well as raise concern in terms of proportionality 
of restrictions.
Even though defamation is one of the legitimate aims for restricting the freedom of speech, 
there have been several cases in practice when criticism of politicians  has led to a disproportionate 
restriction of the freedom of speech (see the ECtHR cases against Latvia). On 19 November 2009, 
the Saeima abolished the offence of intentional defamation under Article 156, and Article 158 of the 
Criminal Law on defamation committed through the mass media (2009).4 However, the provision 
prescribing criminal liability for bringing into disrepute via mass media (Section 157) was retained, 
providing for a punishment of short-term imprisonment (up to 3 months) or community service, or 
a fine. Claims of defamation in mass media may be initiated in a civil procedure.
In the spring of 2014, amendments to the CL prescribing punishment for public glorification, 
denial, justification, or gross trivialization of the crimes committed by the USSR and Nazi Germany 
generated widespread discussions (LR Saeima 2014c). The CL already envisaged criminal liability 
for the justification or denial of genocide (including the Holocaust), crimes against humanity and a 
number of persons had already been convicted for justifying deportations [of Latvian/Baltic residents 
to Gulag camps in Siberia]. Nevertheless, additional amendments were elaborated to condemn the 
denial of Latvian occupation, which, due to divergent interpretation of history can often be heard in 
sections of the Latvian society. However, the broad interpretation of the provision has raised concerns 
about possible restrictions of freedom of speech, which may lead to punishing persons for voicing any 
opinion about historical facts (Tralmaka, Kučs 2014). Even though the fact of occupation has been 
recognised by international society, the ECtHR in its judgements has stated that quests for historical 
truth are an integral part of freedom of speech, and it is not the duty of the court to resolve disputes 
about past events, which is part of ongoing debate among historians (ECHR 2004). It has also 
pointed out that the Holocaust must be considered as a clearly established historical fact, therefore 
challenging or justifying it is not protected under the right to freedom of speech (ECHR 1998b).
Current situation
Unfortunately, there have been several cases of violence against mass media representatives 
over the last decade. On 16 April 2010, the deputy mayor of Daugavpils, publisher of the Miljons 
newspaper of Daugavpils and owner of Million TV G. Ņemcovs was shot. The police suggested 
that it was a contract killing, possibly related to his political and social activities (Delfi 2010), as 
the newspaper was looking into the issue of corruption at the local government and G. Ņemcovs 
had previously received threats of violence and death threats (RWB 2012). 
On March 29, 2012, the journalist of the website kompromat.lv L. Jākobsons was physically 
assaulted, and one of the versions recounted links the assault to his professional activities (BNS 
2012). Earlier, in December 2011, the State Police (SP) arrested the journalist for 48 hours later 
charging him for having published the mayor of Riga N. Ušakovs’ electronic correspondence with a 
staff member of the Russian Embassy after his e-mail account had been hacked. Journalists criticised 
his arrest as disproportionate (LŽA (Latvian Journalist Association) 2011).
There have also been other attempts to intimidate journalists for their investigative work, 
particularly on corruption cases. In 2005 and 2006, work-related and private telephone conversations 
4 Intentional defamation in mass media was an offence punishable by deprivation of liberty for up to one year, 
custodial arrest, community service or a fine of up to 30 times the minimum monthly wage.
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of the investigative journalist I. Jaunalksne were illegally tapped and later leaked in the media. 
The Supreme Court awarded moral compensation of 12,000 Lats (~17,000 EUR) in favour of the 
journalist, and in the spring of 2013, the Court pronounced four officials of the Finance Police guilty 
of abuse of official status, of failure to act by a state official, and in the case of two persons a fine 
of 26,000 Lats (~37,000 EUR) was imposed, while in the case of two others, 8,000 and 3,000 Lats 
(~11,400 EUR and 4,270 EUR) respectively, later reduced based on the grounds that the case was 
not heard within a reasonable time frame (LETA 2014b).
Several ECtHR judgements have been passed against Latvia regarding the boundaries of 
permissible criticism in relation to politicians. On a number of occasions, the assessment by the 
Latvian courts regarding the limits of criticism of politicians-state officials was deemed inconsistent 
with the guarantees of freedom of speech enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
According to the ECtHR case-law, politicians and officials must accept greater criticism than average 
private individual and even broader limits of criticism are acceptable with regard to the government. 
The ECtHR has also emphasised the duty of the press to impart information and ideas on political 
issues, just as those in other areas of public interest, and the right of the public to receive such 
information (ECHR 1986).
On 12 July 2007, the ECtHR delivered a judgement in the case A/S Diena and Ozoliņš v. Latvia, 
where it established the violation of freedom of speech. In a civil defamation case the courts in 
Latvia ordered A/S Diena to retract a number of articles concerning the activity of the minister of 
economics L. Strujevičs in the context of the privatisation process of JSC Ventspils nafta and to pay 
6,000 Lats (~9,100 EUR) by way of compensation as well as litigation costs. The ECtHR found 
that the courts of Latvia, in ruling in favour of the minister, had placed his interests higher than the 
freedom of speech of the applicants and public interest. It ordered Latvia to pay compensation of 
13,292 euros to the applicant in respect of pecuniary damages and litigation costs (ECHR 2007). In 
a similar case V. Seleckis vs Latvia, a friendly settlement was concluded between the journalist and 
the government of Latvia, which paid compensation for damages to the journalist in the amount of 
25,000 euros (ECtHR 2010a). 
Protection of journalist sources of information is one of the basic conditions for press freedom. 
Even though these rights are not absolute, however any compulsion by public authorities imposed 
on a journalist to reveal his source has to be limited to exceptional circumstances where vital public 
interests are at stake (ECHR 1996). 
In 2013, in the case Nagla vs Latvia (ECHR 2013), the ECtHR found a violation of the right 
to freedom of speech when the State Police searched the home of the journalist I. Nagla, an act 
deemed by the Court as disproportionate. The case concerned a well-known investigative journalist 
in the broadcast of the TV program De Facto, informing the public of an extensive data leak from 
the State Revenue Service database about the income and taxes paid by officials and individuals. 
She received her information from an anonymous source Neo. The ECtHR ordered that Latvia was 
to pay the journalist moral compensation 10,000 euros in respect of non-pecuniary damages, as well 
as to cover the litigation costs. Even though the case of I. Nagla had already gained considerable 
publicity, in 2013 there was an attempt to initiate criminal proceedings against the deputy editor of 
the regional newspaper Zemgales Ziņas to compel him disclose the source of information after he 
had published the transcript of a public court hearing (LETA 2013c). In another case, the Security 
Police demanded that an LTV (Latvian Television) news service journalist produce a classified 
document used in a news story, which revealed the possible settlement in the state dispute with 
the former AirBaltic manager B. Flick, to the public (LSM (Public Broadcasting of Latvia) 2013). 
The journalists of the website www.pietiek.com have also reported about the activities of the law 
enforcement in relation to their investigative work. 
During the economic crisis, the Security Police (SecP) intervened in several cases against 
individuals, on account of destabilising the financial system of Latvia, who had critically or in 
a humorous manner voiced their opinion on the national currency – the Lat. This occurred even 
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though many foreign economic experts had strongly suggested devaluation of the Lat at the same 
time. Cases included university lecturers and a pop star, and were widely discussed and criticised 
in Latvian (Presesbriviba.info 2008) and foreign mass media alike as restricting freedom of speech. 
In 2010, the SecP terminated both criminal proceedings as no corpus delicti was established. 
The issue of the proportionality of restrictions to freedom of speech was raised in relation to 
various other forms of expression, such as the poster of the Latvian National Opera of “Puppet 
Opera,” where a naked child was depicted standing sideways and photographed from behind. Among 
the legitimate grounds for restricting freedom of speech is the protection of morals of others - 
banning child pornography by law. The State Police initiated criminal proceedings on the making 
and distribution of child pornography, however the proceedings were terminated four years later, 
as no corpus delicti was found (DELFI 2012). The definition of child pornography Latvian laws 
expressly point to pornographic material of a sexual nature rather than any material depicting a 
naked child irrespective of the context (LCC (Latvian Centre for Human Rights) 2008). 
There have been a number of attempts to restrict ‘homosexual propaganda’ allegedly to protect 
the rights and morals of children. In November 2013, the NGO Protect our children! (Sargāsim 
mūsu bērnus!) began collecting the signatures for a national referendum on the amendments to 
the Children’s Rights Protection Law, prescribing a ban on homosexual propaganda at educational 
and child care establishments as well as the engagement of children in events popularising same 
sex marriages (CVK (Central Election Committee) 2012). Russia and Lithuania have implemented 
such laws, and similar attempts have been observed also in Ukraine and Moldova. The case law of 
the ECtHR has strengthened the rights of sexual minorities to freedom of expression to advocate 
the recognition of the rights of sexual minorities, and the Court has stated that it has no scientific 
evidence or sociological data at its disposal confirming that the mere mention of homosexuality 
or public debates about the social status of sexual minorities would adversely affect children or 
vulnerable adults (ECtHR 2010b).
The freedom of speech is enshrined in the Constitution, as well as in laws regulating the media. 
However, the broad interpretation of legal provisions with regard to denying certain facts of the 
history of Latvia can lead to the restrictions of freedom of speech. The increasing number of ECtHR 
and Latvian court judgements dealing with different aspects of freedom of speech, and in particular 
freedom of the press, determining the legitimate and legal limits of freedom of speech has had a 
positive impact. Nonetheless, in practice, law enforcement authorities still lack the understanding 
about the proportionality of restrictions and their need in a democratic society. There remains 
inadequate understanding, including in the court system, about the differences between freedom of 
speech issues and those of hate speech. 
Freedom of assembly
Legal framework
Since 2004, a range of changes has been introduced in the key law governing freedom of 
assembly in Latvia – the Law on Assemblies, Processions, and Demonstrations. It was influenced by 
the judgement of the Constitutional Court (CC) of 23 November 2006 resulting in the revocation of 
eight legal provisions that had been hitherto limiting the rights to freedom of assembly. Considerable 
case law has evolved in interpreting different aspects of freedom of assembly and gradually 
facilitating the understanding of freedom of assembly among local governments and the general 
public as one of the political freedoms key for a pluralist democracy. The Court ruled that the 
system that required the authorisation from the municipality to organise assemblies was inconsistent 
with the Constitution. The system of authorisation was replaced with a system of notification. The 
restriction on organising events closer than 50 metres from specific buildings (the building of the 
Saeima, government buildings, etc.) was also lifted. The provision, which previously prescribed 
that a local government must issue a permit or a well-founded refusal for organising an event no 
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later than 48 hours before the beginning of the event, as a result of which the terms of appeal 
were often not met, was replaced to prescribe a longer term, namely, no later than four days before 
the beginning of the event. The Court also recognised as inconsistent with the Constitution such 
provisions according to which the organisers were required to have a written contract with security 
company, and more security personnel was required in cases when information was received about 
threats to the event, as well as the ban of voicing slogans during a picket (LR ST (Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Latvia) 2006). 
On a number of occasions (e.g., in 2006 and 2009), public officials, Riga City Council, and law 
enforcement authorities alike tried to have restrictions imposed on assemblies at places important 
for the public and at commemorative sites, including the Freedom Monument, if their aims were 
contrary to the symbolic importance of the specific place (Kovaļevska 2006). In 2006, a meeting 
at the Freedom Monument planned for 8 May to honour the victims of the Second World War was 
prohibited. The reason behind the ban was the inappropriateness of the event in relation to the 
symbolic significance of the Freedom Monument. 
However, the restrictions were not introduced as they would have lacked a legitimate aim and 
considerably restricted freedom of assembly as the place of assembly, procession or demonstration 
is primordial in order to properly safeguard freedom of assembly as the participants wish their 
opinions to be heard by the public or specific groups. 
Current situation
The vast majority of processions, demonstrations, and assemblies on different issues have taken 
place without any restrictions. In 2010, 202 events were notified in Riga, of which four were 
prohibited, the consideration of seven was rejected, and nine were withdrawn (Riga City Council 
2010). Manifestations of freedom of assembly have served various aims, events have been organised 
by individuals, organisations representing various target groups, political parties, and the turnout 
has ranged from a couple of people to several thousands. Assemblies have been organised by 
ultra-national and far-left wing organisations. Even though discussions have often been heated and 
controversial, assemblies in Latvia, except for one case, have been peaceful.
In January 2009, for the first and only time since independence was regained in 1991, a protest 
rally turned violent. After a peaceful public assembly, around one thousand people headed for the 
Saeima and tried to force their way in. There were clashes between the protesters and the police, 
40 people were hospitalised, fifteen police officers were injured, 126 people were taken into custody, 
and damage had been done to several government and local government establishments, as well 
as to private property (BNN 2012). After the event the organising of assemblies was restricted for 
several months. The ban was justified by considerations of public safety, whilst officials and law 
enforcement authorities again considered introducing restrictions to the law concerning venues near 
government and local government buildings. The amendments were not adopted as a result of public 
criticism and court judgements. 
Restrictions on assemblies have most often been imposed in relation to events concerning 
historical dates that are subject to public controversy (16 March – the Day of the Latvian Legion, 
9 May –Victory Day (end of the WWWII celebrated in the former Soviet Union, etc.) or relating 
to the minority group – sexual minorities. As counter-protests have usually been planned, the key 
reasons for the prohibition have included considerations of public safety and morals. From 2006 to 
2012, the Riga City Council regularly prohibited events notified for 16 March (in 2006 – four, in 
2008 – five, in 2009 – three, in 2010 – two, and one in both 2011 and 2012). Riga Pride was also 
banned on several occasions (in 2005 and in 2006) and Baltic Pride (in 2009). Most of the bans 
were appealed in the administrative court, and in many cases the appeals were successful. 
Since 2005, administrative court judgements on assemblies have generated significant precedents 
and have gradually facilitated and solidified the understanding of different aspects of freedom of 
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assembly. Although for a certain period local governments and law enforcement authorities failed to 
ensure that the right to peaceful assembly is respected in practice. The Riga municipality continued to 
ban events and charge the administrative courts with deciding on these matters. Often, the real reasons 
behind the bans were political, such as the proximity of local government elections (Baltic Pride in 
2009, initially permitted, then prohibited by the Riga City Council, and then permitted by the Court). 
Initially part of the cases in administrative district courts were heard in closed court sessions. 
This was explained by security considerations due to classified information at the possession of 
the Security Police. Therefore full court judgements with Court’s reasoning, the parties’ or other 
stakeholders’ opinions were not made available. Appeals against the prohibition of certain assemblies 
continued in closed hearings at the Administrative District Court up until 2009.5 
Administrative courts have provided the interpretation of different aspects of freedom of 
assembly: the positive duty of the state to ensure freedom of assembly, the duty to protect such 
assemblies, opinions voiced during assemblies which might anger or offend certain sections of 
society (LR AT (Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia) 2007), counter-protests as part of freedom 
of assembly, proportionality of restrictions of fundamental rights, etc.. The courts have highlighted 
the need for the relevant institutions to examine closely whether the threat to public safety is real 
and not abstract. They have underscored that the information about possible threats must be regarded 
alongside the State’s duty to prevent threats, i.e. whether the police has reasonable and suitable 
resources at its disposal (LR AT 2010). The courts have also emphasised that particular events must 
not be evaluated on their content, but that only specific, objective circumstances and facts must be 
assessed. Within the context of freedom of assembly, courts have specified the right of legal entities 
to compensation for losses inflicted by state institutions etc. 
Even though courts have often lifted the ban imposed by the Riga City Council, only in very 
few cases have individuals or organisations demanded compensation for damages inflicted. In March 
2013, pursuant to a court decision, Riga City Council made a public apology in five newspapers 
regarding the ban for the association Daugavas Vanagi to organise a procession in 2011 (LETA 
2013a). However, the Court rejected the NGO’s claim to compensation.
During the report period, the police capacity to guarantee public safety during controversial 
events has improved, and this has sometimes been recognised and appreciated by event organisers 
and general public. Unlike in other democratic states, a frequent sight at assemblies in Latvia is 
the large number of police officers deployed in contrast to a relatively (in rare cases up to several 
thousand) small turnout, which can have a chilling effect on the event participants. In 2010, after 
the Court revoked a ban imposed by the Riga City Council on a person to organise a procession to 
mark the 69th anniversary since the Nazi Germany’s army entered Riga, the conduct of the SecP 
elicited a conflicting response. The SecP apprehended one of the organisers before the procession; 
as he was not present, the assembly was declared unsanctioned. Even though the Latvian officials 
criticised the court decision and praised the police, the general public criticised the conduct of the 
law enforcement authorities as they had snubbed the court judgement (Ir 2010), thereby creating a 
worrisome precedent.
There have not been many cases when banned Nazi or Soviet symbols have been used by 
assembly participants – a few individuals were detained and fined6 for the use of Soviet symbols. 
5 Judgement adopted by the Administrative District Court on 8 May 2009 in the case No. A42766509/A 7665-
09/14; Judgement adopted by the Administrative District Court on 13 March 2009 in the case No. A 42707509/A 
7075-09/14.
6 On 8 September 2009, the Riga City Zemgale District Court imposed a fine of 200 lats on A. Ļebedeva 
according to Part 2 of Section 1743  of the Latvian Administrative Violations Code after a repeated violation 
of the procedure of organising and progress of assemblies, processions, and demonstrations, as well as public 
entertainment and celebratory events within one year after imposing an administrative punishment. The Court 
has also imposed a fine of 200 lats on the leader of the National Bolshevik party V. Lindermans.
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At times, the Latvian courts have faced problems in interpreting the use of banned Nazi symbols 
(the swastika) by failing to assess the wider context of their use and have concluded that these are 
symbols of Latvian mythology.7
Overall, fundamental freedoms are well provided for in the Constitution and other laws, and 
in some cases provisions restricting fundamental freedoms (freedom of assembly, law enforcement 
representatives joining trade unions) have been revoked as a result of the Constitutional Court 
judgements. As a result of administrative court judgements, since 2012, there has been a positive 
trend in practice in restricting assemblies, including counter-protests on dates marking controversial 
historic events and events related to the protection of the rights of sexual minorities. Problems 
remain with spontaneous assemblies, which do not require the notification of municipality. The 
police have tended to disrupt these events by requiring such notification. Judgements adopted by 
the Latvian and international courts have facilitated the understanding of legitimate grounds for the 
restriction of freedom of speech, especially in defamation cases of politicians. At the same time, 
the conduct of law enforcement authorities in trying to compel the journalists disclose their sources 
of information, as well as in other situations demonstrates that the awareness and the grounds for 
legally restricting freedom of speech is unstable. Furthermore, the context of the Ukraine-Russia 
conflict has brought the issues of restrictions of freedom of speech and of assembly to the forefront. 
However, even in such situations, restrictions of these freedoms must be carefully assessed in terms 
of proportionality and need. Overall, freedom of movement can be assessed as good, whereas 
freedom of speech and that of assembly is assessed as satisfactory.
3.3. How secure is the freedom for all to practise their own religion, 
language or culture?
Legal framework
Besides the key UN and Council of Europe human rights instruments that Latvia acceded or 
ratified during the 1990s, in 2005, Latvia ratified the Council of Europe Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities which it had signed in 1995. Since the ratification of the treaty, 
the government of Latvia has submitted two reports, and the Advisory Committee on the Convention 
has issued two opinions – in 2008 and 2014 – on the implementation of the Convention in Latvia. 
The issue of language use in Latvia remains sensitive, even though the protection of the Latvian 
language has been strengthened in laws, and in minority schools where the number of subjects to be 
acquired in the Latvian language has increased. The use of Latvian has increased in several spheres 
of life. In a 2009 survey on language skills, 75 % of Russians assessed their Latvian language 
skills as good or average, 16 % said they had basic knowledge, and only 8 % admitted that they 
did not know Latvian at all (in 2000, 52.3 % of Russians knew Latvian) (LVA (Latvian Language 
Agency) 2012). In a 2014 survey, 61.6 % of non-Latvians said that they can easily or with only 
minor difficulty speak about any topic in Latvian, whereas 30.3 % can converse only about simple 
topics in Latvian, and 7 % cannot speak Latvian at all. Latvian language proficiency has become 
more widespread among non-Latvian youth (18–24 yrs) – in this age group 89.4 % can easily or 
with only minor difficulty speak about any topic in Latvian. The proportion of Latvians who can 
easily or with only minor difficulty speak Russian remains high at 83.7 %. However, the percentage 
of youth (18–24 yrs), who speak little (26.2 %) or no Russian (11 %) is increasing (DA 2014).
On 21 June 2012, the Saeima adopted controversial amendments to the Labour Law prohibiting 
in a job vacancy ad ‘to require particular language proficiency except in cases when it is reasonably 
necessary for the performance of job duties’ (LR Saeima 2012a). Amendments were mainly aimed 
at restricting the requirement of Russian language proficiency, justifying it by the fact that many 
7 Decision of the Riga City Zemgale Suburb Court on closing the file in case No P131037407. 
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young Latvians do not speak Russian and find it difficult to compete in the labour market. These 
amendments cannot be perceived as positive as state regulation of language use in the private sector 
should be restricted (Delfi 2011). 
Several laws (the Law on Elections of the Republic City Council and Municipality Council, 
Rules of Procedure of the Saeima) were amended to prescribe the procedure of how elected municipal 
council members and members of parliament can be stripped of their mandate, if it is established 
that they do not have the highest level of Latvian language proficiency. These amendments were 
related to the insufficient knowledge of Latvian by the MP representing the Harmony Centre party 
(Saskaņas centrs) V. Kravcovs and the attempts to remove him from the Parliament. Even though 
an MP’s insufficient knowledge of Latvian can serve as grounds for removing his/her mandate, the 
possible expulsion of an already elected MP was criticised by some experts as anti-constitutional 
and anti-democratic (BNS 2011).
Current situation
Pursuant to the Cabinet of Ministers regulations, dissemination of written public information 
prepared by public authorities in other languages (according to the Latvian legislation - foreign 
languages) is restricted to situations of epidemics, emergency and public safety situations, statistical 
surveys, etc. (LR MK 2005). The number of cases when the State Language Centre (SLC) has tried 
to restrict the distribution of information in Russian in situations where even the law permits this 
has increased. Furthermore, in cases when information must be freely accessible publicly, the SLC 
continued to interpret the law that public authorities may not disseminate information in any other 
language but Latvian except for cases when such information is specifically requested. The SLC 
filed a case against the Central Statistical Bureau because it encouraged the participation in the 2011 
Population Census by distributing invitations also in Russian. In many other EU member states, 
information for population census is provided in languages widely used in the specific country – 
in the United Kingdom, information is available in 56 languages, in Ireland in 21 languages, in 
Lithuania also in Russian and Polish, whilst in Estonia it is also available in Russian (LR EM 
(Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Latvia) 2011). In late 2012, the SLC filed a case against 
the State Police about publicly available brochures (on cyclists’ safety, safety tips against burglaries, 
how/where to complain about police misconduct, etc.) also in Russian. (TVNET/De Facto 2012). 
In some cases, it should be assessed whether the prohibition imposed by the SLC on distributing 
information in other languages is consistent not merely with laws governing the use of languages 
but also the Constitution. In 2009 and 2013, the SLC prohibited the distribution of leaflets printed 
in Russian urging women to attend state-paid preventive check-up for breast and cervical cancer 
(Dzērve 2009; Kamenska 2013). In February 2013, anti-corruption posters in Latvian prepared by 
the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (CPCB) were placed in publicly accessible places 
in medical establishments, whereas the SLC allowed placing the bilingual posters in Latvian and 
Russian, only in doctors’ offices (Zariņš 2013). According to surveys corruption is most widespread 
in the health care, and it is important that the CPCB information reaches as many people as possible. 
The Cabinet of Ministers regulations derived from the Official Language Law prescribe the 
required Latvian language proficiency level and scope for the performance of professional and job 
duties. These requirements are also applicable to the private sector. Initially, the list of private sector 
professions included 70–80 professions, however after the amendments introduced in 2006, the list 
was expanded to include more than 1,000 professions. In the private sector, Latvian language skills 
are required in professions linked to the performance of public functions or concerning legitimate 
public interest, however discussions have focused on language requirements in communication with 
consumers and the proportionality of these requirements. 
The option to choose and use a person’s name is also linked to the use of language in the private 
sphere. There are two principles determining the spelling of names: gender-specific endings must 
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be used and a personal name must be transcribed from another language into the Latvian language 
according to its pronunciation in the original language. Courts continue to hear cases dealing with 
the Latvianising of personal names from other languages, including those of national minorities. On 
28 October 2010, the UN Human Rights Committee in the case Raihman vs Latvia ruled that the 
change of the name and surname of the applicant L. Raihmans (by adding an ending ‘s’) in official 
documents, thus spelling it according to the Latvian language rules, was an arbitrary interference 
with a person’s privacy. In 2012, the government of Latvia in a report to the UN Human Rights 
Committee explained that it did not believe that there was any need to introduce urgent measures 
to change the existing national regulation with regard to the spelling of personal names in official 
documents, at the same time stating that the government would take into account the opinion of 
the Committee in any further discussions arising at a national level with respect to this issue (LR 
MK 2012). Also in other matters examined by the Supreme Court, it has explained that the current 
regulations for spelling foreign personal names in Latvian meet the Constitution and international 
standards. However, experts have stated that the practice of Latvian and international institutions 
shows that in the adoption of decisions on the spelling of personal names, utmost care must be 
exercised with persons, whose form of personal names have for a longer time period or historically 
been previously accepted by the State. Thus, the change of a personal name is often both offensive 
and can lead to serious difficulty for a person. Moreover, the benefits gained by society due to such 
conduct of the state are difficult to prove. (Biksiniece-Martinova, Liepņa 2012, 56)
Even though the Latvian language has been strengthened in law and many spheres of life, its 
protection remains topical. Language legislation can be considered as consistent with international 
standards. However, certain restrictions embedded in the laws, as well as the tendency to expand them, 
show that the grounds for imposing restrictions and the need for such restrictions in a democratic 
society has not yet stabilised. Attempts to restrict the public distribution of written information 
prepared in Russian by public authorities, when the law permits it, as well as to regulate the language 
use in the private sector raise concerns. The situation in this sphere is assessed as satisfactory. 
3.4. How free from harassment and intimidation are individuals and  
groups working to improve human rights?
During the decade, the number of NGOs dealing with various human rights issues such as the 
LGBT and their friends alliance Mozaīka (2006), a resource centre for persons with mental and 
intellectual disabilities Zelda (2007), “Patvērums. Drošā Māja” (2007) working with victims of 
human trafficking and integration of asylum seekers, among others, has increased. Several umbrella 
organisations have been formed uniting NGOs dealing with the rights of specific target groups 
(individuals with a disability etc.). However, similar to the 1990s, the development of human rights 
organisations is taking place qualitatively rather than quantitatively. There are few human rights 
organisations dealing with a broad spectrum of human rights issues, such as the Latvian Centre for 
Human Rights. Although there are several NGOs working to reduce child abuse, there are no strong 
NGOs in Latvia dealing with a broad range of children’s rights issues. 
Non-governmental human rights organisations operate on the same principles as other NGOs 
and their activity is governed by the Associations and Foundations Law adopted in 2003. As a 
result of transposing EU directives, the rights of NGOs established for the purposes of protecting 
human rights to represent the victims of discrimination as well as irregular immigrants, including 
their representation in court, were strengthened.
The funding that non-governmental human rights organisations can receive from the state has 
increased, but it predominantly forms part of co-financing (10–20 %) in projects supported by the 
European Commission. 
Some NGOs, such as the Latvian Human Rights Committee, have been actively engaged in 
the protection of the rights of national minorities. It has successfully contested decisions of public 
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authorities in Latvian courts and at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR 2009). However, 
the links of this NGO with political parties (co-chairs of the NGO are party members, organisation 
members run for local and parliamentary elections on a regular basis, they remain active in the 
NGOs, once elected as members of the parliament or local government) questions their independence 
and impartiality. 
In 2006, the Ombudsman Law was adopted, and the Ombudsman’s Office was created on 
the basis of the formerly National Human Rights Office. The Office’s powers and mandate were 
expanded along with consolidating its independence. The former judge of the Constitutional Court 
Romāns Apsītis was the first elected Ombudsman, and in 2007, the budget and the staff of the 
Office were increased significantly. This was linked to high hopes for expanding the operations of 
the Ombudsman’s Office and to improving the effectiveness of its work. In the summer of 2009, as 
a result of a serious internal conflict between the Ombudsman and the staff, the effectiveness and 
even the existence of the institution was seriously questioned, as during the time of preparing the 
draft budget, the government, which has no mandate in deciding the issue with regard to independent 
institutions, even considered closing the Office. Following protests from several officials and civil 
society, the government abandoned the idea (BNS 2009). During the economic crises and due to 
crisis-related austerity measures, and the fact that advantage had been taken of the weakness of the 
institution, the budget of the Ombudsman’s Office for 2010 was reduced by 57 % compared to 2008. 
In March 2011, the Saeima elected the little-known Juris Jansons as the Ombudsman. The 
selection procedure of the Ombudsman was also controversial, as it was plagued by political 
squabbles, since the Saeima approved the weakiest of the two candidates. In practice, reviewing 
complaints and applications remains the most important function of the Office. Due to the lack of 
financing, the possibility of performing other tasks (research, surveys etc.) was limited and started 
increasing only in the period after the economic crises (Delna 2011).
There are no data about persons or groups in Latvia working to improve the situation of human 
rights, who may have suffered from physical threats because of their public activity. However, these 
people or groups are frequently subjected to verbal insults and intimidation when advocate the 
rights of certain target groups, such as LGBT or asylum seekers. Websites related to LGBT persons 
have been hacked on a number of occasions – in 2008, a database from the website of the alliance 
Mozaīka containing the members’ private and contact information was stolen and published online, 
whilst in 2010, the server of the LGBT ‘Gay.lv’ portal was hacked and the database was copied. 
Until recently, some politicians and activists have publicly encouraged restricting the activities 
of specific persons or organisations or their financing possibilities in various ways. Opinions about 
George Soros’ organisations and their aims continue to be voiced in the media (although a downward 
trend may be observed) (Brands-Kehre, 31). Over the last few years, the issue of whistle-blowers 
and their legal protection has become more topical (Delna 2012).
The overall situation is assessed as satisfactory.
3.5. What measures are implemented to prevent publicly identified 
problems in the sphere of civil and political rights, and to what extent 
they are set as a political priority and offered public support?
The accountability of law enforcement authorities such as police before the public remains a 
topical issue. To a considerable extent, the readiness to solve these issues is impacted by the ECtHR 
judgements against Latvia, such as effective investigation of complaints about ill-treatment by the 
police and in prisons. The state has been ordered to pay compensation to the victims, and the amount 
of these compensations is increasing. The commitment of municipality (predominantly that of Riga 
City Council) to guarantee freedom of assembly – in particular after 2012 – has been influenced by 
administrative courts judgements. However, the understanding of freedoms (freedom of speech) and 
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS LATVIA?80
the legitimate grounds for their restriction is unstable. Addressing certain issues (e.g. crime victims’ 
rights) has been facilitated by transposing EU directives. In various areas, such as the addressing of 
rights of national minorities and integration, Latvia can still be described as ‘reluctant democratizer’ 
(Muižnieks, Brands-Kehris 2003, 30).
Public awareness about human rights and the fact that they refer not only to specific groups 
of people, but to every member of society has increased (though remains incomplete). Part of the 
political elite still perceives the addressing of certain human rights issues as criticism and defamation 
of the state and not as an inherent feature of democracy. At the same time, the readiness of public 
authorities and parliamentary committees to engage human rights NGOs in drafting the legislation 
and policy documents, and in evaluating government reports on the implementation of international 
human rights conventions has increased. The principle of co-financing from various EC and EEA 
funds raises awareness among the Latvian authorities about the urgency of different human rights 
issues (e.g. human trafficking, asylum seekers, restriction of hate speech). The overall situation is 
assessed as satisfactory.
Overall assessment: progress over the last decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
3.1. X
3.2. X
3.3. X
3.4. X
3.5. X
Best features
Over the last decade, the awareness of government and public authorities on the need to address 
legislative issues to reduce physical threat and ensure support measures for crime victims has 
increased. Case law on freedom of assembly and speech is a positive development.
Most serious problem
No independent public body has yet been established to monitor law enforcement bodies and 
prevent possible human rights violations. 
Suggested improvements
Establish an independent body to monitor law enforcement bodies, increase law enforcement 
and court capacity on freedom of speech and assembly, elaborate laws criminalising hate crimes 
against sexual minorities and persons with disabilities. 
References
US State Department (2013). 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report Latvia, 2 tier. Source http://www.state.
gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2013/215500.htm [this and other electronic sources cited in the report have been 
accessed  on April and May 2014].
Biksiniece-Martinova, L., Lapiņa, L. (2012). Personvārdu rakstība un cilvēktiesības. Rīga: Latvijas Republikas 
tiesībsargs.
BNN (2013). Aprit četri gadi kopš 13. janvāra grautiņiem (14.01.). Source: http://bnn.lv/aprit-cetri-gadi-kops-
13-janvara-grautiniem-98513
Anhelita Kamenska. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 81
BNS (2009). Eksperti tiesībsargam pārmet pasivitāti, bet uzsver institūcijas nepieciešamību (04.07.). Source: 
http://apollo.tvnet.lv/zinas/eksperti-tiesibsargam-parmet-pasivitati-bet-uzsver-institucijas-nepieciesamibu/ 
422580
BNS (2011). Brands-Kehre: cilvēktiesību eksperti protestēs pret Kravcova izslēgšanu no Saeimas valodas 
nezināšanas dēļ. Source: http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/brands-kehre-cilvektiesibu-eksperti-
protestes-pret-kravcova-izslegsanu-no-saeimas-valodas-nezinasanas-del.d?id=36544491
BNS (2012). Uzbrukumā cietušais žurnālists Jākobsons sadarbojas ar policiju (19.07. Source:  http://
www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/uzbrukuma-cietusais-zurnalists-jakobsons-sadarbojas-ar-policiju. 
d?id=42522212
BT (2011). Baltic Times. Two Balts’ found in UK ‘slave’ caravan (14.04.). Source: http://www.baltictimes.
com/news/articles/29540/
Brands-Kehre, I. Pilsoniskās un politiskās tiesības. No: Cik demokrātiska ir Latvija: Demokrātijas monitorings 
2005–2007. Red. J. Rozenvalds. Rīga: Zinātne, 27.–32. lpp. Source: http://www.president.lv/images/modules/
items/PDF/item_1586_Demokrat_monitorings.pdf
Brands-Kehre, I., Pūce, I. (2005). Pilsoniskās un politiskās tiesības. No: Cik demokrātiska ir Latvija: 
Demokrātijas audits. Red. J. Rozenvalds. Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 45.–62. lpp.
CPT (2009). Report to the Latvian Government on the visit to Latvia carried out by the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 November 
to 7 December 2007, CPT/Inf (2009) 35. (Strasbourg, 19 December 2009). Source: http://www.cpt.coe.int/
documents/lva/2009-35-inf-eng.htm
CPT (2013). Report to the Latvian Government on the visit to Latvia carried out by the European Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 5 to 15 September 
2011, CPT/Inf (2013) 20. Source: http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/lva/2013-20-inf.eng.htm
CSP (2013). Centrālā statistikas pārvalde. Bērni Latvijā 2013. Rīga, 2013, 107. lpp. Source: http://www.csb.
gov.lv/sites/default/files/nr_13_berni_latvija_2013_13_00_lv_en.pdf
CVK (2012). Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija. 2012. gada 18. februāra tautas nobalsošana par likumprojekta 
“Grozījumi Latvijas Republikas Satversmē” pieņemšanu. Rezultāti. Source: http://www.tn2012.cvk.lv/report-
results.html
CVK (2013). Likumprojekts “Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā”. Source: http://cvk.lv/pub/
public/30673.html [last viewed: 02.06.2014].
DA (2014). 2014. gada demokrātijas audita vajadzībām veiktās iedzīvotāju aptaujas dati (pasūtītājs – LU 
Sociālo zinātņu fakultāte, izpildītājs – SKDS). Valsts programma “Nacionālā identitāte”. Rīga, aprīlis. Sk. šā 
izdevuma 2. pielikumu; ar pilnīgiem aptaujas rezultātiem var iepazīties LU SZF mājaslapā.
Delfi (2010). Aprit gads kopš uzņēmēja Ņemcova slepkavības (16.04.). Source: http://www.delfi.lv/
news/national/criminal/aprit-gads-kops-uznemeja-nemcova-slepkavibas-policija-turpina-izmeklesanu. 
d?id=38050927
Delfi (2011). Pēc darba devēju protestiem pārskatīs ieceri ierobežot tiesības prasīt darbiniekiem svešvalodu 
prasmes (10.08.). Source: http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/pec-darba-deveju-protestiem-parskatis-
ieceri-ierobezot-tiesibas-prasit-darbiniekiem-svesvalodu-prasmes.d?id=40031669
Delfi (2012). ‘Operas puisīša’ plakātā nesaskata noziegumu un lietu izbeidz (26.06.). Source http://www.
delfi.lv/news/national/criminal/operas-puisisa-plakata-nesaskata-noziegumu-un-lietu-izbeidz.d?id=42463270
#ixzz30B8Uf8YX
Delna (2011). Deputatiuzdelnas.lv. Jura Jansona ievēlēšana tiesībsarga amatā (18.08.). Source: http://www.
deputatiuzdelnas.lv/notikumu-hronika/amatpersonu-vel-sana-iecel-ana-atcel-ana/jura-jansona-ievelesana-
tiesibsarga-amata.html
Delna (2012). Ziņojuma “Trauksmes cēlēju tiesiskā aizsardzība Latvijā secinājumi un priekšlikumi”. 
Source: http://delna.lv/2012/10/31/zinojuma-trauksmes-celeju-tiesiska-aizsardziba-latvija-secinajumi-un-
priekslikumi/
Diena (2012). Baltijas valstīs augstākā bērnu vardarbības skolās. Source: http://www.diena.lv/latvija/zinas/
baltijas-valstis-augstaka-bernu-vardarbiba-skolas-13982458
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS LATVIA?82
Diena (2013). Nepilsoņu kongress sola piedzīt naudu no valsts par nepilsoņiem 22 gadu laikā nodarīto 
kaitējumu. Source: http://www.diena.lv/latvija/zinas/nepilsonu-kongress-sola-piedzit-naudu-no-valsts-par-
nepilsoniem-22-gadu-laika-nodarito-kaitejumu-14000029
Dzērve, L. (2009). “Vēža profilakse”. Source: http://www.diena.lv/arhivs/veza-profilakse-13864417
Lingens v Austria, no. 9815/82, (1986) 8 EHRR 407 
Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, no. 17488/90, (1996) 22 EHRR 123. 
United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, no. 113/1996/752/951, 30 Jan. 1998 (Reports 1998-I)
Lehideux and Isorni (on behalf of Isorni) v France, no. 24662/94, Case No 55/1997/839/1045, ECHR 1998-
VII, [1998] ECHR 90 
Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, 2 October 
2001, ECHR 2001-IX
Yazar [and Others] and the People’s Labour Party v. Turkey, no. 22723, 9 April 2002. 
Chauvy & Others v. France, no. 64915/01 (Sect. 2), ECHR 2004-VI, 29 June 2004. 
A/S Diena and Ozoliņš v. Latvia, no. 16657/03, 12 July 2007 ECHR
N. Andrejeva v Latvia, [GC], no. 55707/00, 18 February 2009 ECHR. 
Seleckis c. la Lettonie, (règlement amiable), no. 57829/00, 2 Mars 2010 CEDH. Source: http://jurisprudence.
cedh.globe24h.com/0/0/lettonie/2010/03/02/seleckis-c-lettonie-97829-41486-04.shtml 
Alekseyev v Russia, nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, 21 October 2010 ECHR
Nagla v. Latvia, no. 73469/10, 16 July 2013 ECHR.
EC (2013). European Commission. Free movement of workers: Commission improves the application of 
worker’s rights – frequently asked questions. MEMO/13/384 26/04/2013. Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-13-384_lv.htm 
EC (2014). European Commission. April infringements package: main decisions EU citizens’ electoral rights: 
Commission continues action against Czech Republic, Latvia and Poland. Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-14-293_en.htm  
OJ EU (2006). Official Journal of the European Union. COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1932/2006 of 
21 December 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement. Source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:405:0023:0034:EN:
PDF
EU FRA (2014). Fundamental Rights Agency. Violence against Women Survey. Source: http://fra.europa.eu/
DVS/DVT/vaw.php
Ir (2010). Kalnmeijers: nevar likt šķēršļus tiesas atļautam gājienam (09.07.2009). Source: http://www.
ir.lv/2010/7/9/kalnmeiers-nevar-likt-skerslus-tiesas-atlautam-gajienam
Kamenska, A. (2013). Kad valodas sardze pārvēršas par valodas māniju. Source: http://www.ir.lv/2013/10/28/
kad-valodas-sardze-parversas-par-valodas-maniju
Kovaļevska, A. (2006). Brīvība pie Brīvības pieminekļa. Source: www.politika.lv
LBAS (2013). Latvijas Brīvo arodbiedrību savienība. Darbinieku brīvas pārvietošanās Eiropas Savienībā 
regulējuma aktualitātes. Source http://www.lbas.lv/upload/stuff/201312/darbinieku.briva.parvietosanas_
mickevica.30.11.2013_final.pdf
LCC (2008). Latvijas Cilvēktiesību centra atzinums par reklāmas materiālu Latvijas Nacionālās operas izrādei 
“Leļļu opera”. Source: http://www.diena.lv/sabiedriba/latvijas-cilvektiesibu-centra-atzinums-par-reklamas-
materialu-latvijas-nacionalas-operas-izradei-lel-33915
LETA (2009). ‘Neļķu Alīnai’ piemēro 200 latu sodu par aizliegtas simbolikas izmantošanu (08.09.). Source: 
http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/criminal/nelku-alinai-piemero-200-latu-sodu-par-aizliegtas-simbolikas-
izmantosanu.d?id=26725455
LETA (2013a). Rīgas dome publiski atvainojas “Daugavas Vanagiem” par aizliegumu rīkot gājienu 16. martā 
(08.03.). Source: http://nra.lv/latvija/90594-rigas-dome-publiski-atvainojas-daugavas-vanagiem-par-
aizliegumu-rikot-gajienu-16-marta.htm
Anhelita Kamenska. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 83
LETA (2013b). Latvija kļuvusi par cilvēku tirdzniecības upuru izcelsmes valsti (28.05.). Source: http://www.
tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/465723-latvija_kluvusi_par_cilveku_tirdzniecibas_upuru_izcelsmes_valsti
LETA (2013c). Policija prasa tiesu piespiest “Zemgales Ziņu” žurnālistu atklāt informācijas avotu; Kupčs 
atsakās. Source https://www.ir.lv/2013/11/29/jelgavas-tiesa-plano-prasit-zurnalistam-atklat-informacijas-
avotu-kupcs-atsakas
LETA (2014a). Mozaīka: Seksuālo minoritāšu stāvoklis Latvijā ir sliktākais ES. Source: http://www.diena.lv/
latvija/zinas/mozaika-seksualo-minoritasu-stavoklis-latvija-ir-sliktakais-es-14055963
LETA (2014b). Pārsūdzēts spriedums Jaunalksnes sarunu noklausīšanās krimināllietā. Source: http://www.
leta.lv/archive/search/?patern=Jaunalksne+krimin%C4%81llieta&item=9EF10C55-FA4E-4A2D-9702-16B23
8B0EDE7&date=1104530400%2C1408914000&mode=stem%2Cwide&print
LR AT (2006). Latvijas Republikas Augstākā tiesa, Senāta Krimināllietu departaments un Judikatūras nodaļa 
(2006). Tiesu prakse lietās par cilvēku tirdzniecību un personu nosūtīšanu seksuālai izmantošanai, 48 lpp.
LR AT (2007). Augstākās tiesas Senāta Administratīvo lietu departamenta 2007. gada 15. novembra spriedums 
lietā Nr. SKA-442.
LR AT (2010). Augstākās tiesas Senāta Administratīvo lietu departamenta 2010. gada 10. marta spriedums 
lietā Nr. SKA-34/2010.
LR CSP (2013). Latvijas Republikas Centrālā statistikas pārvalde. Reģistrēto noziedzīgo nodarījumu skaits 
1990-2013. Source: http://data.csb.gov.lv
LR EM (2011). Latvijas Republikas Ekonomikas ministrija. Par atbildēm uz Saeimas deputātu jautājumu “Par 
Valsts valodas likuma 21. panta pārkāpumu”, vēstule Nr. 1-1-2408 (09.03.2011). Source: http://titania.saeima.
lv/LIVS10/SaeimaLIVS_LmP.nsf/0/35726c46b9f3fde1c225784e003d74ae/$FILE/1_64.pdf
LR IeM (2012). Latvijas Republikas Iekšlietu ministrijas Informācijas centra atbilde Latvijas Cilvēktiesību 
centram 2012. gada 26. oktobrī.
LR MK (2005). Latvijas Republikas Ministru kabineta noteikumi Nr. 130 “Noteikumi par valodu lietošanu 
informācijā”, pieņemti 15.02.2005. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 36, 2. marts. 
LR MK (2010). Latvijas Republikas Ministru kabineta noteikumi Nr. 850 “Kriminālprocesa informācijas 
sistēmas noteikumi”, pieņemti 17.09.2010. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 148, 17. sept.
LR MK (2011). Latvijas Republikas Ministru kabineta noteikumi Nr. 675 “Kārtība, kādā Savienības pilsoņi un 
viņu ģimenes locekļi ieceļo un uzturas Latvijas Republikā”, pieņemti 30.08.2011. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 141, 
7. sept.
LR MK (2012). Latvijas Republikas Ministru kabineta pārstāvja starptautiskajās cilvēktiesību institūcijās 
dienesta informācija Nr. 03/149-1513 “Par ANO Cilvēktiesību komitejas viedokli lietā “Leonid Raihman 
(Leonīds Raihmans) pret Latviju” un Latvijas Republikas valdības sniegto atbildi. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 63, 
24. apr.
LR MK (2014). Latvijas Republikas Ministru kabineta rīkojums Nr. 29 “Par cilvēku tirdzniecības novēršanas 
pamatnostādnēm 2014.–2020. gadam”, izdots 21.01.2014. Source: http://polsis.mk.gov.lv/view.do?id=4633
LR Saeima (1998a). Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likums, pieņemts 19.06.1998. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 199/200, 
8. jūl.
LR Saeima. (1998b). Krimināllikums, pieņemts 17.06.1998.  Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 199/200, 8. jūl.
LR Saeima (2006). Politisko partiju likums, pieņemts 07.07.2006. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 107, 7. jūl.
LR Saeima (2009). Grozījumi “Par Krimināllikuma spēkā stāšanās un piemērošanas kārtību”, pieņemti 
19.11.2009. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 193, 9. dec.
LR Saeima (2012a). Grozījumi Darba likumā, pieņemti 21.06.2012. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 108, 11. jūl. 
LR Saeima (2012b). Grozījumi Krimināllikumā, pieņemti 27.12.2012. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 202, 27. dec.
LR Saeima (2014a). Grozījumi Civilprocesa likumā, pieņemti 13.02.2014. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 41, 26. febr.
LR Saeima (2014b). Grozījumi “Likumā par policiju”, pieņemti 6.03.2014. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 57, 
20. marts.
LR Saeima (2014c). Grozījumi Krimināllikumā, 74.1  pants, pieņemti, 15.05.2014. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 105, 
31. maijs.
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS LATVIA?84
LR ST (2006). Satversmes tiesas spriedums 2006. gada 23. novembrī lietā “Par likuma “Par sapulcēm, 
gājieniem un piketiem”” 1. panta ceturtās daļas vārdu “vai citiem atribūtiem” un “kā arī mutvārdos izteikti 
atsevišķi saukļi, lozungi vai uzrunas”, 9. panta pirmās daļas, 12. panta trešās daļas 1. punkta vārdu “kārtības 
uzturētājiem”, 13. panta otrās daļas vārdu “un gājēju”, 14. panta sestās daļas otrā teikuma, 15. panta ceturtās 
daļas vārdu “ne agrāk kā 10 dienas un”, 16. panta un 18. panta ceturtās daļas atbilstību Latvijas Republikas 
Satversmes 103. pantam, Eiropas Cilvēka tiesību un pamatbrīvību aizsardzības konvencijas 11. pantam un 
Starptautiskā pakta par pilsoniskajām un politiskajām tiesībām 21. pantam”. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Nr. 192, 1. dec.
LR ST (2014). Satversmes tiesas spriedums 2014. gada 23. aprīlī lietā Nr. 2013-15-01. Source: http://www.
satv.tiesa.gov.lv/upload/spriedums_2013-15-01.pdf 
LR TM (2013). Latvijas Republikas Tieslietu ministrija. Informatīvais ziņojums par gadījumiem, kad konstatēti 
pārkāpumi sūdzību par iespējamu vardarbību, ko izdarījušas valsts amatpersonas, pildot dienesta pienākumus, 
efektīva izmeklēšana. Source: http://www.mk.gov.lv/doc/2014_06/TMZino_100514_VSS-2106.1014.docx
LSM (2013). Latvijas sabiedriskais medijs. DP aktivitātes raisa bažas par vēlmi iebiedēt žurnālistus. Source 
http://www.lsm.lv/lv/raksts/zinju-analiize/analize/dp-aktivitates-raisa-bazhas-par-velmi-iebiedet-zhurnalistus.
a72573/
LVA (2012). Latviešu valodas aģentūra. Valodas situācija Latvijā 2004–2010. Rīga: Latviešu valodas aģentūra.
LŽA (2011). Latvijas žurnālistu asociācija. LŽA par žurnālista L. Jākobsona arestēšanu (29.12.). Source: 
http://www.latvijaszurnalisti.lv/raksti/2011/12/29/lza-par-zurnalista-l-jakobsona-arestesanu/
Muiznieks, N., Brands Kehris I. (2003). The European Union, democratization, and minorities in Latvia. In: 
The European Union and Democratization. Ed. by P. J. Kubicek. London; New York: Routledge.
Patvērums (2011). Biedrības “Patvērums Drošā māja” kampaņa “Atver acis”. Source: http://patverums-dm.
lv/lv/kampana-atver-acis
Presesbrīvība.info (2008). Žurnālistu atklāta vēstule par vārda brīvību. Source: http://www.presesbriviba.info/
lv/news/zurnalistu-atklata-vestule-par-varda-brivibu/
Rīgas dome (2010). Pieteikumi par sapulču, gājienu un piketu rīkošanu 2010. gadā. Nepublicēta informācija. 
RWB (2012). Reporters Without Borders. Newspaper owner gunned down in apparent contract killing. Source: 
http://en.rsf.org/lettonie-newspaper-owner-gunned-down-in-18-04-2010,37062.html
SKDS (2012). 2012. gada novembra aptauja. Source http://www.skds.lv/doc/Noziedzibas%20izplatiba%20_
SKDS_%20112012.pdf
Tralmaka, I., Kučs, A. (2014). Vēstures faktu interpretācija Krimināllikumā un starptautiskajos cilvēktiesību 
dokumentos. Jurista Vārds, Nr. 24, 17.–21. lpp. 
TVNET/De facto (2012). Soda par informēšanu svešvalodās arī būtiskos jautājumos (04.11). Source: http://
www.tvnet.lv/zinas/latvija/442004-soda_par_informesanu_svesvalodas_ari_butiskos_jautajumos
UN ODCIHS (2011). UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide Statistics. Intentional homicides 
(per 100,000 people) – Country Ranking, database. Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/
VC.IHR.PSRC.P5/rankings
UR (2013). Uzņēmuma reģistra notāres L. Strodes 2013. gada 14. marta lēmums Nr. 10-11/18501. Source: 
http://www.ur.gov.lv/faili/JV_numura%20tema.pdf
Zariņš, T. (2013). Valsts valodas centrs liedz KNAB izvietot savus kampaņas plakātus publiskās vietās. 
Source:http://www.diena.lv/latvija/zinas/valsts-valodas-centrs-liedz-knab-izvietot-savus-kampanas-plakatus-
publiskas-vietas-13994088
Zavackis, A. u.c. (2013). Atbalsts viktimizācijas prevencijai. Rīga: Providus, 40 lpp. Source: http://politika.lv/
article_files/2456/original/LV_105_finish_document.pdf?1377870490 [last viewed: 26.06.2014].
4. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS  
Feliciana Rajevska 
Are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all?
Introduction
Ensured and protected by the state, human rights are an opportunity to act and to implement 
one’s intentions. The extent to which basic rights are exercised is determined by the economic, social, 
cultural and educational development, as well as the political regime of each individual country. 
Civil rights and political rights are prerequisite to liberty, and are first-generation human rights. 
Economic, social, and cultural rights ensuring human survival are second-generation human rights. 
Unlike political rights, which are based on the legal (or formal) equality of people, social rights 
are aimed at their real social equality. It would be more precise to say that social rules ensure the 
implementation of the principle of legal equality with regard to socially vulnerable groups of people. 
After accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004, with the support of structural funds 
and various programs, Latvia strengthened the institutional capacity of the social security system. 
Between 2005 and 2007, Latvia experienced rapid growth, with the gross domestic product (GDP) 
growing at an average annual rate of 11 % (in 2007 – by 10.3 %). In 2007, the economy of Latvia 
had considerably overheated, and Latvia was among the first to be affected by the crisis – already 
in the 2nd quarter of 2008, the growth rates became negative, and later the GDP plummeted by a 
quarter. Latvia was subjected to the stringent monetary control of the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Commission. The key term used to describe Latvia’s policy from 2009 to 2012 
was budget consolidation. The ability of Latvia to overcome the crisis has even been referred to as 
a success story. The social security system of Latvia was able to amortise the initial consequences 
stemming from the economic recession. The government implemented radical reforms – a range of 
long-term and short-term changes were introduced in the field of social security and social assistance 
as well as in the health care sector. The actual household income per inhabitant according to the 
purchasing power parity standard in 2011, compared to the EU average, was at 51 % in Latvia, 
Estonia – 55 %, Lithuania – 64 %, Greece – 80 %, Ireland – 98 %, Spain – 95 % (EC 2013). 
4.1. How far is access to work or social security available to all, without 
discrimination?
In a survey within the DNB Latvian barometer study No 68 performed by SKDS in March 2014 
regarding the current assessment of a family’s material standing, the respondents mostly assessed 
the situation as average (rather good – 10 %, average – 52 %, rather bad – 25 %, very bad – 10 %, 
difficult to tell – 2 %). Of the total, 44 % of respondents also forecast that the material standing of 
the family would not have changed within the next 12 months; however, 20 % found it difficult to 
venture any forecasts. As many as 6 % of the respondents believed that there are good chances of 
finding a decent job in Latvia, whereas 64 % believed that the chances are poor. Among the most 
significant aspects of satisfaction with life, the respondents mentioned good health (74 %), material 
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prosperity (61 %) and a good family (51 %). In assessing the most important factors in attaining 
welfare, it was considered that the person him/herself and his/her invested efforts determine the level 
of welfare (in 2011, 37 % of the respondents believed it to be true, whereas in 2014 – 46 %). In 2014, 
more than a half or 53 % of respondents expressed satisfaction with their own and their family’s 
welfare, and this is a considerable increase in comparison with 28 % satisfaction ratio in 2011.
Unemployment
Unemployment emerges in all surveys as the biggest problem in Latvia (see the unemployment 
dynamics in Table 4.1). The percentage of officially registered unemployment increased from 5 % 
in early 2008 to 16.6 % in early 2010. Even though unemployment has been decreasing since the 
end of 2013, and no longer exceeds 10 %, it is still very high. The unemployment level differs 
in each region, and in February 2014, the situation was characterised with the following figures: 
unemployment in Riga was 6.2 %, Zemgale – 10.5 %, Vidzeme – 11.6 %, Kurzeme – 12.4 %, whilst 
Latgale – 19.5 % (NVA (State Employment Agency) 2014). 
Table 4.1. Unemployment dynamics in Latvia
Year, month Number of unem-
ployed people
Number of people 
receiving benefits 
Percentage of people receiving 
benefits among all unemployed 
2008.01 53 325 29 293 54.94%
2009.01 90 436 42 479 46.97%
2010.01 186 295 82 092 44.06%
2010.12 162 463 38 005 23.39%
2011.12 130 296 31 423 24.11%
2012.12 104 052 25 324 24.33%
2013.12 93 321 34 304 36.75%
Source: Author’s calculations based on the available data from the State Social Insurance Agency and from the 
State Employment Agency.
In September 2009, a special active labour market policy measure ‘Work experience with a grant 
in local governments’1 (hereinafter – WPGLG) was started with an aim to keep the unemployed 
active, while providing them with livelihood. The registered unemployed, who did not receive 
unemployment benefit and who were able to work 40 hours per week (younger than 18 years 
of age – 35 hours) were given a chance to engage in publicly useful, low-qualification, full time 
jobs in local governments (newly created work experience posts), by receiving a monthly grant of 
100 lats. Overall, local governments created 82 305 work experience posts, and during the period 
from 1 September 2009 to end2011, 122 937 were engaged through this measure (45 % participated 
more than once). Approximately 22 % of members found a job during their work experience or 
afterwards. The total funding of WPGLG was 54 23 419 lats (77 174 317 euro). According to the 
World Bank’s evaluation, the measure reached the poorest part of the population, ensuring significant 
support during the crisis situation. 
The dynamics of the number of people receiving benefits reveal an interesting situation. In 2009, 
the number of people receiving benefits rapidly increased, and since 2010, the opposite trend may 
1 The measure was implemented within the framework of the programme ‘Human resources and employment’, 
sub-activity No 1.3.1.5 ‘Support to the implementation of the plan for local employment promotion measures’ 
under the European Social Fund project ‘Ensuring work experience measures in local governments to acquire 
and maintain labour skills’.
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be observed. This can be explained by the duration of unemployment benefits, namely, nine months. 
In 2011, 2012, and 2013, the number of people receiving benefits remained relatively stable. Along 
with the termination of WPGLG at the end of 2011, the implementation of paid temporary public 
works (PTPW) started in 2012. State Employment Agency (SEA), by using the funds from EU 
structural funds, offered a broad range of active employment measures, the duration of which ranges 
from a few weeks to several months: measures for improving competitiveness, career consultations, 
informal training, PTPW, youth guarantee measures, among others. In 2009, Cabinet Regulation 
No 212 was adopted, prescribing that the unemployed can also receive a stipend during training. The 
stipend was set at 99.60 euro per calendar month. If the unemployed person is absent from more 
than 10 % of classes without a justified reason, the payment of the stipend is terminated. In 2013, the 
Youth Workshops measure was established for those aged between 15 and 24, particularly focusing 
on young people who have not received previous professional education. The aim of the measure – 
to help young people make a choice about their future profession and facilitate finding a job: people 
were given a chance to try out three professional sectors in an education establishment, by spending 
three weeks on each of the sectors and during that time learning about the specific features of the 
particular field and about the skills necessary (Ministry of Welfare of the Republic of Latvia, 2013).
Discrimination in the labour market
In 2013, Project and Quality Management, Ltd.(PQM) conducted a study ‘Discrimination in 
the Latvian labour market’ with an aim to evaluate the manifestations and forms of discrimination 
in the labour market of Latvia, as well as to prepare suggestions to reduce discrimination and its 
risks. The study included five target groups – youth aged 15 to 24, pre-retirement age people 50 to 
62 years, people with a disability, people with poor knowledge of the Latvian language, and women 
after maternity leave (up to three years after the maternity leave). The survey was conducted from 
January 2013 until April 2013. A number of this study’s most important findings concerning the 
situation from 2010 until 2012 follow.
Discrimination is manifested in interviews even before embarking upon professional relations in 
issues concerning private life, marital situation, and children. The study participants mentioned the 
following as discriminating conditions: very low salaries, inadequacy of salaries in comparison with 
the work load, absence of a lunch break, failure to give the statutory vacation, giving preference to 
people of the same ethnicity, lack of work experience, differences of salary within the framework 
of the same profession, as well as situations when adequate payment is not made for the work 
performed by managing to ‘cover it’ as work performed, during the trial period (at the end of which, 
the employee is fired as ‘having failed the trial period), unofficial salaries, delayed payment of 
salaries, lack of legal protection for pieceworkers (because short-term contracts do not provide for 
any social guarantees), unregulated work time, as well as unpaid night shifts and overtime, excessive 
work load, for instance, when objectives in the construction sector must be attained, people are 
forced to work thereby extending their physical capabilities to the maximum (PQM, 2014, 50–53). 
Such discrimination in a work place as that related to work relations, such as mobbing, harassment, 
is considered separately. 
The study participants believe that the following groups are most significantly subjected to the 
risk of discrimination in the labour market: youth without work experience, young mothers with 
small children, women receiving a comparatively lower pay than men, even though they perform 
identical tasks; employees, who have moved from less developed regions, as their initial demands 
relative to working conditions and pay are comparatively lower; people with disabilities, ex-convicts, 
people of specific ethnic backgrounds, such as the Roma people, who, due to perceptions historically 
rooted in society, find it more difficult to get a job; sexual minorities, people affiliated with smaller 
religious groups, especially in cases where they are trying to engage others in their religious group; 
non-citizens and the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Latvia. 
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The respondents’ answers give a certain idea of the legal literacy of society, when answering the 
question about the institutions that they would address for help if they had to deal with discrimination 
in a work place. Every fourth person finds it difficult to name any institution, and the least of 
them among young mothers (14.5 %). Most respondents (30.3–46.2 %) would seek help at the 
State Labour Inspectorate. Every fifth person would address top management in his or her work 
place. Additionally, friends and acquaintances are highly appreciated as sources of assistance. Trade 
Unions do not rate very highly as an authority to which one would turn for assistance. They rate 
the highest among the pre-retirement age group. Awareness of national law enforcement authorities 
is the highest among the youth and people with poor Latvian language knowledge. Overall, public 
and non-governmental law enforcement authorities would be addressed by 29.4 % of women after 
maternity leave (explained by the fact that more than one-third (37.4 %) of women after maternity 
leave have higher education, 47.9 % – secondary education (25.6 % – secondary professional 
education, 22.3 % – general secondary education)). The awareness of pre-retirement age people of 
the current activities of various institutions intended for improving competitiveness of pre-retirement 
age employees can be described as poor. 
The annual reports of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia have always dedicated a 
special section to the prevention of discrimination (LR Tiesībsargs (Ombudsman of the Republic of 
Latvia) 2013a, 111–124; 2013b, 102–108). The Ombudsman’s report also states that the measures 
implemented by the Ombudsman’s Office have promoted positive results – an increasing number 
of people are addressing the office for assistance. Thus, in 2011, 2246 written applications were 
received (i.e. 887 applications or 65 % more than in 2010), 355 investigation cases have been 
completed (i.e. 170 cases or 92 % more than in the previous year) (Ombudsman of the Republic of 
Latvia 2013, 132.). E-mails are answered, consultations are held at the office and over the telephone, 
and an increasing number of people are addressing the office. 
Social security network strategy
The budget consolidation policy implemented during the crisis affected the entire society. 
However, it was particularly harsh on low-wage employees. In early 2009, the non-taxable minimum 
had already reached 90 lats and its significant reduction to 35 lats meant a reduction of the net 
minimum salary by 14.64 lats or from 146.82 lats to 132.18 lats, i.e. by 10 % (Rajevska, Ročāns, 73). 
The amount of the subsistence level estimated by Central Statistical Bureau (CSB) in June 2009 was 
163.38 lats. In line with the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
and the European Commission, a Social Security Network Strategy was drafted (approved by the 
Cabinet of Ministers on 8 September 2009, implemented from 1 October and concluded in three 
years – on 31 December 2012). The aim of the Strategy was to implement a set of extraordinary 
security measures to reduce the adverse social impact of the crisis. This strategy prescribed ensuring 
the guaranteed minimum income (GMI) to families in need, at the same time increasing the GMI and 
co-paying a housing allowance; ensuring work places in local governments to promote employment; 
ensuring the availability of pre-school education; availability of basic health care services and basic 
medicines to persons in need;  ensuring transport services in the education system, as well as public 
transport services for those categories of passenger eligible for discounted fares (Kūla 2011). 
The number of persons in need rapidly increased during the crisis.2The number of persons, 
who, for at least one month, had the status of a person in need, amounted to 176 100 in 2009, in 
2010 – 282 100, in 2011 – 265 300, and in 2012 – 210 600. In the fall of 2009, the GMI level was 
increased, setting it at 40 lats for adults and 45 lats for minors. At the same time, it was prescribed 
2 Pursuant to Cabinet Regulation  No 299 of 30 March 2010 ‘On recognizing a family or an individual living 
alone as in need’, a family (an individual) is recognised as having the status of in need, if the average income 
for each family member per month over the preceding three months does not exceed 90 lats, as well as meets 
other criteria stipulated in these Regulations (LR MK 2010). 
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that a state must give support to local governments in ensuring a GMI allowance (50 % of funds 
used by local governments) and providing funds for a housing allowance (20 % of funds used by 
local government) (LR MK (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia) 2009). The State co-
financed GMI allowance until 31 December 2012, but the housing allowance only up to 30 April 
2012. During the crisis, all decisions were made expeditiously in response to the situation. Thus, 
on 1 April 2010, Cabinet Regulation No 299 ‘On recognizing a family or an individual living alone 
as in need’ adopted on 30 March came into force, and this gave the rights to grant the status of a 
person in need also to individuals in debt; likewise, the period, for which the status of a person 
in need could be granted was extended from 3 to 6 months to a period of 6 to 12 months. Thus, 
accordingly, the period of awarding a GMI allowance was extended for 6 to 12 months. The level 
of lower income in society is also shown by the dynamics of the number of people receiving the 
GMI allowance: In 2009 – 62 900, in 2010 – 120 600, in 2011 – 121 800, in 2012 – 92 500, and 
26 300 in 2013. The active state involvement in solving the people’s problems from 2009–2012 
perceptibly reduced social tensions.
As shown by the data of 2009–2013, the highest deprivation level was observed in the age 
group above 65 years. Although the senior citizens’ income is stable, their pension is inadequate for 
covering basic needs. The State still has not resolved the issue of the minimum pension. According 
to the law, the minimum pension may not be lower than the state social security benefit. In Latvia, 
there is no legal regulation indexing this benefit to increases in the cost of living and income increase. 
The state social security benefit has not changed since 2006 (45 lats or 64.3 euro), irrespective of 
whether they were years ‘of plenty’ or crisis years. Therefore, the minimum pension after working 
for 20 years is only 70 euro. Mostly those who worked before the reform (i.e. pre-1996) receive 
this pension. The amount of pension is directly depending on each person’s contributions since 
1996. If there have been no contributions or if they have been kept to the minimum, no other state-
guaranteed provisions are envisaged for the elderly and people must rely on social support given 
by the local authority.
In a 2014 survey, the respondents were asked a question as to what the minimum state-guaranteed 
pension should be. Rather small amounts were proposed: 70, 100, 150, 200 euro, and more than 
200 euro. The proposed amounts were determined by the condition of the country’s economy, salary 
scales, as well as the idea that these sums must form a standard basis, to which a pension, calculated 
on the grounds of contributions made, would be added for each individual. This approach would 
ensure that all persons receiving a salary would always be motivated to make pension contributions. 
Only 8 % of respondents agreed to a basic pension of 200 euro, whereas the others – irrespective 
of their current income – chose in favour of an amount over 200 euro. And indeed, if the amount 
of social security benefit is not changed and remains the point of reference for calculating the 
minimum pension, then the respondents’ proposal of 200 + 70 = 270 EUR is very close to the sum 
of subsistence level invalidated in 2014.
People who retired in 2010–2013 (altogether 83 972) had to face the reality of a pension capital 
index and what effect it has on the calculated pension. The pension capital index is calculated each 
year. It is done by calculating the overall society’s salary and dividing it by the respective amount 
of the preceding year. When the economy is growing and the number of the employed along with 
their salaries is increasing, then the result is always more than one, and this is the number used 
for multiplying the pension capital. As soon as there is unemployment, people emigrate, salaries 
decrease, the total amount of the whole society’s salaries both in absolute numbers and in comparison 
with the preceding year also decreases, the respective parameter is lower than 1, and the capital 
of all pension system participants is thereby reduced. The crisis helped the inhabitants of Latvia 
to finally better understand the principles of operation of the pension system of notional defined 
contributions, ensuring the stability and sustainability of the system. It is undoubtedly the strength 
of this system, and the State of Latvia is a pioneer in introducing this system. Whatever the severity 
of recession and the unemployment level, expressed in double digits affecting the national economy, 
the pension system will be able to adjust with the help of the pension capital index. Each year, the 
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capital accumulated over the preceding years is multiplied by this index, by either increasing the 
capital (as it was in the years ‘of plenty’ or sharply reducing it in the individual account of each 
client of the system. This is the self-adjustment mechanism of the system, guaranteeing resistance 
and not demanding any efforts on the part of the state. All risks of operations are simply diverted 
to the individual, instead of distributing the risks between the state and the individual. While the 
economy was booming and the number of employed and their salaries were increasing, people were 
not particularly interested in such an abstract thing as the pension capital index. The crisis clearly 
illuminated not only the positive aspects of this approach, but also its unfairness with regard to those, 
whose pension, given the same level of contribution, is recalculated at 15–25 % lower for the rest 
of their lives. Other countries have already anticipated the possibility of such unfairness and have 
integrated adjustment mechanisms into their laws, such as a provision determining that the pension 
capital index may not be lower than 1 or that the pension capital index is calculated taking into 
account not one-year indicators, but those of the last three years, thus levelling out any rapid changes 
in the index. The Minister for Welfare Uldis Augulis has publicly promised to review possible 
solutions to the problem. Hopefully, it was not merely a pre-election campaign move. Furthermore, 
the Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia Juris Jansons has pointed out this aspect of unfairness.
4.2. How effectively are the basic necessities of life guaranteed, including 
adequate food, shelter and clean water?
Within the framework of the audit of democracy, in April 2014, a popular survey was conducted, 
and the respondents were asked the same questions about their level of material wellbeing before 
and after Latvia joined the European Union. The answers of the respondents about the inability 
to pay for services and goods of primary necessity in 2004 and 2014 are distributed in the same 
sequence with nearly the same improvement of the items on average by 8 per cent. It points to a 
certain, though rather slow improvement of the welfare level, as well as to the professional activity 
of social services and local governments.
To ensure the basic needs of the people, there are two equally important conditions: they must 
have daily access to food, and it must be of good quality. The availability of food products has 
improved, and 55 % of population have never had to give up food products. The responses of the 
rest are divided as follows: rarely – 16 %, sometimes – 19.6 %, often – 8.6 %.
Table 4.2. Has your family been forced to give up the following items within the last 12 months 
(answer ‘never’ %) 
2004 2014
Heating, electricity 72.5 80.2
Food products 48.6 55.0
Medicines, medical aid 44.2 52.2
Primary clothing or footwear 38.0 45.5
Source: DA (Audit of Democracy) 2005, DA 2014.
The rather modest level of material welfare of our country’s inhabitants is clearly demonstrated 
also by a comparison of the dynamics of the Latvian situation with the neighbouring states, 12 new 
EU member states, and the EU-27 average. There are numerous explanations, however the most 
important of them is related to low pay and an inadequate minimum salary, too low to meet the 
basic needs of the working population, as well as the total absence of any link between social 
security benefits and the poverty threshold indicators. (See Rajevska, Ročāns 2011). Since 2014, 
the government has decided to give up calculating the subsistence minimum, up to now done on a 
monthly basis by the CSB.
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Table 4.3. Material deprivation in countries of Europe in 2009–2012
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012
EU–27 17.3 17.7 18.4 19.6
12 EU new member states 34.6 34.9 34.1 34.9
Estonia 17.1 22.3 21.5 21.3
Latvia 40.2 46.6 49.0 44.6
Lithuania 27.4 36.3 35.1 34.4
Note. The indicator describes the part of the population, who are not able to buy at least three of nine goods or services. 
Source: Eurostat.
The Food and Veterinary Service (FVS) under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture 
implements food monitoring ‘from the field to the table’. There are 11 administrations operating 
within FVS, ensuring veterinary monitoring and control of food circulation. The Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre (CRPC) ensures the implementation of the Consumer Rights Protection Law, 
Unfair Commercial Practice Prohibition Law, Law on the Safety of Goods and Services, Law on 
Information Society Services, as well as of other laws and CM regulations governing consumer rights 
in Latvia (PTAC (Consumer Rights Protection Centre) 2013). In March 1999, non-governmental 
consumer organisations existing in Latvia united and formed the Latvian National Association for 
Consumer Protection. In 2014, the Association represented a range of members from various regions 
of Latvia. Over the last decade, the control over the quality of food that children receive at schools 
has improved considerably. 
Water quality monitoring is performed in Latvia on a regular basis. As it was pointed out in 
the 2014 report of the Health Inspectorate, since 2008, the chemical quality of drinking water has 
improved each year, and in the recent years, the proportion of people who receive quality drinking 
water meeting the regulations has increased to 81%. In Kurzeme and Latgale, this indicator exceeds 
95 % (Veselības inspekcija (Health Inspectorate) 2014, 28–29).
Housing
The housing price bubble introduced crisis to Latvia facilitated by easy access to loans, the 
rapid increase in wages, and the absolute illiteracy of population concerning loan commitments. 
When the bubble burst, it was very painful, and its consequences can still be felt. Latvia ranked 
second on a list of five EU countries with the steepest decline in housing prices in the period of 
2007–2012. Ireland (2007–2010) (-49.5 %), Latvia (-35.7 %), Estonia (-30.2 %), Spain (-28.0 %), 
Romania (2009–2012) (-26.1 %) (EC 2013). Since the reinstatement of independence, the housing 
stock in Latvia has increased significantly; also the total area per permanent resident has increased, 
with the average in Latvia being 35 sq. m in 2012. 
Table 4.4. Number of newly built apartments in Latvia 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2 821 3 807 5 865 9 319 8 084
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
4 187 1 918 2 662 2 087 2 201
Source: Central Statistical Bureau.
The table shows the dynamics of the number of newly built apartments, the rapid growth in 
the pre-crisis periods, the painful bursting of the bubble, and the slow recovery from the crisis. 
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During period 2009–2014, the highest number of apartments was commissioned in Riga since the 
reinstatement of independence. Since 2009, the housing issue for 4168 families in Riga has been 
resolved with the help of the local government. 
The burden of rent and utilities constitutes a considerable part of the household budget, and 
utilities debtors are mostly mortgagors with low payment ability. The Social Services and Social 
Assistance Law prescribes that local governments pay a housing allowance to families in need 
and to low-income families (persons). The binding regulations of the local government regulate 
the amount, payment procedure and persons who are eligible to receive this benefit. Therefore, 
assistance provided by local authorities in some local governments in this field can vary significantly. 
The housing allowance is of a seasonal nature. From 1 October 2009 to 30 April 2012, the state 
co-financed local governments to the extent of 20 % of funds used for housing benefits. Along 
with the termination of state co-financing, the number of families receiving housing allowances is 
decreased at a disproportionate rate: in 2010 – 209 200, in 2011 – 211 500, in 2012 – 185 100, 
and 33 000 in 2013. 
In May 2014, the Riga City Council increased the income threshold for tenants in denationalised 
buildings so that these could be included on the list of municipal flats. Now, income after taxes may 
not exceed 400 euro in the case of single tenants and 320 euro per household member. However, the 
tenants of flats in denationalised buildings are still less protected in comparison with other groups 
of tenants. 
Due to the lack of regulation in the land denationalisation process, many apartment owners, 
whose property is located in a multi–storey building, found, over the last decade, that they have had 
to pay a rather large rent to the landowner for the land on which the building is constructed. The 
search for a solution has dragged on for some time now. As is evident from the LETA announcement 
of 5 June 2014, there is hope that the legal mechanism of coordinating the interests of both parties 
is finally on the table. 
4.3. To what extent is the health of the population protected, in all spheres 
and stages of life?
Legal framework
Article 25 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides as follows: ‘Everyone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services [...]’ Whereas 
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights proclaims that 
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. The steps to be taken by the States Parties 
to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for 
the creation of conditions that would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event 
of sickness. Article 11 of the European Social Charter recognises ‘the right to protection of health’, 
whereas Article 13 – ‘the right to social and medical assistance’. Article 111 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Latvia claims: ‘The State shall protect human health and guarantee a basic level of 
medical assistance for everyone.’ However, there is no clear understanding of the minimum content 
even at the top level.
Actual situation
Along with the onset of the economic crisis in 2009, the issue on the availability of healthcare 
was brought to the forefront. Over the period 2004 to 2014, the government of Latvia has reduced 
expenditure on health care (in 2004 –3.3 % of the GDP, in 2012 – 3.06 % of GDP), however the 
European Union has increased expenditure on average from 6.6 % to 7.3 % of the GDP. The health 
indices of the Latvian population are among the lowest, whereas its mortality rates among the 
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highest in the European Union, however funding for providing health care has not been increased. 
Under the given conditions, it is rather complicated to ensure access to health care services, along 
with continuity and stability thereof (LR VM (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Latvia) 2013). 
In the concept of the model of funding the health care system, the plan is to gradually work towards 
a state health care budget of 4.5 % of the GDP. The health care system has also undergone a number 
of important reforms aimed at more effective use of funds. 
1) The number of hospitals has been abruptly reduced, reaching one of the lowest ratios of 
hospitals per 100 000 inhabitants in the European Union.
2) As from 1 July 2009, the duration of sick-leave benefits was steeply reduced, i.e. from 
52 weeks to 26. 
3) For the purposes of budget consolidation, sick-leave benefits were subjected to a ceiling: 
350 lats per month plus 50 % of the remaining amount in 2010–2014.
4) From 1 March 2009, new patient contribution rates were established, and most of them 
underwent multiple increases (Amendments to the Law on Maternity and Sickness Insurance, 
2009).
Cabinet Regulation No 1046 of the year 2006 ‘Procedure of organising and financing health 
care’ were amended six times in 2009 by both increasing and decreasing contributions. Thus, for 
instance, the payment for a day spent in a hospital, which had been increased from 5 lats to 12 lats, 
at the beginning of 2010 was reduced to 9.50 lats, to make health care more easily accessible to 
low-income individuals. According the last changes since January 2015 the payment for a day in a 
hospital was reduced to 10 euro. From 30 January 2010, those individuals and their family members 
whose income per family member over the last three months did not exceed 120 lats per month were 
fully exempt from patient contributions. Patient costs for people with an income of up to 150 lats 
per month were covered up to 50 %. Moreover, the co-payment for surgery performed during a 
single hospital stay did not exceed 15 lats (Rajevska, Demme 2010). Since 1 January 2012, the 
relief on patient contributions and co-payments for the said groups of people have been abandoned, 
by maintaining exemption from patient contributions for people in need. 
Table 4.5. State-subsidised outpatient visits and cases of hospitalisation (01.10.2009–31.12.2012)
Out-patient visits (family physician and specialist) Cases of hospitalisation
2009 27909 2140
2010 547641 23425
2011 858866 33200
2012 396852 16602
Total 1831268 75367
Source: LM 2014, 15.
During the crisis period (39 months), the state-subsidised outpatient visits approached the near 
2 million mark, and the cases of hospitalisation exceeded 75 thousand, pointing to how important 
this financing was for the life and health of people. This is also shown by the situation after the relief 
was lifted. Patient co-payments for a considerable percentage of patients are too high. According to 
statements by the Chairman of the Board of Riga East Clinical University Hospital, unpaid patient 
contributions at the hospital in early 2014 had reached 3.2 million euro. Over the last three years, 
50 000 people have failed to settle their accounts with the hospital (TVNET 2014).
Financial factors, as well as people’s habits have facilitated the increase in the number of 
those patients who are hospitalised in the late stage of an illness. The problem could be resolved, 
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by increasing the ratio of these health care services available to the population and which would 
be consistent with costs that the State and society can afford. Thus, the number of patients who 
seek health care services in a timely manner would increase (LR VM 2010a). The sad outcome of 
neglected illnesses is clearly illustrated by figures on the malignant tumour morbidity rate among 
the population. The number of patients with first onset diagnosis has increased from 10 600 cases 
in 2010 to 11 476 cases in 2012.
The data from sociological surveys point to a conclusion that traditionally one of the biggest 
causes of concern among the population is the opinion that ‘if I become ill, I will not be able to 
pay for treatment’. This awareness was even more aggravated by the tendency, which has developed 
over the last few years, to abruptly increase the proportion of individual contributions, thereby 
reducing public expenditure. Further consolidation of this tendency, given the current purchasing 
power of the population, endangers the implementation of the direction of action of the National 
Development Plan ‘A healthy person capable of work”, especially bearing in mind that about one 
third of all deaths are premature when people of working age pass away.
4.4. How extensive and inclusive is the right to education, including 
education in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship?
The laws of the Republic of Latvia prescribe that all citizens of the Republic of Latvia and 
permanent residents who are eligible to hold a non-citizen passport of the Republic of Latvia, as well 
as all individuals who have received a permanent residency permit, and citizens of European Union 
member states who have received a residence permit (and their children) are equally entitled to obtain 
education in Latvia. The National Development Plan prescribes an important goal: ‘up to 2020, all 
children and young people must be ensured a quality elementary and secondary education, as well 
as access to extracurricular activities that broaden experience, create opportunities to discover and 
nurture ones talents. Indirectly, professional education must be improved by creating employment 
opportunities and by having weight in the enhancement of the nation’s economic structure. A broad 
experience in early life gives competences for flexible adjustment to the changing labour market.’ 
Good education is a part of the most important resources of each individual and the entire society.
The EU 2020 Strategy in the education and training sphere proposes several quantitative targets 
(indicators), which the member states, including Latvia, should meet before 2020:
• to ensure that 95 % of children (4 years old and older) are engaged in pre-school education 
programmes;
• to bring the percentage of fifteen year old school-children who have poor achievements in 
reading and maths down to no more than 15 %;
• to reduce the number of early school leavers to 10 %;
• to increase the percentage of the population (30–34 year old) who possess higher education 
to 40 % (in Latvia in 2013 – 27 % of the population)
• to ensure that at least 15% of 25–64 year olds participate in adult lifelong learning.
A support policy for families with children is being implemented in Latvia. In the 2012/2013 
academic year pre-school education was provided by 1006 educational establishments (in the 
academic year of  2010/2011 – 974 educational establishments). According to the data of the Ministry 
of Education and Science, in the academic year of 2012/2013, 93 293 children aged 1.5 years and 
above were involved in pre-school education programmes, including 42 084 children aged five years 
and older. Thus, for instance, from 2009 until 2014, 112 new kindergarten groups were opened in 
Riga alone, and in the near future, the Riga City Council has promised to open 45 more.
Furthermore, a special type of education – special pre-school education for children with special 
needs – has also been implemented. In the 2012/2013academic year, special pre-school education 
programmes were implemented at 40 special pre-school educational establishments, as well as 
general educational establishments implementing special pre-school education programmes.
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The number of schoolchildren in general education schools has decreased considerably. 
In the 2012/2013 academic year, the number of schoolchildren was 28.8 % lower than in the 
2005/2006 academic year. In the 2012/2013 academic year, general education programmes were 
implemented in 807 general education day schools, of which 109 educational establishments were 
implementing only national minority education programmes (99 schools in the Russian language, 
four in Polish, two in Hebrew, and one each in – Ukrainian, Belorussian, Estonian, and Lithuanian), 
whereas 66 educational establishments implement both Latvian and national minorities education 
programmes, as well as two private education establishments, which implement general education 
programmes in English (one school) and in French (one school). There are 25 evening study, study 
by correspondence, and further education establishments, of which 14 implement both Latvian and 
national minority education programmes. Several educational establishments provide education to 
Gypsy (Roma) children. There are 56 000 schoolchildren or 27.9 % of all schoolchildren studying 
in education programmes for national minorities (LR LM 2012a, 55). 
The decrease in the number of schools and teachers in 2008 and 2009 was fostered by the 
reshuffling in the funding of the education system according to the principle ‘money follows the 
child’. The organisation Glābiet Bērnus and Velki Society have pointed out that the unification of 
schools has hampered access to education not only for children with special needs, but also for 
healthy children. 
The laws of Latvia guarantee free elementary and secondary education. However, in practice, 
educational costs borne by the family needed to be covered by detailed regulatory texts, especially 
at the beginning of the academic year. In 2012, the Ombudsman drew particular attention to the 
accessibility of education; he pointed out that the real situation does not correspond to the situation 
envisaged in regulatory enactments: parents are buying textbooks, notebooks, and other learning 
materials at their own expense. This is contrary to the principle of free education enshrined in 
Article 112 of the Constitution, Section 55(1) and (3) of the Education Law, and Part two of Section 11 
of the Children’s Rights Protection Law (CRPL) (LR Tiesībsargs 2013b, 7; LR Tiesībsargs 2013c). 
Amendments were introduced in the Education Law prescribing that as of 1 September 2013, costs 
for school books/learning materials were to be completely covered by the state budget funds and 
earmarked subsidies. The new regulation offers a definition of the term learning materials used in 
the law and provides clarity as to who – the State, the local government, or in certain cases the 
parents – is responsible for buying the specific learning materials. 
Access to education is related to the inalienable right of each child to grow up in a family 
(Section 26(1) of BTAL (Children’s Rights Protection Law)), as it is a natural environment for 
the child to develop and grow up. A child with physical and mental disabilities also has the right 
to everything that he/she needs for meeting his/her special needs. Even though the number of 
schoolchildren in the country has dropped, the number of schoolchildren with special educational 
needs has increased: in the 2008/2009 academic year, there were 9 057 (4.8 % of all school children) 
and in 2011/2012 – 9 726 (5.8 %) of such children. The organisation Glābiet Bērnus points out 
that there are special education establishments, and that special programmes have been developed. 
However, they are not accessible to most children with intellectual development disabilities for 
various reasons. Several programmes have been implemented for resolving this problem. Up to 
the end of 2011, schoolchildren with motor disabilities (altogether 6 899) had access to 27 general 
education establishment and 29 special education establishments. In the 2011/2012 academic 
year, 40.8 % of schoolchildren with special needs were studying in these 29 modernised special 
education establishments. Schools are equipped with elevators, adapted classrooms, new flooring, 
adapted doors in hallways and rooms, sanitary facilities, walking paths, pavements, thus resolving 
many daily issues of these youth and their parents in relation to access to and presence in the 
school (LR LM 2012b, 26–27). Children with intellectual development disabilities in 35 special 
education establishments are offered professional elementary education. Five programmes have been 
developed: carpenter’s assistant, bookbinder, domestic staff, chef’s assistant, maintenance worker. 
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Children and youth with learning difficulties, behavioural and emotional disorders constitute a 
special group of schoolchildren. A teachers’ and students’ survey conducted in Latvia (grades 6–12, 
686 correctly filled in questionnaires) about schoolchildren’s learning activities and behaviour showed 
that, according to the teachers, the number of children having learning difficulties, behavioural and 
emotional disorders is rather high: 36 % of schoolchildren showed an insufficient level of results in 
at least one subject, 14 % had behavioural and emotional problems, and only 50 % had no problems 
(Rančevska et. al. 2010, 26) Therefore, it is important to identify this contingent as early as possible 
and start targeted work to make sure that, if necessary, a suitable support system is employed to 
promote the chances of a child’s level of success and reduce those of him/her dropping out of the 
educational system. 
Schoolchildren not having acquired elementary education
The percentage of early school leavers in Latvia has been continuously decreasing. According 
to Eurostat data, in 2011, the percentage of people in the 18–24 age group who have not completed 
school was 11.8 % (LR LM 2012b, 25), whereas in 2012, this parameter decreased to 10.6 % and 
was better than the EU average (12.8 %). Education development guidelines envisage that in 2020 
this number should go down to 10 % (LR IZM (Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic 
of Latvia) 2013a, 39–40). At the end of the 2011/2012 academic year, the percentage of students 
who received a school progress report upon completing elementary education was 3.2 % of all 
elementary school graduates, whereas in 2007/2008, this parameter had reached 4.7 % (LR IZM 
2013a, 67). 
As evidenced by the 2011 census data gathered by the CSB, 594 children have not been registered 
in the mandatory educational system, have not acquired elementary education and are not attending 
school. The highest proportion of children not registered in the educational system is among seven 
year olds, and the reason for absence from school in one half of all cases is the health condition of 
the children concerned (LR IZM 2013a, 67). The monitoring report of education policy initiatives 
‘Education reforms and access to education’(2012) recommends updating the education reform 
agenda (and the government’s Plan of Action) by including measures that increase accessibility to 
quality education for children. It also recommends updating the Plan of Action with measures whose 
direct aim is to reintegrate unsuccessful schoolchildren and ‘drop–outs’ into the educational system, 
by critically assessing the existing correctional class system and, possibly, giving it up in favour of 
a system that does not separate the unsuccessful schoolchildren from the rest (Golubeva 2012, 17).
The problem of access to inclusive education largely is linked to the reduction in the number 
of schoolchildren in rural areas and sparsely populated territories. In 2014–2020, the secondary 
education establishments will be faced with a significant decrease in the number of students. It is 
necessary to assess the peculiarities and development models of each region and planning region. 
The Education Development Guidelines for 2014–2020 envisage a new approach to the offer of 
educational establishment services. 1) pre-school education – as close to the place of residence as 
possible; 2) primary school education (grade 1–6) – as close to the place of residence as possible, 
ensuring availability of services near major local roads. It is important to consider the integration 
of pre-school (five to six year old children) education in these establishments; 3) general secondary 
education (grade 10–12) – with a main focus in the area of towns of regional importance and regional 
centres, and near major highways of regional importance; 4) in accordance with the development 
scenarios of each region, the integration of professional education programmes into the general 
education should also be considered by consolidating the administration and costs of establishments. 
The founder of such establishments is the local government; 5) professional secondary education – 
mainly focused in towns of regional importance and regional centres, implemented by professional 
education centres of national importance and other professional education establishments, the 
subordination of which is expected to be mainly entrusted to local governments.
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The percentage of 30–34 year olds with higher or equivalent education in their age group has 
increased in Latvia from 17.3 % in 2002 to 27.0 % in 2008, and 32.3 % in 2010.The main problem 
here is the content and orientation of higher education.
As regards the participation of the Latvian population in adult education, which is a mandatory 
prerequisite for stable employment, the numbers have reduced from 8.4 % in 2004 to 5 % in 2010, 
and reaching the planned 15 % level in 2020 will require considerable efforts not merely on the 
part of the State Employment Agency, but also from many state and local government institutions 
and the non-governmental sector.
4.5. How free are trade unions and other work–related associations to 
organise and represent their members’ interests?
The Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia (FTUCL) brings together 20 trade unions and 
professional employee trade union associations from various sectors. The total number of trade union 
members in 1998 was 252 000, and it has now reduced by more than half. According to FTUCL 
estimates, in late 2011, there were approximately 110 000 members in trade unions that have united 
in a confederation. Moreover, independent trade unions operate in the country as well (BNS 2011; 
Delfi.lv 2011). In 2006, 16.1 % of employees were members of trade unions, whereas in 2013 this 
number was only 5.8 %. In 10 years, the trust in trade unions has considerably decreased as well.
Table 4.6. Trust in trade unions
2004 2014
Trusting 36.4 28.8
Distrusting 32.3 41.0
Difficult to tell 31.2 30.3
Source: DA 2005, DA 2014.
There are nevertheless also plenty of positive examples about the active and influential stance 
of trade unions in several sectors, such as education, medicine, transport and communications, etc. 
The Latvian Trade Union of Education and Science Employees (LTUESE), among the most active, 
in 2014 organised a protest campaign of education and science employees, with demands of financial 
nature. The existing financing model ‘Money follows the child’ does not ensure a fair, motivating 
remuneration for teachers and equal opportunities for every student to acquire quality education. 
No additional funds are envisaged in the draft national budget of 2015–2017 for the approbation, 
implementation of a new funding model for teachers’ salaries or for increasing the teachers’ salary. 
The government is not observing Section 78(7) of the Law on Institutions of Higher Education and 
Section 33(2) of the Law on Scientific Activity prescribing an annual increase of funding (LIZDA 
(Latvian Trade Union of Education and Science Employees) 2014). 
In the spring of 2014, the Latvian Trade Union of Health and Social Care Employees (LTUHSCE) 
started a social campaign with an aim to increase the ability of employees to receive quality and 
timely medical care. The Trade Union of Railway Transport of Latvia (TURTL) can undoubtedly 
be described as a good practice example for trade union activities. The trade union has more than 
16 000 members, activities are mainly directed towards increasing salaries, maintaining jobs and 
the employment level in the transport sector. The trade union is developing social co-operation 
principles. A general agreement has been concluded with the union of employers of the railroad 
transport sector, as well as collective agreements with several companies in the sector. The said 
agreements determine the pay of employees, indexation, bonus system, as well as additional social 
guarantees for employees, such as additional vacations, additional days off, and similar.
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In the spring of 2014, the Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia organised a letter campaign 
with the aim of preventing amendments to the Labour Law and voiced the following demands: to 
keep the additional payment for overtime prescribed in Section 68 of the Labour Law to a full extent; 
to keep Section 110 of the Labour Law stipulating that the employer must coordinate its actions if 
it wishes to make a trade union member redundant.
Some time ago, the Strike law was rather strongly criticised by international experts. The legal 
specialist in trade union matters of the European Trade Union Confederation, Stefan Clauwaert in 
his opinion has indicated several significant shortcomings in the Latvian law and inconsistencies in 
international law among which, a lengthy pre-strike procedure, excessive voting quorum standards 
for making a decision on applying for a strike. The law prescribes that a decision on applying 
for a strike can be made at the general meeting of trade union members, where at least 3/4 of all 
members are participating, and the decision is deemed adopted only if 3/4 of all members present 
vote in favour of it. This is contrary to the norms of trade union articles of association. Moreover, 
solidarity strikes are in effect banned. Section 23 of the Strike Law fully prohibits the strikers to 
put forward any kind of political requirement or voice political protests. According to the expert, 
solidarity strikes are lawful, if they support a lawful primary strike, just like strike participants may 
not be forbidden to criticise the economic and social policy of the government (Katlaps 2002). 
However, given the existing arrangement of political powers, such amendments to the laws of 
Latvia are not envisaged.
4.6. How rigorous and transparent are the rules on corporate governance, 
and how effectively are corporations regulated in the public interest?
The fundamental principle of the functioning of capitalism is the free market, and its functioning 
is determined by relations of supply and demand. However, the question still remains of how freely 
the free market should be allowed to operate, taking into account the interests of society.
There are three market surveillance authorities in Latvia corresponding to the EU practice. The 
task of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is to ensure that companies’ operations are regulated 
in the interests of society. Among the many functions of the Commission, feature the following: 
(1) to protect the users’ interests and promote the development of public utilities providers; (2) to 
determine the methods for calculating rates; (3) to set the rates unless special laws in each sector 
prescribe a different procedure for setting the rates; (4) to licence the provision of public utilities 
services; (5) to resolve disputes in cases provided for by and in procedures established in the said 
law; (6) to foster competition in regulated sectors and monitor the conformity of public utilities 
to the conditions of the licence, established quality and environmental protection requirements, 
technical regulations, standards, as well as contract provisions; (7) upon the request of ministries in 
charge of the regulated sectors, to provide information about matters of regulating public services; 
(8) to inform society about its activities and those of public utilities providers in the field delegated 
to them; (9) to monitor the operations of power suppliers’facilities and other power supply facilities 
in line with regulatory enactments of the power industry. The PUC takes important decisions in 
controlling and determining the justification of electricity and heat energy rates for persons and legal 
entities. However, the PUC website is quite unfriendly for users and gives little information. There 
is no explanation provided about the widely debated electrical power rates.
The Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC) is a unitary financial services authority 
conducting surveillance of all financial service sectors, including the monitoring of commercial 
banks, a function taken over from the Bank of Latvia. Society voiced severe objections against the 
activities of FCMC,  since its control over  the bank Parex was ineffective  allowing to this private 
bank  borrow money on a short–term basis from Western banks , and then lend it further for long–
term crediting Latvian residents.The management of FCMC was replaced and hopefully the lesson 
has been learnt, and society will not have to tighten its belt to repay private debts.
Feliciana Rajevska. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 99
The purpose of the Competition Council is to provide the opportunity for all market participants 
to perform economic activities in an environment of free and fair competition, as well as to promote 
the development of competition in all sectors of the economy in the interest of the public. Among 
the many tasks of the Council, are the following: to monitor how the prohibition of abuse of a 
dominant market position and prohibited agreements between market participants are observed, as 
prescribed in the Competition Law and in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to 
review filed reports about mergers of market participants and to make decisions on them, to restrict 
market concentration, by making decisions on mergers of market participant shares. Competition 
analyses are regularly posted on the Competition Council’s website, such as, the Report on the 
competition situation in the (wholesale and retail) market of publishing and selling study literature 
(2007–2013), Franchise agreement fuel market (2011–2013), Auto gas market (2005–2012) among 
others. The Competition Council’s website provides good information and is user-friendly; it informs 
and educates society. 
The stringent surveillance to which the IMF and the European Commission subject public 
authorities, as well as the evaluation to which the operations of all public authorities are subjected 
due to the application of Latvia to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), are measures to achieve greater transparency of work of these authorities. 
Overall assessment: progress over the last decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
4.1. X
4.2. X
4.3. X
4.4. X
4.5. X
4.6. X
Best features
Because of the crisis, the level of inequality in Latvian society has been reduced, though it is still 
among the highest in the European Union. The involvement of the State in ensuring social assistance 
manifested as a co-financing for GMI and housing allowances (2009–2012) was an important factor 
in stabilising the situation. The social security system established in Latvia is comprehensive, and 
social workers are well prepared. Therefore, the existing system can absorb the impact of the crisis 
to a considerable extent. Real improvements were achieved in the care of pre-school age children. 
The number of social housing flats in Riga increased considerably.
Most serious problem
Political decision making in determining the amount of social benefits, minimum pensions and 
minimum salaries transpires arbitrarily and the methodologically justified poverty threshold was 
disregarded till now. Reforms and budget consolidation procedures led to a significant deterioration 
and erosion of the human capital. Uncertainties about the mechanism of funding the health care 
systems have lasted for a catastrophically long time; the public funding in the health care sector is 
inadequate.
Suggested improvements
1. In 2003, the overall tax burden (as a percentage of the GDP) in Latvia was 29.1 %, in 2011 – 
28.1 %, and it is among the lowest in the EU. The tax policy is favourable to the well-off members 
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of society. The labour force tax burden is higher than the EU average. The recommendation is 
to reduce the proportion of the labour force tax and to increase the proportion of the real estate 
tax.
2. To maintain social stability, the minimum wage, the non-taxable minimum and the state social 
security benefit, which has not been changed since 2006, must be increased.
3. The existing pension system in Latvia has almost no redistribution mechanism in place and 
therefore is inadequate for countries with a relatively big wealth gap; material stratification is 
not levelled out in senior age, and in combination with the low replacement rate, it leads to 
widespread poverty. The 18 years during which the new pension system has been operating 
give it grounds for introducing certain redistribution mechanisms. There is an urgent need to 
determine the minimum base pension financed by the State, as the current system with the 
minimum pension of 70 euro imposes a disproportionate burden on municipal budgets.
4. The Ministry of Education and Science, in co-operation with the Ministry of Economy, 
Ministry of Agriculture, and the State Employment Agency, must foster the introduction of 
work experience for schoolchildren and professional training in all regions of the state.
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5. FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 
Jānis Ikstens
Do elections give the people control over governments and their policies?
5.1. How far is appointment to governmental and legislative office  
determined by popular competitive election, and how frequently do 
elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel?
Legal framework
The Constitution of Latvia (Satversme) stipulates that the Saeima (Latvian Parliament) shall 
be composed of 100 representatives of the population who are elected in general, equal and direct 
elections by secret ballot based on proportional representation. Only political organizations or their 
associations that are registered in Latvia are entitled to submit candidate lists for such elections. 
Voters have the opportunity of expressing individual attitude towards each candidate of the selected 
ballot by either striking them out or marking them with a ‘+’. Since 2010, one person can be 
registered as a candidate in only one electoral district. The Saeima Election Law provides that the 
candidate lists that receive less than 5 % of the total number of votes across Latvia do not participate 
in the distribution of mandates.
The Cabinet of Ministers is composed of the Prime Minister and ministers appointed by him 
or her. The President designates the Prime Minister candidate; that is, the person who forms the 
government. In order to fulfil their duties, the Prime Minister and other ministers must pass a vote 
of confidence in the Saeima and they are accountable to the Saeima for their actions. The Prime 
Minister and other ministers are not required to be members of parliament or municipal councils; 
however, pursuant to the Law on the Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers, since 2008 persons 
who, in accordance with the Saeima Election Law, cannot be registered as parliamentary deputy 
candidates must not be nominated and approved as Members of the Cabinet of Ministers.
Actual situation
Since 1993 all parliamentary elections have taken place in accordance with the existing 
legislation and internationally accepted standards for free and fair elections; evaluations provided 
by international observers evidence this.
Results of the parliamentary elections show that high volatility exists in terms of voters’ political 
preferences in Latvia; this exceeds average indices in both consolidated and new democracies by 
far (Sikk 2005). 
The number of elected candidate lists did not change in the 2002 parliamentary elections; 
however, two parties lost their parliamentary representation. Two other parties replaced them. The 
number of elected parties did not change in 2006, but rapid changes took place as a result of 
party consolidation in 2010 and 2011. A significant number of persons who had not worked in 
the previously convened parliaments entered the Saeima. Such instability is associated with rapid 
changes in social status and personal identity due to economic reforms as well as the election system 
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and procedures for political party funding in Latvia. Discontentment with the results of policies 
implemented by political parties and the rather simple procedure for establishing and registering 
new parties also facilitates the entry of new political actors in parliamentary circulation.
Table 5.1. Number and stability of candidate lists
Number of candidate 
lists registered for 
elections
Number of candidate 
lists elected in the 
Saeima
Incumbent 
members of 
the Saeima
Pedersen’s (Pedersen 1979) 
volatility index (according to 
number of seats in Saeima)
2002 20 6 49 71.5
2006 19 7 52 27
2010 13 5 40 65
2011 13 5 64 30
Source: CEC data and author’s calculations.
Even though fluctuations have been quite dramatic and, as a result, several previously influential 
parties have disappeared from parliamentary circulation, society has largely accepted the results of 
elections; and transition of power from one political actor to another has taken place peacefully. 
However, in 2006 several less popular political organizations that had taken part in the parliamentary 
elections disputed the results of the elections claiming that the People’s Party (Tautas partija) and 
LPP/LC (Latvia’s First Party/Latvian Way) party had substantially violated the election campaign 
financing restrictions. Applying peculiar reasoning, senators of the Supreme Court Veronika Krūmiņa, 
Jautrīte Briede and Dace Mita did not find sufficient violations in order to recognize the 2006 Saeima 
elections as unlawful.
High instability characterizes the work of the Cabinet of Ministers. Latvia has had 20 governments 
since its independence was reinstated. The average statistical life expectancy of a government is 
approximately 13 months; nevertheless, for example, Valdis Dombrovskis’ government worked 
uninterruptedly for 27 months from October 2011 to January 2014. The average life expectancy of 
Latvian governments is the lowest in Central and East European countries (Conrad, Golder 2010).
Politicians themselves admit that the reason for government collapse is disagreement on 
economic matters related to the privatization of large objects in the 1990s, while later struggles were 
related to the political supervision of large-scale investments. Similarly, the parties’ motivation to 
obtain positions, which dominates their activity, as opposed to the motivation to achieve ideological 
goals, must be emphasized. The state’s general political course has remained unchanged despite 
government instability. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the tradition of ignoring the 
opposition has shaped in the Saeima: nearly all draft laws submitted by the opposition are rejected 
without due reasoning and representatives of opposition parties rarely acquire leading positions in 
the Saeima.
5.2. How inclusive and accessible for all citizens are the registration and  
voting procedures, how independent are they of government and  party 
control, and how free from intimidation and abuse?
Legal framework
The Constitution grants voting rights to all citizens of the Republic of Latvia who are legally 
capable and have reached 18 years of age. This principle is also observed when drafting legislation 
that regulates the parliamentary election process. Participation in elections is not mandatory.
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Participation in parliamentary elections is simplified to the maximum extent possible: citizens 
who possess voting rights need only to present their valid passports, and they can vote at any polling 
station. The Electoral Register did not exist until the 2004 elections of the European Parliament 
(EP). It was established because of the abolition of the residence registration system in Latvia and 
because of the need to ensure citizens of other EU member states the opportunity to participate in 
EP elections in the territory of Latvia. The Electoral Register Law governs the functioning of the 
Register. The Register is used for organizing EP and municipal elections.
The Electoral Register is developed using data from the Population Register maintained by 
the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (OCMA) subordinated to the Ministry of Interior. 
Citizens are not required to perform any special actions in order to be included in the Electoral 
Register. The Central Election Commission (CEC), the composition of which is approved by the 
Saeima, provides the OCMA with information on all established polling stations, and the OCMA, 
in cooperation with local governments, enters data on all legally capable Latvian citizens who have 
reached the age of 18 on the election day in the Electoral Register. The CEC, in turn, includes in 
the Register, data on the citizens of other EU member states who, according to legislation, have the 
right to participate in EP elections in Latvia. At least 70 days before elections, the OCMA sends 
information by post to all voters at their residential address in Latvia detailing which polling station 
list they are registered at. Citizens have the right to change polling stations at their discretion.
The CEC traditionally broadcasts information in the mass media to remind people of the 
upcoming elections and the basic principles of the election procedure several weeks before the 
election day. Since 2014, citizens who plan to be abroad on election day have the opportunity to 
vote by means of depositing their votes earlier at one of the polling stations. This option is not 
available in municipal or EP elections. However, it is possible to vote via post or by appearing at 
a polling station abroad in the elections of all three institutions.
Parliamentary elections take place on a single day, and polling stations are open from 07:00 
until 20:00. The chairperson of each constituency’s Election Commission is in charge of ensuring 
order inside and outside of the polling station in question. Any political agitation at polling stations 
is prohibited. No more than two observers from each political organization, or association thereof, 
which has submitted its candidate list in the respective constituency, may be stationed at a polling 
station provided that they do not interfere with the election process. Observers may also observe 
vote counting and seal parcels of election materials at the respective polling station; this fact is 
recorded in the minutes of the election process. Advance voting is also available.
Actual situation
Despite the fact that the Saeima approves the composition of the Central Election Commission 
and parties’ representatives are included in it, few complaints have been received about the operation 
of the CEC. The transparency of the election organizers’ work is considered one of the factors that 
influences the quality of their performance; this is also ensured through the active participation of 
observers from various political organizations in the processes of the election day. 
No large-scale protests related to the organizing of the parliamentary elections have occurred 
since 2004. Sufficient financial and human resources have been provided to organize elections at 
various levels adequately. However, the Security Police has initiated nine criminal proceedings on 
vote buying during parliamentary and municipal elections during recent years (Rozenbergs, Vīksne 
2013); several people have been convicted of this offence. For example, the results of Rēzekne City 
Council elections were annulled and repeat elections were announced in 2005 because the court 
established that vote buying had occurred; two persons were convicted of this crime. Juris Boldāns 
(TB/LNNK (For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK party)), in turn, was convicted of forging ballots at the 
9th Saeima elections and imprisoned for eight months. He received an additional punishment in the 
form of a prohibition to participate in elections as a candidate.
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Discussions among politicians about using the Electoral Register also in parliamentary elections 
have restarted in 2010; advocates of the idea substantiate the need for this with changes in the range 
of personal identity documents (ID cards have also become identity documents) and the opportunity 
for voters abroad to vote for candidates outside of the Riga constituency. However, such a proposal 
had not acquired broad support in the Saeima until the middle of 2014 because parties are aware of 
the potentially negative impact on the level of participation and support for parties. Analysis of the 
experience of other countries suggests that correlation exists between the more complicated voter 
registration procedures and lower turnout rates; besides, separate types of creating Electoral Registers 
may influence the totality of the citizens who have voting rights, thus providing structural advantages 
to certain political parties (Burden, Neiheisel 2011; Highton 1997; Jackman 1987). Similarly, a poll 
conducted among Latvian citizens after the 2004 EP elections suggested that participation in elections 
was higher among those respondents whose registered place of residence coincided with their actual 
place of residence, which turned out to be a structural contribution to the success of TB/LNNK. 
Conversely, a poll conducted in April 2014 suggested that 58 % of the polled citizens had a negative 
attitude towards the potential introduction of the Electoral Register for parliamentary elections. 
Besides, the younger respondents were the ones who were more sceptical about this novelty.
5.3. How fair are the procedures for the registration of candidates and 
parties, and how far is there fair access for them to the media and 
other means of communication with the voters?
Legal framework
The Saeima Election Law stipulates that only political organizations and their associations 
registered in Latvia are entitled to submit their candidate lists. The CEC carries out the registration 
after verifying that the submitted documents comply with legislative requirements. Each candidate 
list must pay a security deposit of 1,400 euros along with submitting a pre-election programme 
of no more than 4,000 characters, signed by all candidates included in the list. The programme is 
published free of charge and made available to citizens at polling stations. Likewise, each candidate 
must submit a self-assessment of their official language proficiency and a written statement that 
the statutory restrictions on passive election rights (including participation in the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union and its satellite organizations after 13 January 1991, or operation in foreign 
intelligence or security services) do not apply to them. CEC decisions on candidate registration 
may be appealed in court.
Passive election restrictions have been challenged in court several times; however, the 
Constitutional Court has upheld the lawfulness of these restrictions. Nevertheless, while generally 
recognizing the justifiability of the restrictions in 2006, in the case of the former KGB officer Juris 
Bojārs, the Constitutional Court ruled that these restrictions are disproportionate considering his 
actions – his actions demonstrated his ‘loyalty to Latvia as an independent and democratic republic’.
Since 2010, a single individual may be registered as an MP candidate in one electoral district 
only.
The current wording of the Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties) lays down 
restrictions for pre-election campaign spending. The spending must not exceed 0.04 % of the average 
gross monthly salary per voter who took part in the previous parliamentary elections. The Corruption 
Prevention and Combating Bureau (CPCB) is entitled to monitor each party’s campaign spending 
and stop their campaign if it deems that the respective party’s spending limits are exceeded. No 
limits on the total amount of parties’ income have been defined; however, it has been determined 
that one natural person can donate no more than a sum that equals 50 minimum monthly salaries 
a year per political organization.
The Law on Pre-election Campaigning before the Saeima Elections and Elections to the 
European Parliament lays down that each registered candidate list is entitled to 20 minutes of free 
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airtime on Latvian Television and 20 minutes of free airtime on the Latvian Radio for the purposes 
of the pre-election campaign. In addition, political organizations as well as natural persons and 
legal entities have the right to purchase airtime on public and private mass media for pre-election 
campaign advertising. However, since 2011 paid pre-election campaign advertising is prohibited 
for a period of 30 days before the parliamentary elections. In reaction to the egregious violations 
established in the 2006 pre-election campaign, legal restrictions were determined for unrelated or 
third party actions during the pre-election campaigning. Unrelated persons may use a sum which 
does not exceed 15 minimum monthly salaries for pre-election advertising. Any agitation on the 
election day and the day before elections is prohibited.
Actual situation
Sluggish discussions about the opportunities for associations of citizens to submit their 
candidate lists for the parliamentary elections have continued taking place among the public. Half 
the respondents who took part in a poll conducted in April 2014 supported such an idea (see 
Annex 2, question B1). The residents of Riga and individuals who have acquired higher education 
are more positive regarding this matter. However, it has not acquired the legislative’s support so far. 
The opposite trend seems to be more apparent: due to administrative territorial reforms that took 
place in 2009, only registered political parties, or their organizations, may submit candidate lists 
for municipal elections in an increasing number of municipalities. 
One of the most disputed matters related to registering candidate lists is the loss of some 
candidates’ passive voting rights due to their activities in the past. The CEC adopts decisions 
regarding these matters based on information provided by public authorities; however, no grounds 
exist for claiming that the CEC has applied this statutory requirement selectively. Such passive 
election restrictions are not applied to EP candidates. A poll conducted among the citizens of the 
Republic of Latvia in 2014 suggests that more than half (53 %) of respondents support that the 
prohibition on former employees of the Committee for State Security from applying as candidates for 
parliamentary elections be maintained during the next decade (see Annex 2, question B1). Citizens 
with higher education and persons aged between 25 and 54 mostly supported such an opinion. 
The access of various parties and candidates to the mass media has constantly been the topic of 
discussion in society and among politicians. Although the Pre-election Campaigning Law provides 
opportunities for all candidate lists registered for the parliamentary and EP elections to inform the 
public about their political platforms free of charge, this option is deliberately restricted to prevent 
the elections from turning into an opportunity for marginal political actors to carry out excessive 
advertising. Besides, mass media (including public mass media) exercise their editorial autonomy 
to create as interesting pre-election broadcast programs as possible for their target audiences, and in 
many cases, this means more frequent invitations to representatives from the more popular parties 
to these programs. In 2006, several political organizations challenged such mass media practices in 
the courts; however, the Department of Administrative Cases of the Senate of the Supreme Court 
ruled that such mass media activity is substantiated with reasonable and rational argumentation. 
Still, such a ruling does not reflect the opinion of a large part of society. In April 2014, 44% of 
the polled citizens of the Republic of Latvia stated that they do not support the practices of the 
mass media in terms of pre-election discussions that encompasses engaging in discussions with the 
representatives of those parties who have larger chances of acquiring seats in the Saeima. Only 
1.5 % of respondents supported such practices (see Annex 1, question B3). 
Lengthy reforms in the field of political party funding and pre-election campaigning that 
have been taking place since 2004 have resulted in developing a more advanced legal framework, 
including regulation of covert pre-election campaigns and campaigning exercised by third parties. 
Supplemented with the observation of pre-election campaigns carried out by NGOs, these reforms 
have contributed to a substantial decrease in covert campaigning during the past 10 years. However, 
this trend is more common in the mass media that operate in Latvian. The Russian-speaking media 
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have proven to be more immune towards the civic society’s efforts to promote lawfulness and 
consolidate the traditions of liberally democratic journalism. This can be partly explained with the 
concessive attitude of the audience, media concentration (Rožukalne 2010) and a closer link between 
politicians and Russian-speaking media as evidenced by the leaked e-mail messages of Nils Ušakovs 
(representative of the Harmony Centre (Saskaņas centrs) party), which contained instructions for 
journalists on reflecting events in a particular way.
The prohibition to carry out paid campaigning on TV during the 30-day run-up to the 
elections should be regarded as a very substantial turning point. This has made parties review 
their communication strategies by replacing intensive campaigning on TV with other types of 
communication. However, it will be possible to judge what the impact of these restrictions on 
campaigning budgets only after the 2014 parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, such prohibitions 
provide certain advantages for the parties that form the leading coalition because the media expresses 
increased interest in their representatives right up to the election day. The CPCB observes the 
progress of pre-election campaigning and keeps society regularly updated on how political parties 
comply with restrictions for pre-election campaign spending.
Broad use of the internet in Latvia has created beneficial conditions for parties and candidates 
to communicate with the public in a more direct manner; this partly makes it possible to compensate 
for the effective campaigning restrictions. Parties as well as separate politicians have communicated 
via social networks increasingly actively in recent years. Similarly, campaigning materials have 
frequently been uploaded on popular websites (such as YouTube), thus enabling a wide audience 
to become acquainted with them. 
Processes that have taken place during the past 10 years show that the court has recognized 
the media-generated unequal access of parties to publicity as reasonable, substantiating it with 
the interests of the audience; however, the rapid development of the internet has opened up 
unprecedented opportunities for parties as well as individual candidates to reach out to the public 
by circumventing the restrictions generated by the media, and their political arrangement. Citizens 
have simultaneously acquired a new and increasingly used source of information on politics with 
a high degree of interactivity.
5.4. How effective a range of choice does the electoral and party system 
allow the voters, how equally do their votes count, and how closely 
does the composition of the legislature and the selection of the 
executive reflect the choices they make?
Legal framework
The Constitution of Latvia stipulates that the Saeima shall be composed of 100 representatives 
who are elected in general, equal and direct elections by secret ballot based on proportional 
representation. An electoral threshold was introduced after the reinstatement of independence in 
order to decrease the fragmentation of the composition of the Saeima; since 1995 the threshold is 
set at 5 % of the total amount of valid votes. Citizens of the Republic of Latvia who have reached 
the age of 18 on the election day possess active voting rights. 
Citizens who have reached the age of 21 on the election day and whom none of the passive 
voting restrictions apply to, possess passive voting rights; that is, the right to be elected in the 
Saeima. The following individuals cannot stand as candidates for the parliamentary elections: 
(1) persons for whom the court has established guardianship; (2) persons who are serving a sentence 
in a penitentiary; (3) persons who have been convicted for intentionally committing a criminal 
offence, except cases where persons have been vindicated or their conviction has been expunged or 
vacated.  Similarly, citizens who have committed an offence in the state of mental incapacity or, after 
committing an offence, have developed a mental disorder preventing them from controlling their 
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behaviour do not possess passive electoral rights. The following are not eligible to be MP candidates: 
(1) persons who are permanent staff of the state security, intelligence or counterintelligence services 
of another country; (2) after 13 January 1991 have been active in the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (the Communist Party of Latvia), the International Front of the Working People of 
the Latvian SSR, the United Council of Labour Collectives of Latvia, the Organisation of War and 
Labour Veterans, the Latvian Society Salvation Committee or its regional committees; or, (3) have 
belonged to the permanent staff of the state security, intelligence or counterintelligence services of 
the USSR or the Latvian SSR, except persons who have been employed in the Planning, Finance or 
Administrative Departments of the Committee for State Security of the USSR or the Latvian SSR.
Since the Voter Register is not used in the elections of Latvia’s legislature, all citizens who 
possess the right to vote are entitled to cast their ballot at any of the polling stations in any of the 
five constituencies. Citizens who live abroad vote for the candidate lists registered for Riga district 
through mail voting or by appearing at one of the polling stations established abroad.
All voters are entitled to vote for a particular candidate list and to express nuanced attitude 
towards each of the candidates on the list of their choice by striking out the undesired candidates 
or marking their preferred candidates with a ‘+’ sign.
Actual situation
Electoral legislation sets moderate requirements for political parties that wish to nominate their 
candidates for the parliamentary elections. These requirements have largely remained unaltered since 
1995. However, the number of registered candidate lists has decreased from 20 in 2002 to 13 in 
2011. Such a decrease in number should, firstly, be regarded as the result of the electoral threshold 
because 5 –7 candidate lists acquire representation in the Saeima due to it. 
It seems important for some voters to vote for a candidate list that stands a greater chance 
of clearing the 5 % threshold instead of voting for a candidate list that matches their views best. 
Despite this phenomenon, a certain amount of votes is still given to candidate lists that do not clear 
the electoral threshold. The proportion of such votes has decreased in a linear manner from 15.8 % 
in 2002 to 5 % in 2011.
The number of registered candidate lists has decreased; however, voters still have diverse 
political options to choose from. Given the deep ethnic cleavage in Latvian politics, political 
parties whose key priorities include identity policies actively participate in elections. Alongside 
these organizations, citizens have had the opportunity to vote for social democratic, conservative 
and liberal parties in all parliamentary elections. Agrarian parties acquire notable results in elections 
whereas Christian parties have seen ebbs and flows of their success. Flexible lists are perceived to 
be a substantial achievement in elections: nearly ¾ of Latvian citizens polled in April 2014 gave 
positive responses about the options such lists provide (see question B1 in Annex 2).
The Sainte-Laguë method is used for allocating seats in the Saeima; this method encompasses 
calculating the acquired mandates in a constituency separately and only for those parties which 
acquire at least 5% of the total number of valid votes in the country. This method is more 
advantageous for medium-sized parties (Lijphart 2003). The public does not criticize this method 
for being excessively disproportionate. 
In recent years, politicians and experts have been discussing the opportunity of the citizens who 
vote abroad to vote outside of the Riga constituency. Even though this should be viewed in the 
context of broader discussions on the need for an electors’ register, its topicality was increased by 
the condition that one candidate is permitted to run for election in only one constituency.
Partly in reaction to society’s discontentment with the ‘roaming’ of MPs, or, in other words, 
their migration from one party parliamentary group (PPG) to another, or the establishment of a 
new one, amendments have been made to the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima in order to reduce 
such migration. In 2009, it was set forth that “members elected from the same candidate list may 
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form only one party parliamentary group and must not join other PPGs”. These provisions have 
not significantly influenced the MPs’ mobility in terms of migrating from one PPG to another. 
This is one of the ways to explain the society’s wish to limit the MPs’ opportunities to leave one 
parliamentary group for another: two thirds of the polled Latvian citizens supported such restrictions 
in April 2014. Similarly, two thirds of respondents think that MPs who leave their political groups 
should give up their mandates (see question B1 in Annex 2).
Regardless of several institutional reforms during the past 10 years, no fundamental changes 
have been observed in terms of the effectiveness of the political choice available for citizens and 
embedding electors’ wishes in the legislature’s structure.
5.5. How far does the legislature reflect the social composition of the electorate?
Legal framework
MP candidates must be at least 21 years old and legally capable citizens of the Republic of 
Latvia who have not taken active part against Latvia for the purposes of the Saeima Election Law. 
Information about the registered candidate lists as well as the candidates included in them, their sex, 
age, education and occupation is available on the CEC website as well as at each polling station at 
least five days before the elections. Since 2006, candidates are obliged to specify their nationality 
and marital status. 
The legislation of Latvia does not set quotas or other instruments for ensuring representation 
of any social groups in the legislature’s structure. However, voters have the opportunity to express 
an individual attitude towards each candidate specified in the ballot list they choose to vote for.
Actual situation
Disproportions as well as decreased representation of separate groups exist among the running 
and elected MP candidates; moreover, these differences existed both before and after 2004. 
A disproportionally large number of men (approximately 70 %) and persons with higher education 
(approximately 80 %) exist among candidates. The average age of candidates (44.7 years in 2011) 
has gradually decreased, and the number of candidates aged over 60 is disproportionately low. 
The proportion of candidates who run for election in the constituency where they are registered as 
permanent residents significantly increased after the restriction for one person to run as a candidate 
in only one constituency became effective.
Analysis of the composition of parliamentary deputies suggests that men are represented in 
the legislature in a greater number than women; however, the proportion of women in the Latvian 
parliament has increased gradually. Latvians (in accordance with the information voluntarily 
provided by MPs) and persons with higher education dominate the body of deputies. Parties tend 
to take into account their candidates’ regional background when forming candidate lists; however, 
this background does not always mean it is their actual place of residence. In general, one can claim 
that the composition of the Saeima during the past 10 years has reflected the structure of Latvia’s 
society somewhat more accurately.
5.6. What proportion of the electorate votes, and how far are the election 
results accepted by all political forces in the country and outside?
Legal framework
Citizens of the Republic of Latvia who have reached the age of 18 on the election day have 
voting rights. Participation in elections is not mandatory. Political organizations and their associations 
registered in Latvia are entitled to submit their candidate lists in accordance with the procedure 
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established by law. Representatives of the political parties that have submitted their candidate 
lists, persons authorized by the election commissions (including foreign observers) and media 
representatives are permitted to observe the progress of elections and vote counting. Submitters 
of candidate lists are entitled to appeal the CEC resolution on the confirmation of election results 
within three business days after the adoption thereof.
Actual situation
Participation in parliamentary elections reflects the same trends that can be observed in many 
other democratic regimes (Blais, Rubenson 2013), and the participation activity has decreased by 
approximately 10 percentage points since 2012. 
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Image 5.1. Participation in parliamentary elections in 2002–2011, per cent of the citizens who 
have voting rights
Source: CEC data.
Beside low interest in politics and discontentment with the results of the government’s 
performance, the decline in participation is also related to the data used for calculating this statistic. 
Data summarized by OCMA is used for determining the number of citizens who have voting rights; 
however, this data is based on individuals’ registered place of residence. Conversely, many citizens 
who have actually emigrated have maintained Latvia as their registered place of residence. Election 
results show that the number of persons who voted in such emigrant host countries as the UK and 
Ireland is very low compared to the data on immigrants from Latvia provided by these countries. 
People aged over 50, persons who have increased interest in politics and citizens with medium and 
high income levels tend to participate in elections more actively. 
The idea of introducing mandatory participation in elections was voiced publicly after the 2014 
European Parliament elections when only 30 % of eligible voters chose to participate. However, 
59 % of the polled Latvian citizens were against such an idea before the EP elections (see question 
B1 in Annex 2).
Despite public discussions about the regulatory framework for parliamentary elections and 
some violations of pre-election campaigning rules, all of the most significant political actors have 
accepted the Saeima election results. The 2006 Saeima elections whose results were disputed in 
the court on the grounds of violation of pre-election campaigning rules are an exception to this. 
However, all parties that had cleared the electoral threshold accepted the court’s decision to refrain 
from annulling the election results. The public also accepted this decision: this was evidenced by 
the lack of public protests.
International community has been keen to monitor parliamentary elections in Latvia; this was 
related to the way of solving citizenship matters at the end of the 20th century. Representatives of 
the OSCE, EU Member States and scholars from various countries have continued observing the 
Saeima elections in the 21st century. Elections have generally received positive evaluations, and 
they have complied with the principles of free and democratic elections.
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Summary: progress during the past 10 years
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
5.1. X
5.2. X
5.3. X
5.4. X
5.5. X
5.6. X
Best features
Significant progress has been achieved in improving the regulatory framework for pre-election 
campaigning through defining the role of third parties in pre-election campaigning and reducing 
covert campaigning. 
Most serious problem
One can observe a decline in the level of participation in elections; the continuation of this 
decline will raise the issue of the regime’s legitimacy.
Suggested improvements
Substantive, non-institutional, methods to increase the society’s political participation should 
be sought firstly and foremostly.
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6. THE DEMOCRATIC ROLE  OF POLITICAL 
PARTIES
Jānis Ikstens
Does the party system support democratic processes?
6.1. How freely are parties able to form and recruit members, engage with 
the public and compaign for office?
Legal framework
The Constitution (Satversme) of the Republic of Latvia guarantees a number of human rights, 
including the right to form and join associations, political parties and other non-governmental 
organisations, and the freedom of speech. These core principles form the basis of the Law on 
Political Parties adopted in 2006. This law regulates some functions of political parties and partly 
substitutes the 1992 Law on Public Organizations and Associations Thereof.
According to the Law on Political Parties, political parties must be registered in the Register of 
Political Parties. Registration gives them the status of a legal entity and the right to perform their 
various functions, including nominating candidates for elections at various levels and organising 
pre-election campaigns/rallies. A political party can be established by a founding assembly of at 
least 200 citizens of the Republic of Latvia who have reached legal age. This assembly must 
be observed and verified by a sworn notary public. The decision to register a political party is 
made by the Enterprise Register (ER) after careful consideration of the minutes of the assembly, 
party’s programme and by-laws. The law establishes minimum governance standards applicable to 
political parties: rights and obligations of party members, basic management structure, procedures 
for restructuring and disbanding a party.
Parties must submit information about their members to the Enterprise Register. The Register 
must then check whether at least half of the party members are Latvian citizens. It must also make 
sure that there are no fewer members in the party than 150, or otherwise the party has to be either 
suspended or even disbanded.
Financial management of political parties is subject to the Law on Financing of Political 
Organizations (Parties). The law establishes the main sources of political party funding: membership 
fees, income from party’s entrepreneurial activities, private donations and direct contributions from 
the state budget. This law also contains the maximum threshold of annual contributions made 
by individuals to the same political party. The total amount of contributions must not exceed 50 
minimum wages. 
Adopted in 2012, the Law on Pre-election Campaigning regulates the pre-election activities of 
political parties. This law prohibits hidden campaigning and introduces restrictions on third-party 
campaigning activities, limiting the costs of such to the total of 15 minimum wages. Political parties 
and groups, having submitted candidate lists for parliamentary, municipal or European Parliament 
elections, may use free broadcasting time on public media. In addition, this law stipulates equal 
political advertising unit rates, applicable to all parties participating in elections. Paid political 
TV campaigns must stop 30 days before the election date. According to the law, the Corruption 
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Prevention and Combating Bureau (CPCB) is responsible for monitoring pre-election campaign 
spending and may suspend election campaigns that violate funding restrictions. 
Parties compete for seats in the parliament, local governments and the European Parliament on 
the basis of their candidate lists. National parliament and European Parliament candidate lists may 
be submitted only by functioning political parties and groups. Municipal election candidate lists 
may be submitted only by political parties standing in the municipalities with a population over 
five thousand. An important feature of the election system is the possibility to rank the candidates 
included in the selected party list. Since 2010, candidates are not allowed to run for election in 
more than one constituency in parliamentary elections.
Actual situation
The formation of political parties in Latvia had been a very dynamic process affected by the 
existing institutional framework that gives political parties the leading role in the election process. 
From 2009, when re-registration of political parties was completed based on the Law on Political 
Parties of 2007, until 2013, the number of registered parties and political groups rose from 35 to 64 
(with four other parties going for liquidation). Since 2007, registration of several political parties has 
been suspended (Platace: 2012), and in March 2013, the Enterprise Register rejected the registration 
application of the political party ‘For Mother Tongue’ (Par dzimto valodu). The application was 
rejected due to the political goals identified in the party’s programme, which contradicted the 
founding principles of the Republic of Latvia.
Contrary to the 1992 Law on Public Organizations and Associations Thereof, the Law on 
Political Parties does not prohibit officials from becoming members of political organizations. 
However, restrictions of this sort are set out in other laws and regulations. Some claim this is Soviet 
era heritage and that it is necessary to get rid of political influence on key government bodies. For 
instance, Article 86 of the Law on Judicial Power prohibits judges from joining political parties or 
other similar organisations. And Article 15 of the Military Service Law states that military personnel 
are not allowed to engage in political activities.
Prohibition for judges to join political parties was appealed in the Supreme Court (SC) in 2012, 
claiming this restriction on human rights disproportionate. However, the SC established that the 
legitimate aim of the restriction is to protect the democratic system in the country and the rights 
of other groups of society. As for the public benefits of such restrictions, according to the SC such 
benefits are significantly greater compared to the harm resulting from such limitations. The court 
eventually decided that such restrictions are constitutional.
Nevertheless, parties have the power to apply other criteria on potential members of their 
organisation. One of the most popular criteria is references from existing members. It is usually the 
board of the party that decides to admit new members. After joining, members of political parties 
are supposed to pay membership fees. However, this requirement is poorly implemented.
The number of political party members has increased quite rapidly (see Image 6.1).
According to information provided by parties themselves, in 2013 some 24 732 persons were 
listed as party members. This means that 1.7  % of the population with voting rights had joined 
political parties. Estimates show that in 2004 parties had around 15 000 members or 0.9 % of voters 
(Auers, Ikstens: 2005). Increasing political party membership in Latvia is in stark contrast to the 
declining political activity of the people in European democracies, where average membership rate 
among voters has slid to 4.7  % (Van Biezen, Poguntke: 2014; Van Biezen et al. 2012).
However, the official figures are far from the actual situation. For instance, great doubts existed 
about the membership of the crumbling Reform Party (Reformu partija), as many challenged its 
claims of having 2000 members (LETA 2014). It is important to remember that most parties 
operating at the local level, within one municipality, have close-to-minimum membership – little 
over 200 members.
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Public debate has often focused on the need to increase the minimum membership requirements 
for registering a political party, as it would reduce the political fragmentation and strengthen the 
capacity of parties. An opinion poll conducted in April 2014 shows that almost half or 46 % of voters 
support the idea of a serious increase of the minimum membership requirements for registering a 
political party (see B1 in Annex 2).
Generally speaking, the share of membership fees in political party budgets is miniscule. 
Membership fees generate 10–15 % of political party election year budgets. In 2013 the total 
amount of membership fee revenues across parties reached LVL 299 172. That means that one party 
member paid an average of LVL 13 (EUR 19) per year.
Political parties are the main contenders for various elected positions at national, supranational 
and subnational level. Candidate lists for the parliamentary elections and European Parliament (EP) 
elections, as well as local government elections in municipalities with populations over 5,000, may 
only be submitted by registered parties. It must be underlined, however, that the number of lists 
submitted for the Saeima elections has shrunk significantly since 2002 (see Chapter 5), whereas the 
decline in the number of lists submitted for EP elections from 2004 to 2014 had not been as sharp. 
On the other hand, preferential voting has become increasingly popular, which means that voters 
are keener to evaluate the activities of individual candidates.
One of the prerequisites for registering a political party is an election programme. The programme 
must not exceed 4000 characters. Such volume restrictions preclude political parties from vague 
and excessively detailed resolutions. On the other hand, a ‘short’ programme may also be used as 
an excuse for a lack of real targets. However, exit polls conducted over the past decade suggest 
that voters pay very little attention to what political parties promise, focusing on their track record 
and leaders instead. 
The election campaign is still one of the main tools political parties use to vie for power. Parties 
often hire communication and advertising professionals for their election campaign planning and 
activation, and mostly structure these campaigns on opinion poll results. A comparison of campaign 
budgets for election years and non-election years clearly shows how significant these campaigns 
are. For example, in 2012 the total amount of donations to political parties reached LVL 720 000, 
whereas in 2011, when extraordinary parliamentary elections were held, political parties amassed 
LVL 2.142 million in donations, and in 2013, when municipal elections were organised, political 
parties received support in the amount of 2.243 million lats. The victorious 2014 EP election 
campaign of Iveta Grigule (ZZS (Union of Greens and Farmers)) is a vivid proof of the importance 
of election campaigns.
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Image 6.1. Political party membership in 2013
Source: Enterprise Register and party data
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In general, there are very few limitations on founding and registering a political party in Latvia. 
The rapid increase of the number of political parties after the 2007 re-registration of political 
organizations and with the adoption of the Law on Political Parties and a significant number of 
newly established political forces competing for seats in parliamentary elections and municipal 
elections is a clear evidence of the above. However, political party funding restrictions have forced 
some activists to resort to establishing NGOs to promote different ideologies and transforming those 
civic groups into political organizations before the elections.
6.2. How effective is  the party system in forming and  sustaining 
governments in office? 
Legal framework
Formally, the formation of a government begins with the President’s official announcement 
of the next potential Prime Minister who would set up the Cabinet and supervise the drafting of 
the declaration of the government. Since 2008, the State Chancellery is formally responsible for 
supporting the Prime Minister candidate in setting up the Cabinet and developing the government 
declaration.
Ministers do not have to be members of the Saeima or a political party, nor do they have to have 
run for the parliament. However, potential ministers must meet requirements applied to candidates 
of the Saeima (age, citizenship, non-applicability of passive electoral rights restrictions, etc.).
The Cabinet of Ministers must receive a vote of confidence from the Saeima before it can 
commence its work. The government is approved in the Saeima by a majority of members present 
at voting, which means that a minority government can also be formed. Since adoption of the 
Law on the Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers in 2008, the vote of confidence is held only on a 
complete cabinet.
The government is dismissed when the Prime Minister resigns or passes away, or the Saeima 
rejects the state budget proposal or adopts a motion of censure.
Actual situation
Ten governments have succeeded each other in Latvia from June 2004 to June 2014.1 The 
average lifespan of a government is 12 months. All governments have been supported by coalitions 
consisting of several political parties.
Although the formal government formation process starts with the President nominating a 
candidate to the post of Prime Minister, the actual coalition and government formation process starts 
much earlier. Sometimes a potential post-election government setup is discussed and agreed in the 
pre-election period, based on forecasted election results. In Latvia, coalition formation is a free-style 
bargaining process among a number of parties and political alliances trying to come up with the 
best government structure and allocation of Cabinet posts. The President’s decision to nominate a 
particular candidate for the post of the Prime Minister is a mere reflection of this bargaining process, 
a process that is partly shaped by the position of the President regarding particular candidates. For 
instance, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga during her tenure made it very clear that she will not nominate Aivars 
Lembergs, Mayor of Ventspils City, charged with several serious offences, and Andris Bērziņš 
refused to nominate Artis Pabriks (Unity Party (Vienotība)) at the end of 2013.
The negotiations and bargaining process is usually led by a few select party leaders. No specific 
mandate is given to them. Nevertheless, since the party leaders are in charge of the intra-party 
1 A new government is any new cabinet setup lead by a different prime minister or formed by a different 
coalition. Therefore, Aigars Kalvītis has lead two governments from December 2004 to November 2006 
because when the New Era Party (Jaunais laiks) broke away from coalition, a new government was formed.
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position debate, they tend to know quite well what party members think of one or another proposal. 
On the other hand, Zatlers Reform Party is a vivid example of the lack of such expertise and its 
impact. The Reform Party collapsed in less than two months, following its own mistakes in the 
government formation process. Moreover, Latvian political parties are primarily looking for posts 
(Budge, Laver 1986), not the possibility to implement policies. That is due to the party funding 
model and election campaign methods. Holding public offices provide parties with resources for 
maintaining party organization (Ikstens 2009).
Coalition parties have the discretion to nominate potential Cabinet members, but the candidate 
for Prime Minister, selected by the President, may reject ministerial candidates proposed by the 
political parties, on reasonable grounds. When a party withdraws its candidate, it maintains the 
portfolio and identifies a new candidate.
Given the average government lifespan that has remained constant since the restoration 
of independence, there has been a lot of public debate on government stability. Therefore, the 
introduction of a constructive vote of no confidence has come to the fore in the last 4–5 years. The 
initiative is supported by Andris Bērziņš, the President of the Republic of Latvia. However, this 
idea has not been supported by the politicians so far. On the other hand, the reasons for government 
collapse have also changed in the past decade. Prior to 2004, the Cabinet of Ministers mostly 
resigned over conflicts regarding economic policy, whereas over the last 10 years governments have 
most probably disintegrated because of party manoeuvres driven by possible election outcomes.
Although government stability has been low, the overall political orientation of the country 
has remained unchanged. The main reason for that is the composition of the coalitions. The ruling 
coalitions have been dominated by centre-right political parties that support a relatively liberal 
economic policy, pro-European foreign policy and policies strengthening the ethnic identity of 
Latvians. However, emigration driven by inadequate quality of life and the economic crisis of 2008 
has shifted the government’s focus to social challenges and solutions that are more characteristic to 
centre-left parties. Coalitions have frequently been used to evade political accountability, as political 
parties blame coalition partners for not supporting the commitments they have made prior to elections.
It should be noted that the centre-left pro-Russian parties have never been official coalition 
partners. The main reason for that is the fear that ethnic Latvian parties might lose popularity as a 
result of including pro-Russian parties in the coalition. For instance, the Latvian Social Democratic 
Worker’s Party lost the support of its voters after a longer period of cooperation with pro-Russian 
parties in the Riga City Council between 2001 and 2005, whereas Zatlers Reform Party fell out 
of favour with its voters after the extraordinary parliamentary elections of 2011 when some of its 
leaders tried to get the Harmony Centre Party (Saskaņas centrs) into the coalition. Scepticism among 
Latvian voters towards pro-Russian parties is rooted in the fear of endangering their national identity. 
Such a fear is fuelled by announcements by pro-Russian party leaders on domestic and foreign 
policies, and their behaviour in signing cooperation agreements with ruling parties of authoritarian 
regimes, accepting support from Russia and actively supporting the referendum on a second official 
language in 2012.
6.3. How freely can opposition and non-ruling parties form alliances within 
legislature; can they provide efficient oversight of the government to 
ensure its accountability?
Legal framework
The parliamentary activities of political parties and individual parliamentarians are subject to 
the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima. According to the Rules, parliamentary groups formed in 
the Saeima must consist of at least five parliamentarians. However, in 2010 a new requirement 
was introduced – parliamentary groups can be formed only by parliamentarians elected from the 
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same candidate list. Moreover, same list candidates can form only one parliamentary group in the 
Saeima. Several groups may join together to form a political bloc. Parliamentary groups, blocs and 
the Presidium of the Saeima nominate their representatives to the Council of Parliamentary Groups, 
which is responsible for the review of the Saeima’s operational decisions.
Affiliation to a particular parliamentary group enhances the legislative role of parliamentarians 
and assumes additional financial/administrative support (additional offices within the Saeima, larger 
administrative staff, access to an official car, etc.).
At least three MPs may form a group of Saeima Members for expressing some other interests 
related to their work in the Saeima. However, such groups have no particular organisational status 
and their activities are not funded by the Saeima.
A vote of confidence is the most powerful tool for holding government accountable. There is 
no particular procedure for invoking a vote of confidence. At least five MPs may submit questions 
in writing to the Prime Minister, a Deputy Prime Minister, a Minister or the Governor of the Bank 
of Latvia. Answers to these questions are provided outside the plenary meeting of the Saeima, in 
a specially arranged session. At least ten MPs may submit in writing inquiries to members of the 
Cabinet. These inquiries are addressed during a plenary meeting and may result in a vote of no 
confidence to the whole Cabinet or one of its members. Members may also create parliamentary 
inquiry committees to investigate various specific matters.
Standing committees of the Saeima dealing with various legislative initiatives may exercise 
scrutiny over the government and request line ministries to report on sectoral developments or 
undertake a legislative review and suggest changes to legislative proposals submitted by the Cabinet.
According to the Constitution, in some specific cases, citizens or NGOs may ask the President 
to not endorse a law adopted by the Saeima and request it to be reconsidered. Another, more time-
consuming tool for holding government accountable, is lodging a claim with the Constitutional 
Court regarding the constitutionality of a Saeima or Cabinet decision.
Actual situation
Members of the Saeima elected from the same list of candidates may create a parliamentary 
group irrespective of their affiliation to the ruling coalition. All arliamentary groups have access to 
administrative support (parliamentary group consultants, official cars, offices, etc.) funded from the 
Saeima budget. The amount of such funding depends on the size of the particular parliamentary 
group. This funding allows MPs to hire aides/assistants (one full-time equivalent), and it helps 
political parties achieve their goals. However, opposition parties receive no extra funding.
Majority rule, almost an absolute disregard for opposition initiatives, became the decision-
making style of the Saeima already at the turn of the last century (Ikstens 2010). Some changes have 
taken place in the 11th Saeima, as opposition members have been elected to chair two legislative 
commissions, allowing them to influence the legislative process. Nevertheless, the general trend has 
been the same over the past decade.
The National Security Committee of the Saeima operates on the parity basis whereby all political 
groups have one representative, whereas quantitatively the largest committee, the European Affairs 
Committee of the Saeima, ensuring the Saeima’s involvement in EU affairs according to the Rules of 
Procedure, must have at least one representative from each political group in the parliament. There 
is usually also one opposition representative appointed to the Presidium of the Saeima. Opposition 
members have also been included in the few parliamentary inquiry committees that can only be 
established with the support of ruling coalition parties.
Opposition parties have several ways of influencing the legislative process and ensuring 
government accountability. Committees and legislative proposals are the most common ways. 
However, coalition agreements, stipulating the cooperation between ruling parties in the Cabinet and 
the Saeima, have traditionally been against supporting opposition initiatives that are not prompted 
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by the coalition upon prior agreement. Therefore, such initiatives have rarely been efficient. The 
opposition may make enquiries or submit requests to the Cabinet members, but they almost never 
get past the initial stages due to the Saeima approval that is required. In the past 10 years, the 
opposition has never been able to reach a vote of confidence for an already-formed government.
A slightly more efficient way for the opposition to monitor the ruling coalition is a plea to the 
President. Such a plea is submitted to make the President refrain from promulgating a particular 
law and ask him/her to return a legislative proposal to the parliament for reconsideration. Moreover, 
according to the Constitution, a third of parliamentarians may ask for the promulgation of a law to 
be suspended and initiate a popular vote on the matter. However, the opposition has not made use 
of this tool in the past decade. The opposition has been most influential in cases when the minority 
governments have been formed, as well as cases when conflicts inside the coalition have erupted 
over one or another matter. Most often such differences have led to decisions going the way of the 
opposition (for instance, the appointment of Juris Jansons to the Ombudsman’s position in 2011).
Parliamentarians elected from the Harmony Centre, which has always been formally left out of the 
ruling coalition, have rather actively appealed in the Constitutional Court against the constitutionality 
of some legal norms. Their claims have been linked to political and civil rights. None of the political 
claims have been supported by the Constitutional Court. That said, the opposition can still be proud 
of some claims on social matters that have been supported by the court.
6.4. How fair and efficient is legislation regulating political party discipline 
in the Saeima?
Legal framework
Political parties play a prominent role in elections and the competition for government seats. 
This role, however, is weakened by preferential voting that allows voters to influence the election of 
candidates. Moreover, according to the Constitution, once elected, parliamentarians cannot be recalled.
The work of political parties elected to the Saeima is regulated by the Rules of Procedure of the 
Saeima. The Rules of Procedure determine the process for formation and the basic principles behind 
the work of parliamentary groups, blocs and bodies. However, neither the Constitution, nor the Rules 
of Procedure determine any disciplinary rules for parties elected to the parliament. Parliamentary 
group integrity from the voting point-of-view is a matter decided by the groups themselves.
Nevertheless, legislation does contain provisions to reduce the split of political parties and 
strengthen their organisational integrity within the Saeima and beyond it. In 2010 a new requirement 
was introduced – parliamentarians elected from the same candidate list can create only one parlia-
mentary group. Members of the parliament who decide to leave parliamentary groups may join other 
existing groups or continue working in the parliament as unaffiliated MPs. In cases where a party 
funded from the state budget according to the Law on Financing of Political Organizations (Parties) 
decides to split, public funding is still paid to the legal entity initially designated to receive the funding.
Actual situation
The Latvian institutional framework is very vague about the relationship between political parties, 
whose main task is to compete for power, compile and submit candidate lists, organise election 
campaigns, and individual candidates, whose activities from public perception point-of-view may 
significantly change the set of candidates elected to the Saeima. Although the common perception is 
that the popularity of a candidate, quite often gained as a result of working in an important public 
position, may help in the elections, there have been a number of cases when high-ranking officials fail 
to make it into the Saeima despite the success of parties represented by them. Some of the best-known 
instances include former Minister of Culture Sarmīte Ēlerte (in 2011), ex-Speaker of the Saeima 
Jānis Straume (in 2006) and others. There have also been cases where candidates from relatively 
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low-ranked positions have garnered greater voter support and won seats in the parliament ahead of 
their fellow candidates. This raises a legitimate question: does an MP really represent his/her party 
and does he/she have to stick by one’s parliamentary group discipline, or he/she must rather represent 
the voters who have elected him/her, even if the interests of voters contradict with the party line?
Public trust in political parties has been very low for many years (see Eurobarometer data). 
Moreover, over the last five years there has been a growing public concern that Latvia is not 
developing the way it should. For instance, in April 2014 almost half of Latvia’s population (46 %) 
claimed that Latvia is heading in the wrong direction (see Q-B5 of Annex 2). This is a strong signal 
that Latvians are expecting a different kind of representation and looking for ways of creating a 
more individualized bond between themselves and their elected representatives. On the other hand, 
people are clearly against roaming MPs who abandon their parliamentary groups. In April 2014 
poll, almost ⅔ of respondents claimed that MPs who leave their group should resign from the 
parliament altogether.
The Saeima responded to this public attitude by adopting amendments to the Rules of Procedure 
of the Saeima and the Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties) in 2010. Changes 
introduced by the parliament were meant to solidify the political parties and their parliamentary 
groups. And, although parliamentary groups could still be established only by at least five MPs, 
and new parliamentary groups could still be established only by MPs elected from the same list, 
the experience of the 11th Saeima shows that these changes had very little effect on MPs deciding 
to abandon their group and join a different one. 
Affiliation to a particular parliamentary group does not imply any binding obligations of an MP 
towards a parliamentary group in terms of voting. However, parliamentary groups are entitled to 
expel MPs, and therefore, deprive them of administrative resources and positions in the Saeima. A 
study conducted by Jānis Ozols in 2012 shows that although MPs do leave or change parliamentary 
groups, parliamentary group discipline in the Saeima is relatively strong, even compared to the rest 
of Europe. Not much has changed in this respect in the last 10 years. That is obviously due to the 
consolidation of Latvian political parties and the perception of party leaders who have a strong 
influence on the individual status of MPs in the current legislature and their re-election chances in 
the future. There is, however, no information as to how parties have ensured internal discipline in 
the past decade by means of methods favoured by the People’s Party (Tautas partija) or the New 
Era Party (Jaunais laiks) who requested their members to reimburse part of the election campaign 
expenses or give an oath in church (Auers, Ikstens 2005). 
6.5. How far are parties effective membership organizations, and how far 
are members able to influence party policy and candidate selection?
Legal framework
The Law on Political Parties adopted in 2007 outlines the key organisational structural features 
and management tools of political parties: rights and obligations of members, creation of different 
party bodies and defining of their responsibilities, terms of operation, etc. However, neither this law 
nor any other external laws and regulations contain specific procedures for nominating and approval 
of candidates for the Saeima, local or EP elections. Therefore, Latvia does not apply any mandatory 
gender, age or ethnic quotas on candidates. Neither have any of the parties introduced any voluntary 
quotas. Candidate approval procedures for different elections are mostly regulated by party by-laws.
Actual situation
As far as municipal elections are concerned,   there are two types of parties: national and 
local. The main role of the local parties is to provide a legal platform for local leaders to run in the 
municipal elections. This way a local leader can avoid national parties whose ups and downs in the 
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Saeima elections are described in Chapter 5. National parties mostly have decentralised procedures 
for nominating and approving municipal election candidates. Therefore, it is up to the local chapters 
of national parties to decide on candidates. The only exception is the elections in Riga, candidates 
for which are often approved by parties at the council or board level. Local parties mostly approve 
their candidates at the general meeting or board level.
Appointment and approval of candidates for the Saeima and European Parliament elections is 
much more centralised and exclusive. However, party leaders try to promote intra-party democracy 
and good governance approaches in the selection of candidates. Studies conducted so far show that 
Latvian parties have room for improvement in terms of intra-party democracy (Aylott et al 2014).
It is generally accepted that election candidates are chosen from the party ranks. However, the 
elections in recent years show that this is not a universally-accepted principle – some of the best-
known examples include the Unity Party list for the elections of the 10th Saeima and Zatlers Reform 
Party candidate list for the 11th Saeima. More institutionalised parties are much more sensitive 
towards non-partisan candidates, requiring leadership support and solid reasoning to include non-
partisans in the final list.
Although candidates can usually be nominated by any member or local chapter of the particular 
party, party leaders put a lot of effort into getting certain candidates nominated that would guarantee 
the success of a party in elections. More and more local parties rely on opinion polls in deciding 
who gets listed and which place in the list he/she gets. The same rationale is also used by some of 
the politicians when deciding the preferred constituency.
Since 2010, the law prohibits candidates from being listed in several constituencies at once. This 
restriction has forced parties to consider the polling results and individual performance of candidates 
in previous elections very carefully. Although party representatives claim that candidate lists are 
created with a view to gender and age equality, such a balance is by far not the main criteria for 
selecting candidates (Aylott et al. 2014).
Approval of the candidate list is the prerogative of the party council and board. When the 
candidate lists are proposed by an alliance of political parties, organizations merging together define 
the number of candidates from each party and their position in the list in advance. Candidates from 
each party in the group are nominated by the board of the represented party or alliances thereof. 
Interviews with party representatives show that regular members have little de facto influence 
in the selection of candidates. One of the reasons for that is the comparatively little financial 
contribution of regular members to party wellbeing and the fact that party performance in elections 
is mainly a responsibility of its leaders. The candidate selection process largely reflects the tendency 
towards a concentration of intra-party power driven by considerations of efficiency.
All in all, there is no reason to say candidate selection has undergone a major change in the 
past 10 years. Party leaders still have strong influence on the process, but decisions are increasingly 
based on opinion poll results. 
6.6. How far does the system of party financing prevent the subordination 
of parties to special interests?
Legal framework
The funding of political parties has been regulated by the Law on Financing of Political 
Organisations (Parties) (LFPOP), amended several times. Some funding aspects are also regulated 
by the Law on Pre-election Campaigning.
According to the wording of the LFPOP effective as of June 2014, political parties may raise 
funds for their activities from the following sources: 1) membership fees; 2) individual contributions 
(donations); 3) state budget allocations; 4) commercial revenue; 5) other legitimate sources. 
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Political parties have been funded from the state budget since 2012. Budget funding is available 
to parties that have received at least 2 % of the votes in recent parliamentary elections. As in many 
other countries, Latvia provides budget funding per votes received by the political party. Each vote 
is equal to EUR 0.71 per year. This approach is considered beneficial for large political parties.
To counteract political party efforts to disguise their income by increasing revenues from 
membership fees and decreasing the share of donations, the law introduced a limit for contributions: 
annual individual aggregate contribution to a political party may not exceed 50 minimum monthly 
wages regardless of the form of the contribution – donation or membership fee. Donations must 
come from taxable income generated in the last three years. Parties can accept donations only from 
Latvian citizens or individuals with the right to a non-citizen passport. Donations from anonymous 
sources, bank loans, guarantees or credits, or third-party donations are strictly forbidden. Parties 
must report each donation to the CPCB within a maximum of 15 days after receiving the donation. 
A list of donations is made public by the CPCB on its website.
The legal framework for pre-election campaigning has also undergone major changes. The 
framework law for pre-election campaigning is the Law on Pre-election Campaigning adopted on 
1 January 2013. Any political advertising or campaigning the day before and on the day of the 
elections is prohibited to limit the influence of political advertising and funding on the election 
outcome. It is also prohibited to publish party or candidate support ratings on the day of the elections. 
Paid pre-election TV campaigns are not allowed 30 days before the election date. It is also illegal 
to use administrative resources in campaigning. Candidates registered for the Saeima, European 
Parliament and Riga City Council elections are entitled to 20-minute free broadcasting slots on 
public television and radio.
LFPOP sets down restrictions for party funding and pre-election spending. Each party, with its 
registered list of candidates, may spend an amount that does not exceed the average gross monthly 
wage registered by the Central Statistics Bureau two years before the elections on its pre-election 
campaign. This amount is rounded off to full euros, using the multiplier 0.0004 for each vote 
of previous parliamentary elections. According to the law, parties must submit their pre-election 
financial reports (for the period from 120 days before the elections to election date), as well annual 
reports once a year. All of these reports are available on the CPCB website.
Financial activities of registered political parties are monitored by the CPCB. The Bureau 
also has investigative power, allowing closer monitoring of political parties, including declarations 
submitted by them. To avoid the CPCB’s delayed response to pre-election campaigning violations, 
the Bureau is entitled to terminate any political campaign, if there is reasonable suspicion that 
election funding restrictions have been violated.
Actual situation
Party funding has been the most reformed area of political party activity. LFPOP has been 
amended 9 times in the past 10 years. Amendments have mainly been adopted as a response to various 
violations. Changes have also promoted transparency of political parties and their independence 
from private donors. Independence from private donors was the main reason for the introduction 
of the budget-funded system in 2010. However, the economic crisis delayed the implementation of 
the budget-funded system until 2012.
It is difficult to assess the effect of the budget-funded party financing system after such a short 
period since its introduction. Moreover, there have not been parliamentary elections after the imple-
mentation of the scheme. Elections have traditionally been the most capital-intensive activity of politi-
cal parties. However, public attitude towards state budget-funded party activity is distinctly negative. 
Half of the respondents polled in April 2014 claimed that state budget funding has failed to 
reduce the influence of private donors on political parties. More than 3/
4 
of Latvian citizens are 
certain that state budget funding has not had any positive effect on political corruption. Almost 
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3/
5 
of people think that state budget funding had not made political parties more emphatic towards 
society’s needs. A little more than ¼ of respondents agree that state budget funding has improved 
political party management. A little more than 50 % of people were confident that state budget 
funding has not helped political parties raise public awareness on their decisions. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that 2/3 of respondents consider state budget funding a waste of money (DA (Audit 
of Democracy) 2014).
Analysis of financial declarations submitted by political parties shows that in 2013 the share 
of state budget funding in the overall budget of political parties amounted to 20 %. A comparison 
of state budget allocations and election campaign spending/operational expenditure for 2010 shows 
that budget funding would cover only 12 % of party spending in 2010.
The lion’s share of political party income still comes from private donations. According to the 
CPCB financing database, private donations mostly come from the same range of individuals who 
mostly donate more than 500 euros at once. It may be considered a significant amount, raising 
questions regarding the origin of the funds. Although legal entities were prohibited from making 
political donations in 2002, donors include many company owners, managers and their family 
members. This means that the plutocratic party financing model is still alive. Furthermore, society 
largely distrusts political parties, and income inequality is still high. So, it would be precarious to 
expect donations coming from a large circle of donors.On the other hand, in the case of Latvia, 
party funding restrictions diminish the transparency in this area despite the best efforts of responsible 
authorities to verify party declarations. 
One must also stress that substantial shortcomings exist in terms of funding political parties. 
First of all, a whole range of political parties of the past decade have been luring supporters and 
promoting their political plans under the legal disguise of NGOs to avoid any restrictions of financial 
or commercial nature. Secondly, in recent years there has been an increasing number of cases of 
Russia’s support for Latvian political parties being exposed. Support has come in the shape of 
funding and know-how. Responsible authorities, however, have failed to prevent such collaboration, 
raising doubts about how level is the playing field.
A summary of trends observed over the last 10 years shows that the legal framework for 
political party funding has improved significantly, eliminating some of the key challenges detected 
previously (validity check of declarations; covert advertising; incomplete financial statements, etc.). 
The introduction of the state budget funding scheme for political parties has been a major change. 
However, some of the fundamental problems, such as the dependence of parties on a limited number 
of donors and origins of funds are still among the burning issues. Moreover, new problems have 
emerged from restrictions imposed through legislation.
6.7. What kind of support do parties receive from different ethnic, religious 
and linguistic groups?
Legal framework
Latvian legislation contains no quotas on representation of social groups in candidate lists or 
elected bodies. The amount of the security deposit (1,400 euro) is paid irrespective of the number 
of constituencies in which the list of candidates for the Saeima elections is presented. Naturalisation 
has increased the number of Latvian citizens able to vote and strengthened the political participation 
of East Slavic minorities. 
Actual situation
According to the statistics of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (OCMA) of the 
Ministry of Interior, Latvia’s population reached 2.18 million at the beginning of 2014. The Central 
Statistics Bureau offers a different number; however, the OCMA data is much more useful for 
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analysing political party figures and election outcomes since it is also used by the Central Election 
Committee in organising and running elections.
Table 6.1. Changes in the ethnic structure of the population (residents and citizens): 2004–2014, %
Residents Citizens
2004 2014 2004 2014
Latvians 58.7 59.6 74.9 71.2 
Russians 28.8 26.9 18.3 19.7 
Belarusians   3.9   3.4   1.5   1.7 
Ukrainians   2.6   2.4   0.6   1.0 
Poles   2.5   2.2   2.2   2.0
Lithuanians   1.4   1.3   0.9   1.0
Other   2.1   4.2   1.5   3.4 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
Source: The Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs.
The population and ethnic structure of Latvian society has changed in the last 10 years. The 
share of Latvians in the total population has increased by around one percentage point, but the 
share of Latvians among citizens has gone down by almost 3.5 %. This can be attributed to active 
naturalisation – 72 330 individuals have acquired Latvian citizenship between January 2004 and 
January 2014. 
From the political behaviour point-of-view, there are two distinct ethno-linguistic groups – on 
the one hand, people who mostly speak Latvian at home and mostly identify themselves as Latvians, 
and on the other hand, those who mostly use Russian at home and identify themselves as East Slavs 
(Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians). This division is well-reflected in election results as each of the 
groups has a different favourite political party.
The opinion poll conducted in April 2014 shows that the support to political parties clearly 
differs due to the ethnic background of the respondents. Those who consider themselves Latvian 
strongly favour the National Alliance (Nacionālā apvienība), ‘Unity’, Union of Greens and Farmers, 
and the newly-created For Latvia From the Heart (No sirds Latvijai) of Inguna Sudraba. East Slavs, 
including Russians, in turn, are more in support of Harmony Centre. It must be noted, however, 
that the share of Latvians supporting the largest East Slavic political force has increased by 8–10 % 
since 2004. One of the reasons for this is targeted campaigning of that political group to attract 
more Latvians. Campaign tools included positioning Harmony Centre as the only alternative to the 
right-wing nationalist parties. Socially responsive politics exercised by the party leaders in Riga 
City have also helped raise the appeal of the party among Latvians.
Table 6.2. Political party support: breakdown by ethnic groups, %
Latvians Russians Other TOTAL
Harmony Centre 27 62 11 100
Unity 92 4 4 100
Green and Farmers Union 82 13 5 100
National Alliance 99 1 0 100
For Latvia from the Heart 84 7 9 100
Source: DA 2014.
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Official election results also indicate similar trends. Support for Harmony Centre has traditionally 
been very high in Riga and Latgale, constituencies with the largest share of ethnic minorities. The 
EP election outcomes show a similar picture of East Slavic representatives such as Harmony Centre 
Party, For Human Rights in a United Latvia Party (Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā) and Latvian 
Russian Union Party (Latvijas Krievu savienība) getting most of their votes from regions and 
constituencies with larger shares of ethnic minorities. 
Statistics are a clear indication of the ethnic cleavage in political party support. This, however, 
is not unique to Latvia; similar trends can also be observed in a number of Europe’s democracies. 
Based on the ethnic structure of supporters, there are distinctly Latvian  parties and East Slavic 
parties. Moreover, there are no indications that the ethnic cleavage might play a less important role 
in elections in the nearest future if we look at the domestic policy line and foreign policy discourse 
of political parties.
According to the cleavage theory by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, such cleavages largely 
reflect the existing political stratification of the society that began shaping at the end of 1980s and 
early 1990s. Bridging of these gaps is a long-term effort, closely linked with the efficiency of social 
integration policies and changes in the international environment.
6.8. What initiatives have been implemented to overcome the well-known 
challenges? Are these initiatives a priority? Are they supported by 
the society?
The funding of political parties still remains the biggest challenge for the political system 
in Latvia. Politicians have become aware of that and significant legal changes have been taking 
place in the past decade – party support has become more transparent in terms of intensity, more 
appropriate spending thresholds have been set according to economic conditions, state budget 
funding of political parties has been introduced, and more rigorous and immediate penalties have 
been adopted. Although party membership has expanded, which may be a sign of parties taking 
root in the society and greater trust in the parties; political formations are still struggling with a 
poor image, one of the worst among all institutions in Latvia. Moreover, initial assessments of the 
efficiency of state budget funding are rather negative; society does not see the benefits of such an 
arrangement. This means that the image of the political parties does not depend only on the party 
funding system and dependence on narrow interest groups. 
The negative image of political parties is probably a reflection of the overall assessment of the 
nation’s development. Results of the public opinion poll conducted in April 2014 show that half of 
Latvian people think Latvia is not developing as it should. That, in turn, may be explained by a lack 
of intellectual prowess and capacity in party ranks. In the age of information when the representative 
function of political parties is no longer their primary task, political parties seem to have failed to 
reach the required governance capacity. It is difficult to develop such capacity due to public disdain. 
The general public is highly suspicious of roaming MPs who switch from one Saeima group 
to another. Quite many voters see this as a sign of political weakness and sometimes even feel 
betrayed by such steps. Politicians tried to solve the problem by changing the parliamentary group 
formation rules and the introduction of a state budget funding system with clear eligibility criteria. 
However, the work of the Saeima and its public assessment shows that these steps have not led to 
the desired result.
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Overall assessment: progress in the past decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
6.1. X
6.2. X
6.3. X
6.4. X
6.5. X
6.6. X
6.7. X
6.8. X
Best features
The legal framework for political party funding has been improved and is now covering areas 
unregulated or partially regulated in the past. There have been measures aimed at reducing the 
capital intensity of pre-election campaigns and introduce a state budget funding system supporting 
most popular parties.
Most serious problem
Some legislative loopholes still exist that do not preclude the use of various non-political 
organisations for political purposes, thereby making it possible to circumvent the restrictions 
applicable to political parties. Illegitimate external support to parties has not been dealt with either.
Suggested improvements
It is necessary to impose more stringent measures against parties violating funding rules, thus 
reducing the illegitimate support from abroad to parties registered in Latvia. It is also necessary to 
build public confidence in political parties by strengthening their intellectual prowess and capacity.
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7. EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE  
GOVERNMENT
Iveta Reinholde
Is government accountable before the people and its representatives?
7.1. How far is the elected government able to influence or control those  
matters that are important to the lives of its people, and how well is it 
informed, organized and resourced to do so?
Legal framework
Since the 1990s, Latvia has attempted to reform its public administration. Times of success have 
replaced less successful periods. In the mid 1990s, the widespread use of employing the methods 
of the private sector to modernise the public sector in Latvia ended in failure, and the phenomena 
that describe this approach best, namely, public contracts and government agencies, emerged in 
the press from time to time with larger or smaller public scandals. Back then, the failures occurred 
mostly because the government did not have access to sufficiently effective instruments for how to 
monitor the introduction of policies and the economic expenditures of state budget funds. Therefore, 
problems in public administration and the need to meet the criteria for joining the European Union 
(EU) served as an incentive for establishing a legal and institutional framework for the functioning 
of the public administration.
In the early 21st century, the Saeima (Latvian Parliament) adopted several modern laws for the 
functioning of public administration: State Civil Service Law (2000), Administrative Procedure Law 
(2001), Public Administration Structure Law (2002). The State Civil Service Law prescribes the 
role of a professional civil service in the country, whereas the Public Administration Structure Law 
defines the institutional system of the public administration of the executive arm (i.e. authorities 
subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers) and the fundamental principles of their activity. The aim 
of the Administrative Procedure Law is to ensure that the fundamental principles of the rule of law 
are observed in relations between private individuals and the State. Therefore, by early 21st century, 
a legal and institutional framework relevant for the functioning of public administration was created, 
and this was an important factor in the negotiations leading up to accession to the EU, as well as 
in the further modernisation of the public administration. 
Actual situation
The actual ability of the government to introduce the  policies that it had developed and to 
render quality public services is described in the Government Effectiveness Index (GEI) developed 
by the World Bank, and is formed based on surveys of companies, the population, and experts, and 
therefore, it can offer a complex assessment of the work of the public administration.
In the GEI assessment, Latvia ranks relatively well. The highest number of points – 100 – means 
the best possible work of the executive arm, which Finland has earned for the last three years. 
According to the classification of the World Bank, Latvia, like Lithuania, fall in the group ranging 
from 50 to 75, whereas Estonia falls in the next highest-ranking group (75–90) (World Bank 2013). 
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The international assessment of the Latvian government’s ability to implement its  policies 
allows us to draw several conclusions. Firstly, its ability decreased at a time when Latvia was 
experiencing rapid economic growth. This can be explained by the fact that the government did not 
try to slow down the rapid growth rate, in order for all social groups to benefit from this growth 
at the same level. The public administration had insufficient knowledge and skills to introduce the 
necessary changes in policies and laws and to adapt them to the changing conditions during the 
time of economic growth.
Secondly, 2009 and 2010, which were marked by budget austerity measures and attempts to 
balance state budget revenues with expenditures under the circumstances of the economic crisis, 
also showed that the government’s abilities had grown and confirmed that under certain conditions 
the politicians and public administration alike were able to act consistently to introduce reforms and 
make well-considered decisions. In response to the economic recession, the number of employees 
was reduced in public administration, an audit of functions was performed, and taxes were increased. 
The economic stabilisation and growth programme of Latvia, on which the negotiations between 
the government of Latvia and international financial institutions were based, did not only envisage 
a stabilisation of the financial sector, but also financially demanding policy reforms (for instance, 
in the fields of education and health protection) (Reinholde 2012, 180). During the crisis, i.e. 
in a complicated economic situation, the government’s commitments to introducing reforms in 
public administration, without a clear view of the direction that the reforms must take, offered a 
unique opportunity to implement previously postponed activities (such as decreasing the number of 
employees in public administration). However, the long-term question of the goals of reforms and 
the overall capacity of the public administration will become ever more topical both in the context 
of the Latvian presidency of the Council of the European Union and with regard to ensuring public 
services in the context of negative population growth.
The ability of the government to implement  policies also influences its knowledge about the 
successes and failures of implementing policies. Unfortunately, the assessment of the consequences 
of  policies and the following implementation thereof is encumbered by the complicated system of 
updating development planning documents; therefore, the assessments are either performed only 
formally or are not performed at all (BSZI (Baltic Institute of Social Sciences) 2013, 64–67).
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Figure 7.1. Latvian government’s ability to implement policies (ranked according to percentiles 
between all countries; with 0 as the lowest score and 100 as the highest rating)
Source: World Bank 2013.
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In general, Latvia has done a lot over the last decade to ensure that its public administration 
functions according to traditions established in the European Union Member States. At the same 
time, the public administration will have to deal with several future challenges: the simplification 
of the policy planning system and the performance and use of assessments of the consequences 
of policies.
7.2. How effective and open to scrutiny is the control exercised by elected 
leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and other 
executive agencies?
Article 58 of the Constitution (Satversme) prescribes that public administration institutions 
are under the authority of the Cabinet of Ministers. This means that the Cabinet of Ministers must 
assume responsibility for the activity of executive agencies, namely, must ensure control over these 
institutions.
However, there are several parliamentary control instruments, which enable the deputies to 
control the work of the civil service. Section 119 of the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima (Latvian 
Parliament) prescribe that ‘At least five Members may submit questions in writing to the Prime 
Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister or Governor of the Bank of Latvia concerning matters 
which fall within the competence of these officials’. During a regular Saeima session, time will be 
set for answering questions. This means that the members of the Saeima are given a chance to ask 
questions to the senior executive branch representatives about the progress of implementing  policies 
and about the conduct of the civil service.
Another mechanism for the politicians to exercise control over the executive branch, offered in 
the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima, is the inquiries. Section 124 of the Rules of Procedure states: 
‘At least 10 Members may submit in writing inquiries to members of the Cabinet’. All questions 
from the deputies must be answered, and as regards the inquiries, the Saeima has established an 
inter-sitting period – the Inquiries Committee first reviews the inquiry and deems it acceptable. 
According to the conditions of the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima, the addressee must give written 
answers to the inquiries from a group of deputies within seven days. 
The number of inquiries during the last four convocations has not been high. Moreover, there 
has been a prevailing tendency for the Inquiries Committee to reject them. The Rules of Procedure 
of the Saeima prescribe the possibility of changing an inquiry into a question, so that the information 
Table 7.1. Dynamics of inquiries and questions over the last four convocations of the Saeima
8th Saeima
(elected on  
5 Oct 2002)
9th Saeima
(elected on 7 Oct 
2006) 
10th Saeima
(elected on 2 Oct 
2010)
11th Saeima 
(elected on 17 Nov 
2011*)
Inquiries
20 (18 of which 
rejected)
36 (35 of which 
rejected)
3 (2 of which 
rejected)
11 (11 rejected)
Questions 136 253 22 161
* Statistics for a period until 1 May 2014.
Source: 8. Saeima. Statistika. Retrieved from: http://Saeima.lv/arhivs/8_Saeima/statistika_par_8.htm (all 
materials referred to were viewed on 02.05.2014); 9. Saeimas statistika. 07.11.2006.–01.11.2010, retrieved 
from: http://helios-web.Saeima.lv/deputati/stat_9/Kopeja_statistika_9Saeima.pdf; 10. Saeima. Deputātu piepra-
sījumi. Deputātu jautājumi. Retrieved from: http://titania.Saeima.lv/LIVS10/SaeimaLIVS_LmP.nsf/WEB_
questions?OpenView&Count=30; 11. Saeima.Depu tātu pieprasījumi. Deputātu jautājumi. Retrieved from http://
titania.Saeima.lv/LIVS11/Saeimalivs_lmp.nsf/WEB_requests?OpenView&Count=30
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that the deputies want to find out is still provided in a regular parliamentary session. The short hand 
reports of open Saeima sessions, along with the enclosed written answers to the deputies’ questions 
are published in the official gazette ‘Latvijas Vēstnesis’. Questions and inquiries serve as tools for 
the deputies to control the work of public administration; however, due to various reasons these tools 
are not particularly well received and are not effectively employed, as it is rather difficult to use 
questions and inquiries to boost political popularity. However, over the last decade, the popularity 
of inquiries and questions among the deputies has increased compared to the Audit of Democracy 
published in 2005.
According to the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima (Section 150), an inquiry lodged by 
one third of the deputies forms grounds for the establishment of a parliamentary investigation 
committee. The Rules of Procedure of the Saeima additionally prescribe that the members of the 
established committee are entitled to perform audits in public administration and local government 
authorities. A public procurement is a reason for performing such an audit in a private company 
as well. This means that the parliamentary investigation committee can serve as an influential tool 
if the deputies have an objective reason to believe that funds from the state budget have not been 
used accordingly.
Unfortunately, the deputies are not eager to employ this tool, like many other tools created 
for the control of the administrative apparatus of the executive branch, preferring to respond to 
current issues and complaints raised by the public, rather than acting proactively. Consequently, 
in late 2011, a parliamentary investigation committee was created to assess the impact that the 
surveillance of Latvijas Krājbanka, as well as the termination of its operations and the insolvency 
process has on the financial system of Latvia; however, the work of this committee was not as 
intensive as was initially intended (LR Saeima (Saeima of the Republic of Latvia) 2012). In 2013, 
a parliamentary investigation committee was established to assess the difficult situation that had 
developed in relation to the administration and the privatisation process of the Ķemeri Health 
Resort. As a result, the committee merely concluded that a fast solution is necessary to prevent the 
destruction of the cultural and historical legacy that comes with the resort building (LR Saeimas 
mājaslapa (website of the Saeima) 2014).
In 2007, the ombudsman’s institution was created. In 2008, the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima 
were updated to include a chapter on ombudsman’s reports: it prescribes that the ombudsman submits 
an annual written report to the Saeima about the work of the Ombudsman’s Office (LR Saeima 
2008b). Since one of the duties of the ombudsman is to monitor respect for human rights and the 
principle of good governance and that respect for the principle of governance is closely related to 
the work of institutions, then this provides the deputies with another way of obtaining information 
on the work of public administration.
Already in 2007, the ombudsman received 441 complaints about violations of the principle 
of good governance, whereas in 2008, 463 complaints about the inappropriate conduct of officials 
and about inadequate operations of local governments (LR tiesībsargs (Ombudsman of the Republic 
of Latvia) 2007, 62; LR tiesībsargs 2008, 71). In the report of 2012, the ombudsman stated that, 
upon receiving the ombudsman’s notifications of breaches of the principle of good governance, 
the authorities have excused themselves by either denying the problem or by pointing out that a 
legal framework must be introduced to resolve the problem (LR tiesībsargs 2013, 101). In the 
report, the ombudsman lists the key violations of good governance principles (discourteous attitude 
by public administration officials, not replying on merits, distinct practices of providing public 
services in different regional departments of one and the same authority, failure to provide clear 
and objective information) (LR tiesībsargs 2013, 101). Therefore, by reviewing the ombudsman’s 
reports, the members of the Saeima receive enough information about the work of establishments 
in order to make decisions on the necessary improvements in statutes, upon analysing the provided 
information.
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In 2008, the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima were updated by adding a section ‘Reports 
of the members of the Cabinet of Ministers’. It prescribes that every year by 1 March the Prime 
Minister files a report to the Saeima about the CM’s achievements and plans (LR Saeima 2008b). 
Likewise, the amendments provide for an annual report on the work in foreign policy to be filed 
by the minister for foreign affairs by 16 January of each year.
Overall, there are many more tools available to the members of the Saeima than there were a 
decade ago. The conventional tools – deputies’ inquiries, questions, and parliamentary investigation 
committees – have been supplemented with new tools: the ombudsman’s report, reports by the 
minister for foreign affairs, and the annual reports by the Prime Minister. Therefore, the members 
of the Saeima have an opportunity to study detailed information on processes in various sectors and 
policies. However, no significant changes in the use of conventional tools are observed in practice – 
the elected representatives are showing little enthusiasm and they are rather cautious. Furthermore, 
the new tools are not yet being fully used.
7.3. How open and systematic are the procedures for public consultation  
on government policy and legislation, and how equal is the access for 
relevant interests to government?
Legal framework
Article 101 of the Constitution provides that all citizens of Latvia are entitled to participate 
in the work of the State and of local governments. This means that the public participation in 
public administration is established as one of the democratic values, by emphasising the role 
and importance of society in the work of public administration. Moreover, the participation of 
society in public administration is envisaged in several other laws; therefore, forming a relevant 
legislative framework. For instance, the Public Administration Structure Law provides for the public 
administration to engage representatives of public organisations and individuals in its work, by 
including them in work groups, advisory councils, or by asking for opinions (Section 48). The 
Development Planning System Law enshrines the principle of participation, whereby all stakeholders 
are entitled to participate in the drafting of a development planning document LR Saeima 2008a, 
Section 5).
Cabinet Regulations No. 970 ‘Procedure of public participation in the process of development 
planning’ offer a detailed regulation of public participation in public administration, by describing 
the procedure of public participation in the development planning process of the legislature and 
executive branch (at the Saeima and CM), as well as of authorities, planning regions, and local 
governments (LR MK (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia) 2009). These provisions 
are flexible and allow for applying the procedure of public participation described therein not 
only for preparing a development planning document, but also for resolving any other issue. The 
public can participate in all stages of the development planning process, starting with identifying 
the problem and ending with introducing, updating, and assessing the solution. Moreover, it must 
be stressed that these Cabinet Regulations are equally applicable to associations and foundations 
(officially registered as NGOs), individuals and NGOs without registered legal status. Therefore, the 
regulation for public participation prescribed in the law provides for the possibility of participation 
of all members of society.
Cabinet Regulations No. 970 provide for many forms of public participation, thereby giving 
an opportunity to the people and NGOs to choose the method of participation that they see best 
fit, such as voicing opinions directly or indirectly at inter-institutional work groups and advisory 
councils, participating in public debates and public discussions, as well as participating in discussion 
groups and forums (LR MK 2009). The inhabitants can also use the opportunities to give a written 
opinion or conclusion on a development planning document during the drafting process, including 
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the preparation of an opinion about a document that has been announced in a meeting of State 
Secretaries or about a document drafted by a local government.
Pursuant to Cabinet Regulations No. 970, individuals and NGOs can also submit their 
objections and proposals during the decision-making process. Individuals and NGOs can participate 
in person at CM committee meetings, CM sessions, local government council and committee 
sessions. These regulations prescribe that everybody can also make their objections known at 
other public administration authorities in line with the procedure established in internal regulations 
of the authority, insofar as such internal regulations are established within the authority and are 
known to the people. On 1 July 2013, amendments to the Cabinet Regulations No. 970 entered 
into force. With these amendments, a new method of public participation was introduced in Latvia, 
namely, discussion documents. Discussion documents outline the conceptual idea and vision of an 
authority about the possible solution to a problem. Discussion documents are known abroad as 
‘green papers’, thus, it can be claimed that the good international practice has now been introduced 
in Latvia as well.
In order to guarantee the control over whether public participation has indeed been ensured, 
the said regulations prescribe that the participation process must be described in the development 
planning document or in the abstract of the legal enactment. At the same time, all information 
about public participation initiatives must be posted on the websites of the respective authorities, 
in a section ‘Public participation’. For instance, information on public discussion and the reviewed 
documents must be posted on the website at least 14 days before the event, thus ensuring that 
the people and NGOs can prepare to voice their views and that as many public representatives as 
possible could participate (LR MK 2009). The discussion documents introduced and the opportunities 
for the public to get involved in the early stages of document development serve as evidence of 
the achieved progress; therefore, Latvia, for instance, has outpaced Estonia, who in its planning 
documents recognises the need to ensure public access to draft documents in the early stages of 
development (CSDP 2011, 23).
Finally, the Action Direction No. 5 of the Guidelines of Development of Public Administration 
for 2008–2013 prescribed a more active civil participation in public administration (VPAP (Public 
Administration Development Guidelines) 2008). The Guidelines intended to achieve the involvement 
of NGOs in the drafting process of various projects, laws, and documents at as early a stage 
as possible, thereby increasing the chances for the public to influence decisions and making the 
decision-making process more open. The Guidelines view public participation as a bilateral process, 
in which, on the one hand, it is necessary that public representatives get involved in the drafting 
of documents and projects as early on as possible, but, on the other hand, it is also necessary to 
increase the capacity and understanding of the public administration staff about the importance of 
public participation. The Guidelines also defined the objectives attainable in the public participation 
field: to ensure that in 2013 at least in 75 % of cases NGOs have participated in the drafting of 
policy planning documents and in 89 % of cases public discussions have taken place and NGOs were 
involved in the drafting of territorial planning documents (VPAP 2008, 44–45). These objectives 
clearly also outline the fact that  policy makers are trying to achieve the maximum possible public 
engagement.
Actual situation
It must be pointed out that significant progress has been achieved over the last decade in terms 
of public participation. In 2005, a memorandum of cooperation between NGOs and the CM was 
signed, and this was an important step in engaging NGOs in public administration decision-making. 
Initially, 57 NGOs had signed it, but now this number has increased to 352 (LR MK 2014b). 
Later on, a council was established for the implementation of the CM and NGO memorandum on 
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cooperation. It oversees the implementation of the memorandum on cooperation and promotes public 
participation. In a study conducted in early 2013, NGO representatives stated that overall they were 
well informed about the opportunities for public participation, and added that educational measures 
are necessary to raise public interest and motivation to participate in various public participation 
procedures (Konsorts, Baltic Consulting 2013, 22). This conclusion points to a tendency that some 
NGOs are very active, while the activity and willingness of others to participate depends on the 
capacity and level of awareness of their members. Moreover, it must be taken into account that 
NGOs tend to specialise in specific matters; therefore, these specialised NGOs are more interested in 
cooperating in the development of such issues that directly affect the relevant sphere of the NGO’s 
work. The study conducted in 2013 also identified the concerns of NGOs. Namely, the possibility 
for NGOs to follow-up with the further development of the suggested proposals is encumbered, 
as abstracts are rarely updated; likewise, it is difficult to track the development of a draft project 
in various versions of the project, because there is no single site or platform, where the respective 
document stays for the entire duration of its development (Konsorts, Baltic Consulting 2013, 23). 
Overall, the NGO’s capacity, knowledge, and understanding of the opportunities to participate have 
increased considerably over the decade, although new NGOs might require a rather considerable 
period to learn about and understand the possibilities of participation and to master the participation 
instruments in practice.
Over time, NGOs have accumulated skills and experience in participation; however, people 
are still somewhat sceptical about the possibility of participating and their ability to influence 
processes. In the 2014 survey conducted for the purposes of the Audit of Democracy, only 17 % of 
respondents agreed, while 75.3 % disagreed with the statement ‘Overall, the government is taking 
public opinion into account’ (DA (Audit of Democracy) 2014, I1. tabula). This means that less than 
one fifth of the respondents believed that the government is taking public opinion into account, 
which is accordingly transferred to the government’s selected policy priorities, aims, and documents. 
In the survey, 78.1 % of respondents agreed to the statement ‘Everybody must observe the laws, 
even if they appear unfair’, and this result points to the fact that the inhabitants of Latvia are willing 
to accept a seemingly unfair and imprecise statute, instead of using the numerous participation 
methods to change the respective statute (DA 2014, Table I1). This stance is confirmed by responses 
to another question in the public opinion poll. The respondents were asked: ‘Do you think that you 
would have any possibilities to act if the government makes decisions inconsistent with the public 
interest?’ (DA 2014, Table I2). The responses show that 67.8 % of respondents believe that they 
could not do anything. The results have not changed significantly in comparison with the 2004 
survey, as also at that time 67.9 % of respondents recognised their inability to influence decisions 
made by the government (Rozenvalds 2005, 226).
Therefore, it is important to understand the reasons for why people are not certain of their ability 
to participate and accordingly influence the decisions, even though a regulatory framework has 
been introduced and laws provide for various forms of public participation. The 2014 survey data 
also show that only 5.9 % of respondents recognise that they are accordingly informed of how to 
participate in the drafting and discussion of regulatory enactments. This means that the inhabitants 
are not even aware of the numerous public participation mechanisms and opportunities. Public 
scepticism and the increased role of NGOs in the decision-making process leads to the conclusion 
that the key factor is the low level of engagement of the people in the work of public organisations. 
In 2004, 61.9 % of respondents did not participate in the work of any organisation (Rozenvalds 2005, 
227). In 2011, the data did not substantially differ from those of 2004 – only 39.8 % of respondents 
had participated in a non-governmental organisation (Latvijas fakti 2011, 5).
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7.4. How accessible and reliable are public services for those who need 
them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service 
delivery?
Legal framework
All services provided by the public administration and local governments in Latvia are referred 
to as ‘public services’. However, the understanding of the concept of ‘public services’ differs between 
various sectors and from one institution to another. The laws include several definitions of ‘public 
services’, and these differences portray the non-homogeneous development of the public service 
sphere and understanding. 
Section 10 of the Public Administration Structure Law adopted back in 2002 prescribes that 
‘Public administration in its activities shall regularly examine and improve the quality of services 
provided to the public’ (LR Saeima 2002). Later on, in the Law on Information Society Services 
adopted in 2004, the understanding of ‘public services’ is closer to how the private sector interprets 
services. This law prescribes that services ‘include the electronic trade of goods and services, the 
sending of commercial communications, the possibilities offered for searching for information, 
access to this and the obtaining of information, services that ensure the transmission of information 
in an electronic communication network or access to an electronic communication network, and 
storage of information’ (LR Saeima 2004). The Law on Regulators of Public Utilities adopted 
in 2000 describes services as the ‘manufacture of goods, provision of services and infrastructure 
services (the complex of engineering structures or engineering solutions, as well as the complex of 
resources related to the use thereof necessary for the manufacture of goods or provision of services) 
in the regulated sectors according to the special regulatory enactments of the sectors’ (LR Saeima 
2000). The differing interpretation and definitions of public services did not only cause confusion 
among the population as to what services they can receive, but also among the institutions as to 
what services they are rendering.
The Guidelines on the Development of Public Administration for 2008–2013 ‘Better governance: 
quality and efficiency of management’ (approved in 2008) primarily emphasised the services rendered 
by public administration authorities (VPAP 2008, 20). The direction of the Guidelines ‘Improving 
the quality of services provided by institutions’ prescribed the development of a normative and 
methodological regulation for service provision to serve as grounds for a further decentralised 
approach in service development.
In January 2014, the CM reviewed a draft Law on Public Utilities, whereby it is planned 
to promote the development of a public services system, thus attempting to create a uniform 
understanding to define public services and a common approach to the implementation of public 
services, as well as to lighten the administrative burden originating due to the disparate practices 
of institutions (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia 2014a). The draft law stipulates that 
principles of e-governance, time savings, and a one-stop-shop must be consolidated and implemented 
in practice. Therefore, along with the adoption of the Law, an important stage will have concluded in 
the administrative reform process, as already in the late 1990s, documents of public administration 
reform prescribed the direction towards the introduction of client-oriented communication and a 
one-stop-shop. At the same time, the draft law responds to the challenges of the last decade – 
the need to introduce e-governance and ensure the availability of services in areas depending on 
population size.
The methodology, which elaborately explains the preparation of public services catalogues, 
defines public services as follows ‘tangible or intangible goods as prescribed in or deriving from 
regulatory enactments that the institution or individual, who is performing the public administration 
task (hereinafter – the institution), is giving to an individual in relation to a public administration 
function and performance of tasks falling within its competence’ (VRAA (State Regional Development 
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Agency) 2011, 4). In order to determine what can be considered a public service of an institution, 
the methodology for preparing public service catalogues offers a set of five features typical of a 
public service:
a) service provision is established as a public administration function for the institution 
(regulatory feature);
b) gathering information about and satisfying the specific needs of the service receiver (i.e. 
the individual), receiving a specific benefit (public benefit feature);
c) the service is either fully or partially publicly funded (funding feature);
d) there is an interaction between the service provider and service receiver (interaction feature);
e) there is a regular demand for the service (feature of regularity) (VRAA 2011, 4). 
Actual situation
In order to practically help the public administration authorities to implement public services, 
the Public Service Catalogue was prepared already in 2006, and it is available on the portal www.
latvija.lv – the single access point for public services.
The establishment and development of the portal www.latvija.lv depicts the dynamics of the 
development of e-services and e-governance. In 2010, there were 20 public services fully (100 %) 
available electronically, which in the EU have been recognised as services forming the basis 
for creating an information society. In 2012, already 88.7 % of companies were corresponding 
with public administration authorities online, and 85.4 % of companies filed completed forms 
electronically (VARAM (Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development) 2014). 
It must be pointed out that private persons are much less eager to use e-services. In 2005, people 
most frequently sought information about services at the relevant institution (61.6 %), and only 
afterwards tried calling them, whereas using e-services in an electronic environment was the last 
resort (ĪUMEPLS (Secretariat of Minister for Special Assignments on Electronic Government Affairs) 
2005, 6). In 2012, 63.7 % of inhabitants used the internet to communicate with public institutions, 
and only 22.3 % filed electronically completed forms (VARAM 2014). The most popular e-services 
were the residential income tax reports, applications for social insurance benefits, registration of 
vehicles, and registration of domicile (E-practice.eu 2012).
In order for individuals and companies to be able to use e-services, an e-signature is necessary; 
its implementation is linked to many uncertainties in regard to the costs of an e-signature and the 
necessary technical infrastructure. In 2011, the number of electronically signed documents exceeded 
73 000 per month, whereas in 2009 this number was three times lower (eParaksts 2012). Even 
though the use of state-of-the-art technologies is available, most services in public administration 
are still provided conventionally – ‘on paper’ – because the inhabitants do not know where the 
e-signature can be used or that they can receive the necessary e-services via online banking (website 
of VARAM 2013).
Although considerable progress has been achieved over the last decade in the introduction of 
e-governance, in practice, a different rate of development of public services is observed because, 
due to the lack of a definition of a public service, institutions treat all functions that they perform 
or those activities included in the paid services price list as public services. The level of detail in 
describing services also differs – some services are described in great detail and are available online 
at www.latvija.lv, whereas about others only a laconic reference can be found on www.latvija.lv. 
Even though the portal www.latvija.lv was created as a single public services portal, in practice (in 
2014) it was used only by 12.8 % of respondents, of whom more than a half use this portal for 
private needs. However, the database of laws www.likumi.lv is used for work (60.4 %) and for 
private needs (49.9 %) by about the same number of people (DA 2014, 29-30). 
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As of now, there are approximately 2000 services at the central administration level and about 
700 services at the local government level in Latvia (LR MK 2013); therefore, the definition 
and structuring of these services is necessary for the inhabitants and entrepreneurs to lighten the 
administrative burden related to the service provision approach that has developed historically. 
Furthermore, the organisation of service provision in regional Latvia currently reflects the 
mutual detachment of public administration and administrative-territorial reform, and as a result, 
the ministries have reorganised the structure of their respective regional institutions based on 
considerations that are relevant for each ministry; however, during the merging of local governments, 
they have attempted to balance the physical availability of services and available resources. Despite 
the numerous challenges, over the last decade, Latvia has achieved substantial progress in defining 
and electronization of public services, leading to a reduced administrative burden.
7.5. How comprehensive and effective is the right of access for citizens to 
government information under the constitution or other laws?
Legal framework
Opportunities for NGOs and the people in the field of public administration decision-making 
and the quality of participation depend on the availability of information. If the people and NGOs 
have ways of obtaining information about the work of the institutions and their planned activities, 
then the public can decide on a convenient form of participation and voice their views on a particular 
matter.
Article 104 of the Constitution prescribes the entitlement for everybody to address the state 
and local government institutions with applications and receive replies on merit (LR Satversme 
(Constitution of the Republic of Latvia) 1922). Thus, the rights to receive information from the public 
administration are enshrined in the form of a constitutional principle. The Freedom of Information 
Law, which was adopted in 1998, prescribes that information that an institution has or which the 
institution must disclose must be publicly available. This law introduced a specific joint procedure, 
whereby information can be obtained from public administration authorities. Section 10 of the Public 
Administration Structure Law prescribes that ‘The duty of Public administration is to inform the 
public of its activities. This especially applies to that section of the public and to those private persons 
whose rights or lawful interests are or may be affected by the implemented or planned activities’. 
Thus, the Public Administration Structure Law establishes two important conditions for information 
availability. Firstly, the information of society is the duty of institutions, and it is not an expression of 
good will or special benevolence. Secondly, in planning their activities, the institutions must foresee 
that special attention will have to be devoted to those groups of people, which can be affected by the 
planned activity (for instance, new regulatory enactments or infrastructure development projects); 
therefore, attempts must be made to seek compromises and the consequences of various projects in 
the future must be planned.
In 2007, the Law on Submissions was adopted; its objective is to urge private persons to 
participate in public administration. The law covers a dual process: an individual files a printed or 
electronic submission (for the purposes of the law also a complaint, request, proposal, or question), 
and the institution has a duty to review it and issue a reply (LR Saeima 2007). However, the Law 
on Submissions does not cover such requests for information, which must be reviewed according to 
the Freedom of Information Law, as well as laws that are subject to a different procedure of review 
(LR Saeima 2007). Unfortunately, the individual might not know how an application can differ from 
other requests for information within the meaning of the Law on Submissions. At the same time, the 
Law on Submissions prescribes that institutions introduce a procedure for accepting visitors, namely, 
the institution will have to offer an opportunity for the people to resolve their problems outside 
regular working hours. Moreover, the law establishes that the procedure of accepting visitors must 
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be published on the website of the institution and posted on site at the institution, thus instructing 
institutions to be more client-focused.
More than fifteen years have passed since the adoption of the Freedom of Information Law, 
and now people are more often trying to find information using modern technologies. Within the 
context of informing society and access to information, the CM Regulation No. 171 adopted in 2007 
‘Procedures by which Institutions Place Information on the Internet’, whereby all institutions had to 
create a special section titled ‘Public participation’ on their website, thereby urging institutions to be 
active in sharing information, and offering another tool to society, encouraging it to be interested in 
decision-making and participation. This CM regulation also envisages a single approach to creating 
the websites of institutions by prescribing that the section ‘Public participation’ must include 
information about how the institution cooperates with NGOs, about work groups and advisory 
councils, as well as information about development planning documents and draft laws that are 
currently in the process of being drafted and harmonised (LR MK 2007). To encourage the people and 
NGOs to participate in preparing and discussing documents, the said Cabinet Regulations prescribe 
that information about the planned and already held public debates and public discussions must be 
included in the section ‘Public participation’, along with indicating the options for participating in 
them. Moreover, the CM regulation imposes an obligation on the institutions to update information 
on their websites at least once per week, thus ensuring that the posted information is up to date.
Actual situation
Significant progress has been achieved in the area of access to information since 1998, and, in 
general, the stance of institutions regarding the provision of information and public participation 
has changed considerably. In the late 1990s, the attitude of institutions towards initiatives focusing 
on public participation was rather cautious; however, now provision of information and cooperation 
with the public has become an integral part of the administrative culture.
An assessment of the rights of individuals to address institutions was performed in 2011. It was 
found that the citizens use the Law on Submissions to obtain generally available information or to 
find out the institution’s opinion in a specific matter, which burdens the institutions with reviewing 
unjustified submissions (PWC 2011, 5). However, the people might not be aware of or might not 
understand nuances and legal subtleties, because the institutions regard letters submitted by citizens 
within the perspective of one law or another. Moreover, with the growing importance of electronic 
mail in day-to-day life, institutions must handle a great volume of correspondence with citizens; 
therefore, the institutions are forced to develop internal working procedures (PWC 2011, 10). In 
addition, approaches of institutions to responding to electronic mail transmissions can differ from 
one another.
Besides electronic communication, there is still the option of calling the institution or writing a 
letter. For instance, over the last three years, only 2.5 % of respondents have addressed (electronically, 
over the telephone, or in writing) the Cabinet of Ministers or the State Chancellery, 5.1 % have 
addressed ministries, 1.4 % the Ombudsman’s Office, 26.4 % the State Revenue Service (SRS), 
0.4 % the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (CPCB) (DA 2014, Table K1) – 41.9 % had 
not sought information in any institution. These data show that the people are very inactive in looking 
for information and help from institutions, whose direct task is to protect the rights and interests 
of the people (CPCB, State Audit Office, Ombudsman’s Office). The more active communication 
with the SRS is explained very simply by the frequent and regular changes in taxation regulations, 
which forces the people to address the institution by visiting, calling or writing to them (57.8 % of 
respondents) or to look for information on the SRS website (56.3 %), to understand complicated 
taxation questions which are often very important to them. 
Information can also be obtained in many databases. The most popular is the database of 
regulatory enactments (it is used by 16.3 % of respondents) (Audit of Democracy 2014, Table K4). 
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Whereas the policy planning, research, and publication databases http://polsis.mk.gov.lv or http://
petijumi.mk.gov.lv/ui/, the database of State Direct Administration Institutions http://tpi.mk.gov.lv/
ui/ and the database of Parties’ Finances (http://www.knab.gov.lv/lv/finances/db/) are very rarely 
visited (less than 2 % of respondents). This indicates that these databases are either not important 
for them, or that a significant part of society are not even aware of them. It is peculiar that 69.9 % 
of respondents pointed out that they do not use any of the databases, including databases, which 
have gained popularity, namely www.likumi.lv and www.latvija.lv. 
In evaluating access to information, not only must the option of addressing an institution 
to receive information be borne in mind, but also the option of receiving this information. The 
respondents’ answers show that only 52.8 % have received complete information that they needed 
from the CM and State Chancellery, 59.6 % from the ministries, 47.5 % from the Ombudsman’s 
Office, 81.0 % from the SRS, 23.8 % from the CPCB, and 27.1 % from the State Audit Office (DA 
2014, Table K3). Other respondents have not received information or have received incomplete 
information. The SRS results must be commended, as it shows that the SRS has managed to 
organise the internal information exchange process and communication with society in a way that 
the majority of respondents have been satisfied with the answers that they have received. In regard 
to the other institutions, they are often unable to give complete information to inhabitants because 
they simply do not have that information or additional resources are necessary to prepare the 
information. Overall, the achievements of the last ten years prove that Latvia is approaching the 
model of open and transparent public administration providing the public with broad opportunities 
to participate and to obtain information. Although, in regard to the latter, it must be pointed out 
that it is important for the citizens to know exactly what information they are looking for to avoid 
‘bureaucratic football’.
7.6. How much confidence do people have in the ability of government to 
solve the main problems confronting society, and in their own ability to 
influence it?
The indicator from spring 2004 depicting the trust of the Latvian people in the government was 
28 %, placing Latvia in the group of countries with a low level of trust, whereas the same indicator 
was higher in Lithuania and Estonia: Lithuania fell within the group 30–44 % and Estonia in the trust 
level group above 44 % (Eurobarometer 61 2004, 19). At the peak point of economic growth during 
what were known as the wealthy years in late 2007, the level of public trust had reached 34 %, 
thus confirming public support for the government during times of rapid growth (Eurobarometer 68 
2007, 5). However, already in early 2009, public trust in the government had dropped to 10 %, which 
is partly explained by unpopular decisions that the government was forced to adopt in response 
to the economic recession (Eurobarometer 71 2009, 7). Afterwards, trust levels resumed a slow 
increase reaching 20 % by the autumn of 2010, remaining at this level also in 2013 (Eurobarometer 
74 2010, 7). Public trust in the government goes hand in hand with the economic welfare of the 
people and it portrays the general public assessment of economic processes in the country.
The government’s work results also depend on how successful the public administration is in 
resolving pressing public issues, namely in proposing amendments to regulatory enactments and 
developing new policy tools. The fact that the people show a consistently negative attitude towards 
the work of the public administration is nothing unusual; however, if we look back at the last 
10 years, positive changes can also be observed. Therefore, in 2004 and in 2014, people were asked 
to describe the civil service, and they responded as follows: 20.1 % (2004) and 27.3 % (2014) said 
that it is ‘operating according to the laws, professionally’, which shows that public opinion is that 
public administration staff are still following regulatory enactments more than relying on individual 
interpretations (Rozenvalds 2005, 215; DA 2014, Table C1). This means that classical values of 
the sphere such as professionalism, impersonality in decision-making, are becoming stronger in 
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public administration. It is positive that the influence of business on decision-making in public 
administration has weakened –– 32.6 % (2005) and 30.2 % (2014) agreed with the statement that 
the civil service’s ‘activity depends on the influence of the business sphere’ (Rozenvalds 2005, 215; 
DA 2014, Table C1).
However, not everything has seen a positive development. Upon comparing the data of surveys 
conducted in 2004 and 2014, it can be concluded that there has been an increase in the number 
of inhabitants that agree with the statement that public administration ‘staff are often incompetent, 
their work is ineffective’ from 34.2 % (2004) to 49.5 % (2014) (Rozenvalds 2005, 215; DA 2014, 
Table C1). Even though other parameters show that, in general, public administration is becoming 
more professional and that institutional memory and experience is accumulating, the people, when 
they receive public services and are in day-to-day communication with representatives of the public 
administration, have, possibly, wished to receive the services faster or, without having thoroughly 
examined the functions and responsibilities of institutions, have wished to receive a service that the 
institution is not able or is not authorised to render. At the same time, these data can be indicative 
of high staff turnover in the public administration and the reduced salaries during the economic 
recession have also had an impact: many employees (often the most professional) have left public 
administration and this has reduced the overall level of professionalism in this sector.
Public opinion suggests an increase of salaries and pensions (44 % of respondents), reduced 
corruption (40 %) and fewer bureaucratic obstacles (38 %) would be key means for increasing the 
trust of the people in the public administration (DNB Latvijas barometrs 2014). These tools of 
public trust are regularly included in development planning documents and in political promises. 
Before Latvian society has reached the preferred level of well-being, its trust in government, most 
likely, will be closely related to the inhabitants’ economic means –– possibly, one of the reasons 
for the low level of trust in politicians and the limited ability of public administration to respond to 
problems in society. However, an equally important condition for strengthening the public trust is 
communication with society by explaining the adopted decisions and by outlining the development 
priorities in a mutual dialogue.
Overall assessment: Progress over the last decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
7.1. X
7.2. X
7.3. X
7.4. X
7.5. X
7.6. X
Best feature
There is a detailed regulation in Latvia opening up possibilities for public participation in 
public administration and prescribing the rights for the people to receive information from public 
administration institutions.
Most serious problem
The overall assessment of the consequences of policies and development planning documents 
is only carried out as a formality and insufficiently, and as a result, policy makers and the public 
have no access to comprehensive information about the successes and failures of  policies.
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Suggested improvements
• Simplify the system for how development planning documents are updated in order to 
ensure the assessment of the consequences of policies and successive implementation.
• Prepare a training seminar for NGOs and citizens about the mechanisms of participation 
in public administration. This could increase societal interest and motivation to engage in 
various public participation procedures.
• Ensure regular updates of abstracts of regulatory enactments in order to enable tracking the 
development of the document.
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8. THE DEMOCRATIC EFFECTIVENESS 
OF PARLIAMENT 
Visvaldis Valtenbergs 
Does the legislature contribute effectively to the democratic process?
8.1. How independent is the parliament or legislature of the executive, and 
how freely are its members able to express their opinions?
Legal framework
Latvia is a parliamentary republic, where the Constitution (Satversme) has granted rather broad 
powers to the Saeima (the Latvian Parliament). The Saeima decides on the approval of the Cabinet of 
Ministers, it can call a vote of no confidence towards the Cabinet of Ministers and towards individual 
ministers separately. The ministers may not be members of the legislature. The Saeima adopts the 
state budget, in an open vote approves senior state officials, and ensures the openness of political 
debates. The Latvian voters cannot recall individual members of the Saeima, however they can 
call for dissolution of the Saeima (Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia). Latvia 
has a proportional representation election system, which means that the interests of various groups 
of society in the Latvian legislature can have a broader representation than in majority election 
systems. To obtain parliamentary majority in the proportional representation system, the formation 
of a coalition by several political parties is inevitable. Under certain conditions, it can increase the 
strategic impact of small parties in the political process. Therefore, the opposition parliamentarians 
in parliamentary systems consisting of several parties have greater chances of affecting political 
decisions than in majority systems.
The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia particularly consolidates the personal freedoms of 
the legislature’s members so that the parliamentarians cannot be persecuted due to their standpoints. 
Article 28 of the Constitution prescribes that a member of the Saeima cannot be called to justice in 
an administrative or disciplinary procedure for voting or voicing opinions. To protect the personal 
freedoms of a parliamentarian, the Constitution prescribes guarantees of a parliamentarian’s immunity 
against criminal persecution, arrest, search, or other restrictions of personal freedom, and these 
guarantees can be withdrawn only with the vote of the Saeima (LR Satversme (Constitution of the 
Republic of Latvia), Articles 20–31).
Parliamentarians must nevertheless take into account certain restrictions that are imposed on 
voicing opinions. The Constitution prescribes that the members of the Saeima can be called to 
justice if they spread defamatory information, which they know to be untrue, as well as offensive 
information about private family life (LR Satversme, Article 28). The rights of the Saeima members 
to make public statements are governed by Rules of Procedure of the Saeima, prescribing various 
formats, time, and sequence of addresses (LR Saeima (Saeima of the Republic of Latvia) 1994a, 
Section 5). In order to ensure a culture of debate, in 2006, the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima 
was updated to include also the Code of Ethics of the Saeima members prescribing certain rules of 
communication, such as urging the parliamentarians to refrain from using words and gestures that 
might be offensive, inviting them to not use insults or statements that are incompatible with the 
dignity of the Saeima. The Code of Ethics prescribes that the parliamentarian must respect human 
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rights and on account of this, they may not make references to the opposing party’s race, gender, 
skin colour, nationality, religion, social background, or health. The parliamentarian does not have to 
disclose confidential information that they have obtained in an official capacity. The parliamentarian 
also must refrain from inappropriate pretention on the Saeima podium. The Code of Ethics also 
stipulates that a parliamentarian may not justify their vote contrary to their conscience on the pretext 
of pressure from government representatives, parties, or other persons (LR Saeima 1994a, Section on 
the Code of Ethics). A violation of the Code of Ethics is reviewed at the Saeima Mandate, Ethics, and 
Submissions Committee. Ethics violations are infrequent, however the parliamentarians’ behaviour 
during plenaries generates widespread public response, such as was the case, for instance, with the 
11th Saeima member Nikolajs Kabanovs (LR Saeima 2012).
In 2011, the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima were updated to include a section on referring 
parliamentarians for a state language test if at least twenty parliamentarians have voiced doubts 
about the respective parliamentarian’s knowledge of the language at a level that is necessary for 
the performance of his/her professional duties. If it is found in the test that the parliamentarian’s 
language knowledge is not at the level prescribed in the regulatory enactments, the Mandate, Ethics, 
and Submissions Committee submits a draft decision to the Saeima to exclude the parliamentarian 
from the Saeima (LR Saeima 1994a, Section 131). The above-mentioned regulations followed the 
refusal by an opposition member Valērijs Kravcovs (Harmony Centre Party (Saskaņas centrs)) to 
speak to media in Latvian. It must be added that in 2002, following criticism from the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the mandatory requirement included in the Saeima Election 
Law stipulating that a parliamentary candidate must know the Latvian language at the best (third) 
language knowledge level was cancelled. Instead, a parliamentary candidate must give a self-
assessment of his/her Latvian language skills (LR Saeima 1995a, Section 11). In 2012, the Saeima 
introduced considerable amendments to the Rules of Procedure, by giving up secret voting in the 
practice of electing officials. Now, the Saeima openly elects several senior state officials, including 
the president of the Supreme Court, the president of the Bank of Latvia, the Auditor General of the 
State Audit Office, the head of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, the Ombudsman, 
and the head of the Constitution Protection Bureau.
Actual situation
Open voting can improve the transparency of the election of officials, however they can increase 
the pressure of party leadership on parliamentarians, precluding a vote of conscience. The proponents 
of open voting suggest that even though legislatures of various European countries have a practice 
of secret election of officials, in Latvia, the range of people to be elected in a secret ballot is too 
broad. However, it must be pointed out that there are no uniform guidelines established in this 
field. Thus, every legislature can choose to determine the most suitable way of electing officials 
(European Parliament 2005). Parliamentary candidates need language skills, however there are 
concerns among the opposition parliamentarians that the tests organised by the Saeima might be 
manifested as political revenge towards those parliamentarians whose native tongue is not Latvian. 
Even though, at a constitutional level, Latvia has a clear distinction between the legislature 
and the executive power, relationships formed between the parliamentarians and members of the 
executive power shift the ‘centre of gravity’ of decision-making closer to the Cabinet of Ministers. 
Before the most important issues are considered in legislature, they are reviewed at the coalition 
council led by the prime minister. The status of the coalition council is not enshrined in statutes, 
however it has an important influence in determining the mandatory coalition votes on the most 
important issues. The coalition council also decides on the tasks entrusted to the Cabinet of Ministers.
Since the coalition holds the decisive power in creating the political agenda, the opposition 
is left with the podium in parliament for use as a forum, to be active in submitting questions and 
requests or to wait for disagreements in the coalition. The opposition not only actively speaks from 
the podium, but also participates in the legislative work. This style of parliamentary work is referred 
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to as the working parliament. The opposition members actively submit requests and questions; it can 
be said that they are also, within reasonable limits, performing their ‘guard dog’ function. However, 
the Latvian legislature’s practice shows that the majority of proposals from the opposition is rejected, 
in particular those that refer to the state budget. The polarised relations between the coalition and the 
opposition are guided in a constructive direction by collegiality and mutual experience in committee 
work with less politicised issues.
Extensive discussions have been held about limiting parliamentarians’ immunity so that they are 
not able to avoid statutory accountability. The most important reasoning for limiting the immunity 
status of parliamentarians was the decision made by the 10th Saeima to refuse a search at the 
parliamentarian Ainārs Šlesers’ places of residence. The refusal of the Saeima was one of the 
reasons why the then incumbent President Valdis Zatlers proposed the dismissal of the 10th Saeima. 
However, the Saeima has also supported the cancelling of a parliamentarian’s immunity in other 
cases. A broad public response was generated by the cancellation of parliamentary immunity of the 
head of the Legal Committee of the Saeima Vineta Muižniece in October 2011, on the grounds of 
charges brought against her regarding falsification of minutes of the Legal Committee in 2009. The 
court found V. Muižniece guilty of falsifying documents (LR AT (Supreme Court of the Republic 
of Latvia) 2014). Limiting the immunity of parliamentarians would necessitate amendments to the 
Constitution, possible only with a majority of 2/3 of the members of the Saeima. It would mean an 
agreement between the coalition and opposition members, which is not always easily attainable. In 
the meantime, public discussions in this matter are continuing.
Overall, the restrictions of voicing the opinions of the Latvian legislature can be viewed as 
proportionate. A positive factor to mention is the improvement of the parliamentarians’ culture of 
discussion and the introduction of an open ballot system for electing officials. However, a negative 
factor that must be mentioned is the reduced autonomy of the parliamentarians as the importance 
of the coalition council and the party discipline increases.
8.2. How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament 
to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation?
Legal framework
The Constitution prescribes vast powers for the legislature. Unlike legislatures that enjoy limited 
autonomy, such as in the United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, Greece, France, the Constitution of Latvia 
does not prescribe special spheres, in which the legislature’s initiative is not possible for modifying 
government proposals. The opportunities for proposing draft laws are vast. The President of the 
State, the Cabinet of Ministers, committees of the Saeima, no less than five parliamentarians, and 
at least 1/10 of the electorate can submit draft laws to the Saeima (LR Satversme, Article 65).
The most important work in the field of legislation takes place in the Saeima committees. 
They prepare questions for review at plenaries of the Saeima. The committee considers draft laws, 
proposals, and submissions on the grounds of a Saeima decision or submits them itself. A committee 
can form no more than two sub-committees for preparing work or undertaking special tasks. In 
order to undertake specific legislative tasks, the Saeima can create special committees, as well as 
parliamentary investigative committees.
Actual situation
Along with the expansion of the central state administration functions, the key resources in 
the development and analysis of legislation and action policies have ended up in the hands of the 
executive branch. Therefore, the legislature finds itself in the shadow of the Cabinet of Ministers. 
The summary of proposals submitted since the 5th Saeima shows that the majority (on average 
65.1 %) of draft law proposals was submitted at the Saeima by the Cabinet of Ministers. The next 
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most active were the parliamentarians (with 19.9 %) and Saeima committees (14.6 %). Since the 
6th Saeima, the number of proposals filed by the Cabinet of Ministers increased rapidly, whereas 
since the 9th Saeima, it has not changed significantly. Overall, the number of draft laws filed at the 
Saeima has increased. The biggest number of draft laws was received during the 9th Saeima (1993) 
and the 8th Saeima (1934) (see Table 8.1).
Nowadays, the shaping of a policy based on evidence and best practice is no longer possible 
without a quality research support. The question is whether the capacity of the Saeima is sufficient, 
taking into account that when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, it became mandatory for the 
Saeima to also give opinions on the draft European Union (EU) laws, by assessing whether the 
EU legislative initiatives correspond to the national interests. Assessment of the impact of EU laws 
often requires a timely involvement of stakeholder groups, ministries, and industry experts. Since 
only a few interest groups in Latvia have the resources necessary to keep track of the EU laws in 
sectors that they are interested in, the result of the European Affairs Committee of the Saeima is 
very important for the representation of state interests. 
Table 8.1. Draft laws submitted at the Saeima
Draft laws 
submitting body 
5th Saeima
(1993–
1995)
6th Saeima
(1995–
1998)
7th Saeima
(1998– 
2002)
8th Saeima
(2002– 
2006)
9th Saeima
(2006–
2010)
10th Saeima
(2010–2011)
11th Saeima
(17.10.2011–
21.07.2014)
Cabinet of Ministers 472 717 935 1324 1405 334 810
Saeima committees 177 244 199 195 292 78 159
State President 8 4 2 2 2 3 7
10 % of electorate 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Parliamentarians 182 374 305 413 294 75 191
TOTAL submitted 
draft laws
839 1339 1442 1934 1993 490 1168
Source: Saeima of the Republic of Latvia 2014.
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Figure 8.1. Draft laws submitted at the Saeima, %
Source: Saeima of the Republic of Latvia 2014.
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Experts are invited to the Saeima committee hearings on a regular basis, however there are 
no consistent ties between the legislature and the research community. In 2009, a rather extensive 
comparative study was published on the legislatures of 158 countries, which were assessed according 
to four criteria: impact on the executive branch, institutional autonomy, specific competences, and 
institutional ability. The Latvian legislature with 0.78 points out of 1 in this study ranked 10th, lagging 
behind in the criterion ‘institutional ability’ (Fish, Kroenig 2009). Currently, the parliamentarians 
are receiving substantial support from the Legal Office of the Saeima. However, higher quality 
policies could be facilitated by a structural unit under the legislature’s supervision, having research 
functions, or by close co-operation with research institutions, which would give advice and ensure 
expertise to the members, committees, and parties of the Saeima. The party consultants are not 
fully performing this function, whereas the job description and competences of parliamentarians’ 
assistants are rather different – they are more engaged in providing administrative support. It must be 
noted that in Estonia and Lithuania there are special research support structures created specifically 
for the parliament. The consolidation of the legislature’s research capacity is directly related to 
their autonomy and ability to promote improvements in proposals submitted by the government. 
Currently, the information and expertise in shaping evidence-based policy is focused in government 
institutions.
Even though the Constitution of Latvia has prescribed vast powers to the legislature, its abilities 
regarding legislative work are currently restricted by the limited research capacity in legislative 
preparations and in the assessment of legislative EU initiatives. 
8.3. How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or 
legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account?
Legal framework
Pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, the government jointly and each minister 
severally are politically accountable before the Saeima (LR Satversme, Article 59). The Saeima is 
entitled to a vote of no confidence against the ministers and the prime minister. The prime minister 
gives an annual report at a Saeima hearing about what the Cabinet of Ministers has achieved and 
what it plans to work on. The Saeima elects several senior officials of the State, such as the president 
of the Supreme Court, the president of the Bank of Latvia, the Auditor General of the State Audit 
Office, the head of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, the Ombudsman, and the 
head of the Constitution Protection Bureau in an open ballot. Furthermore, the Saeima committees 
also have an important role in the assessment of government and public authorities by organising 
regular meetings with ministers or representatives of the respective authorities. They can give their 
recommendations and suggestions for the improvement of operations of the executive branch. A 
committee is entitled directly, without the intermediation of the Saeima Praesidium, to request the 
information necessary for its work and explanations from the relevant ministers and the institutions 
under the minister’s subordination (subordinated or supervised), as well as from local governments, 
and invite the relevant officials to give their explanations (LR Saeima, Section 172). Additionally, 
individual parliamentarians have tools at their disposal for the control of the executive branch. At 
least five parliamentarians can submit questions to the prime minister, ministers, or the president 
of the Bank of Latvia. Special hearings dedicated to reviewing the parliamentarians’ questions are 
organised. If the parliamentarians wish to receive more detailed information about the work of a 
certain sector, they can submit a request to the government. The Saeima decides on whether to 
accept or reject the request (LR Saeima 1994a, Section 126).
Four parliamentary investigation committees existed during the time of the Audit of Democracy 
reporting period. In 2006, a committee was established to review the financial activity of Einārs 
Repše. The longest-working parliamentary investigation committee was the committee reviewing 
the possible lawlessness and unethical conduct in the judicial branch (2007–2009). The work of 
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other committees was related to investigating the possible lawlessness in the financial sector. In 
2011, a parliamentary investigation committee was established due to the possible illicit operations 
in the process of taking over and restructuring JSC ‘Parex banka’. In 2011–2012, a parliamentary 
investigation committee worked to determine the impact of ensuring supervision, terminating 
operations, and the insolvency process of the bank Latvijas Krājbanka on the financial system of 
the Republic of Latvia.
Actual situation
The powers of the parliament as prescribed in the Constitution relative to the supervision and 
evaluation of the work of the executive power are substantial. However, in practice, parliamentary 
supervision, unfortunately, can be exploited in order to settle disputes between narrow interest 
groups. The quality of parliamentary supervision in Latvia is diminished by political fragmentation 
and corruption scandals, which can easily permeate and thus destabilise the government’s work. An 
example: the stepping down of the cabinet led by Einārs Repše (New Era Party (Jaunais laiks)) along 
with the Latvia’s First Party (Latvijas Pirmā partija) leaving the coalition in 2004. The subsequent 
government of Indulis Emsis (Union of Greens and Farmers Party (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība)) 
was forced to step down at the end of the same year, because the Saeima did not back the budget 
of 2005. Overall, four of the eighteen governments formed after the restoration of independence 
have worked for less than one year, even though over the last decade the life of governments has 
become longer. The political powers elected to parliament find it difficult to agree within a short 
time period on the composition of the coalition. This has forced the President of the State to assume 
a stricter position towards the political forces engaged in negotiations by more categorically urging 
agreement on the coalition composition.
During the Audit of Democracy reporting period, the decisions made by the legislature were such 
that they received a conflicting public response. The aim of this could be to influence the judiciary, 
bearing in mind that the institutions of the judiciary were investigating several representatives of 
the political elite. In 2007, the President of the State, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, refused to proclaim 
amendments to the National Security Law, which would enable legislatures to access information 
about the work of intelligence services and potentially affect the investigation of political corruption 
cases as well. The legislature refused to approve judges of the Supreme Court as well as a candidate 
to the prosecutor general post, even though they all had backing from the judiciary institutions. In 
2007, the Saeima’s planned dismissal of the director of Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau 
(CPCB) Aleksejs Loskutovs led to significant protests in some parts of the public. Furthermore, 
in 2010, the prosecutor Jānis Maizītis, who led the prosecutor’s office when it worked on high-
level corruption cases, unexpectedly failed to receive the support of the parliament to be elected 
as a prosecutor general. At the same time, the chair of the People’s Party (Tautas partija) Vineta 
Muižniece was approved to assume the post of judge at the Constitutional Court, even though she 
had scant experience with court work.
The work of the parliamentary investigative committees helps draw the legislature’s attention to 
specific issues. The establishment of these committees is usually linked to vast publicity, however 
the public does not always learn about the results of the commission work or the results of their 
work are not convincing. Thus, after two judges had been convicted of taking bribes, a parliamentary 
investigative committee was established in 2007. However, a year later it, issued an unconvincing 
report on corruption in the court system. As a result, three judges resigned, but no specific cases 
were initiated. The legislature’s unpredictable decisions and the attempts of specific representatives 
of the elite to affect the judiciary, as well as increasing public pressure encouraged the President of 
the State Valdis Zatlers to give an ultimatum to the Saeima and the government on 14 January 2009. 
Thereby, it was requested that the electoral law be amended to prevent the so-called locomotive law, 
to limit the possibilities for parliamentarians to change the party affiliation within one convocation, as 
well as to create a supervisory body for the development of a plan to stimulate the economy and for 
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the use of international loan, as well as fulfil other conditions (Delna 2011). Not all political parties 
represented in the legislature received the President’s ultimatum with understanding. Sceptisism was 
voiced by the party leaders of People’s Party, Latvia’s First Party, and Union of Greens and Farmers 
Party, whereas the leadership of Unity Party (Vienotība) regarded the President’s conduct as rather 
positive (Delna 2011). On 31 March 2009, Valdis Zatlers announced that most of the ultimatum’s 
requirements proposed to the legislature had been met. The Constitution prescribed the rights of the 
people to initiate the dismissal of the Saeima, the ‘locomotive law’ in elections was eliminated. The 
Saeima had approved a new head of CPCB, and the government of Valdis Dombrovskis had started 
its work, which, following the demand of the President of the State, included also new ministers. 
However, the Saeima had not yet agreed on the structure for determining the rights of the President of 
the State to dismiss the Saeima (Delna 2011). The ultimatum given by the President of the State to the 
legislature, his active role in the process of shaping the government, and the legislative initiatives prove 
that the influence of the President of the State on the legislature’s work is increasing (Pleps 2011).
The ability of the legislature to provide a review of the executive branch’s work can be regarded 
as positive in cases where the government and the parliament are working constructively and the 
Saeima committees assume the main role in the supervision of the executive branch. A special case, 
when the legislature should ensure an overview of the government’s work, is the forming of the 
government. Upon assessing the process of forming a government up to now, it must be concluded 
that it has moved into a grey zone: it is not governed by laws or constitutional traditions. It must 
be emphasised that there is no established practice in Latvia for the State President to entrust the 
formation of the government to the leadership of the party that has obtained the highest number 
of votes in elections. Likewise, there are no clear qualification requirements for the prime minister 
or the ministers. In a sense, it can also be perceived as a restriction of parliamentary control that 
most often those minister-technocrats, who are not elected to the Saeima are invited to work in 
the government. As there are no universally approved guidelines for the forming of a government, 
public confusion and distrust in political processes might increase.
Box 8.1. Should Latvia introduce a rationalised parliamentarianism model?
The expert group created by the State President Andris Bērziņš in its proposals for the improvement of 
governance of Latvia suggested moving towards what is known as the rationalised parliamentarianism 
model (Bāra et al 2013). In European constitutional tradition, rationalised parliamentarianism originated 
as a recipe for overcoming the failures of parliamentary regimes during the interwar period – the 
legislature’s fragmentation, the inability to ensure stable work of the government, frequent government 
changes and the inability to establish a new government for a long period of time. In its report, the expert 
group recommended that Latvia establish a constructive no confidence vote existing in a number of EU 
countries and carry out other measures that would limit the legislature’s shortcomings that are typical 
of parliamentarianism. Along with the constructive voting practice for the dismissal of government, the 
experts also recommend increasing the prime minister’s possibilities to create their team (Bāra et al 2013). 
This would help the prime minister better implement the strategic vision. The candidate to the prime 
minister’s post would name the ministers, who would then be assigned by the State President rather than 
the Saeima. Currently, it is the Saeima that assigns ministers to their posts, however, with regard to the 
tensions between the parties, changes of ministers often cause instability in the leading coalition. On the 
one hand, this proposal would reduce the legislature’s possibility to control the government’s work, but 
on the other the availability of a constructive no confidence vote would increase the co-accountability 
of the Saeima in the creation of the government, as it would have to propose its candidate for the prime 
minister’s post. Therefore, it is possible that the introduction of rationalised parliamentarianism could 
help improve the effectiveness of the government and the legislature.
Currently, the legislature of Latvia has the opportunity of a vote of no confidence in the government 
or a minister, not supporting a government’s proposed budget project. If the Saeima exercises these 
rights, the government falls. Unlike Estonia, Germany, Poland, and Hungary, it is not mandatory 
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for the Saeima to hold what is known as the constructive no confidence vote in the government, 
which would impose the duty on the parliament to first confirm its trust in the prime minister and 
only then dismiss the government. In parliamentary systems, a strong prime minister’s institution or 
integrated party work in the parliament helps ensure the legislature’s effectiveness, by agreeing on 
disputable matters within the coalition, preventing the vote of some coalition members to support 
the opposition. The Latvian legislature’s practice lacks elements enabling parliamentarianism to be 
stabilised: there is no strong prime minister institution and the discipline of political parties is weak.
Upon analysing the legislature’s possibilities of assessing the executive power and requesting 
a report of its work, a negative aspect to mention is the tendency to use parliamentary supervision 
in the interests of small groups. It can be claimed that, in certain cases, the legislature’s influence 
in the political process is even excessively uncontrolled. Likewise, the legislature, in its votes on 
officials, has tried to influence the judiciary. 
8.4. How rigorous are the procedures for approval and supervision of 
taxation and public expenditure?
Legal framework
Even though the government prepares and submits the draft state budget in Latvia, extensive 
possibilities have been envisaged for the legislature to influence the budget. The vote on the state 
budget is also a vote of confidence in the government. If the budget is not approved, there is a vote 
of no confidence in the government and the new government must prepare the budget again. The 
central role in approving state taxation and public expenditure is played by the Saeima Budget and 
Finance (Taxation) Committee (BFC), which implements supervision of the Ministry of Finance 
and public authorities related to the financial sector – the State Revenue Service, the State Treasury, 
etc. (LR Saeima 2013b). The said authorities provide information that is necessary for forming the 
budget and report on the process of forming and implementing the state budget. Likewise, these 
establishments also provide information to the committee about other finance-related matters that the 
legislature has set as a priority. The government submits the annual draft budget to the Saeima. The 
annual draft state budget for the upcoming economic year must be submitted to the Saeima before 
1 October (LR Saeima 1994b, Section 21). There are special provisions which apply to the adoption 
of the budget in an election year. Since Latvia is a eurozone country, the budget plan project must 
also be submitted to the European Commission for its opinion.
The Saeima approves the budget in two readings. After the budget is submitted, the Saeima 
BFC discusses it conceptually and forwards it for review in the first reading. The Saeima first votes 
on the recognition of each draft law as urgent and during that time, debate is permissible regarding 
the entire draft budget law. After a positive vote on the first version of the budget, the Saeima 
sets a deadline by which proposals are to be submitted for the first reading. The BFC summarises 
the received proposals and forwards them for review to the government for its opinion on the 
parliamentarians’ proposals. If the government does not give a specific opinion on the proposals, 
the assumption is that it backs the proposals. The BFC prepares a table of proposals, which shows 
the proposals filed by the Saeima and the opinions of the government, and then the state budget is 
reviewed in the second and final reading, during which the Saeima votes on each submitted proposal 
individually. After the review of all proposals and government’s opinions, a vote is held on the 
draft budget law in its entirety. The Saeima can significantly influence the budget redistribution 
pursuant to the Law on Budget and Finance Management. Each year, before 1 June, the Cabinet 
of Ministers gives a report to the Saeima about the financial standing of the state and evaluates 
the macroeconomic development forecast and assumptions used in approving the budget (LR 
Saeima 1994b, Section 281). The minister for finance regularly informs the Saeima BFC about the 
development of the budget and about the fulfilment of the adopted budget. The committee closely 
co-operates with the most significant entrepreneurs’ associations.
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The Public Expenditure and Auditing Committee of the Saeima also plays an important part 
in financial matters, as it implements parliamentary supervision over public expenditure and also 
performs audits in parliament. 
Actual situation
The discussion and adoption of the budget is one of the issues considered to be the most lengthy 
and most debated at the Saeima. The draft budget law consists of a voluminous document package, 
which includes the budget itself, amendments to the related laws, as well as a draft medium-
term budget framework for the following three years to ensure the relevance to the medium-term 
programming documents, including the National Development Plan. To ensure the possibilities of 
introducing extensive austerity measures, the legislature had to introduce a record high number of 
amendments to various laws and seek new solutions in the spheres of taxation and social security, 
among many others. The biggest draft state budget package was considered in June 2009, when, 
by introducing amendments to the state budget, amendments were simultaneously introduced in 
113 related laws. The committee had to review a relatively big draft law package also in 2010 and 
2011 (LR Saeima 2013b). Before the global financial crisis, the legislature received signals from 
the Bank of Latvia and the International Monetary Fund, however failed to consider them and, as 
the state’s financial standing seemed safe, did not introduce relevant budget adjustment measures. 
The budget of 2008 was planned without a deficit and with a 1 % surplus. Along with the planned 
decrease in revenues, the Saeima was forced to introduce considerable adjustments, which had a 
particularly severe effect on the budget of 2009. One of the most painful decisions to the budget 
was the takeover of JSC ‘Parex banka’. To stop the outflow of capital, in December 2009, the state 
purchased 85.15 % of stocks, by investing a total 1 218 billion lats in the bank.
Even though the decisions adopted by the Saeima have often been unpopular, the expenditure 
and revenues of the state, in comparison with other countries that were severely affected by the 
global crisis, were balanced out in a short time, and the state regained the trust of international 
market players. Taking into account the context of a crisis and the need to act swiftly, the legislature 
expanded the authorisation of the minister for finance to make decisions on restricting costs if, 
during a crisis, it became necessary to prevent the fiscal and economic risks caused by the crisis. 
Affected by the supervision of international lenders and by the route taken by the government 
towards austerity, the procedures determining the adjustments in public revenues and expenditure 
were strictly regulated. At the same time, the role of the Saeima in budget adjustments is respected. 
The most important post-crisis items on the legislature’s agenda have been as follows: the fulfilment 
of the Latvian convergence programme, the introduction of a microbusiness tax, the procedure 
of paying out state allowances, battling shadow economy, relief for economic operators, among 
other issues. From 2008 until 2011, the Public Expenditure and Audit Committee carried out the 
supervision of the financial and economic stabilisation and restoration process, and controlled 
the fulfilment of the international loan programme. In May 2012, the Saeima approved the EU 
Fiscal Stability Treaty, which prescribes a balanced budget creation and fines imposed on those 
member states which allow a high deficit level. Along with the role of the European Commission 
in the supervision of member state budgets, the governments and parliaments of these countries 
are no longer the only decisive players in the financial sector. The Budget and Finance (Taxation) 
Committee includes both the coalition and opposition parliamentarians, and the style of work of 
the committee, irrespective of difficult decisions, is constructive, even though the opposition has 
consistently objected to the government’s implemented policy of austerity.
The legislature helps to guarantee the supervision of public expenditure. However, due attention 
must be paid to ensuring that the legislature, unlike other public institutions, is not subject to the 
scrutiny of utility of expenditure implemented by the State Audit Office. The Saeima Rules of 
Procedure establishes that the Saeima is financially independent (LR Saeima 1994a, Section 1811). 
The Public Expenditure and Audit Committee of the Saeima examine its accounting, utility of 
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expenditure, lawfulness, and annual accounts. Such a remit has been contested by Latvian non-
governmental organisations (NGO) (Delna 2013), and also within the context of the Audit of 
Democracy, this should be regarded as one of the shortcomings. Furthermore, the ignoring of 
proposals from the parliamentary oppositions in the process of forming the budget should be 
considered as a negative aspect. The most positive feature is the legislature’s ability, after the global 
financial crisis, to rapidly agree on introducing budget consolidation measures aimed at stabilising 
the financial situation of the State.
8.5. How freely are all parties and groups able to organise  within the 
legislature and contribute to its work?
Legal framework
The election system in Latvia is established in such a way as to ensure that the representation in 
the legislature is organised according to the party principle, therefore the candidates cannot participate 
in the election individually (LR Saeima 1995a, Section 9). Political fragmentation is diminished with 
the election threshold preserved from the 5th Saeima election, preventing small parties from entering 
the parliament LR Saeima 1995a, Section 138). The Saeima Rules of Procedure establishes that a 
parliamentary party has to consist of at least five parliamentarians. Parties can then unite in political 
blocks (LR Saeima 1994a, Part 8). The possibilities of parties and groups to organise within the 
legislature can be assessed as free. However, in 2009 and 2010, the legislature consolidated the role 
of parties by reducing the possibilities of the elected parliamentarians to change political parties or 
engage in what is known as ‘wandering’ between the parties. A parliamentarian, who has left one 
group, cannot join another group, and he/she is regarded as an independent member. To be aware 
of and harmonise the work of parties and political blocks, the praesidium of the Saeima, the parties, 
and the political blocks create a Group Council which includes the Saeima praesidium and one 
member from each party and political block. The opinions of the Fraction Council are of an advisory 
nature. Since 2012, the parties elected to the Saeima receive a budget for financing or subsidies 
for ensuring their operations (LR Saeima 1995b, Section 7). Besides the fractions, the legislature 
also includes several parties of parliamentarians, in which they unite to promote co-operation with 
the parliaments of other countries or to meet other interests related to the parliamentarians’ work. 
Actual situation
During the report period, the number of parties represented at the Saeima has diminished. 
In the 8th Saeima (2002–2006), there were six parties working after election, in the 9th Saeima 
(2006–2010) – seven after the election, but nine overall, in the 10th Saeima (2010–2011) – only 
five, whereas in the 11th (since 2011) – five as well. The number of parties in the legislature 
is in the first instance determined by the election results. However, in between elections, it is 
affected also by the relatively frequent decisions of the members to leave a party/group and create 
independent parties both before and immediately after the election. Thus, for instance, in 2008, four 
members left the party New Era Party, whereas two left the party For Fatherland and Freedom/
LNNK Party (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK) and formed the Civic Union Party (Pilsoniskā savienība). 
However, the prohibition to change parties did not reduce the ‘wandering’ of the members. Several 
parliamentarians left their parties and became independent members. Shortly after the election, six 
of the elected members of the party Zatler’s Reform Party (Zatlera Reformu partija – ZRP) left the 
group, the motivation behind their decision being the undemocratic decision-making in the party. 
These parliamentarians created their own independent parliamentarian group known as The Olšteins’ 
six (Olšteina sešinieks). The number of independent parliamentarians in the Saeima has fluctuated 
considerably. At the end of the 10th Saeima, there were no independent parliamentarians, whereas 
in 2007, the 9th Saeima, there were eight independent parliamentarians, in 2008 – three, in 2009 – 
five, but in 2010 – six independent parliamentarians. 
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Even though it appears that ‘the wandering parliamentarians’ could be one of the reasons why 
the public distrusts the legislature’s work, the public opinion in this matter is rather contradictory. 
The survey conducted within the framework of the Audit of Democracy shows that on the one 
hand the majority supports the introduction of a stricter party discipline, but on the other, it has a 
high consideration for manifestations of representatives’ individual autonomy. .Most respondents 
agree that the possibilities for members of the Saeima to move from one group to another during 
a Saeima convocation should be curtailed (68.5 %) and a member of the Saeima, who leaves his/
her group, should give up his/her mandate (65 %). However in the matter of how a member of 
the Saeima should vote if his/her personal opinion does not match that of the party, the majority 
(66.9 %) said that the parliamentarian should be voting according to his/her own opinion (DA (Audit 
of Democracy) 2014, Tables B1 and E2).
In terms of gender, the composition of the legislature is disproportionate to the gender 
composition of the population of Latvia, however the proportion of women in the legislature is 
increasing. In the 8th Saeima, there were 18 women, whereas in the 9th and 10th already 19, and 
in the 11th already by two more. Since 2010, the Speaker of the Parliament has been a female.
The number of groups organised by parliamentarians is also increasing. In the 9th Saeima 
there were 65 groups of parliamentarians,  in the 10th Saeima – 58, whereas in the 11th – even 
80 groups. The number of groups of parliamentarians for co-operation with parliaments of other 
countries has increased; this is explained by the fact that the diplomatic and economic relations of 
the country are expanding. It must, nonetheless, be noted that not all groups actively co-operate. 
The representative function of the Parliament abroad is ensured by six permanent delegations – 
the Baltic Assembly delegation, the Parliamentary Assembly delegation to the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly to the Council of Europe, NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly delegation, the Latvian National Group of Inter-parliamentary Union, 
and the Parliamentary Assembly Delegation of the Union for the Mediterranean. There were also 
five groups working in the 11th Saeima, in which the parliamentarians had gathered according to 
their interests: the group for the support of preserving the lat, for the support of the Occupation 
Museum, on the co-operation of female parliamentarians, on the co-operation with the European 
Parliament forum in matters of community and development, on support for Tibet. The sixth group 
unites independent parliamentarians. The groups of parliamentarians must consist of at least three 
members. The groups of parliamentarians do not receive separate funding. 
Overall, the legislature allows free organisation of parties and groups, by prescribing the 
possibility of creating independent parliamentarian groups and groups dedicated to various causes. 
The restriction of moving between parties can be viewed as disciplining the legislature’s work, 
even though it does not fully resolve the problem of ‘the wandering parliamentarians’, and could 
be linked to the ‘life cycle’ of Latvian political parties.
8.6. How extensive are the procedures of the legislature for consulting the 
public and relevant interests across the range of its work?
Legal framework
The public has opportunities to participate in the legislature’s work both individually and 
collectively. Once per month, the Public Relations Office of the Saeima gathers information on the 
submissions of individuals and prepares a report for consideration at the Saeima Mandate, Ethics, 
and Submissions Committee. Reports are also published on the committee’s website. An important 
improvement in the effectiveness of consulting the public is the introduction of a collective application 
in 2012. The Saeima Rules of Procedure prescribes  that the collective application must be signed 
by at least 10 000 citizens, who have reached the age of 16 years at the time of application. The 
collective application can be signed electronically, if the identification of the signatories and the 
protection of personal data are ensured (LR Saeima 1994a, Section 131). Following the receipt of a 
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collective application, the Saeima can decide on taking it forward (for instance, establishing a special 
committee of the Saeima for preparing a relevant draft law, forwarding the collective application 
for consideration to a specific institution, handing it over to the Cabinet of Ministers for preparing 
a concept or a draft law). The legislature has also responded to collective applications. Thus, for 
instance, the collective application, which had more than 10 000 signatures ‘Liability for violating 
the oath of a member of the Saeima’ was handed over to the Ministry of Justice with the task of 
preparing and submitting an evaluation at the Saeima about the regulation of the ceremonious oaths 
of parliamentarians in the EU countries. However, not all collective applications are taken forward. 
They are not allowed include a claim that is clearly unacceptable in a democratic society or is openly 
offensive (LR Saeima 1994a, Section 131). Electronically signed collective citizens’ initiatives are 
a supplementary democratic participation tool in the majority of the European countries. However, 
the Latvian ManaBalss.lv initiative is special in that the collection of electronic signatures is ensured 
by a platform independent of the state, created and maintained by the citizens and recognised by 
the legislature, whereas most of the collective application portals operate under the supervision of 
the executive power, parliaments, or the ombudsmen’s institution (Riehm, Böhle, Lindner 2011).
A new procedure was developed in 2012 on how the electorate can propose laws and amendments 
to the Constitution. Amendments to the Law on National Referendums and Legislative Initiatives 
prescribe giving up the two-tier system in collecting signatures, by establishing that all signatures of 
the tenth of the voters required for proposing a law are collected by an initiative group established 
for this purpose. The procedure of collecting signatures is also made easier, by determining that 
the signatures can also be collected electronically free of charge, as well as approved not only by 
a sworn notary, but also at other establishments (LR Saeima 1994c).
Actual situation
The opportunities for the civic society to participate in the making as prescribed in the laws 
are guaranteed, however they are not as broad as at the executive branch level. If the draft law is 
handed over to the responsible committee of the Saeima, organisations can make attempts to meet 
the parliamentarians in person. They can use lobbying opportunities, by providing information to the 
decision-makers. Assessments of co-operation between NGOs and the Saeima show that the most 
frequently employed type of co-operation is meeting the parliamentarians in person. The meeting 
is followed up by the preparation of applications and letters, and only then – participation in the 
committee and sub-committee work (Latvian Civic Alliance (LPA) 2011).
It must be emphasised that the introduction of collective applications in Latvia did not take 
place on the initiative of the state, but rather on the initiative of the civic society, owing to the 
founders of the portal ManaBalss.lv. Electronic signatures necessary for collective applications are 
collected on this portal. According to the data provided by its founders, the portal is used by about 
300 000 inhabitants. Last year, the chance of signing an initiative on the portal was taken by 5 % 
of inhabitants (DA 2014). In June 2014, there were 40 initiatives posted on the portal, of which 12 
had received more than 10 000 signatures.1 It must be added that the number of regular applications 
from the public for proposals to improve laws and current affairs in the country has increased. On 
average, the Parliament receives about 6000 applications each year, and they are an important source 
of information for the day-to-day work of committees and parliamentarians.
1 On 29 June 2014, the initiatives having obtained 10 000 or more signatures on the portal ManaBalss.lv were: 
‘Liability for violating the oath of a member of the Saeima’ (17 192), ‘To determine the reduced VAT rate 
on food products’ (13 639), ‘Speed cameras 15+’ (12 666), ‘Open up the Saeima!’ (12 105), ‘Restoring the 
true Victory Square of Riga’ (11 940), ‘Open up the off-shores’ (11 933), ‘No additional compensations for 
a dismissed Saeima’ (11 879), ‘On determining equal fares for non-Riga residents’ (11 744), ‘STOP ACTA’ 
(10 966), ‘On preserving the lat as the currency of Latvia’ (11 886), ‘Elections online’ (10 863), ‘On the 
protection of fur bearing animals’ (10 531).
Visvaldis Valtenbergs. THE DEMOCRATIC EFFECTIVENESS OF PARLIAMENT 157
Since the beginning of the work of the 9th Saeima, there have been reasonable grounds to speak 
of significant improvements in the sphere of parliamentary democracy, as the accessibility and 
transparency of the Saeima no longer stop at formal recognition. On 30 March 2006, a declaration 
was signed in relation to the co-operation of the Saeima with non-governmental organisations. This 
declaration expects to jointly evaluate the co-operation of the Saeima and NGOs at least once a year 
and to streamline the formats of involvement and informative co-operation for the development of 
civic society. The declaration prescribes that a coordinator be ensured in each Saeima committee 
for co-operating with NGOs, to engage representatives from non-governmental organisations in 
the committee work, to hear the opinions and suggestions of NGOs and society with regard to 
the matters falling within the competence of the relevant committee, to continuously improve the 
website of the Saeima, and to take other measures to engage civic society (LR Saeima 2013a). 
The co-operation prescribed in the declaration between the Saeima and NGOs is also implemented 
in practice. In the forum of the Saeima and NGOs organised each year, proposals are discussed 
for the improvement of co-operation. The State Administration and Local Government Committee 
holds an important role in this dialogue, as it can initiate law making for the development of the 
NGO sector. Each committee of the Saeima has formed a circle of public organisations, interest 
groups, and experts. However, it should be expanded and updated.
The publicly open decision-making in parliamentary practice will always be associated with a 
certain grey zone, in which the organised interest lobbies will hold an important role. The introduction 
of a comprehensive parliamentary lobbying regulation in Latvia has been delayed up to now due 
to the variations in the understanding of what lobbying is, how the disclosure of lobbyists should 
be guaranteed and to what extent lobbying should be regulated with a special statute, bearing in 
mind that several lobby-related provisions are partially included in other statutes (Delna 2012). 
Currently the draft law on lobbying transparency developed by CPCB has been put on hold. The 
draft law prescribes the lobbyist’s duty to identify themselves and the organisation they represent, as 
well as to disclose the person, in whose interests the lobbying might be performed. The procedure 
for how a meeting with a lobbyist must be recorded and made public is determined (KNAB 
(Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau) 2013). The commenced work on a regulatory 
system for lobbying should be continued. Additionally, it is necessary to improve the knowledge 
of younger parliamentarians concerning communication with organised interest groups and their 
proposed solutions – this would reduce the possibility of these parliamentarians being so easily 
influenced.
The increased opportunities for the public to participate through collective applications, as 
well as a more focused involvement of the organised civic society must be mentioned as the main 
improvements in the legislature’s consultations with the public. The yet incomplete regulation has to 
be regarded as an obstacle impeding the transparency of the legislature’s work and the accessibility 
for various social groups.
8.7. How accessible are elected representatives  
to their constituents?
Legal framework
The constituents have an opportunity to meet with their representatives subject to a prior 
arrangement. At the Saeima building, visitors must comply with the regulations in relation to passes 
and visiting the Saeima building, as well as to the rules of safety, order, virtue, and generally 
accepted behavioural norms (LR Saeima 1994a, Section 23). The visiting procedure and presence 
in the Saeima building are determined by the Saeima Praesidium. Parliamentarians also go on visits 
to their constituents and are entitled to request that related transport costs be covered.
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Actual situation
In addition to the formally prescribed possibilities, focused measures have been initiated to 
inform the public about the work of the Saeima. Since 2009, the Visitors’ and Information Centre has 
been operating at the Saeima. Information gathered by the centre shows that the number of Saeima 
visitors has increased considerably from the initial 149 visitors in 2005 to 3124 visitors in 2012. 
At the Visitors’ and Information Centre, people can learn about the work of the Saeima, how to file 
applications to the Saeima, obtain contact information for the Saeima, meet with parliamentarians 
and officials, as well as consult informative materials on site. Targeted measures are implemented 
to learn about the work of the Saeima, including the school programme ‘Get to know the Saeima, I 
and II’, as well as ‘The youth Saeima’, where every year, authors of 100 of the most supported ideas 
participate in a parliamentary simulation game. The range of informative materials on the Saeima 
has increased considerably: the Saeima website offers various videos, fact sheets, presentation 
pamphlets, and infographics. The most frequently visited sections are the Saeima news, video 
transmissions of Saeima hearings, the legislation database, the calendar of events of the Saeima, 
and informative materials. The survey performed within the Audit of Democracy revealed that the 
most popular ways of how the public learns about the processes in the legislature are the radio 
broadcast ‘Frakciju viedokļi’, transmission of the Saeima hearings, and the Saeima website (DA 
2014, Table E1). The system for searching draft laws has been improved considerably and it offers 
insight into the parliamentarians’ votes. However, in July 2014, a systematic portrayal of information 
on the websites of Saeima committees was not yet available.
The use of modern information and communication technologies is ever increasing in 
communication with the elected representatives. The survey conducted within the Audit of 
Democracy showed that 11.4 % of respondents have also followed politicians on social networks 
(twitter, Facebook, Draugiem.lv), and just as many had been reading a politician’s personal blog 
or website (DA 2014, Table E1). Even though these parameters may seem low, one must bear in 
mind that often, among the politicians’ followers, there are also journalists using this material or 
preparing and supplementing their publications. The parliamentarians and candidates of the Saeima 
are well aware of this fact and are more concerned about their online image. The parliamentarians’ 
assistants help maintain the websites, but,parliamentarians have also been known to post content 
independently on social networks. In the survey conducted by the author after the 2011 Saeima 
election, it was found that 38 % of parliamentarians had active Draugiem.lv profiles, 32 % had 
a profile on Facebook, and 28 % on Twitter. 13 % had their own blog. A comparatively lower 
number, i.e. 2 %, kept an active YouTube profile. At the time of publishing the audit, the number 
of parliamentarians, who use social network platforms, may have increased. 
As the contents published in social media platforms are very fragmented, they are collected 
and clearly presented on the platform for communication between inhabitants and parliamentarians 
Gudrasgalvas.lv. Here, you one may ask questions to politicians at the Saeima and members of the 
Cabinet of Ministers, as well as keep track of their media and social network contents mentioning 
the specific politician. The platform was established and is maintained by the public policy centre 
(think-tank) ‘Providus.’ This organisation has also created another platform – Musuvalsts.lv, which 
offers an opportunity to organise public discussions on matters of action policy or legislation in 
the idea generation phase, by allowing the organisers of the discussion to obtain an evaluation of 
already approved ideas.
The most active NGOs have played an important role in ‘opening up’ the parliament, including 
the NGO Transparency International – ‘Delna’, which has created a database Deputatiuzdelnas.lv, 
where people can read data about the parties represented at the 10th and 11th Saeima, candidates and 
their reputation and involvement in events that have been rated as controversial. The information 
about parliamentarians is based on materials published in the mass media. The portal also offers an 
opportunity to obtain data about the parliamentarians’ session participation and their votes on specific 
issues. In addition, ‘Delna’ maintains the portal Kandidatiuzdelnas.lv, which is aimed at refreshing 
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the constituents’ and parties’ memory before Saeima, European Parliament, or local government 
elections. To increase the clarity of publicly available information and its use for analytical purposes, 
the recommendation would be to publish the information in easy-to-read data formats (CSV, XML), 
so that this information could be reviewed and analysed from various viewpoints, similar to the site, 
where votes by MPs of the European Parliament are analysed Votewatch.eu. 
In July 2014, the legislature decided to establish a domestic security service, aimed at monitoring 
the work of the Saeima pass office, the department of special record-keeping, as well as taking care 
of the information system security measures. The decision led to concerns that this measure could 
reduce the transparency of the parliament’s work and obstruct access to the decision-makers – 
which, up to now, had been based on the principle of neutrality (Delna 2014). Public attention 
has been drawn to the information about the unreasonably high transport compensations of some 
parliamentarians, requested to cover the travel costs to their place of residence or to the places of 
meetings with the constituents, which usually take place on Fridays. Thus, for instance, in 2013 
these costs amounted to a total of about 2.5 million euros (TVNET 2014). Fuel receipts are the only 
proof that these trips actually occurred. Parliamentarians, who live more than 40 km away from 
Riga, can also receive a compensation for the rent of a residence (LR Saeima 1994a, Section 14). 
There is no mechanism at present for controlling the day-to-day itineraries of parliamentarians and 
for finding out whether meetings with the constituents have actually taken place.
Overall, the legislature has improved information accessibility. Focused measures of involving 
the public are also being implemented. Even though meetings between parliamentarians and 
constituents in person should be encouraged, it is necessary to introduce a reasonable mechanism 
for monitoring parliamentarians’ transport compensation.
8.8. How well does the legislature provide a forum for deliberation and 
debate on issues of public concern?
Legal framework
The Rules of Procedure of the Saeima provides that the Saeima regularly hears the reports 
from the members of the Cabinet, including the prime minister’s report on what has been achieved, 
the planned work, as well as the report from the minister for foreign affairs (LR Saeima 1994a, 
Section 118).
Actual situation
The legislature is still the central forum for political discussions, in which various political 
parties openly debate the current issues of the political process. Due to the dominant position of the 
executive branch in this process, political decision-making takes place in formats that are closed off 
to the public. Therefore, the importance of the Parliament in educating the public and portraying 
differing opinions is increasingly relevant. The legislature as a forum is largely dependent on the 
issues that the political parties have brought to the forefront and that are closely related to the 
political agenda. However, there are regular, more broadly positioned conferences, discussions, and 
other events (6–12 events per year) taking place at the Saeima in co-operation with public authorities 
and NGOs. Since 2010, the conference materials have been made available on the Saeima website. 
The Saeima can also provide live broadcasts of various events.
Apart from its formally established functions, the legislature also has a symbolic function. 
As an institution elected directly by the people, the legislature can be the final bastion of defence 
against a course of action taken by the executive branch that is contrary to the interests of the 
majority of population. An opposite process was observed in some countries during the global 
economic and financial crisis. The lawmakers approved drastic austerity measures proposed by 
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governments. Parliament buildings, where the public had gathered for collective support at times 
that were crucial for the nation suddenly turned into edifices to be invaded by dissatisfied crowds. 
Even though the unanimity of coalition partners helped with implementing stability and austerity 
measures, the fulfilment of the government agenda and the acceptance of recommendations from 
international lenders to a great extent put an end to discussing alternative scenarios for overcoming 
the crisis at a political level. 
Public trust in the legislature
Decreasing parliamentary sovereignty and the inability to make decisions on the part of the 
lawmakers when implementing austerity-related policies have reduced public trust in lawmakers in 
several European countries. In 2005, 38 % of EU population trusted their legislatures, whereas in 
the fall of 2013, only 25 % (EK (European Commission) 2013). The lower trust indicators were 
observed in Slovakia, Spain, and Romania, whereas in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, the trust in 
the legislature was the highest. It must be noted that lawmakers in Nordic countries enjoy a greater 
autonomy in decision-making and policy-making.
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of their respective countries, %
Source: EC standard Eurobarometer surveys (2005–fall of 2013). Question: ‘To what extent do you trust the 
parliament of Latvia?’
One of the biggest shortcomings of the Latvian parliamentary democracy, is the low trust that 
the public has for its legislature, and it has not improved significantly over time. It was found 
during the survey conducted within the framework of the Audit of Democracy that 2.2 % trust the 
Saeima, 71.4 % do not trust its work, whereas 6.4 % could not give an answer (DA 2014, Table P4). 
In the survey conducted within the previous Audit of Democracy, 22 % trusted the Saeima, 67 % 
distrusted, and 11 % could not give an answer (Rozenvalds 2005, 229). Relatively more distrust 
in the Saeima was voiced by senior citizens, whereas less was expressed by non-Latvians. When 
considered in a broader context, the level of public trust in the Latvian legislature is lower than the 
EU-28 average, but higher than in political parties. Nevertheless, it must be noted that significant 
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differences are observed between the European countries. Thus, for instance, in a Eurobarometer 
study in Estonia, the level of trust was much higher, even up to 35 %, whereas in Lithuania it was 
even lower than in Latvia only at 11 % (EK 2013).
Since 2012, the trust in the legislature has once again started to show an upward trend.. It can 
perhaps be explained by the stabilisation of the country’s economic situation, however it might also 
be related to the dismissal of the 10th Saeima. The dismissal of the Saeima created a precedent in 
the history of Latvian parliamentarianism, where uninterrupted work for four years in parliament is 
no longer guaranteed. The key reasoning behind the extraordinary elections was the recovery of the 
rule of law, including the reduction of the ‘oligarch’ influence. The battle of active public groups 
against oligarchs was manifested as public criticism to those parties that had developed patronage 
and clientelism ties with narrow interest groups and influential individuals. Even though the Latvian 
voters convincingly voted in favour of dismissing the Saeima, 63 of the former parliamentarians 
continued the work in the 11th Saeima.
During the report period, the legislature has achieved specific improvements in the fields of anti-
corruption and rule of law. Considerable improvements have been accomplished in the legislature’s 
communication with respect to co-operation. Opportunities for involvement of the population have 
been increased by means of collective applications, using modern communication technologies. 
Therefore, the work of the legislature during the final part of the report period of the Audit of 
Democracy can be considered as satisfactory to good.
Total result: progress over the last decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
8.1. X
8.2. X
8.3. X
8.4. X
8.5. X
8.6. X
8.7. X
8.8. X
Best feature
The legislature’s improved communication with the public and its openness to public proposals. 
Most serious problem
The legislature’s increasing dependence on the executive branch, resulting in diminished 
autonomy of the former.
Suggested improvements
1. To continue the work on regulations promoting the rule of law and transparency of the legislature.
2. To strengthen the institutional and investigational capacity of the Saeima for the development 
of evidence- and best practice-based policy and assessment of EU laws.
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3. To prescribe the possibility of a constructive no confidence vote against the government 
and ministers, as well as to consider the introduction of other elements of rationalised 
parliamentarianism in the Constitution. 
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9. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND 
POLICE
Anhelita Kamenska
Are the police, security services, and armed forces under civilian control?
9.1. How publicly accountable are the police and security services for their 
work?
In order for the police, in the fulfilment of its professional duties, to be able to ensure the 
rule of law and public order, it is entitled to detain persons, and in some situations, to use force. 
It is important that individual police officers and authorities, who are granted these powers, are 
accountable for their work – not only to prevent the abuse of power, but also to foster more public 
trust in police forces.
Legal framework
The last decade has seen continued improvement of legislation concerning the public 
accountability of the police and security services, particularly for compliance with human rights 
standards in  this work. On 1 October 2005, the Criminal Law entered into force, which, besides 
other provisions, also strengthened the rights of the detainees. On 19 November 2009, following 
repeated recommendations of the UN Committee against Torture (see UNCAT 2005), the definition 
of torture was included in the Criminal Law (CrimL) (LR Saeima (Saeima of the Republic of Latvia) 
2009; see also Chapter 3). Accountability of officials for torture is stipulated in several sections of 
CrimL, for instance, in Section 294 (Compelling of Testimony), Section 301 (Compelling the Giving 
of False Testimony, Statements and Translation) and Section 317 (Exceeding Official Authority).
The Law on the Procedure of Holding the Detained Persons adopted in the autumn of 2005 for 
the first time prescribed the introduction of specific standards and meeting certain requirements to 
improve conditions at police short-term detention facilities by 31 December 2008; however, due to 
lack of funding, implementation was postponed for another five years. In 2010, the Constitutional 
Court concluded the following: taking into account that poor conditions at these places of detention 
have been existing for a long time and no considerable improvements have been made, the postponing 
of implementation is not in compliance with the Constitution, and early 2012, this provision  has 
become null and void (LR ST (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia) 2010).
Actual situation
More than fifteen years ago, discussions began in Latvia about an independent police complaints 
body. In recent years, the discussions have intensified due to criticism by international organisations. 
In 2007, 2009 and 2011, the Council of Europe Anti-torture Committee (CPT) criticised Latvia for 
the lack of an independent complaint mechanism (see, for instance, CPT 2011; CPT 2013). On 
21 December 2010, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) pronounced judgment in the 
case Jasinskis v. Latvia. The Court found a violation of Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (right to life, duty to perform effective investigation of 
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the circumstances of death) with regard to the circumstances of death of the deaf-mute son of the 
applicant A. Jasinskis at the police detention facility in Balvi in February 2005. The Court pointed to 
the lenghty investigation at the district police department and the State Police (SP) Internal Security 
Office (ISO), which had dragged on due to the inactivity of the police and ineffective supervision 
on the part of the prosecutor’s office, and awarded 50,000 EUR to the applicant in respect of non-
pecuniary damage (ECtHR 2010). The SP ISO is directly subordinated to  the Chief of the SP and 
investigates crimes committed by employees of SP structural units.
Since 2012, the number of cases heard before the ECtHR against Latvia has increased whereby 
individual; claimed ill-treatment by the police and prison staff,1 about the lack of effective of 
investigation of such complaints, and in several cases the ECtHR has found a violation  of Article 3 
of European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (prohibition of torture).2 
The ECtHR has criticised the lack of independence of ISO, poor documentation of bodily injuries, 
delayed forensic medical examination, as well as insufficient supervision by prosecutors among 
other violations (MoJ of the Republic of Latvia 2013). In such cases, the ECtHR has emphasised 
the duty of the State to carry out effective investigation independent of persons implicated in the 
events under investigation (police officers).
In response to criticism, in 2012, the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) established a working 
group on the creation of an independent institution to investigate violations by employees of the 
Ministry of Interior (police, border guards, etc.), municipal police, and the Prison Administration 
in the performance of duties and that are related to violence (LR TM (Ministry of Justice of the 
Republic of Latvia) 2013). In July 2013, the Cabinet of Ministers (CM) approved  the framework 
document prescribing the re-organisation of ISO and its  transfer  from direct subordination to the 
Chief  of the State Police to that  of the Ministry of the Interior (LR IeM (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of the Republic of Latvia) 2013a). This would minimize the possible interference of the senior 
police leadership in an investigation conducted by a subordinate. ISO would be responsible for the 
detection, investigation and prevention of criminal offences committed by representatives the State 
Police, State Border Guard, and the State Fire and Rescue Service having special official ranks. In 
cases of criminal offences committed by the Prison Administration staff, municipal and port police, 
ISO will be responsible for investigating the criminal offences committed in the performance of 
work duties and related to violence (LR Iem 2014).
Both the ECtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee have pointed out that cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment and punishment includes conduct that is related to intensive or regular infliction 
of physical or moral suffering upon a person, even if it does not inflict actual bodily injuries. It can 
also refer to conditions of detention.
Even though new short-term detention facilities have been opened over the course of the last 
decade (in Riga Region, Liepaja, Daugavpils), and old places of detention have been either renovated 
or shut down due to unsatisfactory conditions (in Ventspils), the poor condition of many detention 
centres for extended periods has resulted in court proceedings at Latvian courts and in the European 
Court of Human Rights. After 1999, the Council of Europe Anti-torture Committee has on numerous 
occasions pointed out in its reports that the conditions of detention can be considered as amounting 
to inhuman and degrading treatment. In regard to the Daugavpils police detention facility opened in 
1 In early 2012, the Office of the Representative of the Cabinet of Ministers before International Human Rights 
Institutions informed that 14 cases are currently pending on alleged violations of Article 2 of European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (prohibition of torture, duty to carry out effective 
investigation) related to complaints about alleged abuse for the part of public authorities officials.
2 Judgment of 2 October 2012 by the European Court of Human Rights in the matter of J. Dmitrijevs v Latvia, 
judgment of 11 December 2012 in the matter of Timofejevs v Latvia, judgment of 11 December 2012 Vovruško 
v Latvia, 28 May 2013 judgment in the matter of Sorokins and Sorokina v Latvia, judgment of 2 July 2013 in 
the matter of Holodenko v Latvia, judgment of 11 February 2014 in the matter of Cēsnieks v Latvia, judgment 
of 11 February 2014 in the matter of Sapožkovs v Latvia.
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2013, the Committee has pointed out that it can serve as a model for other police detention centres. 
In 2006, the ECtHR ruled in the case A. Kadiķis v Latvia, where it found that the overall conditions 
at the Liepaja police detention centre do not meet the requirements of Article 3 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court awarded 
compensation to the claimant in the amount of EUR 7,000 for the inflicted damages (ECHR 2006). 
In 2012, in the case of Petriks v Latvia regarding conditions degrading to human dignity at the place 
of detention at the Saldus District Police Headquarters, the ECtHR awarded compensation to the 
complainant in the amount of EUR 6,000 (ECtHR 2012). Since the time when administrative courts 
started operating in 2006, the number of complaints about conditions of detention at national level 
has increased, and courts have recognised them as degrading on numerous occasions, by awarding 
compensation.3
In its reports, the CPT has pointed out various other possible risks of ill-treatment by the police: 
holding the detainees at police short-term detention facilities  for extended period of time before 
transferring to a prison after the investigating judge has remanded them in custody; frequent and 
repeated return  of persons to the police short-term detention centres  for investigative purposes  or 
to a court hearing; the lack of legal time limit for the repeated detention. Likewise, references are 
made to delayed access to a lawyer.
Since 2007, the Committee has on several occasions found that the situation is also improving. 
In comparison with the preceding visits, when the detainees often alleged ill-treatment and the 
severity of cases was confirmed, the Committee concluded that there are fewer cases of this sort; 
however reiterated that there remains the risk of being subject to ill-treatment by the police  in 
Latvia. Over the course of recent years, several leading lawyers have acknowledged that there are 
fewer cases of coercing testimonies than there were before (MIXNEWS 2014). 
Complaints about police ill-treatment and the conditions at police short term detention facilities 
are also reviewed by the Ombudsman’s Office, which, besides other duties, also conducts monitoring 
visits to police detention centres. However, since the Ombudsman’s Office does not have the 
authority to conduct investigations, it can only point to possible shortcomings in an investigation 
conducted by the police. On average, the Ombudsman’s Office visits four police short-term detention 
facilities per year (LR ĀM (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia) 2011) and in 
annual reports points out the main problems found; however, no elaborate reports on the results of 
visits and recommendations to the competent authorities have been published.
The issue of conditions of detention was also brought up in the discussions commenced in 
2012 regarding the abolishing of administrative detention as a form of administrative punishment. 
In 2013, the Ministry of Justice prepared the Draft Administrative Violations Procedure Law, which 
prescribes abolishing administrative arrest. This was inherited from the Soviet times and could be 
imposed for up to 15 days; it was widely imposed in cases of drunk-driving. The duty of the State 
is to ensure that the administrative arrest is imposed under due circumstances (Līce 2013) and if it is 
abolished, the number of complaints about conditions at police detention centres could also decrease.
In early May 2014, an agreement was concluded in Latvia on the implementation of a large-
scale project aimed at the improvement of standards at State Police short-term detention facilities, 
abolishing the former practice of administrative detention, changing the practice of  returning 
remand prisoners for further investigation, and ensuring relevant training for the custodial staff at 
temporary places of detention. The project  also provides for exchange of international experience 
3 For example, the judgment of 11 July 2012 adopted by the Regional Administrative Court in the case 
No A42583206 (AA43-3027-12/11). The Regional Administrative Court imposed an obligation to pay 
moral compensation of 3000 lats and reimbursement of personal damages of 5000 lats to a person, who had 
complained about degrading conditions at Ventspils TPD, where the person had been held for 182 days. See, 
the judgment of 8 January 2013 adopted by the Regional Administrative Court Jelgava Court House in the 
case No A42042012 (A4209-12/37).
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and learning best practices with regard to police detention centres, analysis of the current legal 
framework with regard to detention centres, and the preparation of proposals for improvements; 
organising training for SP staff. From 2014 until 2016, the project aims at reconstructing or renovating 
10 police short-term detention facilities – in Gulbene, Cesis, Aizkraukle, Jekabpils, Jelgava, Bauska, 
Rezekne, Saldus, Liepaja, Ogre, and in 11 temporary placement centres within the SP Riga Regional 
Department, as well as equip 12 police detention facilities and 14 temporary placement centres. 
The project is financed within the framework of the EEA and Norwegian Grants Mechanism and 
co-financed by the government of Latvia, and implemented in partnership with Council of Europe 
experts. (VP (State Police) 2014a). This is the largest project since the restoration of independence 
of the Republic of Latvia, and once completed, police detention sites and practices will have moved 
considerably closer to conformity with international human rights standards.
Structural reforms have also been introduced during the report period. In 2009, the regional 
reform of the SP was enacted. As a result, five regional departments were established (regional 
department of Riga, Kurzeme, Latgale, Vidzeme, and Zemgale) on the former basis of 27 district 
police stations, and districts of three categories were introduced. One of the reasons behind the reform 
was to streamline the police institutions and functions. As a result of the reform and the economic 
crisis, the number of police officers decreased significantly, both as a result of redundancies and 
people leaving jobs due to the low salaries and reduced social guarantees. This process transpired 
in a situation that from the start was rather dramatic – as of 1 July 2013, out of 7,849 jobs, only 
7,030 were filled in the State Police; there was a substantial shortage of patrol officers, which is 
the part of the police that is most visible to the public (VP 2014b, 4).
Earlier due to the economic crisis, the Police Academy of Latvia was closed down in 2010, and 
its functions were handed over to the University of Latvia. A number of senior law enforcement 
officials believed that the move was a mistake, because, without ensuring the continuation of a 
specialist programme and a development strategy for further training the changes have influenced 
the quality of staff – and with that the quality of investigations – in the police and the prosecution 
alike (Orupe 2014).
Since the restoration of independence in 1991, the SP had not adopted any long-term police 
development strategy, and some experts have viewed this as a possible obstacle for a purposeful and 
systematic development of the SP away from a militarised police in the direction of a democratic 
police. SP work was planned for a period of one year, and up until the territorial reform of 2009, 
local level plans were classified. The lack of a long-term strategy has been impacted by the frequent 
changes of the minister of  the interior (16 ministers over a 23-year period). The lack of political 
commitment and the lack of government support has regularly resulted in the allocation of insufficient 
funding to law enforcement agencies, including the police (Avota 2007).
The development of a draft SP strategy was started in 2012, and was adopted in January 
2014 at the meeting of State Secretaries. The strategy  is based on the introduction of community 
policing  manifested predominantly as a partnership between the police and society, in resolving 
problems related to crime and public order offences. Four main components are emphasised in 
the police work: close co-operation with the public and local authorities; a complex approach to 
problem solving; assessing feedback or public ‘demand’ and public satisfaction; increasing police 
visibility and accessibility. The concept provides for focusing extensively on crime prevention, and 
for the first time since the restoration of independence, an important role is given to police work 
with victims (VP 2014b).
The draft concept also provides for introducing new police work assessment criteria. Until 
now, the greatest emphasis in evaluating police work has been placed on conventional quantitative 
criteria, i.e. registered and solved crimes. According to these criteria, those who have solved more 
than 30 % of cases, have been working well, but those with less than 10 % of cases solved have 
been working poorly; however, qualitative assessment criteria have not been taken into account. 
The emphasis on quantitative criteria has led to a situation where police officers infrequently try 
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to avoid taking crime reports to avoid decrease in the proportion of solved cases (Mukha 2012). 
The implementation of the new concept will depend on the national and regional commitment of 
the SP, on new training programmes for police officers, as well as on the development of different 
assessment criteria for police work.
The development of the concept was fostered by the implementation of a project supported by 
the European Commission ‘Pilot project at the Talsi District Police Station – community policing’ 
(2009–2012). This was the first attempt in Latvia to adopt community policing methods within 
a specific territory. For several decades now, these methods have been successfully implemented 
in many EU member states, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, where they are 
recognised as being most effective in managing local communities with diverse needs. Some of the 
reasons for launching the pilot project included the low level of public trust in the police, mutual 
distrust between the police and society, the inability of the police to conduct preventive work, the 
weak support offered to the victims of crime, focusing on quantitative parameters, lack of public 
understanding about the day-to-day objectives of the police, the public perception of the police as 
a military authority, low visibility  of back-office police officers, among others (Mukha 2012, 6–7).
Several emergency situations, which have affected the SP prestige, have occurred during the 
report period. In early 2011, there was an attempted armed robbery at a gambling establishment 
in Jēkabpils. During the assault, one policeman was killed and two injured; among the offenders, 
there were two current operatives of the SP special tasks unit ‘Alfa’ and two former officers of the 
Tukums police station. Service investigations were initiated at the SP Riga Regional Department and 
Zemgale Regional Department. After the event the minister of the interior Linda Mūrniece resigned. 
In relation to this occurrence, the special task force ‘Alfa’ underwent a psychological aptitude test; 
12 out of 120 police officers did not pass the test and had to leave the unit. Insufficiently strict 
selection, including psychological evaluation for the work in a special tasks unit, the low salary, and 
the absence of a strong control mechanism were named as the main deficiencies (TVNET 2011).
Despite some extraordinary occurrences – the police reform and the economic crisis –– the 
public trust in the SP is gradually increasing, and traditionally people trust police more than the 
government, the Saeima, or political parties.
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Figure 9.1. Trust in the State Police
Source: SKDS (2013), Factum (2011, 12), Fieldex (2009, 10).
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At the same time, the surveys point to a contradictory public attitude towards the SP. Even 
though the trust indicators are increasing, 57 % of the population in 2009 and 56 % in 2013 would 
avoid any contact with the police, if possible. People take this stance irrespective of whether they 
have come into closer contact with the police or not. (Fieldex 2009). One of the possible reasons 
for this opinion is that the public still believes that the police are a repressive institution.
Security institutions
The role of state security services unavoidably creates tension between the need to ensure that 
their work is carried out with utmost secrecy and the requirement that the authorities granted these 
powers are accountable before elected officials (Wilks-Heeg, Blick, Crone 2012).
Legal framework
The Constitution Protection Bureau (CPB), the Security Police (SecP) and the Military 
Intelligence and Security Service have the status of a state security institution (SSI) in Latvia. 
The amendments introduced in the Law on State Security Institutions in 2005 prescribe that the 
responsible minister exercises control over the state security institution under their subordination 
in all areas, except for the operative work, intelligence and counterintelligence activities of state 
security institutions and the State secret protection system, which falls within the competence of the 
Prosecutor General or prosecutors with special authorisation to perform the task. The amendments 
also prescribed the disciplinary liability of SSI employees in cases of illegal or unethical conduct 
(LR Saeima 2005). Parliamentary control over an SSI is performed by the Saeima National Security 
Committee.
Actual situation
Civilian control over SSIs, exercised by various institutions within the framework of their 
respective powers, has been strengthened over the last decade; however, people in Latvia still 
harbour concerns about the lawful exercise of powers bestowed upon security institutions and 
about the effectiveness of their oversight mechanisms. Concerns have been raised after several 
attempts to introduce changes in the laws; for instance, in the National Security Law, Law on State 
Security Institutions, which envisaged the increased control of the executive arm over SSIs and 
reduced parliamentary control. A strong response about the proportionality of SSI intervention was 
triggered by the CPB’s drafted amendments to the Law on Scientific Activity, which prescribed the 
entitlement for security institutions to suspend research, if they consider that it contains threats to 
national security (LR Saeima 2013). These amendments were later rejected.
At the same time, more information about SSI operations has become publicly available, a 
website of the CPB was created, CPB annual reports have been made available for nearly a decade 
now and in recent years, Security Police reports have also become publicly accessible.
 Already before joining NATO and the EU, there were concerns that when the security institution 
system was reformed, senior state officials of Latvia, as well as institutions, instead of striving for 
the overall effectiveness of the SSI system, were often battling to ensure that other officials did not 
gain access to more data at the disposal of security institutions (Kamenska, Kristovskis 2005, 118).
After accession to the European Union, amendments to the National Security Law and the Law 
on State Security Institutions of Latvia caused the most controversy. In late 2006, the coalition 
government, disregarding the opinion of the incumbent President of the State Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, 
the opposition, and experts, in an urgent procedure, exercising the rights envisaged in Article 81 of 
the Constitution, adopted amendments that raised confusion in EU and NATO member states and 
triggered political turmoil in Latvia (Kamenska, Lejiņš 2007, 57). Concerns were voiced that the 
amendments to the laws are based on the oligarchs’ wish to influence the progress of an investigation 
instigated against them. The amendments provided for an increased role of the Prime Minister and a 
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reduced role of the President of the State and of the Saeima in decision-making in matters of national 
security. The amendments proposed to expand the circle of people, who would have unhindered 
access to operative information about the security institutions. The President, by employing veto 
rights, prevented the amendments from entering into force, and 214,000 citizens gave their signatures 
in favour of organising a referendum. As a result of public pressure, the controversial amendments 
were called off (Deputatiuzdelnas.lv 2007).
During the report period, there have been numerous allegations in Latvia claiming that state 
institutions are tapping telephones for purposes other than those stipulated in the law. According to 
the Investigatory Operations Law, state institutions are entitled to engage in investigatory operations, 
including telephone tapping. There were concerns both about the large number of institutions that are 
authorised to perform investigatory operations, as well as about the capacity of Prosecutor’s Office 
(Prosecutor General and prosecutors specifically authorised by them) to conduct the oversight and 
supervise the lawfulness of investigatory operations. There are 13 institutions in Latvia, which are 
subjects of investigatory operations; besides the SRS, these also include the Corruption Prevention 
and Combating Bureau (CPCB) and the State Police, among others (Krautmanis 2012). The CPB 
has equipment, which is used by law enforcement and state security and intelligence services 
to control mobile telephones. The area of competence and responsibility of the CPB includes 
the lawful control of telephone conversations and protection of the obtained information against 
unauthorised disclosure.
One of the most scandalous cases within this area is the case of Ilze Jaunalksne – for purposes of 
research investigation, the journalist had obtained information about possible corrupt transactions on 
the part of officials. In 2005 and 2006, the Finance Police of the State Revenue Service unlawfully 
tapped her work and private telephone conversations, which were later leaked in media. In the spring 
of 2013, the court found four officials of the Finance Police guilty of malicious abuse of authority, 
failure to act in the capacity of a public official, and two of them were fined in the amount of 
26,000 lats, and the other two, 3,000 lats and 8,000 lats respectively. The Chamber of Civil Cases 
of the Supreme Court imposed a fine of 12,000 lats to be paid to the journalist (LETA 2013). The 
Supreme Court (SC) judge, who had authorised the tapping, received a written reproof (lowest of 
disciplinary sanctions).
This case positively influenced further requests to tap mobile phones. The number of requests 
in 2007, in comparison with 2006, decreased by 44 %, and the Director of the CPB Jānis Kažociņš 
referred to this as ‘the Ilze Jaunalksne effect’ (Zālīte-Kļaviņa 2008). For several years now, the reports 
of the CPB offers information about public institutions – subjects of investigatory operations – 
which most frequently request mobile telephone tapping (CPB 2010, 2013). Several cases related 
to tapping reached the Constitutional Court (CC), the Supreme Court, as well as the ECtHR, thus 
actualizing the problems of the lawfulness of investigatory operations and options for legal remedies 
against human rights infringements.
On 12 May 2011, the CC recognised that the provisions of the Investigatory Operations Law, 
which make is possible to perform extraordinary investigatory operations (such as telephone tapping) 
without first receiving a judge’s permission, allowing permission to be obtained later, are consistent 
with the Constitution. The challenged provisions of the law provide that in cases when immediate 
action is required to prevent a serious or especially serious crime, as well as in cases when there 
are real threats to the life, health or property of a person, measures of investigatory operations may 
be taken without the approval of a judge. The prosecutor must be notified within 24 hours, and 
the judge’s approval must be received within 72 hours. Otherwise, the measure of investigatory 
operations must be terminated. One claimant M. M. believed that the challenged provisions allow 
for arbitrary and uncontrolled interferences with a person’s private life, because institutions can 
listen in on a person’s telephone conversations without the court’s approval, but in cases where the 
investigative operations are completed before the end of the 72-hour period, the court is not even 
informed of the occurrence of the tapping. The CC held that measures of investigatory operations 
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performed in order to prevent criminal offences provided for under the law are to be recognised as 
proportionate and consistent with the Constitution only if, irrespective of the time the measures are 
completed, an approval is received from the President of the SC or of a duly authorised SC judge 
(LR ST (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia 2011).
In early 2014, there were two cases pending against Latvia at the ECtHR: G. Antoms v Latvia 
and M. Meimanis v Latvia. In the first case, on 31 March 2008, conversations were covertly recorded 
at the Matīss Prison between a lawyer and his client; the CPCB was recording the conversations. The 
Investigatory Operations Law prohibits public institutions from collecting investigatory information 
at a time when sworn attorneys are performing professional duties unless they are subjects of 
operative work. In both cases, the claimants are referring to a violation of their right to a private life 
and family life, as well as to a violation of correspondence confidentiality and access to effective 
legal remedies in Latvia (Globe 24h 2009; Globe 24h 2011).
Complaints about the lawfulness of the conduct of state security institutions and subjects of 
investigatory operations are reviewed by an authorised prosecutors’ unit at the Prosecutor General’s 
Office. In 2010, it received 44 applications and complaints, in 2011 – 23 applications, in 2012 – 
applications 26, and in 2013 – 27 applications and complaints (Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of 
Latvia 2010–2013). More elaborate information about the contents of the complaints is not publicly 
available; however, the annual reports of the Prosecutor’s Office mention institutions (e.g. CPCB, 
State Revenue Service (SRS) Customs Criminal Board, etc.), in which the Prosecutor’s Office has 
performed inspections on the lawfulness of certain measures of investigatory operations. Inspection 
results are classified; however, the officials of these institutions are urged to take measures in order 
to strictly and consistently adhere to the Investigatory Operations Law.
Over the last few years, there have been increasing discussions about the need to introduce 
extensive amendments to the Investigatory Operations Law or to start drafting a new law, as several 
parts of the law adopted in 1993 have become obsolete and do not correspond to international human 
rights norms. In April 2014, amendments to the Investigatory Operations Law were announced at 
the Meeting of State Secretaries, drafted, among other things, to ensure better respect of human 
rights in the course of conducting investigatory operations. Pursuant to the case-law of the ECtHR, 
in order to guarantee due protection of a person’s rights in cases where investigatory operations 
are carried out resulting in substantial interference with the person’s private life, the law must 
ensure sufficient protection against possible arbitrary activity. The amendments envisage a new 
Section 231, to determine a more detailed procedure of how approval is received from the judge 
or prosecutor for performing the necessary investigatory operations measures, as well as a new 
Section 241, determining the cases where, upon completing an investigatory operations process (such 
as tapping, video surveillance), the subject of investigatory operations informs the person against 
whom the measure of investigatory operations performed according to the special procedure has 
been performed, about the investigatory operations that have been performed, and about the time it 
was performed against the person (LR IeM 2013b).
Trials about alleged unlawful tapping have not lessened the concerns of the Latvian public about 
the lawful exercise of powers bestowed upon security institutions or about the adequate effectiveness 
of the functioning of oversight mechanisms (SC, Prosecutor General’s Office, National Security 
Committee of the Saeima etc.). Furthermore, the large number of institutions authorised to perform 
investigatory operations is also worrisome. The existing laws do not guarantee sufficient protection 
of individuals against possible arbitrary operations. Further discussions might be encouraged by 
judgments by the ECtHR against Latvia; however, the practices of other European countries, such 
as the Netherlands, must also be examined in effectively controlling state security institutions and 
other subjects of investigatory operations.
In the last decade, the guarantees of detainees against the unlawful conduct of the police have 
been strengthened in the laws. As a result of the ECtHR judgments against Latvia concerning in-
effective investigations of police violence and recommendations of other international organisations 
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plans are under way to strengthen the independence of police complaints body. Following extended 
criticism by international and Latvian human rights organisations about the conditions at short-
term police detention facilities, considerable foreign funds have been attracted to improve the 
human rights standards in these facilities. For the first time after the restoration of independence, 
a long-term strategy of the State Police was adopted; it emphasises the introduction of community 
policing in Latvia. The effectiveness of the commenced extensive measures will depend on genuine 
commitment on the part of politicians (including the allocation of adequate financial resources) and 
on the momentum of the officials in charge. 
Overall, the accountability of the police and state security institutions is assessed as satisfactory.
9.2. How far does the composition of the army, police and security services 
reflect the social composition of society at large?
Legal framework
Only citizens of the Republic of Latvia can work in the State Police and in security and intelligence 
services; they must be proficient in the official [Latvian] language, have no criminal record, have not 
been tried, and have to meet a range of other criteria. For a long time, these requirements did not 
apply to municipal police which could also employ non-citizens. However, in several larger local 
governments, such as Riga and Daugavpils, only citizens were entitled to work for the municipal 
police. Local governments may establish a municipal police force for ensuring public order and for 
compliance with binding rules of the local government, and they are part of the local government. 
On 16 September 2010, the Law on Police was amended, prescribing that only citizens of Latvia are 
allowed to work for the municipal police (LR Saeima 2010b). The amendments were justified by the 
need to harmonise the legal requirements for carrying a firearm, which only citizens of the Republic of 
Latvia are entitled to (LR Saeima 2010a). After these amendments were adopted, non-citizens working 
for municipal police could stay on if they underwent naturalisation within a specific period. The 
requirement for the police to be nationals of the country is a mandatory requirement in most countries.
As the public becomes more diverse, occurring as a result of active migration processes, in 
some countries, such as the United Kingdom, citizens of other EU, European Economic Association 
member states, and of the Commonwealth of Nations are eligible to become police officers subject 
to having resided in the country for several years (Police Recruitment 2014).
Actual situation
During the years under Soviet rule, work in the militia was considered a prestigious profession 
among many national minorities; however, due to the negative associations with the Soviet regime 
(their relation to repressive authorities) and due to the Russian language requirement, there were 
relatively few Latvians working in the militia (Pabriks 2002, 28–30). Therefore, upon reorganising 
the Soviet militia in the 1990s, besides the demilitarisation and democratisation of the police, 
another challenge was to encourage the representation of the majority population – Latvians – in 
the police force.
At the same time, international organisations recommend that the police composition – at local, 
regional, and national level, and including ranks, and also civilian personnel – should reflect the 
diversity of the population. The public image of the police as an ethnically representative body 
needs to be actively promoted (OSCE 2006). The lack of representation of some social groups can 
lead to distrust of the police as non-representative and can add to tensions in the communication 
between the people and these services.
In the 1980s, there were around 35 % Latvians in the Soviet militia (in Riga 10 %), whereas 
in 2001, 65.8 % (Kamenska, Kristovskis 2005, 119–120) and in 2007, 64.9 % (Kamenska, Lejiņš 
2007, 61). Since the restoration of independence in 1991, the proportion of Latvians in the State 
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Police had increased considerably, and this was partially influenced by the legal requirement to be 
a Latvian citizen,  know Latvian, as well as introduction of Latvian as the language of instruction 
at the Latvian Police Academy. A notable proportion of representatives of national minorities has 
remained in the State Police, and should be regarded as a positive trend. Unfortunately, more recent 
data about the current ethnic make-up of the police is unavailable. 
Data about the number of employees and the social composition of security and intelligence 
services are not available, as this is classified information.
Even though knowledge of Latvian among the police has significantly improved, on occasions, 
it remains a problem. In 2010–2011, during Latvian language proficiency inspection by the State 
Language Centre and the Ministry of the Interior it was identified that out of approximately 
7,000 police officers, 219 police officers and 19 senior staff members did not know Latvian at 
the level prescribed by the law (Diena.lv 2010). The police officers were tasked to improve their 
Latvian by 1 October 2011, and 24 % or 53 employees passed the Latvian language exam within 
the established period. The Minister of the Interior L. Mūrniece instructed the SP to resolve the 
issue by terminating employment relations with those officials that were not taking any steps to 
improve their Latvian to a level that is necessary for performing their duties and is prescribed by 
law (Fahretdinova 2011). The Saeima adopted vaguely worded amendments to the Law on Career 
Course of Service of Officials of MoI institutions and of the Prison Administration having special 
service ranks, by prescribing that a person can be dismissed due to unsuitability to the position, if 
the official does not agree with a transfer to a different position or if there are no other positions to 
offer in the respective institution, the requirements of which the official fulfils (LR Saeima 2011). 
This opened up the possibility to dismiss a police officer with insufficient Latvian language skills. 
At the same time, it has been recognised that knowledge of Latvian is not a problem for younger 
police officers who belong to national minorities (LETA 2010).
Ethnically diverse societies require police officers to be proficient in different languages. These 
can be necessary in emergency situations (victims, witnesses), they can help establish rapport and 
more effective communication with different minorities. Moreover, international human rights 
instruments also guarantee the right to speak minority languages in situations related to person’s 
detention and case proceedings. Even though the recruitment of persons belonging to national 
minorities into the police will provide the police organisation with the necessary language knowledge, 
also members of the majority group are encouraged to learn minority languages (OSCE 2006).
The law does not prescribe that police offers must know other languages; however, taking 
into account the ethnic composition of the Latvian population, the police officers often need to 
know Russian. Most ethnic Latvian police officers have no problems in communicating in Russian; 
however, the issue became relevant after a case whereby a police officer had refused to speak 
Russian in an emergency call. The police officer had pointed out to the caller that since they live 
in Latvia they should be speaking Latvian. He received a disciplinary punishment – a warning 
about non-compliance with the post for a period of one year for failing to take and record the call. 
He appealed the punishment, but the District Administrative Court (DAC 2011) and the Regional 
Administrative Court (RAC 2012) upheld the decision. The Court concluded that the police 
officer’s Russian language skills were sufficient, but at the same time pointed out that in the case 
of insufficient Latvian language skills, there was an option of forwarding the call to a competent 
colleague. Likewise, the Court found that the police officers’s conduct was deliberate and contained 
signs of discrimination on the basis of language use and ethnicity; the disciplinary breach was 
serious and essential, as people were refused help.
Even though some politicians have criticised the need for mandatory Russian language 
knowledge for police officer (LETA 2011a), the police management have emphasised the need for 
police officers to know Russian (LETA 2011b).
In many countries, especially with the introduction of community policing, the role and number 
of female police officers has increased. In the past, women were usually delegated to performing 
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the so-called women’s tasks – dealing with paperwork, juvenile matters, and crime prevention. It 
was thought that by engaging women in patrols, they will be subjected to violence. Oftentimes, the 
police leadership doubted the ability of women to manage violent situations. Studies conducted in 
the USA (Martim, Jurik 2007) and in Europe (Prenzler, Sinclair 2013) have confirmed that gender is 
not a substantial reason for not delegating women to the patrol service, and women perform in this 
job just as well as men do, and often are even better in resolving conflict situations. Furthermore, 
the attitude of society is equally positive towards police officers of both genders.
In the discussions in 2006 in Estonia, where women made up 33 % of the police force (the 
highest proportion of women in police in Europe at that time), several senior police officers expressed 
concerns about security; while other officials pointed to the increase of the proportion of women in 
police forces in most European countries, with some Scandinavian countries even setting a target 
of 40 % proportion of women in the police (LETA 2006).
Over the last decade, Latvia has also seen an increase in the proportion of women in the State 
Police: 23.56 % of police officers were women in 2006, 28.25 % in 2011 (SP 2012, 37), and 34 % at 
the end of 2013 (SP 2014). In the Riga Municipal Police, which is the largest municipal police force 
in the country, the proportion of women has decreased from 43 % in 2006 (Riga Municipal Police 
(RPP) 2007) to 35.3 % in 2013 (RPP 2014). Unfortunately, no detailed data are publicly available 
about the representation of women in various ranks and at various levels, which prevents from 
identifying whether women face any obstacles in their career path. Sometimes, lower proportion of 
men in the police is also explained by low salaries.
International experience (e.g. in the USA) shows that the armed forces can also foster social 
integration (Muižnieks 2010, 12). When mandatory military service existed in Latvia, the number 
of new recruits belonging to national minorities in some drafts often reached 25–30 %, and from 
time to time the issue of poor knowledge of Latvian was brought up. Thus, in 2004, 30 new recruit 
groups (about 500 people) were enrolled in Latvian language courses (LETA 2005). Even though 
some officials in Latvia refer to the armed forces as one of the integrating factors (see Līcītis 
2012), since the creation of a professional army in 2006, data about ethnic make-up of the army 
are available only for 2008, while the social role of the army has not been a subject of research.
During times of peace, the National Armed Forces (NAF) consist of active duty personnel 
(approximately 4,500), national guards (8,000 in active service and 830 National Guard veterans 
(Zvirbulis (2014)), military and civilian staff, as well as the NAF reserve. Candidates for the 
professional military service must be Latvian citizens, must know Latvian at the highest level if 
the candidate has not acquired education in the Latvian language, has not graduated from a school 
with Latvian language of instruction or has not studied in the Latvian language group in a school 
with two language sections (usually Latvian and Russian).
Along with the considerable decrease in the population resulting from emigration and the 
demographic crisis, the NAF recruitment base has also decreased (every year 500 individuals must 
be recruited) (LR AM (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia) 2012);  which can jeopardise 
the establishment of an adequate professional army.
Public information about the ethnic composition of the NAF in recent years has not been 
available. According to data from 2008, there were 5,025 servicemen in the NAF, including 4,559 
Latvians, 358 Russians, 41 Lithuanians, 35 Poles, 31 Belarussians, 21 Ukrainians, and seven 
belonging to other national minorities (NAF 2008). Therefore, the proportion of national minorities 
in the National Armed Forces was only 10.83 %. In 2014, the proportion of national minorities 
among the citizens of Latvia was nearly 30 % (CSB, 2014).
The National Guard accepts Latvian citizens aged between 18 and 55 years on a voluntary 
basis. Similarly, no data are publicly available about the ethnic composition of the National Guard; 
however, e.g., 386 national guards were enlisted in the 34th artillery battalion of the National 
Guard stationed in Daugavpils, including 170 Russians, 138 Latvians, 65 Poles, 8 Belarussians, 
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2 Lithuanians, and 3 Ukrainians (Sargs 2012a), and these data reflect the diverse ethnic composition 
in the region.
The opportunities for female soldiers in the armies of NATO member states have grown as 
countries are gradually lifting various restrictions; for instance, for assuming military posts, which 
prescribe the use of firearms, in submarines, etc. Following a judgment of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (Eiropas Savienības Tiesa (Court of Justice of the European Union) 2010), 
since 2001, women in Germany can serve in combat units, whereas in 2014, the first women 
started service in submarines in the United Kingdom. At the same time, studies point to various 
obstacles that women must face when integrating in the army, incl., unwanted attitudes (e.g. sexual 
harassment) from fellow servicemen (DW 2014).
Women in the Latvian professional military service are accepted on general conditions, except 
for physical fitness requirements, which are not as stringent as they are for men. In the service, 
women and men are subject to the same requirements for education, assuming a post, or rank 
promotions. The NAF has not set a mandatory number or a proportion of women, and there are no 
units, specialist fields, or positions, in which women could not serve (Sargs 2012b). However, no 
surveys or studies are available about the possible obstacles that women are faced with in the army.
According to the NATO data, in 2010, Latvia had the second highest proportion of women 
(17.44 %) in the military (followed by Hungary with 20 %). In the Polish army, the proportion was 
considerably lower at 1.8 %, in Denmark 5.2 %, Luxembourg 5.8 %, Belgium 8.02 %, Norway 
8.6 %, the United Kingdom 9.5 % and Germany 8.9 %, whereas in Bulgaria the proportion of 
women in the military is 13 %, the Czech Republic 13.6 % and Slovenia 15.4 % (Sargs 2012c). 
The proportion of women in the NAF over the last decade has ranged between 17 and 19 %, and 
in the National Guard, the proportion of women has ranged between 12 and 15 %.
Table 9.2. Female soldiers in the National Armed Forces
Year 2003 2006 2009 2010 2011 2013
Total number 742 758 833 887 801 765
Proportion, % 18.95 17.25 18.19 17.44 16.98 16.3
Source: Data of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia.
As many as 119 women, or 5.2 % of the total number of soldiers having participated in operations, 
have been on international operations. In 2013, out of 177 NAF troops serving in operations 7 were 
women. In 2011, 838 women served in the National Guard, which is slightly more than 10 % of all 
national guards (Pļavniece 2011).
In the study conducted in late 2008 ‘Opinion of Latvian population and leaders about professional 
service in the NAF’, 30.3 % of respondents believed that there are too many women in the NAF, 
whereas 76.1 % of the military disagreed with that statement. It was found in the study that soldiers 
and opinion leaders recognise that the army is a suitable place for women to work, and they 
also concur with the opinion that women can assume equal positions in combat units and go on 
international operations (Sargs 2012d).
Even though the proportion of Latvians has grown in the State Police, a considerable part of 
the police is represented by national minorities. Compared to the mandatory military service, where 
up to 30 % of recruits belonged to national minorities, there are only 10 % of national minorities 
in the professional army, which is less than half the proportion of national minorities among all 
citizens. To gain a more comprehensive picture of the representation of national minorities and 
women in the police and army, disaggregated data should be collected on a regular basis, including 
the representation at various levels of commanding ranks. Overall, the situation is assed as good.
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Summary: Progress over the last decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
9.1. X
9.2. X
Best feature
The ethnic composition of the State Police generally corresponds to the ethnic composition in the 
country. Unlike other public authorities, the State Police has maintained a considerable proportion 
of personnel representing national minorities.
Most serious problem
Police ill-treatment of detainees remains a concern, along with ensuring effective investigation 
of such offences, as well as the establishment of an independent police complaints body.
Suggested improvements
•	 Adopt and implement the concept envisaging a transfer to community policing, ensure funding 
necessary for the transformed Internal Security Office. 
•	 Adopt amendments to the Investigatory Operations Law to strengthen human rights standards 
when performing investigatory operations. 
•	 Promote higher enrolment of national minorities in the NAF. 
•	 Gather data about the ethnicity of the police and military personnel ensuring their anonymity.
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10. INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC LIFE 
Valts Kalniņš 
Is the integrity of conduct  in public life assured?
10.1. How effective is the separation of public office from the personal 
business and family interests of office holders?
Legal framework
A rather strict regulation for the separation of public office from personal interests is in place 
in Latvia. Since 2002, the fundamental principles and regulations have been enshrined in the Law 
on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials (hereinafter – the Law on 
Prevention of Conflict of Interest).
The law elaborates on the broad range of people, who are subject to the law (starting with the 
President of the State to all persons authorised to issue administrative acts, perform supervisory, 
control, notification, or penalising and similar functions). Public officials must observe various 
restrictions and prohibitions. Public officials, in principle, may combine their posts with an additional 
job; however, some categories of office holders are subject to detailed restrictions. For instance, 
members of the Saeima and of the Cabinet of Ministers (CM) may combine their positions only with 
very few types of additional jobs, such as a position in a trade union, an association or foundation, 
political party, association of political parties, or a religious organisation, as well as with work as 
a teacher, scientist, doctor, professional athlete, and creative work (Section 7(2)).
The law still contains a large part of the deficiencies detected within the Audit of Democracy 
of 2005. The complex system of restrictions and prohibitions urges to formally comply with the 
requirements rather than avoid conflicts of interest as such. A previously reached conclusion in this 
regard is still relevant, namely, that the law ‘refers only to lineal relatives, but does not directly 
apply to cousins and relatives in-law (daughter-in-law, son-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, 
etc.). In determining the thin boundaries of such situations of conflict of interest, the existing law 
excludes a potentially vast circles of persons, upon making decisions on which an official can end 
up with a conflict of interest’ (Čigāne, Kārkliņa 2005 127).
In comparison with 2005, the regulation applicable to the President of the State, members of 
the Saeima, CM members, and members of local government councils is even weaker. The Audit 
of Democracy drew attention to the risk of the state capture, because the prohibition of conflicts of 
interest was not applicable to cases when members of the Saeima and CM members are participating 
in issuing administrative acts. The difficulty of ensuring control served as a justification for the 
2007 decision to also apply the exception to cases when the said persons are participating in, for 
instance, the adoption of external regulatory enactments or in political decision-making.
A positive development that must be mentioned is the 2011 prohibition introduced on disclosing 
information about the state or a local government official, who has informed of conflicts of interest, 
and, without an objective reason, to create unfavourable consequences to this person (Section 20(7)). 
This is an important element in the generally deficient whistle-blower system in Latvia.
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Actual situation
Significant results have been achieved in the practice of applying the Law on Prevention of 
Conflict of Interest. The Corruption Prevention and Combatting Bureau (CPCB) has ensured a 
generally uniform practice of preventing conflicts of interest across state and local government 
administration. In regard to conflicts of interest, as well as violations of restrictions and prohibitions, 
the CPCB holds a large number of public officials administratively accountable every year. In 2011, 
81 officials were brought to account, in 2012 – 47, but in 2013 – 77 officials. In the second half of 
2013, officials of state institutions had mostly violated restrictions on combining positions, whereas 
among the violations committed by local government officials, there is a high proportion of cases 
where the official functions are performed in a situation of a conflict of interest (KNAB (Corruption 
Prevention and Combatting Bureau) 2014b, 9–10).
The practice of the Saeima in deciding on the authorisation to hold parliamentarians accountable 
for violations of the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest shows that in practice the law is 
also applied to senior officials (during the period from 2003 until 2013, the Saeima has decided to 
authorise holding a deputy administratively accountable on 32 occasions upon a request by the CPCB, 
and only once (in 2005) was this request rejected) (LR Saeima (Saeima of the Republic of Latvia)).
One of the problems encountered in the practice of preventing conflicts of interest is insufficient 
supervision within state and local government institutions (KRSVPIP (Draft Concept on the 
Reduction of Corruption Risks in Public Administration and Local Government Institutions) 2012, 
29). Furthermore, a rather considerable part of violations of the Law on Prevention of Conflict of 
Interests reviewed by the CPCB are relatively insignificant. Due to this, the CPCB has proposed to 
consider the possibilities of expanding the power of heads of state and local government institutions 
in preventing conflicts of interest (KNAB 2014c). In order to assess the existence of a conflict of 
interest on merit, complete information is necessary about the duties to be performed by an official 
and about the related risks. This information is most easily available to the head of each institution 
about their respective subordinates. However, the persisting practice of the control of conflicts of 
interest, which has seen largely centralised supervision, leads to many heads of institutions not 
perceiving this area as a priority.
Negative indicators
Even though the CPCB is conducting constant control of officials’ activities, some signs point to 
problems that are present in the area of separating public office from private interests. In the public 
opinion, conflicts of interest are still an important problem, which is proven in the entrepreneurs’ 
survey conducted in 2011, in which 71.7 % of respondents recognised that it is a widespread 
occurrence in Latvia for heads of state or local government institutions to have a conflict of interest, 
for instance, an official has made a decision favouring a relative or a business partner (SKDS 2011).
From time to time, mass media reports on seeming conflicts of interest or situations, when 
private interest is manifested indirectly, and therefore, pursuant to the provisions of the Law on 
Prevention of Conflict of Interest, the case is not qualified as a conflict of interest or the conflict of 
interest is seeming and as such is not subject to strict regulation. There was a case of this sort in 
2013, when information became available about a situation where several companies operating in an 
area supervised by the Ministry of Economics (MoE) had donated large funds to a society managed 
by the wife of the Secretary of State of the MoE with the main directions of operation being the 
implementation of cultural projects. The donors included construction companies, Rietumu banka, 
which was interested in a state policy of granting residency permits for people, who invest large 
sums of money in Latvia, a company offering short-term loans, and others. One of the donors is a 
company, which participated in the construction of biogas stations. Such stations depend on MoE 
decisions on awarding mandatory procurement quotas (Delna 2013a). The media have also reported 
cases where the formal provisions of the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest prevent the 
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detection of allegedly apparent conflicts of interest, as was the case, for instance, in the situation 
when the former minister for environmental protection and regional development gave a money 
prize of 1 400 lats to the head of the office – his girlfriend (LETA 2013b).
The development of stable practices of applying the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest 
deserves a positive evaluation, including with regard to members of the Saeima. Even though there 
is no accurate data, it can be assumed that most state officials are aware of and are performing their 
duties deriving from this law. Therefore, the situation in this area can be assessed as satisfactory.
10.2. How effective are the arrangements for protecting office holders and 
the public from involvement in bribery?
Legal framework
The Criminal Law prescribes a penalty for giving bribes (unlawful benefits) and taking bribes 
in relations with state officials (Section 320 and 323), employees of state or local government 
institutions, who are not officials (Section 3262 and 3263), and private sector employees (Section 198 
and 199). By significantly expanding the range of persons from the private sector the bribing of 
whom is a punishable offence, as well as by determining accountability with regard to state and 
local government employees, who are not state officials, the legislator has practically resolved the 
problem stated in the Audit of Democracy of 2005, namely, of impunity over bribing doctors or bank 
employees (see Čigāne, Kārkliņa 2005, 129). As a result of multiple amendments to the Criminal 
Law, Latvia has now approximated international standards.
However, there are still problems related to the accountability of officials regarding abuse of 
office, namely, there are difficulties in determining whether ‘activities have caused material damage 
to state authorities or administrative order, or to person’s interests protected under the law’ (Criminal 
Law, Section 318). In 2012, the Supreme Court Senate reviewed a criminal case, in which State 
Police staff were tried and acquitted in the deliberate conduct of using their office to protect another 
police officer from accountability for driving under the influence and running over a pedestrian, 
who died as a result of injuries. As there was no dispute as to the facts of the case, the court ruled 
that the allegations ‘on the existence of material damages are general and unspecific, worded in a 
form of an assumption’ (AT (Supreme Court) 2012).
Legal protection for whistle-blowers reporting corruption (i.e. situations that are not merely 
a conflict of interest) at their work place is relatively weak in Latvia. The Labour Law prohibits 
‘applying sanctions on an employee or to otherwise directly or indirectly cause adverse consequences 
for him or her because the employee, within the scope of legal employment relationships, exercises 
his or her rights in a permissible manner, as well as if he or she informs competent institutions or 
officials regarding suspicions with respect to the committing of criminal offences or administrative 
violations in the workplace’ (Section 9(1)). However, the law does not prohibit disclosing the whistle-
blower’s identity, does not refer to situations when a person has leaked information to the media, and 
does not provide for penalties to officials, who have unlawfully dealt with whistle-blowers. Moreover, 
in the case of an infringement of a whistle-blower’s rights, they would have to demand compensation 
in a possibly expensive and lengthy court process. In 2013, a study by Transparency International 
found that legal regulation for the protection of whistle-blowers is well-developed in four EU member 
states, partially developed in 16 member states (incl., Latvia), and that such regulation is almost or 
practically non-existent in seven member states (Transparency International 2013b, 8).
Actual situation
In comparison with other EU countries, assumptions of alleged briberies are widespread in 
Latvia. In a survey of 2013, 25 % of respondents said that they know somebody personally who is 
taking or has taken bribes (there were only three countries, including Lithuania, where these results 
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were worse). The comparison sheds a slightly better light on Latvia in the assessment of actual 
personal experience with regard to, for instance, additional payments or valuable gifts to a doctor 
or a nurse, or donations to a hospital (7 %). There are seven countries with worse results, including 
Lithuania. Estonia in both indices ranks in the mid-range among the EU member states (European 
Commission 2014, 70, 89).
Over the period from 2004 until 2012, the number of officials convicted for criminal offences 
while serving in a public institution has fluctuated; however, showing a general tendency of decreasing 
(criminal cases heard in the first instance reached a peak in 2005 with 96 officials involved, whereas 
in 2012, this number was the lowest with 34 cases; see Table 10.1). Furthermore, the number of 
criminal cases heard in the first instance regarding giving and/or taking bribes has decreased from 
49 cases in 2006 and 2007 to 24 and 27 cases in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The rise to 47 cases in 
2012 is explained by the State Police activity in a part of Latvia, where detained drivers are trying to 
avoid accountability for traffic violations by offering bribes (28 of the said 47 cases) (Providus 2013). 
Due to the covert nature of corruption, it is difficult to tell whether the overall decrease has been 
achieved owing to reduced crimes of this type, weakened attention of law enforcement authorities, 
or the employment of more sophisticated and more difficult to detect corruptive schemes.
Table 10.1. Individuals tried for criminal offences committed during service in state institutions
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Criminal cases 73 78 82 79 72 48 45 49 57
Number of accused persons for crimi-
nal offences committed during service 
in state institutions (crimes of office)
104 142 125 130 1111 67 752 85 1043
    incl., public officials 794 110 96 85 725 49 546 71 42
Convicted 87 128 114 109 91 54 66 63 86
    incl., public officials 63 96 85 68 57 36 47 49 34
    incl., conviction entered into force 
(data as of 19.08.2013)
87 128 112 106 86 48 60 52 58
Acquitted 15 15 12 18 18 12 4 22 16
    incl., public officials 14 14 11 17 13 12 4 22 8
    incl., acquittal entered into force 
(data as of 19.08.2013)
15 15 12 16 16 9 4 19 0
Source: Providus 2013.1,2,3,4,5,6
One of the least favourable features in Latvia’s battle against corruption is the long time that 
is necessary for hearing complex cases in court. Since 2007, a criminal case has been under court 
review in the matter of possible fraud in the project of implementing digital television, which was 
started in 2000. The partner company engaged in the process of digitalisation Kempmayer Media 
Limited had no experience in implementing such projects and was most likely a front for Latvian 
entrepreneurs, whose participation in the project was concealed. There are 20 persons accused in this 
case, including some, who have been in close association with Andris Šķēle – an individual, who 
1 Incl., criminal proceedings with regard to two persons have been terminated.
2 Incl., criminal proceedings with regard to two persons have been terminated.
3 Incl., criminal proceedings with regard to one person have been terminated.
4 In the case of one official, the trial result is unknown.
5 Incl., criminal proceedings with regard to two persons have been terminated.
6 Incl., criminal proceedings with regard to two persons have been terminated.
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has been traditionally regarded as one of the oligarchs of Latvia (Delna 2011–2012a). The criminal 
case against the mayor of the city of Ventspils, Aivars Lembergs, for offences such as bribing, 
violations of regulations of prevention of conflicts of interest, among other criminal offences, has 
been under court review since 2008 (Walker 2011, 12–13). In none of these cases has a first instance 
judgment been passed as of early 2014. The lengthy proceedings of such complex cases can lead 
to impunity, especially in the light of updates to the Criminal Law, introduced in 2010, enabling 
extenuation of punishment, if rights to completing a criminal proceeding within a reasonable period 
are not respected (Section 491).
Negative indicators
Since the accession of Latvia to the European Union, the most positive tendency that can be 
backed up with data is the reduced administrative corruption in many areas. Of all respondents to 
surveys who had had encounters with the Traffic Police, informal payments or connections were 
employed by 69.8 % in 1999, 59 % in 2005, 31.9 % in 2007, and 28.8 % in 2012. In obtaining 
permits and licences, this tendency has developed as follows: 59.8 %, 46.1 %, 31.2 %, and 13.6 % 
respectively. In registration or technical inspection of a vehicle: 29.9 %, 20.4 %, 11.5 %, and 7.3 %. 
There have been significant improvements in nearly all spheres covered in the surveys (LF & 
KNAB (Latvian Facts and CPCB) 2012). However, in international comparisons, several results are 
still alarming. According to the Global Corruption Barometer data for 2013, 25 % of respondents 
in Latvia themselves or members of their household had given a bribe to a police officer in the 
last 12 months (in Estonia 2 %), 24 % had given a bribe to medical and health care services (in 
Estonia 7 %), and 14 % to a court (in Estonia 2 %) (Transparency International 2013a). It is almost 
impossible to detect changes in political corruption and in the corruption of small professional 
circles, such as judges. Some data lead to the assumption that problems exist in these sectors; 
however, the data are insufficient to discuss the extent of the problems quantitatively (see Box 10.1).
Box 10.1 Non-transparent insolvency administration system
In the autumn of 2012, the magazine Ir published a range of studies about corporate insolvency processes 
and voiced suspicion of the existence of corrupt schemes in the system. Upon performing insolvency 
cases over the course of three years, it was found that several dozen companies, by making sure that 
their cases ended up with the same administrators and judges, with their help have, possibly, fictitiously 
gotten rid of extensive debt commitments, resulting in losses for large creditors. The non-transparent 
insolvency administration system is linked to the interests of the National Alliance All For Latvia! – 
For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK (Visu Latvijai! – Tēvzemei un brīvībai/LNNK), namely, current 
and former administrators, the integrity of the actions of which has been questioned, were among its 
members and the most generous donors.
Change of address in order to fall within the competence of the right administrator
The magazine Ir found 45 cases where companies facing financial hardships, before applying for 
insolvency or legal protection proceedings, have changed addresses. In most cases, the court districts 
in the jurisdictions these companies moved to, and the names of the judges reviewing these cases, 
were the same. Additionally, the electronic system for allocating court cases has ‘randomly allocated’ 
mutually related companies to certain judges. The magazine wrote about several companies, who were 
deep in debt, and who, following a change of address, managed to make sure that a favourable result 
was achieved; this was possible because claims of related companies were recognised as the primary 
or even the sole claims to assets in insolvency proceedings or legal protection processes, whereas bank 
creditors’ claims were rejected.
Banks pointing to possible corruption
Swedbank representatives have pointed out that the insolvency regulation in Latvia is used ‘to create 
schemes’ and ‘systematically defraud’ investors’ funds; moreover, this process is occurring with ‘the 
help of dishonest and, most likely, corrupt officials (insolvency administrators and judges)’. The 
representative of the state-owned Reverta bank, Rolands Neilands, has also linked the changing of 
address to make sure that a case is heard by a specific judge with possible corruption (Delna 2013–2014).
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In regard to battling the corruption of public officials, one of the least favourable features is the 
continuing conflicts in relations between the CPCB and the Prime Minister, as well as within the 
CPCB. The early stages of the operations of the CPCB were dominated by conflict between CPCB 
officials and politicians; the conflict could be perceived in the decision by the Saeima to reject the 
candidacy of Juta Strīķe for the post of director of the CPCB in 2003, who later assumed the post 
of a deputy director of the Bureau. This was followed by verbal assaults on the part of the Prime 
Minister, Aigars Kalvītis, attempts to hold disciplinary liable and to dismiss the CPCB director 
Aleksejs Loskutovs (2005–2008), as well as the unconvincingly founded attempt by the government 
to dismiss him in 2007. The work of the subsequent CPCB directors Normunds Vilnītis (2009–2011) 
and Jaroslavs Streļčenoks (since 2011) has been conflict-ridden with regard to relations between 
senior level officials and a large part of their staff. The height of the conflicts was reached when 
Juta Strīķe was dismissed from the post on several occasions in late 2013 and early 2014, following 
an enduring conflict between her and the director of the CPCB.
It appears that according to quantitative parameters, such as the number of initiated criminal 
proceedings and cases referred to the prosecutor’s office to initiate criminal prosecution, the 
effectiveness of CPCB operations has not diminished (in 2013, 16 cases were transferred for 
criminal persecution, which roughly corresponds to the level seen since 2007) (KNAB 2010, 19; 
KNAB 2014b, 11). These cases included several important corruption cases. In 2013, a criminal 
case initiated against two judges was referred for criminal prosecution (KNAB 2013c), a criminal 
case in the matter of defrauding the joint stock company ‘Ceļu pārvalde’ under the supervision of 
the Riga local government of approximately 73 000 lats, and the case of receiving more than five 
million EUR in bribes related to buying Mercedes-Benz buses for Riga city (KNAB 2013d). Ever 
new suspicions emerge about cases of large-scale corruption. For example, in 2013, KNAB started 
criminal proceedings on suspicions of large-scale bribery occurring over a long period, involving 
officials of the State Revenue Service (KNAB 2013e). 
Taking into account the improvements introduced in the Criminal Law and the reduced 
administrative corruption, the situation in terms of bribery has seen positive changes in comparison 
with 2007. However, overall, this problem is still rather severe.
10.3. How far do the rules and procedures for financing elections, candidates 
and elected representatives prevent their subordination to sectional 
interests?
Legal framework
Already before accession to the European Union, Latvia started amending the system of 
financing political parties, to decrease the influence of some large sponsors in politics and to 
promote transparency. In 2002, the legislature reduced the permissible amount of donations and 
introduced significant transparency requirements with regard to party donors and expenses (Čigāne 
2003, 48–54). In addition, important subsequent changes have been implemented on a number 
of occasions, and in 2014, the European Commission has recognised that ‘financing of political 
parties and pre-election campaigns are relatively transparent’ in Latvia (Eiropas Komisija (European 
Commission) 2014, 4).
Currently, the Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties) and the Pre-election 
Campaign Law establish comprehensive regulations for the sphere. According to the laws, 
information about enrolment and membership fees of political parties exceeding the amount of one 
minimum wage, as well as about donations (names and surnames of payers or donors, amounts) 
must be published in an online database maintained by the CPCB, one individual may donate no 
more than 50 minimum wages, namely, 16 000 EUR to a political party (as of early 2014), several 
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campaign expense categories (placement of advertisements, funding charities) are restricted with 
expense caps, and paid pre-election campaigns on television are not allowed within a 30-day period 
before the elections.
To curtail dependence on private sponsors, parties, which have received more than 2 % of the 
electorate’s votes in parliamentary elections, receive public funding. Additionally, the rights of all 
parliamentary candidate lists to free-of-charge broadcasting time granted by the state constitute an 
indirect state aid. Moreover, state budget funds are earmarked for creating pre-election broadcasts 
on television.
Actual situation
Before joining the European Union, it was a common occurrence in Latvia to have extremely 
expensive election campaigns – in 2002, 3.9 lats per one person with the right to vote, compared 
to amounts ranging from 0.4 lats to 2.0 lats in the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, and Austria 
(Čigāne 2003, 54). The parliamentary election campaigns became more expensive up until 2006, 
but in 2010, the expenses plummeted.
Table 10.2. Estimates on total expenses of parliamentary election campaigns
Year Sum (LVL)
1998 1 699 999 (according to parties’ reports)
2002 6 325 000 (according to NGO monitoring data). The officially reported sum also exceeded 
five million
2006 6 635 546 (according to NGO monitoring data)
2010 3 607 411 (according to parties’ reports)
Source: Kažoka 2011, 28.
Upon analysis of the situation covering a two-month period before the local government elections 
in 2005, 2009 and 2013, some parameters lead to the conclusion that the range of party donors 
has become broader and the predominance of large donors has slightly diminished. The average 
donation for the 2009 elections was 608 lats, while before the 2013 elections, only 463 lats. The 
proportion of large donations (exceeding 5000 lats) decreased from 43 % to 23 % (Kažoka 2013).
Taking into account the numerous restrictions and prohibitions, the Latvian system of funding 
parties and elections can be effective, if sufficiently strict control is exercised and penalties for 
breaches are imposed. The control of party funding falls primarily within the competence of CPCB. 
On several occasions, the CPCB has demonstrated their supervisory ability. During the 2006 election 
campaign, non-governmental organisations implemented a campaign to promote People’s Party 
(Tautas partija – TP) and the alliance between Latvia’s First Party (Latvijas Pirmā partija) and the 
Latvia’s Way Party (Latvijas ceļš – LPP/LC). By adding the respective costs to the total amount of 
the TP pre-election campaign, the CPCB imposed an obligation on the party to transfer the exceeded 
pre-election costs and the unlawfully accepted donations in the amount of nearly 1.03 million lats 
to the state budget. TP challenged the CPCB decision in court. In 2011, when the judgment came 
into force, the party was already dissolved. LPP/LC had to transfer 528 870 lats to the state budget. 
By the time the proceedings in this case ended in 2012, the successor of LPP/LC – Šlesers’ Reform 
Party (Šlesera reformu partija LPP/LC) – had been dissolved (Delna 2011–2012b).
Over time, CPCB has found many relatively small breaches of party funding regulations. 
However, in general, in recent years, election participants have been trying to keep in line with the 
law at least insofar as it concerns compliance with formal procedures.
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Negative indicators
Even though parties avoid outright breaches, unfair practices in campaigns are far from over, 
and such problems as native advertising in media and advertisements corresponding to the needs 
of specific party campaigns posted by local governments continues (Kažoka 2011, 7). Indirect 
indicators point to on-going hidden party funding and activities of elected politicians to further 
limited, hidden interests.
Within the context of party funding, attention has been drawn to cases where individuals having 
modest income have been donating large amounts (Eiropas Komisija 2014, 4–5), causing suspicion 
of intermediation in party funding (i.e. the original source of money is a third party), party funding 
from income earned in the shadow economy or transactions where the donation is given in exchange 
for a benefit ensured by the respective party. For instance, in 2012, a party had received a donation 
of 2000 from a person whose income in 2011 had only been 4 396.93 lats and debt commitments 
constituted 4685 lats. The donation appears to be linked to the fact that the donor obtained a 
better-paid job in a municipal capital enterprise (TVNET/LTV De Facto 2013; VID (State Revenue 
Service (SRS)). In 2010, several individuals had paid relatively large sums – ranging from 1000 to 
2498 lats – to a certain party, even though according to data they had reported, they did not own 
any property and their savings did not exceed 500 lats. Their publicly known amount of income 
in the position of an assistant to a member of the Saeima was relatively low, and they would have 
had to spend several months’ worth of income to cover the respective payments (DELFI 2011).
From time to time, a shadow of suspicion is cast on some members of the Saeima or parliamentary 
groups in relation to protecting limited interests in the decision-making process, even though these 
cases often cannot be linked to dependence on funders. For example, in early 2012, the President 
of the State, Andris Bērziņš, handed over the amendments to the State Boarder Law to the Saeima 
for a second review; the amendments provided for entrusting the creation of an electronic border 
crossing system to a specific society. The publicly voiced concerns pointed to the possibility that this 
society will achieve that lorries are forced to enter a paid parking lot, which, was constructed using 
European Union co-financing by a company related to Parex bank (LTV Panorāma 2012). Later 
on, the legislator charged the State Border Guard with the task of registering the queuing vehicles. 
When the National Alliance in late 2013 requested that the minister for justice Jānis Bordāns be 
dismissed from his post, some media representatives and experts explained this with the minister’s 
attempts to reform the insolvency sphere, thereby endangering the interests of the party’s sponsors 
(among sponsors, which included also insolvency administrators) (LETA 2013a; Sprance 2013).
An analysis of donations to parties shows that there are many individuals among the sponsors, 
whose business activity depends on public procurements. In 2013, journalists reported extensive 
donations given to the party Unity Party (Vienotība) by persons who are related to information 
technologies and construction companies handling procurements of public institutions or capital 
enterprises. Among donors to the Harmony Centre Party (Saskaņas centrs), there were several 
builders, who had completed procurements for Riga local government institutions (DELFI 2013). 
Therefore, there are suspicions of favouring such companies in awarding procurement contracts, 
which are related to party funders. There are also concerns about the still high overall dependence 
of parties on private sponsors. Since 2012, six parties and alliances have earned the right to receive 
annual state funding for the total amount of 442 322.50 lats (629 368.22 euros) (KNAB 2014d), 
but the permissible level of expenditures for each party before the Saeima elections of 2014 is set 
at 422 997.09 euros (besides, not all expenditures are included in this amount) (KNAB 2014a).
Court judgments that sustained the large penalties for parties, which had breached campaign 
funding rules, the introduction of state funding for parties, ever more stringent restrictions, and 
the reduced total expenditure allows concluding that the situation has improved considerably in 
comparison with 2007. However, the suspicions of hidden advertising in the media, intermediation 
in donations and the influence of party sponsors’ limited interests on the conduct of politicians lead 
to assessing the situation merely as satisfactory.
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10.4. How far is the influence of powerful corporations and business 
interests over public policy kept in check, and how free are they from 
involvement in corruption, including overseas?
Legal framework
There is no direct lobbying regulation in Latvia, and any attempts to promote the adoption 
of a lobbying law have ended with a fiasco. There are some regulatory enactments, which touch 
upon certain lobbying-related aspects. For instance, with regard to transparency, the requirement of 
including information about public participation and consultations held during the drafting process 
in the explanatory reports of draft laws must be emphasised (Paragraph 3 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Cabinet of Ministers; Paragraph 60–62 of the Procedure of Initial Impact Assessment of Draft 
Laws; Paragraph 6 of part five of Section 85 of the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima). Nevertheless, 
the laws in general do not stipulate the gathering and publishing of detailed information about the 
interaction of lobbyists and decision-makers.
In addition, regulatory enactments include individual provisions governing the relations between 
public officials and private entities in general (incl., possible lobbyists). The Law On Prevention 
of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials prohibits officials from accepting gifts when 
fulfilling duties of office (with some exceptions), and determines the restrictions for cases when the 
official must perform certain official activities with regard to the provider of the gift (Sections 13, 
131 and 132). Paragraph 9 of the Code of Ethics of the Members of the Saeima prescribes that ‘a 
deputy shall not accept a private invitation and shall not participate in an event or shall avoid such 
situations, if, as a result of that, suspicions may arise about a conflict of interest, or the prestige of 
the Saeima may suffer’.
The public can receive a partial insight in the private interests of a public official by examining 
data provided in reports submitted by public officials. In the reports, the officials provide the 
following details: place of residence, spouses, siblings and children, public office held and other 
positions and jobs; real estate owned, held in possession, or used by the official; capital shares, 
stocks, and securities, vehicles owned, savings, transactions, debt commitments and issued loans if 
they exceed 20 minimum monthly wages, and all types of income (Section 24(1) of the Law On 
Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials). In January 2014, the Saeima 
expanded the range of data to be indicated in the reports, by establishing the obligation to report 
if the public official is the true beneficial owner of assets owned by another person. The reported 
information is available publicly, apart from some exceptions established in the law.
However, adequate control of the material standing of public officials is impossible in 
circumstances where unlawfully acquired assets can be easily hidden under the name of other 
physical persons. By referring to the CPCB, the Audit of Democracy of 2005 stated that ‘no reliable 
system for declaring the income and savings of the inhabitants is created in Latvia to enable obtaining 
information about the funds that are available at the disposal of the inhabitants and keeping track 
of the circulation of these funds’ (Čigāne, Kārkliņa 2005, 132). The most important attempt in the 
legislature to resolve this issue was the adoption of the Law on the Declaration of Assets of Physical 
Persons and Undeclared Income. According to this law, the residents of Latvia, who met certain 
criteria, had to file a declaration of assets until 1 June 2012. The idea was that a public official or 
any other inhabitant could no longer refer to past savings that cannot be checked where the State 
Revenue Service has doubts about the correspondence of the person’s expenses with legal sources 
of income. The declaration of assets was a one-off measure, and its effectiveness, at least in publicly 
available sources, has not yet been comprehensively evaluated.
To intensify the control in cases where the openly reported owners of companies are not the true 
beneficial owners, the Saeima amended the Commercial Law in 2011, and prescribed an obligation 
for capital enterprises to submit a statement to the commercial registry authority about the true 
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beneficiaries (Section 171). A similar requirement was established also with regard to founders and 
owners of mass media (Section 102 of the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media). Thereby, the 
possibilities for dishonest officials to hide their actual participation in capital enterprises should be 
curtailed. However, the effectiveness of these amendments to the law is not yet clear.
Over the last decade, the political will of the Latvian legislature to achieve more transparency 
of and control over relations between politicians and private economic interests has not been steady. 
Nevertheless, the general tendency shows gradual improvements.
Actual situation
At the time that Latvia joined the European Union, within the context of corruption, there were 
special concerns about what is known as state capture – influencing laws, regulations, decisions, 
and other government action policies, by unlawfully and non-transparently offering private benefits 
to public officials. These concerns were fostered by the state capture index published in 2000 
by the World Bank, expressed as a proportion of companies influenced by state capture, which 
in the case of Latvia was 30 % (Lithuania – 11 % and Estonia – only 10 %) (The World Bank 
2000, XV, 13). Repeated studies showed improvements in the case of Latvia, but the progress 
was not sweeping. In recent years, new data about the state capture index for Latvia are not 
available; therefore, recent tendencies cannot be measured quantitatively. Taking into account the 
improvements achieved in the area of party funding, it might be expected that the situation has 
also improved in the case of state capture. Following the parliamentary election of 2011, the so-
called influence of oligarchs in the Latvian legislature appears to have diminished (Dreifelds 2013, 
319–320). At the same time, the merits of typical state capture cases as mentioned in the Audit 
of Democracy of 2005 (the three million case of Latvenergo, the economic interests of the mayor 
of Ventspils, and the introduction of digital television) have not been fully clarified (litigation is 
still pending in the latter two cases).
An indirect indicator of the extent to which public institutions are acting in public rather than 
limited private interests is the appointment of public officials. Whether state secretaries stay on after 
ministers have been replaced also serves as an approximate indicator of professionalism/level of 
politicisation of the civil service, especially in cases where the incoming minister’s party affiliation 
is different to that of their predecessor. In March 2013, out of 13 state secretaries, one had seen the 
replacement of four ministers, one worked with three, four with two, two with only one replacement, 
but five with none (i.e. they had been appointed during the current minister’s tenure). Certainly 
not all replacements meant that the minister’s party affiliation changed as well, although all state 
secretaries, who had ‘lived through’ a replacement, had also experienced at least one change of the 
minister’s party affiliation (Kalniņš 2014, 8). Although some signs of politicisation are observed, 
the civil service at least partially preserves stability in the context of political change.
The study by the Centre of Public Policy ‘Providus’ conducted in 2010 looked at a sample 
of 13 public enterprises. The boards of directors of six enterprises included individuals related to 
political parties. These six boards of directors included 19 members, of whom 10 were related to 
parties (Kalniņš, Litvins 2011, 59–61). The frequent changes of board members due to changes in 
the government, as well as lack of professional selection criteria point to the fact that the risk of the 
abuse of public assets invested in the enterprises is very high. Information about politically motivated 
appointments regularly reaches the public. For instance, in February 2014, the appointment of the 
former head of the Prime Minister’s office to the board of the ‘Rīga’ international airport reached 
the news (DELFI 2014), whereas in April, the appointment of the deputy chair of the board of the 
Reform Party (Reformu partija) to the board of the Freeport of Ventspils Authority (LETA 2014).
Protests from the public flaring up from time to time against political corruption and the power 
of oligarchs (such as campaigns in 2007 against the dismissal of Aleksejs Loskutovs and in 2011 
against the oligarchs), it appears, to a certain extent restrict political corruption. However, direct 
Valts Kalniņš. INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC LIFE 191
attempts to combat state capture have led to rather modest results, even though there have been 
numerous attempts to do so since 2004.
Negative indicators
Leaked materials from what has been referred to as the oligarch criminal trial gave an unusually 
detailed insight into how limited interests have influenced officials’ decisions. One of the episodes 
referred to the year 2010, when the deputy chair of the Riga City Council and the chairman of the 
board of directors at the Freeport of Riga Authority, Ainārs Šlesers, was elected to the Saeima, and, 
according to the law, he had to leave the previous posts outside the Saeima. A. Šlesers tried to make 
sure that the position at the Freeport of Riga Authority was assumed by his then fellow party member 
Andris Ameriks. A. Šlesers allegedly had agreed with Aivars Lembergs that the latter would ensure 
that A. Ameriks is backed for the position at the Freeport of Riga Authority by the representative of 
Union of Greens and Farmers Party (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība). As compensation, Šlesers had 
undertaken to ensure an advertising contract with SIA Mediju Nams, which was under the control of 
A. Lembergs. The advertisements would be bought by the Freeport Authority or the airline AirBaltic 
through the Riga municipal foundation ‘Live Riga’, including covert advertising for the political 
party of A. Šlesers (Pietiek 2011; Delna 2013b). A. Ameriks was indeed elected to the post of the 
chairman of the Freeport, and he is still in that position at the time of preparing this report.
Following the collapse of the Maxima supermarket in Riga in November 2013, allegations were 
made in the public space (including by the minister for economics) claiming that the pressure of 
the construction industry was one of the causes for delaying increased safety and quality standards 
in construction (Lēvalde, Ķirsons 2013). Nevertheless, these claims do not confirm the existence 
of corruption, although they do constitute grounds for concerns that limited economic interests can 
influence government policy to such an extent that can even cause threats to public safety. 
Since it has not been possible in Latvia up to now to lawfully establish the merits of several of 
the largest alleged cases of state capture and final decisions in several important litigations cannot be 
expected in the foreseeable future, the non-transparent exercise of interests and ineffective judicial 
processes force us to assess the situation as poor (which, nevertheless, is better than the extremely 
critical assessment of 2005 and 2007).
10.5. How much confidence do people have that public officials and public 
services are free of corruption?
The opinions among the population of Latvia are rather diverse regarding what political 
corruption is. In 2008 and 2014, surveys were conducted (SKDS 2008; DA (Audit of Democracy) 
2014) asking respondents to select from given situations that they believe to be political corruption. 
Moreover the situations proposed in the survey covered not only typical situations corresponding to 
narrow definitions of corruption (such as when a politician accepts or asks for an unofficial payment 
to make a certain political decision), but also breeches of party funding regulations and manifestations 
of nepotism (for instance, appointing persons affiliated with the party to advantageous state paid 
positions), symptoms which could point to corruption (such as expensive gifts (trips, vehicles) given 
to politicians), but could also be explained otherwise, and signs of bad governance (such as making 
a political decision without engaging the general public in the discussions).
At least one third of the population of Latvia would categorise all of these cases as corruption. 
Many tend to use this term to refer to cases that most experts would not call corruption. Moreover, 
the predominance of this opinion has increased with regard to all of the aforementioned situations. 
Overall, the tendency to refer to various negative occurrences in politics as corruption has been 
increasing. In regard to the seven situations in the survey, the increase has reached even ten percentage 
points. If the use of the concept ‘corruption’ is interpreted as a manifestation of intolerance, it 
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has increased the most (by about 14–17 percentage points) with regard to appointing individuals 
affiliated with the party to posts, acceptance of unlawful donations to fund the party’s activity, 
and backing political decisions favourable for companies of individuals affiliated with the party. 
Therefore, condemnation of situations related to the dishonest conduct of parties has increased 
considerably.
However, the public not only condemns, but also tolerates corruption. This tolerance is 
manifested as the attitude towards allegations, which indirectly justify the need to live with it, 
voicing incapacity or indifference. Since 2008, the proportion of people that believe that a situation 
where politicians are thieves can be acceptable as long as they take care of the rest of society, has 
decreased (from 31.3 % to 26.2 %) (in 2014, about the same number of respondents believed that 
a politician’s professional competence is more important than their honesty). Still more than half of 
the respondents agree to statements voicing a certain fatalism, namely, that everybody is corrupt in 
politics, nobody is better than the rest and that everybody, upon becoming a politician, would try to 
use the position for personal good. Moreover, the highest increase has been seen in the proportion of 
respondents that consider information about cases of political corruption as too biased and unreliable 
to understand who is and who is not guilty. This answer was given by more than two thirds of 
Table 10.3. Various views exist as to what constitutes political corruption. Please indicate 
which of the below-mentioned situations could be considered as political corruption, in your 
opinion, %
2008 2014
The situation when a politician takes or asks for an unofficial payment to make a poli-
tical decision
71.2 77.7
Appointing a person close to one’s party to a lucrative, official, government-paid 
position
52.7 70.2
Expensive gifts (trips, cars, etc.) for politicians 52.5 65.3
The inexpedient use of government property (resources) 48.7 58.2
Greater financial support from the state budget to local governments that are led by 
people who are connected with a specific party
48.1 57.0
The support or adoption of political decisions that benefit companies belonging to peo-
ple who are close to a specific party
46.9 61.1
The acceptance of illegal donations to finance a party’s activities 44.9 60.4
The situation when a decision that benefits only a part of society is supported 44.0 48.9
Political decision-making that is influenced by lobbyists 41.8 52.4
The allocation of state funding without clear criteria 36.1 46.8
The expenditure of funding for pre-election campaigns that exceeds the sum permitted 
by law
34.5 47.7
Political decision-making without discussions with the general public 30.9 35.8
The adoption of a controversial political decision that is not sufficiently justified 28.6 35.6
Other 0.7 0.1
None of the above 0.6 1.9
Difficult to tell 6.1 4.7
Source: SKDS (2008; published partially for the first time in: Kalniņš 2009); Audit of Democracy 2014, Table F1
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citizens, and that could point to difficulties in distinguishing between corrupt (and hence not to be 
backed) election candidates from candidates who are not corrupt. Overall, about one quarter of the 
people of Latvia are rather tolerant of corruption.
Table 10.4. Please choose to what extent you agree with these statements, %
Year Agree Do not 
agree
Difficult to tell, 
no answer
Information about cases of political corruption 
is too complicated to tell who is and who is not 
guilty.
2008 60.1 23.9 16.0
2014 70.7 18.4 10.9
Information about cases of political corruption is 
too difficult to tell who is and who is not guilty.
2008 64.0 24.6 11.4
2014 71.1 20.4 8.5
Everybody, upon assuming a political office, would 
try to use the position for personal good.
2008 56.1 29.5 14.3
2014 58.9 30.8 10.3
Everybody in politics is corrupt, nobody is better 
than others.
2008 53.2 35.4 11.4
2014 54.9 37.1 8.0
It is OK to back a politician, who is a thief, as long 
as they are taking care of the rest of society.
2008 31.3 58.4 10.3
2014 26.2 69.5 4.3
Politician’s professional competence is more im-
portant than their honesty.
2008 26.5 58.4 15.1
2014 26.3 60.7 13.0
I am not particularly concerned about breaches in 
political party funding.
2008 28.8 55.7 15.5
2014 33.1 56.1 10.8
There are countries, where there is practically no 
political corruption.
2008 27.0 41.0 31.9
2014 26.6 43.9 29.5
Source: SKDS (2008; published partially for the first time in: Kalniņš 2009); Audit of Democracy 2014, Table F4.
Even though the attitudes are rather diverse, unanimity is reached only with regard to the 
general question about the prevalence of corruption. According to the Eurobarometer survey, 83 % 
of respondents recognised that corruption is widespread in Latvia. Therefore, Latvia ranked 16th out 
of 28 European Union Member States (Eiropas Komisija 2014, 20 (European Commission)). Within 
the global context, Latvia is slightly above the average. Furthermore, the situation has changed 
since 2003. According to the World Bank’s corruption control indicator, Latvia, within the global 
comparison, has ranged between 60th and 66th percentile (the higher the percentile, the better the 
corruption control). At the time of accession to the European Union in 2004, the indicator for Latvia 
was +0.14 (on a scale of –2.5 to +2.5), whereas in 2012, it reached +0.15 (the best result for Latvia 
was 0.32 in 2005 shortly before the crisis; a significant decrease down to +0.13 was recorded in 
2008) (The World Bank Group 2013).
Nevertheless, upon comparing the survey data of 2007 and 2012, it can be concluded that 
the trust of the people in the integrity of public institutions within the context of corruption has 
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increased. Though, it must be noted that the assessment of specific institutions is notably different. 
The best assessment of integrity in 2012 was given to the State Fire and Rescue Service (1.13 on a 
scale from –2 to +2; in 2007 it was 0.74), out of public institutions followed by the State Audit Office 
(0.72; in 2007 it was 0.34), and the State Social Insurance Agency (0.63). The lowest assessment 
results were seen in the case of the Privatisation Agency (–0.17; in 2007 it was –0.57), CM (–0.27; 
in 2007 it was –0.75) and the Saeima (–0.34; in 2007 it was –0.66) (LF, KNAB 2012).
In comparison to 2005, the importance of the topic of corruption in the mass media has 
diminished; however, it has not disappeared altogether (Kalniņš, Ķirse 2012, 158–159). Therefore, 
for instance, the weekly magazine Ir and some television broadcasts still regularly prepare materials 
about possible corruption in public and local government authorities, and about some party funding 
cases. It is paradoxical that it may be the weakened media coverage that can have led to increased 
public trust in the institutions. However, the survey data allow us to assess the current situation as 
satisfactory.
Summary: Progress over the last decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
10.1. X
10.2. X
10.3. X
10.4. X
10.5. X
Best feature
The overall comprehensive legal regulation in the area of anti-corruption, corresponding to 
international standards.
Most serious problem
Impossibility to complete complex corruption criminal cases within a reasonable period.
Suggested improvements
• Consolidate the responsibility of heads of institutions for the control of conflicts of interest and 
promote considering conflicts of interest on merits.
• Encourage reporting on corrupt criminal offences and create a comprehensive whistle-blower 
protection system.
• Continue looking for ways to make criminal proceedings more effective.
• Increase public funding to political parties.
• Improve the management of public and local government enterprises.
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11. THE MEDIA IN A DEMOCRATIC  
SOCIETY
Ojārs Skudra, Ilze Šulmane, Vita Dreijere
Do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values?
Introduction
In the Audit of Democracy for 2005, upon examining the role of media in a democratic society 
(Kruks, Šulmane 2005), a well-organised regulatory framework and the diversity of the media 
were recognised as the best features. Whereas the most serious problems were recognised as 
the existence of two information spaces with differing orientations, the dependence of public 
electronic media on state funding, insufficient information about media owners, weakness of 
analytical and investigative journalism, lack of a uniform understanding of the role and functions 
of journalism, difficulties experienced by specialist and high-quality publications in staying afloat 
under the circumstances of commercialisation and the limited media market, as well as the lack 
of an organisation to review citizens’ complaints about ethical breaches on the part of journalists.
Over the last decade, the media system has experienced trends typical of other democratic 
countries – reduced number of daily newspapers, difficulties funding and maintaining investigative 
journalism, reduced audiences for public electronic media and the rapid entry of new media. The 
economic crisis experienced in Latvia in 2008–2010 has also affected the media. Because of the 
crisis, the purchasing power of the population decreased, and many gave up subscriptions of printed 
press; furthermore, the ad market also shrank – for newspapers and journals by 59% (Ruduša 
2009). The Latvian media has lost nearly half of the funds they once gathered from advertising, 
resulting in a reduction in media and decreased volumes of original content (Rožukalne 2013, 22).
The influence of politics on journalism has remained as parallelism of the editorial line of the 
media and the activity of political parties, leaving also a certain positive impact on the processes 
of the formation of civic society. In interviews, newspaper journalists have openly confirmed their 
direct involvement in ensuring publicity for parties and candidates (Šulmane, Kruks 2007, 72). 
In the assessment of the media role performed within the framework of the integration audit 
of 2010 (Šulmane 2010a, 252–253), the external pluralism of the media and good accessibility to 
media in Latvian and Russian are stated as the greatest achievements, whereas commercialisation 
of media and political parallelism were mentioned as factors that delay the guarantee of the internal 
diversity of information.
11.1. How independent are the media from government, how pluralistic is 
their ownership, and how free are they from subordination to foreign 
governments or multinational companies?
Legal framework and public media policy
In addition to the Constitution (Satversme) of the Republic of Latvia, and in particular 
Chapter VIII on fundamental rights, the work of the media in Latvia is primarily governed by three 
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framework documents: The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media of the Republic of Latvia 
adopted in 1990 (LR AP (Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia)/ LR Saeima (Saeima of the 
Republic of Latvia) 1990/2014), the Electronic Mass Media Law adopted in 2010 (LR Saeima 
2010/2014), and the Audio-visual Media Services Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council adopted in 2010 (AVMSD 2010). There are three other laws that are important for the 
work of the media in Latvia, namely: the Pre-election Campaign Law (LR Saeima 2012/2014), 
Advertising Law adopted in 1999 (LR Saeima 1999/2014) and the Electronic Communications 
Law adopted in 2004 (LR Saeima 2004/2014). The Law on the Press, which has undergone nine 
amendments, does not employ the concept ‘democracy’, and the wording of provisions is dominated 
by vagueness. Owing to this law, censorship in the Republic of Latvia is not prohibited but rather 
‘is not allowed’, just as the ‘monopolisation of mass information media’ is not allowed. Subjects 
of the freedom of the press are persons or groups of persons, public authorities, enterprises and 
organisations, who ‘are entitled to freely voice their views and opinions, issue statements’ and 
‘receive information’ through the mass media; however, agreements in civil law only prescribe ‘the 
duty of the editorial board to publish the founder’s or publisher’s materials’ (LR AP/ LR Saeima 
1990/2014). Even though the law in terms of its contents can be considered inadequate for the 
age of new information and communication technologies, the legislator of Latvia does not wish to 
radically modernise it or replace it with a new legislative enactment.
These problems of inadequacy are partially resolved with the Electronic Mass Media Law, 
which was adopted during this audit period. The legislator has proclaimed that the aim of the law 
is ‘to ensure the freedom of speech and voicing opinions, universal access to socially important 
information, and unhindered maintenance and development of a free, democratic discussion, by 
opening up opportunities for all inhabitants of Latvia to form opinions independently about the 
processes taking place in the country, and thereby, foster individual participation as a citizen of a 
democratic society in the development of decisions related to these processes’ (Saeima 2010/2014). 
In defining the general regulations for creating electronic mass media (EMM) broadcasts, the law 
prescribes that EMM ‘while respecting the multitude of opinions, protects the idea of an independent, 
democratic, and judicial State of Latvia, respects human rights, and acts in the interests of the public 
of Latvia’ (Saeima 2010/2014). Even though, this deals only with ‘the idea’ rather than with practice, 
the law can be regarded as a step in the direction of codifying the democratic role of the media.
The law governing the public EMM contains some contradictions. In describing ‘a public 
order’ as ‘financed and supervised’ by the public, the law points out that ‘the funding required’ for 
the performance of functions of the National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEMMC) and ‘to 
ensure the fulfilment of public commissions is allotted from the state budget’ (Saeima 2010/2014). 
In regard to the activities of public EMMs, emphasis is not placed on democratic participation, but 
rather on the formation of ‘a well-founded and free opinion’, ‘patriotic attitude’, ‘educating’ the 
population, and promoting ‘a civic understanding’ in the population (ibid). The law prescribes the 
establishment and activities of NEMMC, by assigning an important role to the national strategy for 
developing the electronic mass media sector.
The Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council is important for a number of 
ideas and goals aimed at the future. This, firstly, refers to measures intended to ‘enable and ensure a 
transfer from domestic markets to a single market for creating and distributing broadcasts’, and ‘the 
growing social and democratic importance’ of audio-visual media services as ‘a service of culture 
and economy’ in an information society, in particular ‘by ensuring freedom of information, diversity 
of opinions, and media pluralism, as well as education and culture’ (AMPD 2010). The Directive 
is aimed at ‘completing the formation of an internal market and facilitating the introduction of a 
single information space’, while preserving the co-existence of ‘private and state’ service providers, 
modernising the legal framework, not affecting the independence of Member States ‘in developing 
the union culture and preserving cultural diversity’, governing only those forms of mass media that 
‘inform, entertain, and educate broad audiences’, ensuring ‘a free flow of information and audio-
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visual broadcasts on the domestic market’, and calling upon the Member States to ensure protection 
against ‘the formation of a dominant position that would lead to restrictions of pluralism and 
freedom of television information or to restrictions of freedom of the information sector in general’, 
including situations when ‘a broadcaster located in the territory of one Member State broadcasts 
content that is fully or predominantly intended for the territory of another Member State’ (ibid).
State media policy issues that up until 2014 had traditionally included such spheres as domestic 
freedom of press, private and public media (dual structure), division of competences in the field of 
media, changes in the media sector brought about by the development of new media (Hesse, Ellwein 
2012, 249–250), had been largely ignored but lately have seen a rapid increase in attention due to 
the massive pressure by Russia’s foreign policy propaganda on the Russian-speakers of Ukraine 
and other post-Soviet countries with the aim of achieving support for Russia’s activities – the 
annexation of Crimea forming a part of Ukraine and co-operation with the proclaimed ‘republics’ 
in the southeast of Ukraine.
Media owners
The most significant changes in the sphere of media owners are linked to changes in the 
ownership of daily newspapers. Investors, whose interest is the media business and not political 
influence, cannot afford extensive long-term losses; understandably, the large foreign investor 
Bonnier left the Latvian media market, and as a result the newspaper Diena was sold and rapidly 
lost its influence and readership. Interviews with the former leaders and journalists of Diena show 
that the new owners instructed them not to criticise A. Šķēle, A. Šlesers, and A. Lembergs (Šulmane 
2011a). Likewise, the newspaper Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze Latvijai (NRA) still has an unclear editorial 
policy, in many spheres demonstrating diverse opinions, but with the assistance of certain staff 
members providing support to the influential mayor of Ventspils A. Lembergs.
The Telegraf newspaper has turned into a liberal centrist-inclined weekly publication of little 
importance, whereas the Čas newspaper, which fought over readership with the best-selling daily 
newspaper in Latvia Vesti segodnja, was incorporated with the latter, and as the most successful 
newspaper, continues to be published with a circulation of 12 500–13 000 copies. 
The names of offshore companies appear as the Russian newspaper publishers, and the lists of 
company leaders change so frequently that it is difficult to keep track of these changes; however, with 
the increasing influence of Russia, and as Russian-speaking parties consolidate and the ‘Saskaņas 
centrs’ party is actively trying to get a place in government, Russian investors have become more 
active.
There is no newspaper among the largest newspapers in Latvia, about which should not be any 
doubt concerning the owners and true beneficiaries (Rožukalne 2013, 148).
Regional newspapers find it difficult to compete with publications established by local 
governments that are placing ads, thus encumbering the financial circumstances of alternative 
publications (Jelgava is one example). Therefore, the boundaries between journalism and public 
relations are made increasingly vague.
The re-broadcasting of Russian radio channels or their co-operation with Latvian channels 
broadcasting in Russian is observed in the field of private radio.
By the later stage of the audit period, all of the largest Latvian news portals ended up owned 
by Estonian media companies. In the fall of 2013, the Scandinavian media group Schibsted sold 
the Tvnet portal to Eesti Meedia, while in the spring of 2014, this Estonian company bought the 
Apollo portal from SIA Sanoma, which is owned by a Finnish media group. The Delfi portal has 
been owned by the Estonian Ekspress Grupp since 2007.
During the period of the report, the ownership of national electronic media has also changed. 
The independence of LNT from the owners’ political interests was questioned when the co-owner 
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS LATVIA?204
of the channels, A. Ēķis, assumed the post of a council chair at the Par labu Latviju union. In early 
2012, the Modern Times Group announced the purchase of LNT and TV5, which meant that two of 
the largest commercial television channels – LNT and TV3  – were now in the hands of one owner. 
The conditions for the merger established by the Competition Council are an important contextual 
factor that creates a precedent, including the obligation to preserve independent and unaffiliated 
news editorial boards and the provision of news to at least the same extent as up to now, as well 
as including an item in the job description of programme editors that would consolidate editorial 
independence from the media owner.
In terms of regulations, independence from media owners is one of the advantages of public 
media. To promote the ties to the owner of the public media, namely, society, the model of 
administering and funding public media is important. In the case of Latvia, after the adoption of the 
Electronic Mass Media Law, the public media funding also depends on annual political decisions, 
and this promotes the possibility of political pressure. The national strategy for EMM sector 
development for 2012–2017 does not envisage the implementation of ‘a change in the legal status 
of public media’ or the introduction of ‘a public co-payment to ensure the financial independence 
of the public media’ (EPLNANS 2014). 
The Electronic Mass Media Law still prescribes that NEMMC member candidates are put forth 
by the Saeima Human Rights and Public Affairs Committee and elected by the Saeima. Therefore, 
the direct link between NEMMC members and political parties is weakened. During the report 
period, the potential for a pluralism of opinions among the NEMMC has decreased because the 
number of council members has been reduced from nine to five.
Amendments were introduced to the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media in September of 
2011, prescribing changes in the procedure for registering media, by establishing that more detailed 
information about the owners must be given; furthermore, the concept of editorial independence 
was also introduced to the law.
In the national strategy for the development of the EMM sector, it has been reasonably concluded 
that ‘as a result of an unregulated free market, two different (in the sense of language, geopolitics, 
democratic traditions and culture) information spaces have developed in Latvia’ (EPLNANS 2014). 
According to the representative SKDS survey data, 24.1 % of respondents agreed and 23.0 % 
partially agreed with the statement that journalists in Latvia are serving the interests of the owners 
and not those of society. At the same time, 41.3 % fully agreed that the contents are what matter 
and the owner’s persona is irrelevant, and an additional 19.9 % rather agreed with this viewpoint 
(DA (Audit of Democracy) 2014, Table G4).
Foreign influence
No balance has been achieved in the electronic media sphere between purchasing cheap mass-
produced (US and Russian movies) products in various channel packages, on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, the inclusion of European and local cinematographic works and channels in the 
content. There is a considerable amount of Russian channels – information, entertainment, cinema 
and culture programmes – included in TV cable operator packages. Only recently, in response to 
intensive Russian foreign policy propaganda and the dissatisfaction of the public, such Western 
channels as BBC, CNN, RTL, Sat1, Euronews and ARTE were also included.
The study by J. Juzefovičs shows that the younger non-Latvian generation is less interested in 
the processes taking place in Russia; however, broadcasts from Russia, including material about 
Latvia, are consumed by the older family members. The Russian-speaking audiences does not 
trust Latvian public TV, seeing it as official state propaganda; therefore, they prefer Russian news 
(Latvijas Laiks) on PBK and news on channel TV5 (Juzefovičs 2013, 174–191).
The possible influence and concerns about this became particularly topical as the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict started and the annexation of Crimea took place. However, this was already in the national 
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strategy of the development of the EMM sector, where it was stated that ‘Russia is employing 
electronic media with the purpose of exercising soft power and shaping the public opinion of the 
inhabitants of Latvia in order to promote its geopolitical interests ‘ (EPLNANS 2014). What counter 
measures are observed in the media space?
Firstly, activities related to the establishment of the media policy department under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Culture must be mentioned. Secondly, there have been active discussions about 
and implementation of several measures to restrict the impact of foreign information for a fixed 
time, such as a three-month prohibition on re-broadcasting the television channel Rossija RTR, and 
the initiation of administrative violation proceedings after alleged violations in a PBK broadcast 
Laiks about the events in Ukraine. Thirdly, financial support and enhancing the public media news 
programme and the LPM (Latvian Public Media) online version in Russian has been suggested, as 
has holding discussions at the government level about a single channel for the Baltic States in the 
Russian language.
It must be added that in March 2014, in comparison with February, PBK viewership saw the 
biggest increase, and in April, due to deteriorated availability of TV3 resulting from the conflict 
between Lattelecom and MTG, it became the TV channel with the biggest viewership in Latvia. In 
late June 2014, TV3 was once again included in Lattelecom’s basic cable TV package.
Currently, 14.4 % of the inhabitants of Latvia watch mostly or only Russian TV channels, 
whereas another 28.2 % watch Russian TV channels more often than Latvian TV channels. However, 
23.7 % watch mostly Latvian TV channels, but 26.0 % watch Latvian TV channels more often than 
Russian TV channels. Further, 29 % of Latvian citizens and 61.2 % of respondents without Latvian 
citizenship fully or rather trust the Russian official power mouthpieces NTV Mir, RTR Planeta and 
REN TV. In addition, 38.9 % of inhabitants, 42.5 % of Latvian citizens, and 20 % of respondents 
without Latvian citizenship agreed to the suggestion that there has been an increase in the influence 
of Russian political propaganda, whereas 28.8 % of inhabitants of Latvia, 25 % of Latvian citizens 
and 48.5 % of respondents without Latvian citizenship disagreed with that suggestion (DA 2014, 
Tables G2, G3).
The survey data also show that most of the inhabitants of Latvia without Latvian citizenship 
fall within the coverage of Russian soft power, along with Russian-speaking households. Since there 
is no reason to consider this portion of the inhabitants as a united group of opinion and the efforts 
of Russia to maintain its influence is not going to diminish, the situation from the viewpoint of 
a functioning political democracy might be regarded as satisfactory. However, it must be pointed 
out that the influence of Russian propaganda is massive and cannot always be recognisable; by 
intensively criticising the State of Latvia and its internal affairs, Russian propaganda also affects a 
part of the Latvian audience. Therefore, taking into account the fact that information about media 
owners and true beneficiaries has also not been made easily available to the public, as well as due 
to the reduced diversity of opinions resulting from takeovers of newspapers and the concentration of 
commercial TV channel owners, the overall the situation in this field must be viewed as deteriorated 
in comparison with the previous report period.
11.2. How representative are the media of different opinions and how 
accessible are they to different sections of society?
Legal framework
The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media interprets the freedom of the press as the ‘right to 
free expression of views and opinions, making statements’, thereby ‘receiving information through 
them’ (LR AP/LR Saeima 1990/2014); however, the diversity and availability of views is left 
without due attention. The Law on Electronic Mass Media is considerably more democratic, as it 
prescribes ‘maintaining and developing a free, democratic discussion’ as its objective and provides 
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for ‘respecting the diversity of views’, ‘promoting opinion exchange’, ‘observing the diversity of 
Latvian society in the social, economic, regional, educational, cultural, and religious sense’, ‘for 
each member of society to be able to shape a well-reasoned and free opinion’, but at the same time 
‘the idea of an independent, democratic State of Latvia, subject to the rule of law, must be protected’ 
(Saeima 2010/2014). The national strategy for the development of the sector of electronic mass 
media as the practical policy document is limited to the commitment of ‘promoting democracy, 
rule of law and civil participation in Latvia’; however, the need to ensure ‘diversity of opinions’ 
is mentioned only when referring to the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(EPLNANS 2014). 
However, the lack of a thoroughly considered state media policy can also be perceived as a 
factor which has de facto fostered a great diversity of opinions both in Latvian media and in the 
public space, in particular in its virtual manifestation. The extreme forms of this diversity sometimes 
borders on politically extreme views or can be regarded as such. The legal framework of Latvia in 
the field of media has also to a great extent facilitated the formation of this situation.
Accessibility
The Latvian press structure includes the availability of various types of newspapers and journals 
in Latvian and Russian. Overall, the accessibility of the press is ensured; however, due to increased 
costs, the growing popularity of internet news portals, and digital versions of newspapers, as well as 
the influence of changes in the delivery conditions, subscription figures have decreased. According to 
data from Latvijas Pasts (Latvian Postal Service) – the largest press distributor in Latvia – in January 
2006, there were 616 621 press subscriptions, of which 38.12 % were subscriptions for magazines. 
Only about 445 000 press subscriptions were made in 2014, of which 61 % were subscriptions for 
magazines; in addition, 78 % of all subscriptions were taken out in rural areas, whereas Riga and 
the largest cities of Latvia experienced only 22 % of all press subscriptions (Latvijas Pasts). The 
circulation of a single publication of the three daily newspapers issued in Latvian has decreased from 
141 200 copies in 2006 to 79 900 copies in 2012, whereas the number of Russian daily newspapers 
from four has come down to three, and the circulation of a single edition from 76.3 thousand copies 
in 2006 to 30 420 copies in 2012 (Gailīte et al 2007, Līce et al 2013). 
Starting from 1 January 2012, Latvijas Pasts no longer delivers press on Saturdays, and the 
editorial offices of newspapers and the readers must adapt to this situation. People in rural areas 
receive daily newspapers with delays.
The data from TNS Latvia show that the availability of the internet has increased significantly 
during the report period. In the fall of 2005, 19 % of the population aged 15 to 74 had an internet 
connection at home, but already in 2006, internet availability in households had increased to 42 %, 
and in 2012, to 67 % and more (TNS Yearbook 2006, 2012/2013).
The biggest problem is accessibility to television. The exclusion of TV3 from the Lattelecom 
package (albeit for a short period) and the soon expected termination of the agreement with LNT 
(MTG) aggravate the issue of the rights of Latvian viewers to consume TV products made in 
Latvia and the guarantee that these rights be respected in a situation, when the economic interests 
of commercial channels and service providers clash. The problem of accessibility also arose due to 
the fact that on 1 June 2010, Latvia stopped analogue terrestrial broadcasting. As proven by data and 
journalistic research, people residing in the border area still live in the information space of Russia 
and Belarus, which is perceived as a social problem by most of these people. Nevertheless, it is a 
matter of national information security, and the state should be investing every effort to guarantee 
access to national broadcasting channels and programmes across the territory of Latvia. 
Overall, the media structure ensures bilingual functioning of all channels and types of media. 
There are problems with regard to (1) the offer in other national minorities’ languages and 
guaranteeing quality news broadcasts about Latvia in Russian on public TV; (2) the provision of 
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national channel broadcasts across the territory of Latvia and for all groups of inhabitants; (3) cable 
operators offering balanced TV packages including original broadcasts and Latvian movies in the 
minimum offer.
Radio broadcasts show a better situation, although the radio channel Klasika is not available 
in equally good quality everywhere in Latvia. The availability of LR4, however, is best ensured for 
urbanites, who are the absolute majority of the audience for that channel.
Use
Access to media does not imply their use; as evidenced by studies, in the majority of cases 
people choose to consume the media they trust.
Daily newspaper consumption has decreased rapidly. In 2011, the readership of daily newspapers 
reached 24 % of the Latvian population aged 15 to 74 years, and this is a decrease by 23 % in 
comparison with 2005 (TNS Latvia 2006, 2012/2013). Magazines are still popular, especially lifestyle 
and women’s weekly magazines Ieva, Privātā Dzīve, Kas Jauns. Upon comparing the circulation 
of these magazines with the circulation of the social political magazine Ir and the magazine for 
intellectuals Rīgas Laiks, it must be concluded that the consumption of quality press has decreased 
in Latvia.
Upon comparing radio channels, it is evident that the Latvian music channel LR2 still enjoys 
popularity, no changes are observed in the public radio audience: the channel still attracts relatively 
older audiences, whereas the share of viewers of the public channel LTV1 in overall TV viewership 
is decreasing. Among audiences of ethnic minorities, LTV is often described as a television for 
Latvians about Latvians in the Latvian language (Juzefovičs 2012, 35).
Use of the internet is still increasing, even among the older groups of the population. As 
evidenced by TNS data, the most frequent online activity in the spring of 2012 was browsing search 
engines. The second most popular activity online among the population of Latvia is reading online 
news portals. In the spring of 2012, browsing social networking sites moved up from fourth position 
to third (TNS Latvia 2012/2013).
As mentioned before, the use of media is related to trusting the media and also journalists, 
and this trust overall has decreased since 2006 (when trust in internet was first measured) (see 
Table 11.1).
Table 11.1. Trust of Latvian citizens in mass media
                 Mass media
Year Television Radio Press Internet
2006 65 61 50 39
2013 60 61 46 46
Source: Eurobarometer 66, 2006; Eurobarometer 80, 2013.
It must be added that 24.1 % of the Latvian population does not trust any mass media, and 
they value their personal experience higher than any media source (DA 2014, Table G4). However, 
trust in mass media is considerably higher than in Latvian political parties, government and the 
Parliament.
Diversity and representation of opinions
In a study of representative political communication culture, which took place in eight countries 
of the European Union (EU) and in Switzerland and was published in 2014, it was pointed out that 
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three broad democratic ideals united by core values translate to three specific media functions in 
a democratic society: (1) the elite democratic model, where power is entrusted with the elite, but 
the most important function of media is transparency; (2) the electoral-representative model of a 
pluralistic democracy, which relates to group representation as the media function; (3) democracy 
preferring the participation ideal and in which the primary media function is enabling citizens 
(Håkansson, Mayerhöffer 2014, 128).
According to this division, the opinions of the population of Latvia were sought in a survey 
conducted by SKDS, asking the respondents to state how much they agree with these descriptions 
of the role of media. The results show that irrespective of nationality, language used at home, or 
citizenship status, the role of the media as the party explaining the elite’s decisions is fully supported 
by 68.9 % of respondents, the representative model was supported by 42.3 % overall, but more 
(58,3 %) by people of other nationalities and those who are speaking Russian at home; and  by 
people without Latvian citizenship (51,3 %). Only 39.8 % of the Latvian population fully agreed 
with the suggestion that the task of the media is to encourage the users’ ability to participate in 
political processes in person; however, also in this case 8–10 % of other nationalities, Russian-
speakers and non-citizens of Latvia gave an affirmative answer (DA 2014).
The pluralism of opinions in Latvian media is rather widespread, and it does not necessarily 
serve the purposes of democracy – it is often hostile towards the policy of the continuity of the 
state, contrary to the key foreign and internal affairs policy guidelines of the state and to the official 
discourse of the history of Latvia (recognition of the occupation and the continuity of the state). 
This is practically manifested as the spread of distrust in the EU and, in particular, in NATO, by 
means of provincial populism, a narrow understanding of Latvian national interests, and a rather 
overt anti-Americanism.
TV and radio 
Since commercial television channels are also creating news programmes and their own original 
social political broadcasts, in general, this ensures the pluralism of opinions. In this respect, some 
concerns are raised in relation to the MTG group, which now owns several TV channels, and this 
means that they now are in a situation that is not far from a dominant position.
The public commission related to the introduction of new channel offers, as channel TV3 has 
left broadcasting, has not proven to be particularly successful, as one of the television channels is 
not receiving funding, and the ratings of the rest are low (NEMMC 2014).
The fact that a markedly commercial approach on the part of the cable operators is observed in 
preparing their packages of channels rather promotes the dominance of opinions instead of diversity, 
and this is also indicative of the lack of a national regulatory policy and indifference towards 
meeting the cultural needs of low-income viewership.
Among the public media, Latvijas Radio (Latvian Radio) is more successful, as it appeals to 
audiences speaking differing languages and to special target groups (Radio Klasika, LR2). LR4 
in the Russian language is one of the positive examples in the sphere of public media confirming 
the ability of its creators to speak to its audiences. As regards the management of Latvian public 
television channels, the agenda includes ensuring constant broadcast times for the most important 
programmes, such as newscasts in Russian; promoting the creation of new original broadcast formats, 
as well as finding attractive and trust-building hosts and efforts to keep them on public television. 
The channel LTV7, offering sports broadcasts and interesting documentary programmes, deserves 
the most criticism for the fact that due to inconsistency of programmes it cannot attract permanent 
audiences that are loyal to the channel. Public TV channels must be more active in advertising in 
media consumed by audiences that are not yet the viewers of these channels.
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Internet
Communication researchers have emphasised the positive impact of the internet on the quality 
of democracy, for instance, the potential for diversifying civil participation formats and promoting 
the civil participation of youth, fostering access to media content and diversifying interactivity 
possibilities are stressed (Dahlgren 2005; Coleman, Gotze 2001; Ostman 2012; Howard 2006).
When relating the quality of democracy to the level of awareness among citizens, one of the 
aspects is the increased amount of information originating from new media. However, this trend 
is not necessarily linked to increased awareness, as the increased quantity of information and the 
speed of information flow are linked to certain risks, which specifically affect the new media – this 
applies to distributing information that has not been verified (and is often false). The expansion of 
unverified and imprecise information in the public space can have several adverse effects, including 
a lack of trust in professional journalism, and this adversely affects democracy. Even though reading 
the news is one of the most popular online activities, the search for and consumption of news of 
primarily entertaining nature is not necessarily linked to positive effects as far as the quality of 
democracy is concerned. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that practically only commercial 
organisations are operating online and their primary aim is to earn profits.
Likewise, an important aspect is that blogs are not ranking highly among the most popular 
internet sites. A tendency can be observed in Latvia that blogs with the highest readership are blogs 
that are dedicated to a specific thematic niche and various lifestyle topics (such as technologies, 
cooking, fashion), but not to social political themes (Gemius blog ratings, see: www.audience.
gemius.lv). 
In regard to the potential of internet democratisation, the aspect of interactivity must be 
emphasised, as interactivity, in turn, leads to the potential for dialogue and conflict alike. In this 
sense, the growing popularity of social networking sites during the audit period must be emphasised. 
As proven by TNS data, browsing the contents of social networking sites is one of the most popular 
online activities. Even though in the international communication research environment this is a 
broadly discussed issue, there are currently no convincing data from studies conducted in Latvia 
about whether there are any democratic effects from social networking sites and what these might be.
The internet is a productive environment for the pluralism of opinions. This is especially 
stressed in the portal ir.lv. From the very start, it was positioned as ‘a terminal of communication’, 
the function of which is not merely journalism, but also ‘communication for the community’. One 
of the reasons for a different commenting culture on this portal (ir.lv) is the requirement to log 
in in order to leave comments. The Delfi.lv portal has also introduced the option of logging in; 
however, an absolute majority of comments are still left by unregistered users. Within the context 
of the democratic effect of the internet, anonymity is an important aspect because the boundaries 
of expression of the commentators are much more smudged if they do not need to disclose their 
identity. On the one hand, this can be a positive factor because it facilitates the freedom of speech, 
but on the other hand, it does not guarantee a democratic and rational discourse (Papacharissi 2002). 
This statement is linked to discussions on the boundaries of the freedom of speech – to whether the 
freedom of speech is absolute. The subject of discussions among researchers in this context is also 
what is known as ‘radical pluralism’ (Cammaerts 2009), which also includes the use of the internet 
for voicing extreme views and delivering hate speech; therefore, in fact, it is also effectuating 
the anti-democratic potential. Aggressiveness in online commentaries in Latvia is measured using 
the aggressiveness index developed by RSU researchers, and has led to the conclusion that the 
aggression intensity fluctuates and is mostly in response to certain news pieces, of which most are 
about politics or about the people related to politics (see RSU 2011; research conclusions have not 
yet been offered in academic publications).
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The opinion voiced by the editor in chief I. Bērziņš of the Delfi portal serves as valuable 
grounds for critical arguments in discussions about the link between online commentaries and 
public opinion: ‘[..] At a time of scandalous court cases or political tensions, commentaries to news 
articles, which touch upon these processes, continue ‘the debate’ by involving users with internet 
connection addresses, which are registered to the name of public relations agencies that work with 
law offices representing the respective litigants, to the respective political party offices, or companies 
involved in the respective processes’ (Bērziņš 2006, 222). He also points to another important 
fact, which enables the reassessment of the democratic potential of online commenting, namely, 
these commentaries are written only by a small percentage of readers. Moreover, a rather small 
share of users engages in further debate (Juzefovičs 2011, 37). There are also other aspects to be 
taken into account, such as that the possibilities offered by digital technologies do not guarantee 
mutual understanding between people or that opinions voiced virtually will have any impact or 
social value – rather a deceiving understanding can originate with regard to the actual impact of 
the opinion (Papacharissi 2002).
As regards the encouragement of civil activity in the digital environment, the initiative of the 
ManaBalss.lv portal deserves special mention. It enables the citizens to propose initiatives, and 
once these have obtained the support of at least 10 000 citizens, they can later be put to a vote in 
the Parliament.
Even though there have been other isolated seeds of civil activity, overall the effect of these 
activities has been short-lived.
Press
Journalists in interviews confirm the tendency of the printed press ‘to turn yellow’, as it is 
difficult to pay for quality and investigative journalism under crisis circumstances. Press journalists 
also recognise the tendency towards an increasing proportion of public relations material, 
commercialisation of press and the loss of quality (Šulmane 2011b, 29).
As a result of the change in ownership of the Diena newspaper, a high-quality liberal newspaper 
was practically destroyed, and this fact is lamented even by representatives of the direct competitors 
of the newspaper – Latvijas Avīze and Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze (Šulmane 2011a). Diena has lost its 
reputation and clearly defined editorial values, as well as its role as the actor dictating the agenda 
to other media.
As has been confirmed on multiple occasions in interviews with Russian daily newspaper 
journalists, instead of well-reasoned analysis and criticism, now the newspaper shows uncritical 
support for political parties backed by these publications; during election campaigns, it offers the 
readers complimentary interviews with the supported parties’ representatives, instead of an analysis 
of what has been achieved, or of programmes and promises. The journalists are, in fact, serving the 
parties (Šulmane 2010b, 43, 52).
To sum up the section on the diversity of opinions in the media and access to the media for 
various groups of society, it must be pointed out that freedom of speech in Latvia is often abused, 
by publishing insulting statements and allegations that incite hatred – 49.9 % of the surveyed 
inhabitants of Latvia agreed with this statement, and 16.4 % did not agree. To a certain extent, 
these data do contradict the high levels of trust as presented by the Latvian mass media. However, 
it is positive that 69.8 % are in favour of the mass media promoting the consolidation of shared 
democratic values in Latvia and in the EU, and only 6.6 % of the surveyed inhabitants of Latvia 
think the opposite. A similar situation is also observed in the matter of portraying all opinions within 
society, including those that are not acceptable by many. As much as 65.6 % of respondents admitted 
that this should be the task of the mass media, and only 7.4 % thought the opposite. These figures 
point to the willingness of the majority of Latvian inhabitants to make sure that democratic values 
and unacceptable opinions are protected and represented in tolerant forms. Survey data showing 
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that 74.4 % of Latvian inhabitants agree with the statement – to be able to find your way around 
social political processes, it is necessary to follow various sources of information – is indicative 
of the willingness to overcome the trend of political parallelism in the Latvian media system (DA 
2014, Table G4).
Journalist education, self-regulation, the role of professional organisations, 
links to advertising and public relations
The quality of journalism can be increased via mechanisms of reporting and accountability, 
both external-formal, such as media laws, codes of ethics, and complaints from the public, and 
external-informal, such as public opinion, pressure groups, the media market, journalist education 
and media criticism, whereas internal reporting mechanisms include management control, editorial 
policy, research, journalist socialisation, peer assessment of colleagues and audience feedback 
(McQuail 2013, 161–163).
There are diverse education opportunities and competition between the higher education 
establishments offering training for communication specialists in journalism, public relations, and 
advertising, as well as in new professions. Moreover, from time to time, media players also announce 
courses, in which the participants can learn certain skills, for instance in radio-journalism. The 
disappearance of boundaries between professional journalism and the activities of users and citizens 
in the media can decrease the quality of journalism and its role in democratic discussion if the 
interviews or discussions are held by amateur journalists, who are in fact controlled by public 
relations professionals.
The unclear borders between public relations and journalism and the practically non-existent 
co-operation between professional organisations do not contribute to more trust in journalism, but 
decrease the performance of its democratic functions, as it generates grounds for doubting its 
professionalism. This is happening both in public and private television, as well as in the press. 
Ministry funds are allocated to creating materials in media about the work of the institutions – 
these are, essentially, public relations materials or advertising, but they are presented as journalism. 
Furthermore, municipal administrative resources are used, which, in addition to informing the people, 
also create an image of the respective authorities and their leaders in the newspapers. Therefore, 
for instance, we can mention the free bilingual newspaper of the Riga City Council, of which a 
large number of high-quality print copies have already been published. During the report period, the 
practice could be observed whereby political commentators in newspapers turn into public relations 
specialists or public television journalists switch these professions several times.
In recent years, politicians working in journalism and journalists in politics has become 
a regular practice. This practice is condemned mainly by representatives of Latvian newspapers 
and the journalists of the Telegraf; however, some staff members of Vesti Segodnja consider it an 
advantage (Šulmane 2011a). The laws allow these jobs to be combined for parliamentarians, but 
journalists do not eliminate this conflict of interest or the loss of professional identity, as it is not 
clearly prescribed in their codes of ethics. This is indicative of the weak self-regulation mechanisms 
in journalism, as journalists often become a part of the authorities and at the same time serve as a 
tool rather than a watchdog.
The field of self-regulation demonstrates the peculiarities of the divided media space in Latvia, 
as several relatively separate journalist communities are involved in self-regulation processes. 
Journalist surveys and interviews show that the Latvian Union of Journalists (LUJ) lacks authority, 
and the number of its members is insignificant. Some of the members of the LUJ, along with other 
peers, established an alternative professional organisation in the media environment – the Latvian 
Journalist Association (LJA), which, unlike the LUJ, is not registered as a trade union. The LJA also 
has a small number of members, and the establishment of the new organisation has not promoted 
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unity between Latvian and Russian journalists, as the proportion of members from among Russian 
media journalists in the LJA is very small.
One of the means of media self-regulation is the code of ethics. The LUJ code of ethics has 
not been updated since the time it was created in 1992, even though the media environment has 
changed. The members of the LJA are bound by the code of ethics of this organisation. The work 
of some media journalists (TV and press) is regulated by the codes of ethics and/or conduct of 
the respective media. These facts indicate that the journalists of Latvia cannot agree on the most 
general common criteria, which would be binding upon all professionals. Professional ethics is 
predominantly practiced in the form that is known as declarative ethics, which does not prescribe 
any specific sanction mechanisms, not to mention how these ethics are applied. During the report 
period, suggestions have been proposed in public discussions to establish the institution of a media 
ombudsman; however, no actual initiatives have followed these discussions.
Furthermore, interviews by press journalists have repeatedly shown that journalists have different 
professional values, which is also manifested in the form of disparate attitudes towards separating 
fact from opinion, as well as different understandings of the roles and functions of journalism 
(engaging in propaganda versus providing information and promoting discussion), and attitudes 
towards relations with media owners (maximum possible independence versus voicing the owners’ 
interests) (Šulmane 2011a). 
The laws governing the media, its use and accessibility, and its diversity, as in the previous 
audit, can, in general, be viewed as satisfactory, as some negative tendencies have not changed 
(e.g., being aware of a journalist’s professional identity, self-regulation),and new negative features 
have emerged related to the reduced supply and demand of quality press; however, also positive 
tendencies can be observed, such as, the rapidly increasing availability and growing use of the 
internet. The function of the media as promoters of representation and participation still has fewer 
proponents than for that of the function of the media as an informer, mentor and mobiliser, which 
can be explained via the economic and political dependence of the media, the post-Soviet heritage, 
and the fragility of the democratic-political communication culture.
11.3. How effective are the media and other independent bodies in 
investigating government and powerful corporations?
It is possible that the fragmentation of the audience does not permit the sufficiently open 
proposition of certain requirements for journalism. This creates the impression that only cheap 
entertainment and sensational news are in demand, and these, along with the lack of responses to 
criticism on the part of the authorities, as well as the restricted time and financial resources, continue 
to delay the journalists’ willingness and possibilities for engaging in investigative work.
The economic crisis adversely affected the content of the media, editorial boards lost experienced 
journalists, who left the editorial staff because of the ‘in their opinion’ reduced pay and increased 
workload. A study on how the largest Latvian and Russian newspapers depicted the economic crisis 
points to the insufficient investigative and analytical capacity of the media, which was evidenced by, 
for instance, a rather simplified approach, blaming only the politicians for the crisis, and passively 
reflecting the solutions proposed by politicians, which indicates that the media are not on top of 
specific events, without looking at the processes in a broader context (Dreijere 2013).
One of the most noteworthy examples of investigative and analytical journalism, on which the 
effectiveness of media is greatly dependent, in the investigation of the work of government and 
powerful corporations, is the Baltic investigative journalism centre established in 2011 – Re:Baltica, 
a non-profit organisation, which focuses on extensive research. Journalists from other Baltic States 
are also involved in some of its research. Media co-operation projects have also been implemented 
on the basis of Re:Baltica. For instance, by using the crowd-sourcing method, which means that 
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representatives from the general public are engaged in developing journalistic materials, mostly 
in the information gathering stage, shortcomings were found in the methodology of calculating 
heating costs.
The ability of the public television to analyse problems at various power levels has not been 
stable during the audit period. This also relates to changes in staff at LTV. However, the trends 
in 2014 show that the replacement of journalists at television channels may have brought about 
a positive result as well – more versatile content in the informative-analytical broadcast niche of 
public media and commercial television. Namely, alternative analytical broadcasts have been created 
at LTV. With the stabilisation of the current teams for the Nekā Personīga and De Facto programs, 
competition has been created between the informative-analytical Sunday night broadcasts, and this 
may also lead to positive pressure to improve the quality of their content.
Some studies that have brought about public responses have been conducted by the weekly 
magazine Ir, which in 2010 was established by a number of people who left the newspaper Diena. 
However, the fact that daily newspapers in Latvia, following changes in ownership, are not regularly 
conducting investigative work or serious analyses of social, economic and political processes, as well 
as the indiscriminate support of Russian newspapers for political parties that they are affiliated with, 
the weak effect of investigative material aimed at exposing (no response from the authorities), and 
the unsafe social and economic status of journalists, due to which the pressure of the owners restricts 
the possibility of voicing criticism, leads to recognising media effectiveness in the supervision of 
authorities as low.
11.4. How free are journalists from restrictive laws, harassment and 
intimidation?
During the report period, there have been discussions of several cases, which could be categorised 
as threats to the rights of journalists not to disclose their sources of information. One such example 
involved the illegal tapping of journalist I. Jaunalksne’s telephone conversations. The European 
Court of Human Rights imposed the duty on Latvia to pay compensation of EUR 20 000 to journalist 
I. Nagla, because the journalist’s freedom of speech and rights not to disclose source of information 
were violated during a search at her place of residence.
During the audit period, there has also been a physical assault on a journalist: journalist 
L. Jākobsons of the kompromat.lv portal was stabbed in the stairwell of his building; he had 
previously written about several scandalous facts, including publishing e-mail correspondence of 
the mayor of the City of Riga N. Ušakovs. Another method of exerting pressure on the media 
that has been used is to initiate court proceedings; for instance, within a period of four months, 
four claims have been raised against the journal Ir. A special case worthy of mention is the claim 
initiated by a member of the European Parliament against the former journalist of the newspaper 
Diena, G. Sloga: the politician addressed the court in a criminal proceeding with claims raised 
directly against the journalist, and he initially demanded compensation of half a million lats from 
the journalist for publishing information that was unpleasant for him. The journalist was acquitted 
at all court instances. 
A positive feature observed during the audit period is the exclusion of Section 158 on defamation 
in the media from the Criminal Law (CrimL). This means that there are fewer possibilities of 
starting criminal proceedings against journalists for their professional work. CrimL, nevertheless, 
still contains one section on libel in the mass media; therefore, there still is one way of attempting 
to affect the professional work of journalists, by turning against them with criminal proceedings.
Changes in the ownership of daily newspapers in both languages led to financial problems 
(salaries not paid to journalists) and at times drastic layoffs of journalists or provocations resulting 
in resignations, thereby demonstrating the poor understanding of the owners about the role of the 
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journalist’s persona and reputation in preserving the image, recognisability, and reliability of a 
newspaper, as well as sending a certain message to those that remained on staff.
As can be observed, the small media market is endangering the journalists’ freedom because the 
threat of redundancy makes them especially dependent on the owners; furthermore, the extent and 
form of remuneration do not promote the social security of journalists. Even though the crisis, changes 
in media owners and political parallelism does not foster the independence and professionalism of 
journalists, the said changes in laws and the litigation outcomes in favour of journalists can be, in 
general, assessed as satisfactory.
11.5. How free are private citizens from intrusion and harassment 
by the media?
During the report period, there have been no controversial trials in Latvia, in which the media 
has been accused of violations of citizens’ rights or freedoms, the illegal use of their personal data, 
or other violations related to the failure to observe human rights. This can be partially explained via 
the development of social media and the arrival of new information and communication technologies 
in the daily lives of people, since this opens up unprecedented opportunities for self-presentation 
and voicing one’s own opinions. Another aspect, which cannot be assessed unequivocally, but is 
mostly related to the protection of personal and private life, is the comprehensive commercialisation 
of the media world and tabloidization of a major part of it. This is also fostered by the Latvian 
media market, and especially its Latvian counterparts, the small scale of the market, and the fierce 
competition for the attention of media consumers.
The situations where the media are intensively and persistently working to achieve negative 
publicity about certain individuals, most often officials, must be regarded slightly differently. A 
serious problem that the legislature should resolve is hate speech ad hominem in the commentaries 
of various internet media users, where usually the manifestations of poor culture are intertwined 
with radical political views. The problem should be resolved by imposing sanctions that are already 
provided for in the law, as well as by introducing relevant changes in laws and requesting that media 
owners and editors act consistently to restrict the activities of these media users. Since the media 
criticism is mostly aimed at those in power and there are no specific published cases known where 
citizens have complained about media harassment, the situation overall must be regarded as good.
Conclusions
The model of the Latvian media system can be described as a hybrid, which suffers from a lack 
of a dominant paradigm. The fact that a medium-term media policy has still not been developed, that 
the free market is primarily the regulating force and no support is given to professional competing and 
cultural publications, points to features of a liberal model. Weak media professionalization trends, 
activities of some pro-West media and attempts to consolidate public electronic media confirms the 
activities of the proponents of a democratic corporate model. However, political parallelism in the 
media environment and the considerable impact of political public relations on media content points 
to explicit features of a polarised pluralistic model.
The public space has seen a tendency, which shows that the differences in ideological and 
geopolitical orientations, social and historical memory, as well as value orientations are not only 
determined depending on ethnic affiliation. They are related to the West-East orientations, attitude 
towards Latvia as a nation state, the Soviet heritage and its post-Soviet legacy.
The audit data show that there is potentially a shift away from the polarised elite democracy 
model – which features a fragmentation of the political and business elite, and the relevant public 
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opinion and understanding of the media system functioning – in the direction of a mixed representation 
and participatory model. 
Overall assessment: progress over the last decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
11.1. X
11.2. X
11.3. X
11.4. X
11.5. X
Best features
Opinions of the broadest variety are represented; however, mostly via internet media, user 
commentaries and social networks. Diversity in the field of electronic media has increased, possibly 
because the unification of abilities will result in better quality products.
In the sphere of public media, positive trends can be observed in the public media; however, 
public radio channels are still more successful.
The national development strategy for electronic mass media aims at creating a single, 
journalistically powerful public medium. There might be some economic gains from combining 
the resources; however, they cannot be extensive. The successful functioning of the radio is causing 
concern among the employees about the possible negative consequences of unification.
Most serious problems
1. Overlapping of political communication and journalism, as politicians and parliamentarians are 
working in journalism, and journalists become politicians. This points to the fact that instead 
of a journalist elite supervising the authorities, they are fusing with them or serving them. This 
tendency, as shown by the surveys, is accepted by the less active majority of society.
2. Changes in the ownership structure of the Latvian press and in its supply are narrowing the 
diversity of opinions and at the same time decreasing their representation; the internal and 
external diversity of Latvian daily newspapers, as well as their reputation and influence has 
dropped; whereas, upon the merger of two Russian daily newspapers, Vesti segodnja has become 
even more dominant, by preserving an explicit parallelism with the political parties that it 
supports.
3. Decreased diversity, influence and audiences for quality press, as well as the orientation of 
electronic media towards entertainment are raising concerns about the lack of quality social and 
political information; this can result in poorly informed and thoughtless voting in elections.
4. Increased influence of public relations professionals on journalism, use of local government 
administrative resources to influence the media and enhance their image.
5. The increased influence of private and state-controlled Russian media in the information space 
of Latvia.
6. Information retrieved from the internet (and especially twitter and social networks) often lacks 
analytical depth and reliable sources, collisions between opinions representing extreme opposites 
does not leave a forum for a rational, well-reasoned dialogue or deliberations. Hate speech and 
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informative noise reduces the possibility of rational discussion or analysis of problems and 
opposing views.
7. The costs of creating quality content under the circumstances of a small media market does not 
provide the active audiences with quality media content and investigative journalism.
Suggested improvements
1. To support local media competition by establishing regulation that governs the involvement of 
local governments in the media business.
2. To adopt regulation that governs consumer rights to choose the most suitable TV channels, 
minimum/maximum cable operator packages and their content in terms of diversity and price.
3. The structural unit of the Ministry of Culture dealing with the media policy should assume 
responsibility for ensuring the availability of radio and TV signals across Latvia and for ensuring 
the availability of alternative quality journalism Russian programmes/channels and active 
advertising in the relevant audiences. To envisage financing for the support of quality press 
publications.
4. To improve the public portal lsm.lv, by offering the opportunity to comment in several languages, 
create sections for programmes/news for national minorities, to activate viewer evaluations of 
programmes and hosts, to increase the visibility of the activity of the public advisory board of 
electronic media.
5. To promote ideas about the implementation of establishing a common multimedia platform for 
all Baltic States in Russian and English with specific projects to support the transfer of the Baltic 
States from national audio-visual media service markets to creating and distributing broadcasts 
on a common market, thereby facilitating the introduction of a single EU information space.
6. To promote the involvement of Latvia’s Russian-speaking intellectual elite and organisations 
of national minorities and of their representatives in creating and distributing the content of 
public broadcasters, public media, by ensuring freedom of information, diversity of opinions 
and media pluralism.
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12. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Ivars Ijabs
How extensive is the participation of citizens in public life?
12.1. How extensive is the range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, 
social movements, and how independent are they from government?
Laws regulating the registration, administration and membership in voluntary 
organisations, non-governmental organisations and self-management organisations
Article 102 of the Constitution (Satversme) of Latvia guarantees the right to everybody to unite 
in societies, political parties and other public organisations. Article 108 of the Constitution establishes 
that the State protects the freedom of trade unions. These freedoms can be restricted only in cases 
provided by law to protect the rights of other individuals, to safeguard the democratic system of 
the country and public safety, welfare, and morality (Article 116 of the Constitution). Likewise, 
Latvia has joined a range of international instruments guaranteeing the right of association, such as 
the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ANO 2003 (UN)).
The principal legal document governing the operations of non-governmental organisations 
(NGO) in Latvia is the Associations and Foundations Law (Biedrību un nodibinājumu likums) 
adopted in 2004. This document elaborately regulates the operations, registration, and economic 
activity of associations and foundations (or funds). The minimum number of people, who can 
establish an association in Latvia is two. Members of an association can be legal entities, and the 
association is managed by an executive body or the board. The foundation must have a certain 
amount of assets intended for achieving the set aim; it is administrated by the board. The registration 
of an NGO usually takes about two weeks and costs EUR 11.38.
Besides the Associations and Foundations Law, the legal regulation in Latvia also includes 
the Public Benefit Organisation Law, which establishes a special status for organisations operating 
to achieve objectives of public benefit (charity, human rights, education and art, etc.). The key 
benefits of this status are related to tax allowances when receiving donations; moreover, it is often 
a pre-requisite for attracting assets from EU funds. This status can be granted to associations and 
foundations, and about one tenth of public organisations registered in Latvia currently hold this 
status. A Public Benefit Committee approved by the Cabinet of Ministers decides on granting 
and removing the status of public benefit; the Committee is made up of an equal number of 
representatives from public administration and the NGO sector. Lately, some NGO representatives 
have been showing discontent with the lack of clear guidelines for granting the status, and as a result, 
sports organisations are clearly the most numerous among the registered public benefit organisations.
Besides the aforementioned laws, a range of other regulatory enactments affect the work of 
the public organisations of Latvia, including the Accounting Law, Freedom of Information Law, 
taxation laws and others. Specific laws and particular articles regulate the work of certain types of 
associations; for instance, the Law on Trade Unions, Medical Treatment Law, Advocacy Law of 
the Republic of Latvia, Law on Religious Organisations, etc.
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In regard to the most significant changes in recent years in the NGO legal framework, the 
amendments to the Associations and Foundations Law adopted by the Saeima in 2011 must be 
commended. These amendments simplify accounting procedures for associations and foundations 
whose revenues from economic activities do not exceed LVL 25 000. These organisations are 
allowed to implement the single-entry bookkeeping system. In 2013, the said amount was increased 
to EUR 40 000.
Number of public organisations, areas of operations, and prevalence
Since the publishing of the last audit (Rozenvalds 2005), the number of public organisations 
registered in Latvia has significantly increased. In September 2004, there were 8 232 organisations 
registered in Latvia (Miezaine, Sīmane 2005), but over the following ten years, the number more 
than doubled, with 18 707 associations and foundations registered as of 24 May 2014. Over the last 
five years, the average number of newly established public organisations per year was about 1 600, 
peaking in 2011, when 1 739 new organisations were registered. The dissolution of associations is 
occurring at a slower rate: over this period, around 80 associations were dissolved each year. A bigger 
wave of dissolving associations was observed in 2007, when 2 544 organisations were dissolved. 
This is explained by the fact that the registration renewal period was drawing to an end (the period 
started in 2004 along with the adoption of the Associations and Foundations Law) (Lursoft 2014).
As we will see, the dynamics of the growing number of organisations is, unfortunately, not 
representative of an increase in the number of active population. Accordingly, it is only logical to 
ask how many of these organisations are active and how many are merely empty shells existing only 
on paper. It is impossible to answer this question with absolute certainty. However, the approximate 
proportion of shell organisations can be guessed from annual reports filed at the State Revenue Service 
(SRS), because the fact that they are filed points to at least a minimum level of mobilisation of the 
organisation. According to SRS data, annual reports for 2012 were filed by 14 138 organisations or 
78 % of the total number of registered organisations. This allows us to make a cautious assumption 
that the number of shell organisations does not exceed one quarter of all registered organisations 
(Šimanska etc. 2013, 48).
If we consider the NGOs of Latvia from a regional viewpoint, a rather marked disproportion 
between various regions of Latvia is observed. About 60 % of NGOs are registered in Riga or in 
the region of Riga, and among other cities of Latvia, Liepaja (5 %), Daugavpils (2.5 %) and Jelgava 
(2 %) stand out. The average density of NGOs per 1 000 inhabitants is the highest in Riga, and the 
lowest in the Zemgale region.
No comprehensive data are available about the division of NGOs in Latvia in areas of activities/
interests. According to Lursoft data for 2011, 39 % of NGOs in Latvia are operating in culture 
and sports, 21 % in development and management, 11 % in the sphere of legislation, promotion 
of interests, and politics, 10 % are entrepreneurial and professional associations, 5 % are working 
in education and research, and the number of associations is smaller in the spheres of social 
services, philanthropy, health, spirituality, religion and others (Šimanska 2012). The lack of uniform 
methodology and a system of categorisation in studies conducted up to now makes it extremely 
difficult to analyse the spheres of activities of Latvian NGOs, because trade unions, religious 
organisations and farmers’ interest groups might or might not be considered NGOs (Rūse 2012).
The number of organisations, which has rapidly grown over the last decade, is in stark contrast 
with the opposite tendency of the people participating in organisations of various types – trade unions, 
professional and religious organisations, women’s movements, sports and health protection asso-
ciations. Most of the abovementioned organisations have become less popular among the inhabitants. 
Furthermore, the proportion of people not participating in any of these organisations has increased 
from 61.9 % in 2004 to 71.7 % in 2013. This strongly suggests the conclusion that most organisa-
tions have a rather small number of members, many of the socially engaged people are members of 
several organisations, and these organisations do not prioritise increasing the number of members.
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Table 12.1. In the activities of which of the following organisations are you engaged or a 
member?
2004 2008 2014
Religious and church organisations, congregations 10.3 8.8 7.6
Trade unions 6.9 9.6 6.9
Political parties and groups 1.4 1.2 1.5
Sport, recreation organisations and clubs 7.4 6.1 7.2
Amateur artistic groups (choir, theatre, folk and ballroom dancing, rock 
band or other)
8.3 7.7 4.3
Youth clubs, organisations, student corporations 4.6 2.8 1.5
Professional unions, associations 3.3 3.4 25
Senior citizens’ organisations 1.3
Environmental protection organisations 1.0 1.4 1.6
Women’s movements 1.4 1.5 1.2
Non-governmental organisations offering help to improve the level of wel-
fare of the poor and socially vulnerable groups
2.5 0.9 0.6
Non-governmental organisations participating in resolving domestic 
problems at home
2.1 0.6 1.1
Non-governmental organisations participating in resolving human rights 
problems
1.1 0.5 0.4
Volunteer health promotion associations 0.7 1.1 0.9
Ethnic minorities’ organisations 1.1 0.7 0.3
Other organisations, incl. informal 0.2 0.5 1.1
Not participating in any organisations 61.9 65.8 71.7
Source: Rozenvalds 2005, p. 227, Tab. 21; TAP (Human Development Report) 2009; TAP 2013.
As the variations of responses in most of the abovementioned organisations are within statistical 
error, it would be premature to speak of a significant decrease in participation in Latvian NGOs. We 
can rather speak of stability or stagnation with regard to the level of civic participation. At the same 
time, previous optimistic expectations of the expert community, linking the quality of democracy in 
Latvia to the increasing participation in NGOs, have turned out to be false.
Dependence on domestic and/or international funders
Non-governmental organisations and foundations are essentially non-profit organisations, and 
gaining material benefits should not be their primary task. However, it is clear that in order to 
function, any organisation needs funds – to cover the rent of premises and office equipment and to 
pay the hired employees. In Latvia, NGOs have access to a range of funding sources, and they are 
being used in different proportions.
Firstly, NGOs can use internal resources – membership fees and donations from their members. 
However, in most cases, active NGOs are also using other sources of funding. They attract private 
and corporate donations, receive earmarked state and local government subsidies, participate in 
project tenders, as well as deal with entrepreneurship. Overall, over the last five years, the structure 
of the income of NGOs has changed: the role of revenues from economic operations has become 
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more important, while the contribution of membership fees and other annual payments to the NGO 
budget has decreased. The total NGO income in 2012 was 232 million lats or on average 14 677 
lats per organisation. Of these, the income of public benefit organisations accounted for 102 million 
lats. Overall, the NGO sector is experiencing an increase of income annually, which can at least be 
partially explained by the increased number of organisations (Šimanska et al 2013).
A relatively vast range of public funding is available for NGOs in Latvia, including state and 
local government funds, European Economic Area (EEA) instruments and EU funds. In Latvia, 
NGOs have a number of options for obtaining state and local government funding. Earmarked state 
and local government subsidies (include also the attracted financing from EU funds) are among 
the most frequently used sources of obtaining funds. According to the data at the disposal of the 
association ‘Latvijas Pilsoniskā alianse’ (Civic Alliance – Latvia), in 2012, 17 % of the total Latvian 
NGO budget was made up of earmarked state and local government subsidies; 41 % was income 
from economic activity, 5 % donations and gifts; 1 % consisted of membership fees and other annual 
contributions; while 36 % was other income. As much as 73 % of organisations, which have used any 
external funding, have used earmarked local government subsidies; 29 % consider this a rather easy 
way of attracting funds. Furthermore, 66 % of the said organisations have attracted funds from local 
government project tenders, and 33 % consider this a rather easy way of attracting funds. The process 
of obtaining earmarked subsidies from the centralised state apparatus has been more complicated. 
Only 33 % of organisations using external financing have these types of funds, and only 4 % consider 
it an easy way of attracting funds. The situation is better in the case of tenders organised by ministries 
and EU funds, within the framework of which funds have been attracted by 63 % of organisations, 
of which 20 % consider it an easy way of attracting funds (BISS 2012, 64 (Baltic Institute of Social 
Sciences)). Overall, it cannot be claimed that the Latvian NGOs were financially dependent on state 
or local government funding. Besides attracting the said funds, NGOs gladly accept donations from 
private companies and individual members, as well as engage in economic activities.
Organisations can obtain state delegation for the performance of certain functions, as stipulated 
in the laws or in a government decision, and receive remuneration from the budget for performing 
those functions. For instance, the Student Union of Latvia has received such a delegation with regard 
to representing the interests of students at the Council of Higher Education and elsewhere; another 
example is the association Brāļu kapu komiteja (War Grave Committee), to which the Ministry of De-
fence has delegated certain functions. The State can also establish earmarked subsidies and subsidies 
for organisations, the operations of which in the representation of the respective sector is recognised 
as important; for example, the Ministry of Agriculture is extensively engaged in funding farmers’ 
NGOs. Likewise, a State can organise procurement tenders for the provision of certain services.
Local governments also play an important role in funding NGOs. The work of local governments 
is closer to the needs of specific individuals and a particular place; therefore, local governments 
are often the most important co-operation partner of an organisation, and sometimes they also get 
involved in the establishment of NGOs in spheres like education and culture, social care, child 
protection, sports, environment, among others. In regard to local government funding, it must be 
pointed out that the support is often provided with specific resources, such as rent of premises, 
payment of public utilities services. At the same time, local governments are also organising their 
own project competitions with the objective of improving quality of life for their inhabitants.
This does not necessarily mean that there are no problems with the role of the State in the 
funding of NGOs. Even though some ministries are providing funds to NGOs in their respective 
sectors, there are, however, no uniform principles for how the available funding is distributed. 
Likewise, NGO activists often feel confused about the distribution of support provided by some 
state enterprises (for instance, the SJSC ’Latvijas valsts meži’), when considerable funds are donated 
to the Latvian Olympic Committee. The ‘democratic’ quote system is no less problematic; within 
the system, members of the Saeima, upon adopting the annual state budget law, provide support 
via the relevant line ministries to NGOs representing a certain sector. Even though the wish of 
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the parliamentarians to strengthen the operations of specific public organisations as such should 
be viewed positively; nevertheless, here we cannot talk of equal opportunities or a transparent 
procedure of granting the funding.
Traditionally, Latvian NGOs have received significant financial support from international 
sources. In recent years, activities within projects of the European Social Fund have played a 
particularly important role in strengthening the administrative capacity of non-governmental 
organisations and social partners over the period from 2007 to 2013. From 2012 to 2014, the ‘NGO 
fund’ created within the framework of the EEA financial instrument has been operating to provide 
support to activities of democratic development, fostering participation, eliminating discrimination 
and other activities. Both of these programmes were managed by the Society Integration Foundation. 
Several Latvian NGOs have gotten involved in international co-operation networks in the relevant 
sector, and these networks open up options of collective funding attraction at European and global 
level. Apart from these sources of funding, Latvian NGOs have access to a range of other public 
and private foundations.
In the 2012 the USAID Civil Society Sustainability Index states that, apart from the public 
image, the financial sustainability of NGOs poses an important problem for the future of the sector 
(USAID 2012). This is linked to the inconsistent state policy concerning NGOs, which results in 
the overall lack of NGO sustainability, inability to accumulate competence and fully protect their 
interests. Public funding for NGOs greatly depends on foreign (EU ESF, EEA) programmes, which 
run until 2013 (ESF) and 2014 (NGO fund). This significantly endangers further development of 
the sector.
Considering the overall development of the NGO sector, the situation can be assessed as 
satisfactory.
12.2. How extensive is citizen participation in voluntary associations, 
self-management organizations, and non-governmental organisations 
and in other voluntary public activity?
Voluntary citizen participation in public life: trends
A range of studies have previously found that in terms of voluntary participation, the people 
of Latvia are relatively passive. Therefore, for instance, the Eurobarometer data show that Latvia 
is below the EU average in terms of volunteering (Eurobarometer 2011). On average, only about 
one quarter of Latvian inhabitants have been involved in voluntary work. In a study ordered by 
the Ministry of Education and Science on volunteering opportunities in Latvia, in 2011, 25 % of 
respondents said they had done some volunteering work; in 2013, 28 % of respondents had done 
volunteering work. Of the types of indicated volunteer work, the most popular were participation 
in environmental protection and cleaning measures (mostly during the annual clean-up, 55 %), 
organisation of culture and arts events (29 %), and in educational events (27 %). A typical volunteer 
in Latvia is either a young person (18–24 y. o.) or pre-retirement or retired person (55 years and 
older). The most frequently mentioned reasons for why people choose not to volunteer are: ‘I have 
a job’ (41 %) and ‘I have no/little time’ (35 %). The value of volunteering, by applying the cost 
replacement method, is estimated at about 83 million lats per year (APSL 2011). Overall, it could be 
assumed that activity in the area of volunteering might increase as generations are replaced, when 
the youth, who have acquired volunteering skills early on, will replace the middle generation, which 
does not have such skills. Simultaneously, the popularity of volunteering is affected by several other 
factors, such as tradition and prestige, as well as the relatively long duration of work-time and low 
productivity during that time, which leaves little time for volunteering.
When considering other ways for how the people of Latvia are voluntarily getting involved 
in public life, stark differences can be observed between forms of institutionalised participation 
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and social solidarity demonstrated individually. Thus, for instance, in a survey of 2013, 58.2 % 
of the Latvian population stated that they had donated to charity (TAP survey, C6.11 (Human 
Development Report)). This is also confirmed by a range of organisations collecting donations and 
supporting various underprivileged social groups. The most popular of such organisations is ziedot.
lv, which is implementing a range of various charity projects, ‘Gaišie spārni’, who are taking care 
of children from poor families, ‘Paēdušai Latvijai’, which is providing poor families and senior 
citizens with food packages, the charity organisation ‘Varonis’ etc. Various religious organisations 
are also successfully working with collecting funds.
The significant number of donors and the donated amounts are indicative of a considerable 
presence of social solidarity. At the same time, social participation in Latvia, which mostly takes 
place in a private and non-governmental format, is separated from political participation. If we 
compare the processes in Latvia and in other EU countries, then it is undoubtedly clear that the 
people of Latvia are alienated from the State and are rather inactive in terms of political participation. 
The Eurobarometer survey of 2013 shows that the inhabitants of Latvia are among the most passive 
in Europe in terms of civil participation.
Table 12.2. Political participations of the inhabitants of Latvia
Over the period of the last two years, have you... In Latvia 
(%)
EU-27 
average (%)
...signed a petition (online or in paper format)? 17 34
...voiced your opinion on socially important matters online or in 
social media?
27 28
...voiced your opinion on socially important matters to an elected 
official at a local or regional level?
14 24
Do you agree with this statement: Voting in local/regional elections 
is an effective way of influencing political decisions.
59 73
Do you agree with this statement: Voting in national level elections 
is an effective way of influencing political decisions.
54 70
Do you agree with this statement: Voting in the European Parliament 
elections is an effective way of influencing political decisions.
32 54
Do you agree with this statement: NGOs are an effective way of 
influencing political decisions.
36 54
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 373 (2013). 
These figures show the relative passivity and scepticism of Latvian citizens regarding their 
political influence. People sense the link and feel more capable of influencing the power at local 
government level; this sense of capability is lower at the national – Saeima and government level – 
and the same applies to participation in the European Parliament elections. Furthermore, only one 
third of the inhabitants of Latvia consider the work of NGOs as an effective way of influencing policy.
Increasing inactivity is also reflected in some, though not all, parameters of participation in 
elections. Over the last decade, decreased participation has been observed in local government 
elections (in 2005, 51.85 %, in 2013, 45.99 %) and in European Parliament elections (in 2004, 
41.34 %, in 2014, 30 %). The turnout in the Saeima election has stabilised at around 60 % (in the 
elections of the 9th Saeima in 2006, it was 60.98 %; the 10th Saeima elections in 2010, 63.12 %; the 
11th Saeima elections in 2011, 59.45 %). Nevertheless, these figures must be interpreted critically, 
bearing in mind the vast emigration of Latvian citizens – these processes particularly intensified 
along with the onset of the economic crisis in 2008/2009. In regard to the people’s attitude towards 
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types of conventional participation, we can speak of definite stability or stagnation. The number of 
people participating in the life of political parties has also remained practically unchanged. In the 
last decade, various surveys have shown that a small number – around 1.2–1.5 % – of inhabitants 
are political party members.
Since 2007, Latvia has seen an increasing interest in various forms of direct democracy – 
referenda, citizen initiatives, collecting signatures, dismissing public officials. Possibly, the main 
reason behind this tendency is public discontent with the functioning of the representative democracy 
and the wish to ‘compensate’ for it in a peculiar way, by employing instruments of direct democracy. 
In general, contradictory tendencies can be observed in this process over the course of this period – on 
the one hand, there is the will of the political elite to expand the possibilities of direct participation, 
in order to promote their own legitimacy; on the other hand, there is the tendency of narrowing these 
opportunities, to prevent them being used for potentially destructive purposes. The turning point 
in this sense was the referendum of February 2012 about Russian as the second official language, 
which set off alarms for many members of the Latvian political elite in regard to these types of 
possibilities offered by direct democracy.
The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia from the outset has provided for relatively broad 
opportunities of direct participation. Moreover, some of them, such as citizen initiatives with the 
mandatory subsequent referendum (Article 78–79 of the Constitution), at the European level are 
nearly unique. It must be pointed out that before 2007, these instruments were used relatively 
rarely. The year 2007 brought some changes, when the President of the State Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga 
proclaimed a referendum under Article 72 of the Constitution regarding amendments adopted by the 
Saeima in the legislation on national security agencies, which prescribed to considerably increase 
the role of politicians in the control of special services, and which, according to the opinion of 
the President of the State, caused significant threats to national security (CVK (Central Election 
Committee) 2007). The following fact is also of importance: even though the Saeima had essentially 
already repealed the laws, 23 % of the citizens of Latvia still participated in the referendum, thereby 
demonstrating a symbolic protest against the actions of the political elite. In 2008, two new signature 
collection initiatives took place with the objective of introducing amendments to the Constitution to 
envisage the rights to the people to dismiss the Saeima, as well as to introduce amendments to the 
pension legislation. The former draft law was initiated by the Free Trade Union Confederation of 
Latvia with informal support from opposition parties, whereas the latter, by the Latvian Pensioners’ 
and Senior Citizens’ Party (Latvijas Pensionāru un senioru partija) in co-operation with the ‘Society 
for different politics and the rule of law’ created predominantly by the former members of the 
People’s Party (Tautas partija ). Even though in none of these cases was the necessary quorum 
reached, referenda during this period caused broad public response and later became an important 
reasoning used in political battles.
In early 2009, the only mass riots in the last decade took place in Riga Old town; they were 
caused by the inadequate response of the government to the economic crisis and in particular the 
collapse of Parex bank and the government bailing it out. As a result of these riots, the President of 
the State gave an unofficial ultimatum to the Saeima, threatening it with dismissal. One of the items 
of the ultimatum was the demand to supplement the Constitution with the rights of the citizens to 
initiate the dismissal of the Saeima – rights which had not been passed by referendum. This was 
done on 8 April 2009, although, setting a rather high quorum for this kind of referendum (at least 
2/3 of the participants of the last Saeima elections voting in favour), as well as restrictions as to 
the time before and after parliamentary elections, when the referendum can take place. The adopted 
provision (Article 14 of the Constitution) is in a way unique among modern-day political systems, 
by entitling one tenth of the citizens to initiate a referendum on the dismissal of the parliament in 
the middle of the electoral cycle. The adoption of this provision in 2009 was undoubtedly fostered 
by the public wish to control the politicians and further subject them to the influence of public 
opinion, as well as by a severe lack of legitimacy of the political elite (which accepted this idea 
without much discussion).
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Citizen initiatives and demands following the referenda over the following years gained even 
more popularity. In 2010, the Latvian radical political party ‘All For Latvia!’ (Visu Latvijai!) initiated 
a collection of signatures for the liquidation of Russian schools. This initiative did not succeed, but 
retaliation followed from the Russian-speaking extremist group led by Vladimirs Lindermans and 
Jevgeņijs Osipovs, and they managed to initiate a referendum on amendments to the Constitution, 
which would make the Russian language the second state language in Latvia. The referendum took 
place on 18 February 2012. Taking into account the importance of the language issue across all 
ethnic groups in Latvia, as well as the fact that ‘the said initiative was supported by the most popular 
Russian-speaking party ‘Harmony Centre’ (Saskaņas centrs), the turnout for this referendum was 
the third largest since the restoration of independence with 71.13 % of voters participating (CVK 
2012) (Referendum of 18 February 2012 on the draft law ‘Amendments to the Constitution of the 
Republic of Latvia’, http://cvk.lv/pub/public/30256.html).
This referendum generated widespread concerns about the potential for citizens to manipulate 
the constitutional bedrock of the State of Latvia through instruments of direct democracy (especially 
in the ethnically divided society of Latvia). Even before the referendum, the State President’s 
Commission of Constitutional Law (CCL) proposed an Opinion, which focused on the attempt to 
define the unchangeable core of the Constitution (see KTK 2012 (Commission of Constitutional 
Law), which could not be changed with a referendum. The ideas proposed in this document were 
enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution adopted in 2014. Likewise, without emphasising it 
formally, the said referendum served as a trigger for introducing a range of amendments to the laws 
governing the initiation and process of referenda. On the one hand, on 8 November 2012, despite 
protests by various activists and by a part of the politicians, the Saeima adopted amendments to the 
Law on National Referendums, Legislative Initiatives, and European citizens’ initiative, prescribing 
that the initial signature collection phase for the citizens’ initiative now be cancelled. Before, it was 
necessary to collect merely 10 000 notarially certified signatures, and then the duty of collecting 
signatures had to be assumed by the Central Election Committee; after the amendments entered into 
force, 30 000 signatures are necessary to this end, and as from 1 January 2015, the Central Election 
Committee (CEC) is fully released from the duty to collect signatures in citizen initiatives; however, 
an option of electronic signature collection is provided for.
The question of whether such legislative amendments infringe the democratic principles is 
theoretically rather complicated. In any case, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia has 
ruled that the said amendments are consistent with the Constitution (see LR ST 2013 (Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Latvia). The fact that since the said amendments entered into force 
(11 December 2012), the CEC has received applications for signature collection from nine initiative 
groups indirectly points to the fact that the impact of the aforementioned amendments on citizen 
participation in initiating laws might not be expressly negative. Instead, this points to an increased 
popularity of initiatives rather than to the existence of significant encumbrances (see: CVK 2013).
However, by restricting the institutional support of the state in organising national (and in 
particular, constitutional) level referenda, the legislature has made steps towards organising lower 
level voting and signature collection. Thus, for instance, on 19 January 2012, the Saeima adopted 
amendments to its Rules of Procedure. These amendments provide that 10 thousand citizens of Latvia, 
aged at least 16 years, are entitled to address the Saeima with a collective petition that the Saeima 
must review. This initiative also provides for the option of submitting a signature electronically. 
The public initiatives platform manabalss.lv established back in mid-2011 played a crucial role in 
promoting this initiative; more than 50 initiatives have already been applied for on the platform 
since it was established. Following lengthy discussions, the Saeima adopted these amendments to 
the Rules of Procedure, moreover, by doubling the number of the necessary signatures from the 
original five thousand to ten thousand. As of May 2014, 13 initiatives had collected the set amount 
of signatures. The fate of these initiatives differed after they were submitted to the Saeima. We can 
see that the participation platform itself has served as a positive stimulus to engage the citizens in 
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determining the political agenda, by bypassing the complex and categorical (yes/no) referendum 
mechanism.
Overall, it must be pointed out that the various political participation opportunities online 
are gaining ground, especially among the younger generation of the Latvian population. Political 
discussion groups are formed in social networking sites and around the websites of parties; politicians 
are using twitter, facebook, instagram and other communication platforms to communicate with their 
electorate with increasing frequency. Primarily under the guardianship of the centre for public policy 
Providus and the Society for Transparency ‘Delna’, attempts have been made to create innovative 
models for the direct communication of politicians with the electorate online – these include the 
communication platform for members of the Saeima gudrasgalvas.lv, the platform for assessing 
the reputation of election candidates kandidatiuzdelnas.lv and the political discussion platform 
manavalsts.lv. Even though the effectiveness and political neutrality of these initiatives has often 
been questioned, they still outline evident attempts to increase political participation.
Factors influencing participation in public life
There are very many factors affecting participation in public life, and here we cannot even 
give a summary of these factors. The most important participation factors expressly manifested in 
Latvia over the last five years are stressed here. The economic crisis has played a significant role 
in people’s public activities. Its impact has been twofold – simultaneously positive and negative. 
Within studies of human security conducted in 2012, many respondents pointed to an increasing 
tendency to associate, which was caused by the economic instability, loss of job and income. Bearing 
in mind that the ability of the State to resolve people’s day-to-day problems is decreasing, the need 
for self-management in people is increasing significantly. The following are the opinions of some 
respondents.
Romāns, employed, Russian-speaker, Riga. Mid-range self-management groups that are 
higher than the family but lower than the State are emerging. Social networks of this type are 
emerging.
Vera, employed, Russian-speaker, Daugavpils. It is very important to find something 
to occupy yourself with, even if you are not officially employed. Not a long time ago, we 
established an organisation for this – a volunteer movement. If you are out of work, it is better 
not to stay at home. It is better to be involved even if you are not getting paid for it. Somebody 
might take notice of you, or something of the sort.
Andis, employed, Latvian, Riga. We need to engage as many people as possible; I am 
speaking to my neighbours – intentionally and purposefully. The main thing is not to be 
indifferent. If you rely on the idea that there will be somebody, who will help you, it is one 
of the ways of managing fear. The people of Latvia harbour excessively high expectations 
towards the State where there should be no expectations at all. And where there should be, 
there is no response whatsoever. An example: the tax policy and distribution of the burden. 
And how does a post-Soviet individual react? They do not go out on the streets and protest, 
but instead avoid the situation altogether by evading taxes. This is a typical situation, which 
in a long-term will be causing problems. This is our Soviet legacy – muffling any initiative. 
A global approach would be to teach initiative, to teach people what they can expect from the 
State (Ijabs, Reinholde, Ozoliņa 2012).
Along with the economic crisis, emigration must be recognised as an ever-growing problem: 
a considerable number of civically active people simply leave the country instead of establishing 
lasting ties with the local community.
Since this chapter is dedicated specifically to forms of political participation, particular attention 
must be paid to attitudes towards the State and its institutions. It is that attitude, which determines 
whether people will want to get involved in political life and whether they will feel that it makes 
sense to participate in political activities.
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Table 12.3. Attitudes towards the State and political participation
Agree with the statement 2004 2014
Overall, the government is taking into account public opinion 31.7 17.0
People, who assume important public posts, usually are thinking of their own 
rather than the public good
87.8 81.2
Some strong leaders will do more for the good of our country than all laws and 
negotiations
58.5 60.7
Do you think that you would be able to do something if the government made 
decisions inconsistent with the public interests? (definitely would be able + maybe 
would be able)
26.1 21.5
Do you think that you would be able to do something if local government institu-
tions made decisions inconsistent with the public interests? (definitely would be 
able + maybe would be able)
40.7 29.4
Source: Rozenvalds 2005, p. 223, Tab. 16.1, 16.2, 16.3; p. 226, Tab. 19, 20; DA 2014 (Audit of Democracy).
From these attitudes, we can perceive a growing alienation of the public away from the State, 
a consistently high support for authoritarian alternatives, as well as growing uncertainty of the 
public’s own abilities to influence political processes. Despite the activities of individuals and many 
non-governmental organisations, the public activity of the inhabitants of Latvia is not channelled 
into the work of democratic institutions. These institutions are often perceived as alien, imposed 
from the outside, untrustworthy and ineffective. In this case too, the recently announced forecasts 
on inevitable consolidation of democratic institutions and increased legitimacy have not proven 
to be correct. From the viewpoint of political participation, a range of indicators rather shows the 
opposite tendency.
Taking into account the aforementioned, the situation with regard to civil participation in 
volunteering, self-management and non-governmental organisations, as well as in other volunteering 
work over the last five years can be regarded as poor.
12.3. How far do women participate in political life and public office at all levels?
Gender equality in political life and public office at all levels
From the viewpoint of political participation, the disproportion is not as marked in Latvia as 
it is in some other countries, where a strong prevalence of men is observed in politics. However, 
Latvia too has certain problems with regard to the public understanding of gender equality – in the 
public opinion, politics is still perceived as a markedly masculine occupation. This is also reflected 
in the attitude towards female politicians, who often have to jump through much higher hoops than 
male politicians. It is not possible to speak of a single, clearly manifested tendency with regard 
to the attitude of the Latvian political environment towards gender equality. Nevertheless, slightly 
simplifying the issue, it could be worded as follows. Women in Latvia are not prohibited from 
assuming governance functions and responsibility; however, widespread representation of women 
in the most important decision-making bodies is regarded as undesirable. This especially applies 
to political parties, in which the representation of women is very small. The European Institute 
of Gender Equality (EIGE) in the report published in 2013 points out that a peculiar situation 
can be observed in Latvia in terms of female influence: the index of female political influence in 
Latvia is considerably lower than the EU average (38.9 and 49.9 respectively), whereas in terms of 
economic influence, it is considerably higher than the average (38.3 and 29.0 respectively) (EIGE 
2013 (European Institute of Gender Equality)).
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Latvia is among the few EU countries, in which female and male representation in the 
parliament and in local governments is not governed by any quotas, whether legally stipulated or 
voluntarily accepted by political parties. It is one of the reasons why we cannot speak of significant 
improvements in this sphere. The proportion of women in the Saeima of Latvia among the elected 
parliamentarians remains constant – already starting with the 7th Saeima, on average 18–22 % of the 
parliamentarians are women. At the local government level, the situation is closer to equal gender 
representation: in the election of 2013, 31.3 % of parliamentarians are women. At the same time, 
it must be pointed out that this tendency is more prevalent in the regions, and less in cities under 
state jurisdiction, where the female proportion in councils is rarely higher than 20 %. A marked 
exception from this tendency is the city of Jūrmala, where the proportion of women in the City 
Council is at 53 %. However, there are no chairwomen in any of the councils of cities under state 
jurisdiction (LR LM 2013, 6 (Ministry of Welfare of the Republic of Latvia)).
Nevertheless, in the medium-term, the situation of gender equality in some administrative 
institutions has developed positively. Female representation has gradually increased in the executive 
branch. In the 1990s, most governments did not have any women ministers, whereas in the 
government approved in January 2014, five out of 14 ministers are women, in the posts of the prime 
minister, minister for culture, minister for health, minister for justice, and the minister for education 
and science. Statistics show that female representation in the governments of Latvia overall has been 
increasing over the last decade, though not in a linear progression. It is indicative of that gender 
equality considerations are not set as a priority in the process of shaping governments. Most likely, 
gender considerations do not dominate the division of spheres of the responsibility of ministers. In 
general, a certain tendency of traditionally ‘feminine’ ministries can be observed – most explicitly in 
the sphere of culture, but also welfare; over the last decade, these ministries in seven governments 
have been led almost exclusively by women. However, female ministers in Latvia have been in 
charge of defence, internal affairs and agriculture as well.
A less positive situation in regard to gender equality is observed in the boards of the leading 
political parties. A relative exception from this tendency is the Unity Party (Vienotība), in whose 
board seven out of 15 members are women; furthermore, the party leader is a woman (Solvita 
Āboltiņa). The board of the National Alliance (Nacionālā apvienība) has 14 members, of which 
only two are women, whereas there are no women in the boards of Harmony Centre and the Union 
of Greens and Farmers (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība).
A different situation is observed in civil service. Overall, there is a high proportion of women 
in the civil service of Latvia compared to the EU average, and this is particularly marked in the 
lower level positions of the civil service. Out of 13 positions of state secretaries, five (or 38.5 %) 
are filled by women, whereas in the category ‘specialists’, out of 8 847 positions 6 862 or 78 % are 
filled by women. The feminisation of the civil service is obviously not only linked to the attitude 
towards women in public administration, but also to other factors, such as payment, which was 
significantly reduced due to the crisis.
The attitude of the political elite towards the participation of women in a democratic society is 
rooted in the public perception. Even though it would be wrong to view Latvian society as highly 
patriarchal; nevertheless, the view of strictly separated social roles for women and men is clearly 
perceptible. In the survey conducted in the fall of 2013, 82 % of respondents answered that the 
professions ‘a politician’, ‘a minister’ and ‘a civil servant’ are equally suitable for both men and 
women. At the same time, when asked about professions that are suitable specifically for women, 
only 1 % said ‘a politician’, whereas, when asked to determine most suitable male professions, 
17 % named ‘a politician’. Likewise, 20 % of respondents from both gender groups agreed that 
men are better politicians than women. Men are more sceptical than women with regard to female 
participation in politics: 29 % of men and 12 % of women respondents agreed to the statement ‘a 
job, where important decisions must be made, is more suitable for men’, and 43 % of men and 
19 % of women respondents agreed with the statement ‘in a senior level position a woman loses 
her femininity’ (GfK 2013). A similarly patriarchal attitude among the elite, possibly, serves as a 
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reason for not reforming the currently undeniably male-dominated political structures to achieve 
increased gender equality. To sum up, it must be pointed out that these patriarchal attitudes remain 
alongside relatively egalitarian and modern attitudes in other social spheres. For instance, women 
are widely represented in entrepreneurship and top-level management, where, apparently, patriarchal 
attitudes have fewer ways of being actually, institutionally manifested. This probably is evidence 
of the need to reconsider the issue of gender equality at the level of democratic representation as 
well, including from the perspective of introducing quotas. To include this topic on the agenda, 
serious initiative should be expected from women represented in the political elite; however, nothing 
of the sort has been observed up to now, even though two out of three of the highest level state 
officials of Latvia are women. Even the party Vienotība, which is represented by women in many 
important positions at the Saeima, the government and in the European Parliament, does not even 
mention gender equality in its programme. This proves that the patriarchal perception of the role 
of a woman in politics in today’s Latvia is not typical of men only.
Gender equality in policy-making
Along with the integration of Latvia in the EU and other international organisations, the notion of 
gender equality has developed into an important argument in policy formation. Already in 2001, the 
government of Latvia adopted the Concept on the Implementation of Gender Equality, which served 
as the grounds for drafting a range of related short-term planning documents, for the Programme 
of Implementation of Gender Equality for 2004–2006 and 2007–2010, as well as the currently 
active Plan for the Implementation of Gender Equality for 2012–2014. The Ministry of Welfare is 
to issue its report about the results of implementing the latter planning document in mid-2015. The 
priorities outlined in the plan include reducing the gender roles and stereotypes, promoting a healthy 
and environmentally friendly lifestyle for women and men, promoting economic independence and 
equal opportunities for women and men in the labour market, as well as the political supervision 
and assessment of gender equality (LR MK 2013 (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia)).
The main institution ensuring public engagement in policy formation in terms of gender 
equality is the Gender Equality Committee created in 2010 by the Ministry of Welfare to replace 
the former Gender Equality Council. This committee includes representatives of ministries and 
local governments, as well as a number of NGOs. The most influential of the represented NGOs in 
terms of protecting gender equality and women’s rights is the association ‘Resursu centrs sievietēm 
“Marta’’’, which, besides active operations in various areas related to women’s rights and the quality 
of life (prevention of abuse, combatting human trafficking, etc.) are also involved in policy formation 
and influencing public opinion.
During the 8th Saeima (2002–2006), there was a Gender Equality Subcommittee at the Saeima. 
A number of parliamentarians voided their position in the matters of the gender role and equality 
issues in the fall of 2012, when the Ministry of Welfare in co-operation with the Nordic Council of 
Ministers published the children’s book by Louise Windfeldt ‘Diena, kad Kārlis bija Karlīna’ (transl. 
‘The day when Carl was Carly’) and ‘Diena, kad Rūta bija Rihards’ (transl. ‘The day when Ruth 
was Richard’) and the learning material for pre-schools ‘Pirmsskolas, kurās ir vieta PepijPrinčiem un 
PirātPrincesēm’ (transl. ‘Pre-schools where there is room for PippyPrinces and PiratePrincesses’). In 
February 2013, 36 members of the Saeima – bothfrom ruling and opposition parties – signed a letter 
urging the Ministry of Welfare not to distribute these books and review the aforementioned Plan for 
the Implementation of Gender Equality for 2012–2014, which speaks of integrating the principle 
of gender equality in pre-schools. This case proves that the transfer of various action policies from 
other EU countries in the sphere of gender equality is not always successfully accepted across all 
social groups of Latvia.
The Ombudsman’s Office is responsible for the introduction of gender equality principles in 
Latvia from the perspective of preventing discrimination. Since gender discrimination is still one 
of the most widespread types of discrimination, the need to address this will remain also in future.
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All in all, the situation with regard to female participation in political life and in public office 
at all levels over the last five years is assessed as satisfactory. 
12.4. How equal is access for all social groups to public office and how fairly 
are they represented?
No reliable statistics is available about how social groups are employed in public office due 
to data protection regulation. Therefore, the situation in this sphere can be assessed merely from 
approximate data. It is estimated that the proportion of non-Latvians in public office is not lower 
than 20 %. This shows that the representation of national minorities in public office is less than 
half of what it is in Latvian society in general. An overall prevalence of Latvians is observed in the 
public sector as well. In 2007, out of all employed Latvians 36.9 % were employed in the public 
sector, whereas only 24.0 % of non-Latvians were employed in the public sector (Hazans 2010).
A pilot study (of limited level of representation), conducted in 2011, similarly showed a lower 
level of representation of non-Latvians. Only about 12 % were non-Latvians in the institutions 
included in the study (Golubeva, Kažoka, Rastrigina 2011). Furthermore, 29 % of respondents from 
the civil service do not consider that attempts should be made to attract more employees representing 
national minorities, whereas 49 % believe that such policy would be preferable.
Summary: Progress over the last decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
12.1. X
12.2. X
12.3. X
12.4. ?
Best feature
Latvia has a broad, active, and dynamic spectrum of non–governmental organisations.
Most serious problem 
A considerable part of Latvian society is becoming more alienated from democratic institutions.
Suggested improvements
In the sphere of non-governmental organisations: establishment of a transparent system for 
granting public funding to NGOs.
In the sphere of public participation: complex solutions for ‘a restart’ of interaction between 
the citizens and the State, by paying particular attention to the effectiveness of the State’s activity.
In the sphere of female participation: commencing discussion of potentially establishing quotas 
in party election lists.
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13. DECENTRALISATION 
Inga Vilka
Are decisions made at the level of government that is most appropriate for the 
people affected?
13.1. How independent are the sub-national tiers of government from the 
central government, and to what extent do they have the power and 
resources to carry out their responsibilities?
The European Charter of Local Self-Government (adopted by the Council of Europe (CoE) in 
Strasbourg in 1985; hereinafter referred to as – ‘the Charter’) can be considered as the safeguard 
of local autonomy. It is an international document ratified by 45 of the 47 COE Member States. 
Latvia has ratified 29 of the 30 principles included in this Charter. The Preamble of the Charter, 
inter alia, states that the local authorities are among the main foundations of any democratic regime, 
that the existence of local authorities with real responsibilities can provide an administration which 
is both effective and close to the citizen, and that the safeguarding and reinforcement of local self-
government in the different European countries is an important contribution to the construction of 
a Europe based on the principles of democracy and the decentralisation of power (EP (Council of 
Europe) 1985).
The CoE Congress of Local and Regional Authorities regularly carries out monitoring of 
local and regional democracy in the countries which have ratified the Charter, and it prepares 
recommendations for improving the situation according to the Charter’s merit and principles. 
Moreover, the new procedure, which lays down that monitoring must be carried out in each member 
state at least once in five years, became effective in 2010. The first democracy monitoring in Latvia 
was performed, and a report was prepared accordingly, in 1998, while the most recent monitoring 
report, and recommendations, were drafted and approved in 2011. A monitoring on a separate 
matter (municipal elections) was carried out in 2008 between these reporting periods. In its 2011 
recommendations for Latvia, the CoE recognized that generally the local government system in 
Latvia has been developed in accordance with modern European local government standards (CLRA 
2011), simultaneously providing several recommendations (incorporated in the text below).
The Saeima (the Parliament of the Republic of Latvia) adopted the Law on Local Governments 
as the key legislative document which governs local governments in 1994. Amendments to this 
law have so far been adopted more than 20 times. This law defines local government as a local 
administration which, through bodies of representatives elected by citizens – city or municipality 
council – and authorities and institutions established by them, ensures the performance of the 
functions prescribed by law, as well as the performance of tasks assigned by Cabinet of Ministers 
according to the procedures specified by law, and local government voluntary initiatives, observing 
the interests of the State and of the residents of the relevant administrative territory (LR Saeima 
(Saeima of the Republic of Latvia) 1994b). Local governments are also mentioned in the State 
Administration Structure Law (passed in 2002), which grants local authorities the status of derived 
public entities that have been conferred their own autonomous competence by law which includes 
also establishing and approval of their own budget (LR Saeima 2002).
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Local governments have extensive competence in Latvia. Amendments to the Law on Local 
Governments made in 2005 encompassed changing the groups of local governments’ functions and 
introducing the concept of local governments’ autonomous functions. This law and other legislative 
documents lay down the functions and responsibilities of local governments. The competence of each 
local government includes a range of matters, which the private individuals (physical individuals 
and legal entities subject to private law) located in its territory deal with in their everyday life and 
activity. For example, local governments must organise the following autonomous functions for 
their residents: utility services, public facilities and cleanliness, education for inhabitants, cultural 
activities, social aid for their inhabitants, social services and access to healthcare, the promotion 
of a healthy lifestyle and sports among its inhabitants, assistance in solving housing matters, the 
reduction of unemployment and facilitate economic activity in their territory, etc.
A comparison of the proportion of Latvian local government budget expenditures in the 
Latvian general government consolidated budget to the indices of other EU countries evidences 
the comparatively extensive competence and importance of local governments in the public sector. 
Eurostat data shows that Latvian indices are slightly above the EU average. In 2004, the indicator 
for Latvia (27.9 %) was the 10th highest in the EU 27 (EU average: 24.4 %), whereas in 2012, this 
indicator for Latvia was the eighth highest (27.1 %) among the 28 EU Member States (EU average: 
23.9 %). The dynamics of this indicator points to centralization trends in Latvia and in the EU in 
general; this trend is mainly related to the stabilization measures carried out centrally in the Member 
States due to the economic downturn.
In 2009 the administrative territorial reform was completed in Latvia; currently there are 119 local 
governments in the country, nine of them are republic cities (hereinafter referred to as cities) and 110 
are novads municipalities (hereinafter referred to as municipalities). All local governments possess 
an equal local government status and competence. A two-tier local government system with more 
than 500 local governments existed in Latvia before the reform (at the beginning of 2009 there 
were 7 republic cities, 50 towns, 41 novads municipalities and 424  rural municipalities (pagasts) 
in lowest level and 26 districts (rajons) in second level). 
In general the competencies of local governments were extended within the reforms because 
the vast majority of functions of second level local governments, i.e. districts, was handed over to 
novads municipalities. Other cases of extending local government competencies can also be observed 
in practice (e.g. several local governments have taken over professional educational institutions) 
through voluntary initiative. However, certain areas exist where it would be desirable for the 
engagement of local governments to increase. Recently local governments have raised discussions 
regarding the necessity to extend their opportunities to solve housing matters (including issuing 
guarantees to young families) and facilitate business activity in their territories. 
In its informative report on the Assessment of the Administrative Territorial Reform, the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection and Regional Development (MEPRD) states that the diversity of and 
access to municipal services provided to inhabitants has increased in the amalgamated municipalities, 
and local governments use the infrastructures at their disposal to a greater extent (VARAM (Ministry 
of Environmental Protection and Regional Development – MEPRD) 2013). The Concept of Local 
Government Reform (1993) set forth the following: ‘The territorial division reform must be carried 
out for the purpose of decentralising state administration;’ however, this has not been achieved in 
practice. The MEPRD report points out that the administrative territorial division lacks the capacity 
to decentralise state functions as a result of the reform (the population in some of the municipalities 
is smaller than stated in the law requirements (4 000) even after the reform) (VARAM 2013) thus 
indicating that it might be necessary to continue implementing the reform.
The scope of local government competencies reflects some kind of progress towards 
decentralisation whereas the regulatory framework regarding the functions that fall within local 
government competence indicates a refraining from moving towards decentralisation. The trend 
to increasingly regulate the implementation of local government functions (processes, procedures, 
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institutional framework, requirements towards staff, wages, funding, etc., sometimes even coming 
up with regulations which cannot be implemented due to lack of funding) exists in Latvia. The 
increase of unification and normativism has been a long-term trend in Latvia even though during 
certain periods it justified itself by the necessity to resolve matters related to the economic crisis. 
At times, the provision of sufficient quality of local government functioning in all places and the 
protection of inhabitants against arbitrariness were used as an excuse for these trends.
Local government leaders point out in local governments self-assessments that excessive 
bureaucracy is one of the key factors that hinder the high quality performance of local governments. 
For several years (2007–2009, 2011, 2012) local government leaders mentioned excessive bureaucracy 
as the most hindering factor for effective performance (e.g. 77.3 % of local government leaders 
mentioned bureaucracy as the most obstructive factor in 2011; moreover, 24 % of them considered 
it as a very obstructive factor; in 2010 it was mentioned as the second most hindering factor 
whereas in 2013 it was mentioned as the third most cumbersome) (Krastiņš, Vanags, Valodiņš 2012; 
CSP (Central Statistics Bureau) 2013). The decrease in the importance of this obstructive factor 
was not related to the solution of this problem, or, in other words, the reduction of bureaucracy; 
instead, it was related to the exacerbation of problems linked to other obstructive factors (in 2013 
the most obstructive factor was the poor state of roads, and the runner-up was lack of funding in 
local governments (CSP 2013). On the one hand, local governments are discontent with limitations 
whereas, at the same time, the ministry in charge of these matters points out that sometimes it is 
the local government employees who call for stronger regulation in certain matters, or, mention the 
lack of regulation as the reason for refraining from tackling certain issues locally (EGPP (Expert 
Group on Improvement of Governance) 2013). 
In its report published in 2013, the expert group for improving governance established by 
the President of Latvia stresses that inconsistently determined competence or functions of local 
governments and the increasing regulation are currently substantial issues in the area of local 
governance. When shaping a regulatory framework for local government autonomous functions in 
laws and regulations, one should take into account the reference made by the Constitutional Court in 
its judgment in case No 2008-03-03, which states that the performance of local governments in terms 
of implementing autonomous functions may be regulated by law; however, it must not completely 
deprive local governments of a certain freedom of discretion (LR ST (Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Latvia) 2008). Similarly, to other matters related to self-governance guarantees, local 
governments must maintain the core of these functions, in other words, the local governments’ 
opportunities to perform at least their basic functions and assume responsibility for them. This 
would also facilitate the implementation of decentralisation as well as efficient consolidation of the 
principle of subsidiarity in the legal system (EGPP 2013). 
The opportunities to implement voluntary functions are treated ambiguously in practice, and 
state authorities express the opinion that local governments are permitted to carry out only the 
functions that are prescribed by the law. The Law on Local Governments provides for voluntary 
initiatives. Therefore, no doubts should exist regarding the fact that local governments can carry 
out functions that are not defined by laws, and such an approach deserves support (EGPP 2013).
In response to the question of whether insufficient independence of local governments is a factor 
that impedes their performance, 77.4 % of local government leaders responded that this was not 
an obstructive factor (CSP 2013). However, local government leaders have unalterably indicated a 
lack of funding as one of the top three issues throughout the years (e.g. 77.3 % mentioned this as 
an obstructive and very obstructive factor in 2011, whereas in 2013 such a response was received 
from 66.4 % of respondents) (Krastiņš, Vanags, Valodiņš 2012; CSP 2013).
Summarizing data from general government and local government budget reports published 
by the Treasury (see Table 13.1), the dynamics of local governments financial resources on a year-
by-year basis show that a significant increase in local governments’ resources existed until 2008, 
when the proportion of local governments’ funds in the consolidated government budget increased 
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accordingly. Conversely, after the crisis – in 2009 and 2010 – local government resources decreased 
substantially, and their share in the general government consolidated budget contracted respectively. 
In 2011, local government resources started increasing in comparison to the previous year, whereas 
in 2013 their proportion increased also in the general government budget. In 2013, local governments 
expenditures exceeded the expenditures level of 2007; however, it did not reach the expenditures 
level that was in 2008.
Table 13.1. General government consolidated budget expenditures and local government 
consolidated budget expenditures in Latvia, 2004–2013
Year General 
government 
consolidated 
budget 
expenditures
Local 
government 
consolidated 
budget 
expenditures
General 
government 
consolidated 
budget 
expenditures
Local 
government 
consolidated 
budget 
expenditures
Share of local 
government 
expenditures in the 
general government 
consolidated budget 
expenditures, %Million LVL Million EUR
2004 2599.6 687.5 3698.9 978.22 26.4
2005 3297.8 823.4 4692.3 1171.59 25.0
2006 4070.9 1038.5 5792.4 1477.65 25.5
2007 5255.4 1457.5 7477.8 2073.84 27.7
2008 6266.5 1787.3 8916.4 2543.10 28.5
2009 5626.3 1394.9 8005.5 1984.76 24.8
2010 5401.8 1264.6 7686.1 1799.36 23.4
2011 5540.2 1403.8 7883.0 1997.43 25.3
2012 5718.4 1427.0 8136.6 2030.40 25.0
2013 5980.1 1537.8 8508.9 2188.13 25.7
Source: State Treasury Reports.
The results of the local government self-assessment poll of 2013 show that in 2012 the financial 
situation had improved for 50.4 % of local governments compared to the previous year. Only 9.2 % 
of local government leaders claimed that the financial situation had deteriorated. The majority of 
local government leaders (62.5 %) recognized that the financial situation of their municipalities was 
mediocre at the beginning of 2013, whereas 28.6 % claimed that the situation was good, 0.8 % 
stated that the situation was very good, and another 8.4 % were of the opinion it was poor (CSP 
2013). However, the majority of local government leaders recognized that funds were insufficient 
for performing autonomous local governments functions as opposed to 30.2 % who claimed that the 
funds were sufficient. The proportion of local government leaders who considered that funds were 
insufficient had increased compared to the previous year. One must take into account however that 
substantial differences exist among local governments in terms of the financial resources at their 
disposal. A system of local government finance equalization has been in place since the mid-1990s, 
nevertheless differences are significant even after leveraging.
Improvements in local government finance equalization system has been on the government’s 
agenda since 2009, yet the matter has still not been resolved, even though the deadlines for submitting 
the new draft law have been stated in the law, and several governments have stressed the importance 
of solving this issue in their declarations.
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The only principle of the Charter that Latvia has not ratified is related to funding; this principle 
lays down that for the purpose of borrowing for capital investment, local authorities shall have 
access to the national capital market within the limits of the law. The CoE has recommended 
Latvia increase the financial autonomy of local governments through diversifying their sources of 
income and increasing the proportion of such financial resources whose tax base and rates local 
governments can influence (CLRA 2011). The responsible ministry (back then – the Ministry of 
Regional Development and Local Governments – RAPLM) reviewed the methods of resolving this 
matter as early as in 2010 by means of submitting a respective informative report to the government 
(RAPLM 2010). Since 2013, local governments are entitled to determine real estate tax rates within 
the limits defined by the law. During the recovery from the economic crisis, the COE encourages 
decreasing the central government’s supervision over local government finances (CLRA 2011).
Considering the significant differences between the number of residents and the scope of 
functions of the Riga city and other local governments, the CoE suggested determining a special 
status for the capital city. Since 2005, the Law on Local Governments lays down state and city’s 
shared responsibility functions for Riga as the capital city. The practice of adopting a special law 
for the capital city, which may also provide for special funding for it, exists in several European 
countries. Riga city attitude towards the need for a special law has altered in recent years, and 
currently it does not insist on it. This might be explained by a certain cautiousness on the part of 
Riga city: the risk exists that a government run by the political opponents of those who manage the 
local authority may draft a disadvantageous law for the city. The campaign on the differentiation 
of public transport ticket prices, distinguishing between declared residents and other passengers, 
launched by the city of Riga in the autumn of 2013, was a manifestation of Riga city discontentment 
and protest against the existing local government funding system.
The matter of regional level government has still not been resolved, and thus remains topical in 
the context of decentralisation in Latvia. A two-tier local government system existed in Latvia until 
the end of 2009. The second level, or, the government level between local and central government, 
consisted of 26 district governments, and seven cities simultaneously functioned as both local level 
and second level administrative territorial units that were not included in district territories. The 
competence of district governments was comparatively narrow. The key law adopted in the area of 
district administration was the Law on Local Governments; however, in its judgment in case No 
2007-21-01, the Constitutional Court stated that district councils, for the purposes of the principle 
of local governments, should not be regarded as a fully-fledged independent local government; 
instead, it should be mainly considered as a form of cooperation between rural municipalities and 
towns, as prescribed by the law, which is aimed at the implementation of certain functions (LR 
ST 2007).
The Administrative Territorial Reform Law adopted in 1998, alongside the reform of the 
administrative territorial division of local governments, also provided for the reform of district local 
governments stating that a separate law is to be drafted for this process. Amendments to the Law 
on the Establishment of Administrative Territories of the Republic of Latvia and Definition of the 
Status of Populated Areas of the Republic of Latvia (1991) passed in 2006 provided for the inclusion 
of counties (apriņķis) in the administrative territory of Latvia, setting forth that they will be formed 
before 2010. The Law on Administrative Territories and Populated Areas in its currently effective 
wording still distinguishes counties as a type of administrative territorial unit in the Republic of 
Latvia (LR Saeima 2008b).
District administration level was abolished as a result of the administrative territorial reform, 
which was completed in 2009. The Law on Reorganisation of District Local Governments adopted 
in 2008 governed this process (LR Saeima 2008a). It stated that all district councils must develop 
and adopt their reorganisation plans before the end of 2008. Analysis of district reorganisation plans 
reveals that all district institutions, property, funds, rights and liabilities were handed over to new 
local governments, and planning regions assumed the responsibility for managing agreements with 
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public transport service providers (for services provided in municipal territories); in a few cases the 
property of districts was handed over for privatization. District council powers expired on 1 July 
2009, and the implementation of reorganisation plans was completed on 31 December 2009 (VRAA 
(State Regional Development Agency) 2010).
In the late 1990s, when districts still existed, planning regions started to form in Latvia according 
to local government initiative. Based on the Regional Development Law (2002) the Cabinet of 
Ministers established five planning regions (in accordance with the proposals received from local 
governments) for planning and coordinating regional development and ensuring cooperation between 
local governments. Since 2006, planning regions possess the status of derived public entities whose 
development councils, consisting of representatives of local government councillors, make up their 
decision-making bodies. The Regional Development Law defines the key competencies for planning 
regions. In general, the competence of planning regions is narrow, and recently it has been prone 
to shrinking even more (since 2014, planning regions are no longer responsible for planning and 
controlling passenger transport functions, which they took over from districts; currently they only 
take part in this process). The 2010 amendments to the law set forth that planning regions may be 
assigned administrative tasks, which fall under the competence of direct state administration. This 
option has rarely been applied in practice – examples exist only in the field of culture; discussions 
about these options are taking place in other fields. Government budget subsidies are the permanent 
funding source for planning regions; the amount of granted subsidies is small, and the largest part of 
activity is related to the implementation of various projects funded by the EU and other programmes.
The 2011 CoE local democracy monitoring and its subsequent recommendations stated that, 
‘regional development is unbalanced in Latvia. The five planning regions lack the characteristics of 
genuine autonomous regional administrations, and their representative bodies are not elected through 
direct general elections.’ It is recommended to clarify the regulatory position of the five planning 
regions and to grant them an adequately autonomous status. Similarly, it is recommended to apply 
principles included in the CoE Reference Framework for Regional Democracy in forming genuine 
regional government (CLRA 2011). 
In its January 2014 report, the State Audit Office’s evaluation stated the following: ‘Due to the 
lack of vision on the part of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development, the 
efficiency of the performance of Latvian planning regions is currently questionable. Such a situation 
is caused not only by errors in the functioning of the planning regions, but also by gaps in legislation, 
insufficient funding and inadequate support and supervision from the responsible ministries’ (VK 
(State Audit Office) 2014). The State Audit Office has recommended the MEPRD assess further 
development of the planning regions. If a decision is adopted on continuing their activity, the State 
Audit Office indicates the necessity for developing a relevant regulatory framework – a procedure 
for the permanent funding and activity of the planning regions.
An unclear and volatile stance regarding regional matters has become a characteristic feature 
of the Latvian public sector. The summary given in Table 13.2 illustrates the situation; that is, the 
commitment expressed in the last five government declarations regarding regional administration 
in Latvia. This matter is still waiting for a solution. Similarly, completion of the administrative 
territorial reform at the local level (formerly incompleteness served as an excuse for postponing 
the solution of the matter at the regional level) has failed to provide clarity about the future of the 
regional administration.
The opinions of the local governments regarding regional governance differ. The results of 
local government leaders’ self-assessments show that the number of those who support formation 
of regional governments is smaller than the number of those who support this necessity; support for 
the necessity for regional governments has decreased during recent years compared to the situation 
10 years ago (see Table 13.3). 
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Table 13.2. The government position regarding regional administration expressed in 
declarations by the Cabinet of Ministers 
Head of the 
government, period
Commitment stated in government declaration regarding regional admi-
nistration
Ivars Godmanis,
July 2007 – 
March 2009
We will ensure the completion of the regional reform through consultations 
with the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments.
We will ensure balanced development of the entire state territory by de-concen-
trating public administration, developing the regional administration level, in-
creasing the role of regional and local administrative institutions when determi-
ning and implementing priorities in line with the National Development Plan.
Valdis Dombrovskis,
March 2009 – 
November 2010
We will establish a regional administration level before 2010 that will serve as 
the basis for forming counties. We will ensure the passing of a law on counties.
We are going to decentralise state administration by increasing the role of re-
gional and local administrative institutions when determining and implemen-
ting priorities in line with the National Development Plan.
Valdis Dombrovskis,
November 2010 –  
October 2011
We are going to decrease the number of administrative levels by eliminating 
planning regions, and we will split up their functions between regional munici-
palities and respective public administration authorities.
Valdis Dombrovskis,
October 2011 –  
January 2014
We will continue arranging and improving the administrative territorial struc-
ture in order to finish with the administrative territorial reform. We are going 
to evaluate and hand over those public administration functions to local gover-
nments and planning regions that they can implement more efficiently and in a 
more financially feasible manner.
Laimdota Straujuma,
January 2014
We will carry out measures to strengthen the role of local governments and 
planning regions in facilitating entrepreneurship and socio-economic develop-
ment. We will strengthen the capacity of planning regions through developing 
and implementing strategies and programmes for regional development.
Source: Information retrieved from RL CM website www.mk.gov.lv
Table 13.3. Local government leaders’ responses to the question ‘Are the second level local 
governments necessary in Latvia?’
Year Yes No, not necessary
Directly elected Indirectly elected
2005 48.7 45.3
2008 42.7 13.3 38.5
2011 32.8 10.9 55.5
2012 24.4 22.7 52.9
Source: Krastiņš, Vanags, Valodiņš 2012
One can conclude that currently neither the central administration, nor local governments 
support the strengthening of regional administration; therefore, instead of nurturing illusions about 
regional governments, an agreement should be sought on the most optimal level of cooperation and 
coordination in the level between the central administration and local governments. 
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Even though the competence of local governments is extensive in Latvia, and the admi-
nistrative territorial reform has been completed, which might serve as a precondition for 
increasing decentralisation, the existing excessive regulation of local governments as well as the 
local governments’ inadequate financial autonomy (regarding income) and unresolved regional 
administration matters (unclear and volatile stance regarding regional issues due to which the 
activity of planning regions is insufficiently effective) makes it possible to evaluate the situation 
within the scope of this chapter no higher than ‘satisfactory’.
13.2. How far are these levels of government subject to free and fair 
electoral authorization, and the criteria of openness, accountability  
and responsiveness in their operation?
The core of a local government is the local council. It is a representative authority of a local 
community and it is its key decision-making body. In accordance with the Law on Elections of the 
Republic City Council and Municipality Council (adopted in 1994), city and municipality councils 
are elected for four years in equal and direct elections by secret ballot based on proportional 
representation. Number of amendments have been introduced to the law that was passed two decades 
ago; therefore, each new municipal election possesses characteristics that make them different from 
the previous elections. 
Local elections in Latvia have taken place six times since the reinstatement of independence: 
in 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013. Local governments are also elected for a period of 
four years in the majority of other European countries. The term of office for local councillors is 
shorter only in one country – Andorra – where local governments are elected only for three years. 
In several other countries, such as Italy, Cyprus, Ireland, Ukraine, Turkey, some Swiss cantons, 
some parts of Belgium, Austrian states and German federal states, local councils are elected for five 
years. Conversely, the local council term of office is six years in such countries as Luxembourg, 
France, and some parts of Germany (Bavaria), Austria and Belgium. In the future, changes are 
planned in Greece and Hungary: these countries plan to switch from a four year to a five-year 
term of office (Vilka 2013). In its congress resolution of 30 May 2014, the Latvian Association of 
Local and Regional Governments encourages the organisation of municipal elections once every 
five years, simultaneously with European Parliament (EP) elections. Such a proposal is in line with 
the changes that are taking place in Europe, and they would significantly contribute to the voter 
turnout at EP elections. However, one should bear in mind: a transitional period with the extension 
of the currently convened councillors’ term of office (by two years) would be necessary in order 
to align these periods.
Local government election principles were included in the Constitution (Satversme) with 
amendments introduced to it in 2002. Initially Article 101 of the Constitution was supplemented with 
Paragraph 2: ‘Local governments shall be elected by Latvian citizens with voting rights,’ whereas 
after the 2004 amendments this Article lays down the following: ‘Local governments shall be elected 
by Latvian citizens and citizens of the European Union who permanently reside in Latvia.’ In its 
judgment No 2007-21-01, the Constitutional Court ruled that ‘Article 101 of the Constitution not 
only lays down the fundamental right of individuals to elect local governments and their deriving 
the right to participate in the administration of public matters through elected local governments, 
it also stipulates the general status of a local government as an elected self-governance authority, 
observing the laconic style of the Constitution’ (LR ST 2007). 
In Latvia, persons aged over 18 possess municipal voting rights in the city or municipality 
where their registered place of residence is or where they own real estate. Generally, in Europe 
persons acquire municipal voting rights at the age of 18; however, in Austria, some federal lands 
in Germany and in one Swiss canton people can participate in municipal elections from the age of 
Inga Vilka. DECENTRALIZATION 241
16. In Hungary, persons can participate in elections from the age of 16 if they are married whereas 
in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro persons are allowed to vote 
from the age of 16 if they are employed (Vilka, 2013). Since the 2005 elections, persons aged at 
least 18 possess the right to be elected in a local government council (previously one had to be at 
least 21) in administrative territory where is their registered place of residence is, where they own 
real estate or where they are employed. In European countries, persons can run for election in local 
governments starting from the age of 18, 20 or 21.
In terms of municipal elections, non-citizens’ rights to participate in them generate the most 
heated discussions in Latvia. In this regard, the CoE prepared special recommendations for Latvia 
in 2008 (CLRA, 2008), and this matter was also mentioned in the 2011 recommendations about 
local democracy in Latvia. The CoE pointed out the following: ‘Regardless of the endeavours 
carried out by Latvian institutions in terms of facilitating social cohesion, restrictions exist 
regarding the participation of those non-citizens who identify themselves with national minorities 
in public affairs. One such restriction is their inability to vote in municipal elections’. The CoE 
also recommends ‘granting non-citizens the right to vote in municipal elections in order to 
accelerate their integration into Latvian society, which has already begun’ (CLRA 2011). In all 
EU Member States, citizens who are registered in the respective country as residents possess 
the right to vote in municipal elections. Yet the solutions vary regarding other citizens who are 
not citizens of the respective country. In some European countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Slovakia), non-citizen residents, having lived in the 
country for a certain period, have the right to vote and be elected in municipalities. In other 
countries (Belgium, Estonia, Hungary and Luxembourg), non-citizen residents have only the right 
to vote, but not to run for election (CLRA 2009). In some countries, including Latvia, residents 
who are not citizens of the respective country or of another EU member state have neither of 
these rights. Non-citizens of Latvia have the opportunity to be naturalized and become citizens 
of the Republic of Latvia.
Currently, registered political parties or their associations have the right to submit their local 
government candidate lists in all cities and municipalities where the number of residents exceeds 
5 000. In smaller municipalities, where the number of residents does not exceed 5 000, electoral 
associations may submit their candidate lists alongside political parties or their associations. 
Cities have been subject to such rules since the introduction of the law in 1994, whereas in other 
local municipalities with the number of residents exceeding 5 000 the opportunities for electoral 
associations to run as candidates were gradually eliminated starting from the 2001 elections. On 10 
January 2014, the Constitutional Court passed a judgment on launching a case for the application 
requesting the recognition of the inconsistency of the part of the Law on Elections of the Republic 
City Council and Municipality Council, insofar as it prohibits electoral associations to submit their 
candidate lists in cities and municipalities where the number of inhabitants exceeds 5 000, with 
the fundamental human rights stated in Articles 91 and 101 of the Constitution (LR ST 2014). The 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in this matter is still pending.
Altogether 686 097 voters participated in the 2013 municipal elections; they elected 1 618 
deputies out of 8 725 deputy candidates (CVK (Central Election Committee) 2013). The voter 
turnout in these local governmemnt elections reached their lowest point in the history of Latvia 
after its reinstatement of independence (see Table 13.4).
Table 13.4. Voter turnout in municipal elections in Latvia
Year 1994 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013
Voter turnout 58.5 % 56.84 % 61.98 % 52.85 % 53.75 % 45.99 %
Source: LR CVK data.
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The comparatively highest voter turnout in municipal elections was registered in 2001. The 
Electoral Register was introduced during the run-up to the 2005 municipal elections; a sharp decline 
in the turnout was registered that year. The voter turnout slightly increased in 2009 despite the 
forecast that it might change as a result of the administrative territorial reform; the turnout decreased 
in 2013. A 50 % voter turnout in municipal elections is considered a European standard; with a 
turnout of 46 % Latvia joined the group of those countries where the turnout is lower than the 
European average. It is true that such a technical issue as the data on the number of residents (the 
CEC uses data from the Population Register of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs 
which differs from the data of the Central Statistics Bureau which are based on census results) 
also influences the calculation of the Latvian indicator (Vilka, Brēķis 2013). The post-election poll 
ordered by the CEC shows that the actual voter turnout was higher (SKDS 2013). Citizens who did 
not take part in the 2013 elections indicated that they did not see any sense in it (18 %), had no faith 
or trust in anything (12 %) or were not present in the area of their registered place of residence on 
the election day (10 %) as the main reasons for not participating (SKDS 2013).
Voter turnout in municipal elections is traditionally lower than in parliamentary elections. At 
the same time, people’s trust in local governments is significantly higher than their faith in the 
Saeima and the government. Eurobarometer studies suggest that faith in local governments in Latvia 
increased during the past year – it is higher than the EU average; moreover, the proportion of the 
population that trusts local governments is higher than the proportion of those who do not (it is the 
opposite in the EU) (Eurobarometer 2013).
Participation in elections is not the only opportunity for people to take part in local administration, 
and local government leaders indicate that participation tends to increase among the population. 
According to local governments’ self-assessment data from 2013, in 31 % of cases participation in 
local government activity and decision-making continued to increase during 2012 compared to the 
previous year. However, more than half of the local government leaders (53.0 %) evaluated resident 
participation as average, 27.7 % claimed that participation is passive, and only 19.3 % recognized 
participation as active (CSP 2013).
Chairpersons who are elected amongst council councillors run the work of local government 
councils. Before 2013, elections of council chairpersons were closed but starting from 2013 these 
elections are open. In Latvia, council chairpersons are the actual heads of the decision-making 
authority and executive power. In Europe, when implementing measures that ensure an increasingly 
broader engagement of the population, the trend for residents to entrust both the election of the 
decision-making authority (council) as well as the head of the executive power (mayor) exists. 
Local government leaders, often referred to as mayors, are elected directly by residents in Italy, 
Greece, Portugal, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Cyprus, Albania, part 
of Germany’s federal lands, some of the counties in the UK and some municipalities in Norway 
(Vilka, Brēķis 2013). A pilot trial is planned in some Finnish municipalities; Sweden is actively 
debating this matter, and active discussions are taking place in Lithuania (parliamentary majority 
has supported it; however, the majority was not large enough to introduce amendments to the 
Constitution, a separate section of which also includes municipal provisions).
The 2013, the local government self-assessment poll included the question whether local 
government leaders should be elected directly; 40.3 % of local government leaders supported this 
idea whereas 35.3 % considered that leaders should not be elected directly. The remaining 24.4 % 
of respondents did not have a clear opinion in this matter (CSP 2013). A public poll was conducted 
in Latvia regarding this matter at the beginning of 2014. Results of the poll suggest that the majority 
of respondents (65.7 %) would be ready to support the idea of entrusting voters to select their local 
government leaders, i.e. to elect local government leaders along with deputies in municipal elections. 
The proposal to elect local government leaders in direct elections is fully supported by 32.2 % of 
respondents, 33.5 % rather supported, 10.4 % rather did not support, 7.9 % did not support at all 
whereas 16.0 % of respondents did not have an answer to this question (Lasmanis 2014).
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The development and broader introduction of information and communication technologies in 
the functioning of local governments facilitates transparency: the openness and public awareness 
of the work of local governments is continuously increasing. The Law on Local Governments sets 
forth that councils meet in open sessions unless the law provides otherwise; announcements on the 
time, place and agenda of regular council meetings must be posted in conspicuous places in or by 
council buildings and published online on the respective local authority’s website; council decisions 
and minutes of meetings must be made publicly accessible. In accordance with amendments to the 
law introduced in 2013, audio recording of council meetings must be ensured by 1 July 2014, and 
records must be made publicly accessible on the respective local authority’s website. The 2014 
amendments to the law postponed this deadline by another year.
Establishing the extent to which the functioning of a local government complies with 
responsibility and responsiveness criteria is a more difficult task.
Local government councils adopt decisions at their meetings. The Law on Local Governments 
stipulates that draft decisions are considered supported if more than half of the present councillors 
vote in favour of them. Three types of voting for draft decisions have introduced themselves in 
regular local government practice: voting for, against, and abstaining (such an option is also provided 
by responsible ministries in their decision templates). The Expert Group established by the President 
of State is of the opinion that local government councillors, acting as decision-makers for local 
economic life, must be able to decide for or against a proposed solution, instead of making political 
manoeuvres and deluding voters with their decisions to ‘abstain’ which turn out as votes ‘against’ 
in the end. Therefore, the group has proposed the elimination of the option of ‘abstaining’ (EGPP 
2013).
In 2008, an article on the option of conducting local municipal referendums was introduced 
in the Law on Local Governments. Initially, these amendments provided that the government will 
submit a draft law on local referendums at the Saeima before the end of 2009, but this deadline was 
cancelled later on. The law has not been passed up to now. The COE has recommended Latvia to 
sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to the European Charter of Local Self-Government on the 
right to participate in the affairs of a local authority (2009) (CLRA 2011).
Legislation requires mandatory organisation of public discussions during the course of drafting 
and approving territorial development planning documents, and publishing their results accordingly. 
In practice, the local population participates in other cases and ways as well. Good practice examples 
of responsiveness are the local governments which have set up residents’ advisory councils, organise 
residents’ forums where residents are regularly polled to clarify their needs, wishes and opinions, 
and engage in an active dialogue with their residents also in other ways.  
The positive assessment of this matter created by such things as the increase of transparency 
and openness in local government functioning, expansion of opportunities for residents to participate 
and be active is diminished by the fact that voter turnout in municipal elections has decreased and 
that the matter of local referendums still remains unresolved.
13.3. How extensive is the cooperation of government at the most local level 
with relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation 
and implementation of policy, and in service provision?
Chapter XIII of the Law on Local Governments is dedicated to cooperation between local 
governments. In order to resolve matters in which several local governments hold a stake, local 
governments have the right to cooperate as well as establish or join associations.
The MEPRD proposes the following model of cooperation and grouping of institutions: 
contract-based types of cooperation (delegation agreements, collaboration agreements, and 
partnership agreements), common institutions (associations, joint institutions, cooperative groups, 
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public-private enterprises and private enterprises), informal cooperation networks (events, work 
groups, etc.) and cooperation with foreign institutions (Šults 2011). From another point of view, 
inter-municipal cooperation between local governments can be conditionally divided into four basic 
groups: cooperation for defending mutual interests, cooperation for implementing certain functions 
(services), cooperation for development (projects) and cooperation as fellowship.
Local governments in Latvia make maximum use of cooperation opportunities in order to defend 
their interests. This is also provided for in the Law on Local Governments, which consolidates 
the status of an association that represents all local governments during the consultancy process. 
Government provisions arising from the law provide for the necessity of consulting during the 
legislative drafting and approval processes as well as in the annual negotiations between the 
government and local governments (EGPP 2013). Founded in 1991, the Latvian Association of 
Local and Regional Governments (LALRG) represents the interests of all local governments in 
Latvia. Shortly after the reinstatement of independence, local governments succeeded at reaching 
an agreement of establishing a single organisation – which represents local governments of all 
levels, types and regions. This organisation should be regarded as one of the most powerful of its 
type in European countries; it participates in negotiations with the government and the parliament 
(EGPP 2013). The organisation stresses that, compared to similar associations in other countries, the 
Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments has developed the most advanced system 
of formal negotiations, one of the most advanced mutual consultation systems, which engages local 
government politicians and employees, and the administration of the LALRG enjoys the highest 
level of recognisability compared to the administration of other countries’ associations. The CoE has 
also recognized that the LALRG plays a central role in facilitating local democracy (CLRA 2011). 
When assessing the positive impact of the consulting process on the functioning of democracy, 
it must be pointed out that the relationship between the central authority and local governments 
has been witnessing a certain crisis for the past couple of years; the negotiations between the 
government and local governments lost constructivism and their role decreased accordingly. Even 
the Memorandum of Agreement and Disagreement, which traditionally forms an integral part of 
the annual Government Budget Draft Law document package, was not signed between the LALRG 
and the Cabinet of Ministers in 2013. In June 2014, as the next year’s budget matters approached 
the government’s agenda, Andris Jaunsleinis, the long-standing Chairman of the LALRG, publicly 
expressed the opinion that one of the reasons why the government of the former Prime Minister 
Valdis Dombrovskis collapsed were explicit disagreements with the LALRG regarding the drafting 
of the government budget (LETA 2014).
Local governments have established various associations for specific groups, for example, 
Association of Novads Municipalities, Association of Coastline Municipalities, Association of 
Selonian Municipalities, and associations for representing specific areas, such as Association of 
Executive Directors, Association of Municipal Social Care Institutions, and so on, within the scope 
of the LALRG.
The Association of the Major Cities of Latvia (founded in 2001) must also be mentioned in the 
context of defending local government interests. It represents local governments of one group, and 
actively engages in representing this group’s interests. Even though this association does not have 
the same status recognized by law as the LALRG, the government has signed several cooperation 
agreements with it.
The law provides opportunities for various options regarding cooperation for ensuring local 
government functions (including provision of services). Legislation principally enables local 
governments to cooperate; however, the forms and procedures of cooperation are at the discretion 
of the local governments (Bite 2012). The most common types of cooperation between local 
governments are related to culture, sports, construction supervision as well as implementation of 
methodological management functions in the area of education. In a study dedicated to cooperation 
between local governments (Bite 2012), it is concluded that cooperation has been an insufficiently 
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used resource so far; cooperation that is more extensive would facilitate regional development 
and enable local governments to benefit economically, socially and politically. The study showed 
that in reality local governments disassociate themselves from cooperation with other territories 
and sometimes even compete with them. Institutional integration among local governments is low 
in Latvia. Cooperation costs are too high in order to enable higher cooperation forms to develop 
between local governments (Bite 2012). Cooperation between local governments is basically an 
instrument for small municipalities to improve the quality and capacity of services to be provided to 
residents. Cooperation between large municipalities for implementing mutually substantial municipal 
functions is not taking place (VARAM 2013).
Unsettled funding arrangements can be regarded as the key reason why competition and isolation 
exists between local governments (Bite 2012), which results in a lack of cooperation. The financial 
crisis in Latvia has not facilitated cooperation; on the contrary – it has encouraged competition 
between local governments. 
Regional Policy Guidelines adopted in 2013 and EU funds planning for 2014–2020 show a 
trend towards forcing cooperation in a top-down manner through providing funds for cooperation-
oriented projects. Cooperation initiatives should not be imposed; instead; local governments should 
come up with them and cooperation must be related to their needs and harmonized development.
All local governments carry out cooperation forms such as fellowship with the local governments 
of other countries; this type of cooperation is most likely to take place in the field of culture, but 
is not limited to it, and it is valuable in terms of exchanging experience. Within the scope of the 
‘Smart governance and performance improvement of Latvian municipalities’ project funded by 
the Norway Grants programme and launched by the LALRG in 2013, a cooperation network is 
being developed for exchanging experience. This project simultaneously offers local government 
politicians a new approach, the key idea of which is as follows: municipalities compete amongst 
themselves and with public sectors, and cooperation is not an aim in itself, it is an instrument that 
helps outperform competitors (Klismeta 2013).
Latvian local governments have significant and, in general, successful experience in terms 
of cooperating to defend their interests; however, cooperation for ensuring functions requires 
improvement. 
Summary: progress during the past 10 years
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
13.1. X
13.2. X
13.3. X
Latvia has witnessed manifestations of both centralization and decentralisation during the past 
10 years. An orientation towards decentralisation is usually advocated verbally whereas actual 
developments evidence the opposite. The economic crisis in Latvia, as in other European countries, 
was a reason for certain decentralisation. If a country is recovering from a crisis, then this should 
be evidenced with actual orientation towards decentralisation.
Best feature 
In general, local governments in Latvia are strong, and they enjoy a comparatively high degree 
of people’s trust.
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Most serious problem
An excessively large regulatory framework on the autonomous competencies of local 
governments exists, and it is prone to increase continuously. 
Suggested improvements
It is necessary to bring the regulation of local government functions to order by determining 
consistent groups of local government functions and significantly decreasing the regulatory 
framework. It is also necessary to facilitate the citizen participation in municipal matters.
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14. POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY 
Jurijs Ņikišins, Juris Rozenvalds, Brigita Zepa 
To what extent does the political culture of the Latvian population promote 
democratic processes?
Introduction. What is political culture and how is it measured?
In political science, there is a generally recognised assumption – in order for democracy to 
function successfully in a country, it must have an adequate political culture. Political culture is defined 
in various ways, but the contents of the definitions are similar. The International Encyclopaedia of 
the Social Sciences defines political culture as ‘the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give 
order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that 
govern behavior in the political system’ (IESS 1968, 218). Whereas, political culture in the Gabriel 
Almond’s and Sidney Verba’s classic piece The Civic Culture is defined as political orientation or 
attitudes towards the political system and its components, as well as towards the individual’s role 
in a system, respectively, a set of these attitudes (Almond, Verba 1989, 12). Ellen Dran, Robert 
Albritton, and Mikel Wyckoff identify three components in political culture: perceptions of an 
adequate role of the government and the sphere of interference, the individual’s attitude towards the 
political system, and the opinions as to who should be in power (Dran, Albritton, Wyckoff 1991, 17). 
Thus, the democratic political culture is perceived as values that attribute the meaning to the 
observation of political process norms and the recognition of its outcomes.
Political culture is multi-dimensional; therefore, the idea of covering all of its dimensions cannot 
be implemented within the framework of one chapter. In the Latvian context, it would be interesting 
to conduct a study of the three aspects of political culture from both the theoretical and empirical 
viewpoint. The first is what political science refers to as political competence, or efficacy, namely, 
to what extent do the people of Latvia believe that they can influence the decisions made by the 
political elite, and to what extent is this belief turned into actual activities of influence. The other 
aspect is orientations or attitudes towards the values of democratic culture and political processes 
describing political culture, as well as differences in the fundamental characteristics of the political 
culture existing between the two largest ethnolinguistic communities of Latvia – Latvians and non-
Latvians (further in the text sometimes – Latvians and Russians/Russian-speakers/aliens; depending 
on how the ethnolinguistic communities are defined in surveys in which the analysis is rooted). 
And finally, we will be looking at issues of how the mutual understanding by ethnolinguistic groups 
influences the democratisation processes in Latvia.
14.1. According to the population of Latvia, what is the extent of the 
politicians’ and officials’ responsiveness and the people’s ability to 
influence political decisions in the country?
Political efficacy is perceived as the belief of an individual that his/her political activity can 
influence political processes (Campbell et al. 1954, 187); other authors refer to it also as political 
competence (Almond, Verba 1989, 138–139). According to the political scientists David Easton 
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and Jack Dennis, political efficacy can be manifested in three ways: as a norm, as disposition, and 
as behaviour (Easton, Dennis 1967, 25–26). The normative dimension of efficacy corresponds to 
expectations that under the circumstances of a political regime, the people will be politically capable 
to act and will be aware of the elected politicians’ accountability before the nation. Disposition is 
explained as the self-assessment of the political skills of each individual separately. Finally, the 
behavioural dimension refers to the conduct of the individual, namely, whether the conditions of 
the order and the self-assessment of an individual’s political skills are transformed in political 
participation, namely, in attempts to influence political decisions. 
To empirically study the political efficacy of the inhabitants of Latvia, it is necessary to 
operationalise its theoretical definition, by adjusting it to the survey needs. Keeping in line with the 
aforementioned efficacy dimension classification by Easton and Dennis (normative, disposition, and 
behavioural), we have formulated questions for measuring the dimensions of political efficacy. The 
normative dimension refers to the responsiveness and impressionability of Latvian national and 
local (local government) politicians and officials, and the politician’s and official’s response and 
an individual addressing them with an important problem was used as a criterion for determining 
this. Disposition is manifested as the inhabitants’ expressed willingness to protect their interests 
themselves, by influencing political decision-makers. To measure the normative and disposition 
dimension, questions from the political efficacy scale by Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman and Henry 
Brady were used (Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995, 556). The behavioural dimension of political 
efficacy is examined using questions about participation in various political activities: elections, 
referenda, election campaigns, various protests and conversations with politicians or officials with the 
intention of addressing their attention to a problem. Bearing in mind the 2014 European Parliament 
election (in May) and the Saeima election (in October), questions were asked also about the intention 
of voting or not voting in the planned election.
As was pointed out and substantiated above, political efficacy is to be studied as an important 
measure and manifestation of political culture. To determine the overall level of political efficacy, 
it is useful to construct a uniform performance index out of the relevant four questions. The 
Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach 1951) for these questions is α = 0.77, which is indicative of a sufficiently 
high reliability in that the questions to be included in the scale are measuring one and the same 
phenomenon, and therefore, can be combined in an index. Taking into account that the focus of 
analysis is the comparison of Latvians and non-Latvians, alpha levels for both of these sub-groups 
also have to be determined. It is found that they are sufficiently high and similar (α
Latvians
 = 0.78; 
α
non-Latvians
 = 0.77), and this enables us to also use the efficacy index in comparing groups.
The political efficacy index (PEI) is constructed, firstly, by summing up the answers to four 
questions – on the responsiveness of a local government politician and official (namely, taking into 
account or ignoring a requirement or an application), the responsiveness of a member of the Saeima 
or a government official, as well as responses to analogous questions on how a respondent evaluates 
their possibilities of affecting the decisions made by representatives of the relevant authorities. 
The sum obtained in the second step is divided by the number of questions included in the index, 
namely, by four. Therefore, it was achieved that the index range is similar to the range of each 
question (ranks of 1 to 4). An additional benefit is as follows: even if one of the efficacy questions 
was left unanswered, it does not affect the value of the index. The middle point of this scale is 2.5; 
therefore, the values that are lower than the middle point are interpreted as a lower political efficacy, 
but those above the middle point, as a higher political efficacy.
As evidenced by the parameters of Table 14.1, the total value of the political efficacy index is 
1.81, which can be interpreted as relatively low. The Latvian and non-Latvian index values do not 
differ significantly (for Latvians – 1.83, non-Latvians – 1.77). Bearing in mind that the index is a 
combined parameter, we must descend lower by one level and study whether there are any differences 
between index components (such as, whether the efficacy dimension has higher parameters than 
others), as well as must address the role of components in each ethnolinguistic group.
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Table 14.1. The average political efficacy index values for Latvians and non-Latvians
Average PEI value Respondent base
Total 1.81 947
Latvians 1.83 535
Non-Latvians 1.77 412
Note: level of statistical significance p = 0.15 (greater than 0.05, which is indicative of that there is no difference 
between groups).
Source: DA (Audit of Democracy) 2014.
As seen from the parameters given in Table 14.2, the levels of all the dimensions of the political 
efficacy index are assessed as low, as they do not reach the middle point of the scale (2.5). The 
highest value is attributed to the belief that a councilperson or an official of the local government 
will take into account the resident’s request with regard to a problem (the average value – 2.40), 
whereas the lowest, the belief that the respondent can influence the decisions of the parliament or 
the government (the average value – 1.34). It must be pointed out that only in one PEI dimension, 
namely, the ability to influence local government decisions, statistically significant differences are 
observed between Latvians (1.73) and non-Latvians (1.56); however, both values are too low to 
underline the efficacy of either group from this perspective.
Table 14.2. Average values of political efficacy indicators
Average value Respondent base
Responsiveness of a local government councilperson/official 2.40 801
Responsiveness of a parliamentarian/government official 1.92 766
Ability to influence local government decisions 1.66 903
Ability to influence the Saeima/government decisions 1.34 908
Source: DA 2014.
Differences in political efficacy in Latvia are observed among differing types of residential 
settlements (the capital Riga, other towns of Latvia, and rural areas). Table 14.3 shows that the 
responsiveness of a local government council person/official is most positively assessed in rural 
areas, where the value of the parameter (2.53) is slightly higher than the middle point of the efficacy 
scale. Whereas, in the capital, there is a larger belief in the responsiveness of a parliamentarian/
government official and the individual’s ability to influence the Saeima/the government decisions.
Table 14.3. Average values of political efficacy indicators in various types of residential 
settlements
Average value Respondent 
baseRiga Other town Rural areas
Responsiveness of a local government 
councilperson/official 2.33 2.35 2.53 801
Responsiveness of a parliamentarian/
government official 2.18 1.90 1.71 766
Ability to influence local government 
decisions 1.62 1.65 1.71 903
Ability to influence the Saeima/government 
decisions 1.50 1.33 1.23 908
Note: statistically significant differences (at a level of at least p = 0.05) are emphasised in bold.
Source: DA 2014.
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Upon interpreting these results, it must be concluded that residents of rural municipalities 
have a closer and better communication with elected officials; therefore, the assessments of the 
responsiveness and impressionability of local government councilpersons’ is higher. Whereas in Riga, 
where the central authorities are located, there are relatively higher values for the impressionability 
of parliamentarians and government officials. Living in Riga contributes to the perception that the 
individual is ‘close’ to the state power hubs and can influence them more successfully than those 
living in the regions. Due to the same reason, the residents of Riga, more often than those not living 
in Riga, indicate that they have participated in protests (Ņikišins 2011). Overall, PEI parameters 
in Latvia range from medium low to low, and the normative and disposition dimension of political 
efficacy in the section of ethnolinguistic groups does not differ, whereas in the section of types 
of residential settlements differs insignificantly. The inhabitants do not perceive the political elite 
as being responsive and subject to influence via democratic means, and voice apparent scepticism 
about their abilities to influence the decisions of the political elite.
14.2. To what extent are the inhabitants of Latvia certain  
of their ability to influence political decisions?
A rather exhaustive list of questions was prepared for the survey of democracy audit for 2014 
concerning engagement in various political activities, starting with participation in elections at 
various levels (local government, the Saeima, the European Parliament (EP)) down to donating 
funds to a party or a candidate. Questions about political engagement were asked for the period of 
Table 14.4. Forms of political participation in Latvia
Form of political participation
Total parti-
cipated  %
Latvians 
%
Non-Latvians 
%
Number of 
respondents*
EP elections, 2009 66.8 68.4 63.4 741
Municipal elections, 2009 73.0 75.0 68.8 753
10th Saeima Elections, 2010 73.7 75.0 70.9 758
11th Saeima Elections, 2011 75.4 76.6 72.7 768
Municipal elections, 2013 75.9 76.0 75.5 800
Voted in a referendum 52.4 54.3 48.1 779
Signed a petition for a referendum 24.8 24.1 26.1 779
Attempted to persuade others to vote 
for a certain party/candidate 
9.8 11.4 7.4 1000
Volunteered as an assistant for an 
election campaign 
2.2 3.3 0.7 1000
Donated money to a party/candidate 0.4 0.2 0.7 1000
Contacted a politician/official 2.6 3.1 1.8 1000
Taken part in a protest 5.6 6.7 4.0 1000
Signed a petition 4.3 4.8 3.6 1000
Boycotted/deliberately bought products 
from a specific country or manufacturer
5.5 7.4 2.7 1000
* For election and referendum activities the total number of positive response given by citizens with voting rights 
indicated, including those who answered “hard to say”.
Source: DA 2005, DA 2014.
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the last five years (2009–2014). Likewise, questions were asked about possible participation in the 
EP election in May in 2014 and in the Saeima election in October. These questions offer particularly 
good information, as, besides the possibility to find out the people’s thoughts and intentions, offered 
by studying the normative and disposition dimensions of efficacy, they enable ascertaining the level 
of actual political engagement.
In questions about participation in the last five elections, starting with the EP election in 2009 
down to the local government election in 2013, only the answers given by citizens with voting 
rights were taken into account (see column ‘Respondent basis’ in Table 14.4). It must be pointed 
out that the answers about participation in elections were often problematic, as a considerable part 
of the respondents, who have not in fact voted, tend to point out that they have participated in the 
election (Norris 2002). Latvia is not an exception in this sense: The data of the Central Election 
Committee (CEC) show that 59.45 % of citizens with the right to vote participated in the 11th 
Parliamentary election (CEC of the Republic of Latvia 2014a). However, the turnout claimed by 
the surveyed respondents was 75 % (76.6 % – ethnic Latvians, 72.7 % – ethnic non-Latvians). If 
we assume that both Latvians and non-Latvians equally ‘exaggerate’ their voting participation, it 
can be concluded that non-Latvians slightly less frequently (1–7 percentage points) than Latvians 
use the opportunity to elect representatives in the Saeima and the European Parliament. However, 
much fewer citizens with the right to vote admitted that they participated in a referendum (52 %) 
than recorded in the 2012 referendum on amendments to the Constitutions (71 %) (CEC of the 
Republic of Latvia 2014b), but more than, for instance, in the 2011 referendum on the dissolution 
of the Saeima (45 %) (CEC of the Republic of Latvia 2014c). Taking into account that 2–3 years 
have passed since both referenda, some respondents may have failed to accurately remember the 
fact of participating or not participating in the vote. Fewer than 10 % of respondents reported 
having engaged in other activities – agitating to vote in a certain way, protests, communication with 
politicians and officials and so on (see Table 14.4).
Overall, it must be concluded that for the majority of the inhabitants, participation in elections 
is still not only the main, but also the only method of political engagement. Ranking second is 
referenda participation, which, unlike elections, are not regular, but to a great extent dependent on 
the initiative of the inhabitants themselves (mostly – a certain stakeholder group). Only a few per 
cent are engaged in other activities expressing political influence – protests, signing petitions, contact 
with a politician or an official, etc., also including attempts to convince peers to support a certain 
party or candidate. This picture, together with the marked distrust towards politicians, lead to a sort 
of a vicious cycle, with the negative image of the leading elite and the overall political situation not 
having any prospects of changing, bearing in mind that the distrust towards and dissatisfaction with 
politicians does not translate into active participation to encourage politicians to pay more attention 
to the people and the quality of the decisions that they make. 
14.3. To what extent do the basic tendencies of political culture in Latvia 
create a favourable environment for democratisation processes?
The third aspect that we addressed within the context of the 2014 Democracy Audit was the 
orientations describing political cultures. The study of orientations will enable us to determine 
the most typical features of the political culture of the inhabitants of Latvia, and how they differ 
between Latvians and non-Latvians/aliens. Comparisons with the 2005 Democracy Audit data will 
offer an understanding of the most typical changes that have affected the political culture of the 
inhabitants over the last decade.
In the preparation of the theoretical grounds of this study, we, firstly, used the conceptual 
framework of Almond and Verba (Almond, Verba 1989), within which political culture is perceived 
as political attitudes, political orientations, values, knowledge, and expectations in regard to the 
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political system. The authors’ devised typology distinguishes between an individual’s attitude towards 
the overall political system and their place in the political process; it distinguishes between emotion- 
and knowledge-based and action-oriented attitude. In developing the political culture models, the 
researchers indicate various stages in political processes: the initial investment stage (the input), 
policy implementation and policy result (the output). Based on this conceptual framework, the 
researchers involved in the Democracy Audit project devised a renewed set of indicators for studying 
the political culture orientations in Latvia. To assess the attitudes towards political processes, the 
following indices and question wording were employed in the survey of the inhabitants: press 
freedom, opinion pluralism (‘there must be various press publications in a country representing 
differing political opinions’, ‘newspapers criticising the government are more valuable to a free 
society’), equality in political rights (‘all permanent residents of Latvia must enjoy all citizen rights’), 
observing the laws (‘everybody must observe the laws, even if they appear unfair’). The authors of 
this research considered a positive attitude towards ‘possibilities of influencing a decision made by 
the government or a local government inconsistent with the public interest’ as a reference to input 
in the political process (Gamson 1968). Two other indicators – ‘overall, the government is taking 
into account the public opinion’ and ‘everybody in Latvia has equal opportunities to voice their 
opinions, organise protests, demonstrations’ – enable us to determine the overall attitude towards 
the implementation of democracy in the country.
Secondly, we study political culture by employing the dimension of political alienation/
engagement. We use the conclusions reached by researchers, who are studying political alienation, 
juxtaposing it against the engagement orientation. Respecting the conclusions of Seeman and 
Finifter (Seeman 1959; Finifter 1970), we explain political alienation as (1) political powerlessness, 
(2) political meaninglessness, (3) failure to meet political norms in power structures due to their 
inefficiency (political normlessness), and (4) political isolation, which implies ignoring those political 
norms that are observed by other members of society. 
We measured political powerlessness by employing a negative answer to a question on the 
possibilities for influencing a decision made by the government or a local government that is 
inconsistent with the public interest. The attitude towards the statement ‘The conduct of Latvian 
politicians is unpredictable’ served as the measure of political meaninglessness. Political normlessness 
in power structures was discovered by determining the attitude towards the statement ‘People, who 
assume important public posts, are usually thinking of their own rather than the public good’, whereas 
political isolation was unveiled via a negative attitude towards the statement ‘Everybody must 
observe the laws, even if they appear unfair’. The question about attitudes towards the possibilities 
of a strong leader was included among the indicators of political alienation, juxtaposing it against 
such democratic values as laws and negotiations: ‘Some strong leaders will do more for the good of 
our country than all laws and negotiations’. Our aim was to find out in which orientation structures 
the said indicator is most closely integrated. We look at a positive attitude towards ‘the possibility 
of influencing decisions made by the government or local government inconsistent with public 
interests’ as an indicator describing inclusive orientation. In the analysis of survey results, we will 
first look at the main types of orientation, and then move on to a comparison of the prevalence of 
certain attitudes, using the survey data obtained for the democracy audits of 2004 and 2014 (DA 
2005; DA 2014).
Political culture orientations: An analysis of results 
In the statistical data analysis, using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), the groups of mutually 
related features (a specific indicator corresponding to each feature), which can be referred to as political 
culture orientations, were determined. Each of these orientations describes a more expressed feature 
of an individual’s political culture: in our case, we discovered three most significant orientations: 
(1) pluralistically open, (2) participation-oriented, and (3) closed alienated orientation. The 
orientations of each group of features are depicted in the factor chart (Fig. 14.1), and we have 
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Figure 14.1. Results of confirmatory factor analysis: orientations of political culture
Table 14.5. Indicators included in confirmatory factor analysis
Indicator name Indicator interpretation
new_i01_01 Overall, the government is taking into account the public opinion
new_i01_02
People, who assume important public posts, usually are thinking of their own 
rather than the public good
new_i01_03
Some strong leaders will do more for the good of our country than all laws and 
negotiations
new_i01_04 The conduct of Latvian politicians is unpredictable
new_i01_05 The country’s leading newspapers must support the government’s opinion
new_i01_06
There must be various press publications in a country representing differing poli-
tical opinions
new_i01_07 Newspapers criticising the government are more valuable to a free society
new_i01_08 All permanent residents of Latvia must enjoy all citizen rights
new_i01_09
Everybody in Latvia has equal opportunities to voice their opinions, organise 
protests, demonstrations
new_i01_10 Everybody must observe the laws, even if they appear unfair
new_i02
Would you be able to do something if the government made decisions inconsis-
tent with the public interests?
new_i03
Would you be able to do something if municipal authorities made decisions in-
consistent with the public interests?
Source: DA 2014.
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formulated the names as follows: (1) pluralistically legitimising orientation (PL), (2) participatory 
orientation and (3) sceptically alienated orientation (SA). 
These orientations are not mutually exclusive; they can mutually correlate. For instance, 
quotients in Figure 14.1 above the straight arrows point to the relation between individual indicators 
(in rectangles) and orientation type (in ovals) determining the extent to which the type of orientation 
influences a specific feature. Whereas the quotients above the bent arrows depict the correlations 
between orientation types. In cases where the quotient is higher, the links are stronger, and vice 
versa – if the quotient is lower, the link is weaker. A negative quotient (<0) points to an inverted 
relation, namely, the more expressed a specific political orientation, the less expressed a specific 
feature.
(1) The pluralistically legitimising orientation includes the following indicators: ‘there must 
be various press publications in a country representing differing political opinions’, ‘newspapers 
criticising the government are more valuable to a free society’, ‘all permanent residents of Latvia must 
enjoy all citizen rights’, ‘everybody must observe the laws, even if they appear unfair’, ‘everybody 
in Latvia has equal opportunities to voice their opinions, organise protests, demonstrations’, ‘the 
country’s leading newspapers must support the government’s opinion’. From the standardised factor 
loadings presented in the factor chart, it is evident that the pluralistically legitimising orientation 
correlates the most with the indicators ‘there must be various press publications in a country 
representing differing political opinions’ (0.6), ‘newspapers criticising the government are more 
valuable to a free society’ (0.46), ‘all permanent residents of Latvia must enjoy all citizen rights’ 
(0.47). Of these indicators, the first two refer to press freedom as pluralism of opinions, whereas 
the third, to the legal equality of inhabitants. 
On the one hand, this orientation includes features (press freedom, pluralism of opinions, 
equality of political rights, observing the laws), describing the attitude of an individual towards 
the political process as pluralistic and democratic. If we compare the extent to which Latvians 
and non-Latvians agree with these statements, it is evident that the majority (84 %) support the 
opinion that ‘there must be various press publications in a country representing differing political 
opinions’. This opinion is equally widespread among Latvians (83 %) and non-Latvians (85 %). The 
opinion that ‘everybody in Latvia has equal opportunities to voice their opinions, organise protests, 
demonstrations’ is widespread among Latvians and non-Latvians alike. With this orientation, the 
belief that democratic processes in Latvia are occurring successfully is clearly voiced. The majority 
of society (70 %) believes that ‘everybody in Latvia has equal opportunities to voice their opinions, 
organise protests, demonstrations’. However, Latvians agree with this statement more (77 %) than the 
ethnic minorities (59 %). In our society, there is a widespread opinion that ‘everybody must observe 
the laws, even if they appear unfair’ (78 %). This opinion is popular both among Latvians (76 %) 
and ethnic minorities (81 %). In Finifter’s opinion, a negative attitude towards norms observed by 
most other members of society is described as political isolation (Finifter 1970). Our survey data 
show that this manifestation of political alienation in Latvian society is observed less frequently 
than, say, views on the failure to observe political norms (see Sceptically alienated orientation). 
On the other hand, the pluralistically legitimising orientation also includes agreement with 
such a statement as ‘the country’s leading newspapers must support the government’s opinion’. 
This, possibly, describes the complexity of the process of the formation of a political culture in 
society; it is clear that democratic values in the minds of the people cohabit with the wish to 
control opinions and their prevalence. Perhaps, this relates to Castells’ proposed interpretation of 
the concept legitimising identity: the well-known Spanish sociologist explains the construction of 
identity as the mutual interaction of political power and civic society, in which society accepts the 
aim of the authorities to maintain support for the existing power structures and the reproduction of 
order determined by them (Castells 2009). 
If we compare how the agreements with statements describing the pluralistically legitimising 
orientation have changed over the last decade, we see that support for such democratic values 
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as ‘freedom of press’ and ‘pluralism of opinions’ has weakened – in particular among Latvians. 
As evidenced by survey data, in 2004, 66 % of Latvians supported the opinion that ‘newspapers 
criticising the government are more valuable to a free society’, whereas in 2014, 53 %. At the 
same time, the number of people believing that ‘the country’s leading newspapers must support the 
government’s opinion’ has increased. 
Table 14.6. Statements describing the pluralistically legitimising orientation: Dynamics of 
attitudes (2004–2014), %
Pluralistically legitimising orientation Latvians 
2004
Others 
2004
Latvians 
2014
Others 
2014
There must be various press publications in a country 
representing differing political opinions.
92 88 83 85
Newspapers criticising the government are more 
valuable to a free society
66 59 53 59
Everybody must observe the laws, even if they appear 
unfair
– – 76 81
Everybody in Latvia has equal opportunities to voice 
their opinions, organise protests, demonstrations 
72 48 77 59
The country’s leading newspapers must support the 
government’s opinion
29 20 34 30
Source: DA 2005, 2014.
(2) The participatory orientation includes the following indicators: ‘would you be able to do 
something if the government made decisions inconsistent with the public interests?’ (standardised 
factor loading = 0.9) and ‘would you be able to do something if municipal authorities made decisions 
inconsistent with the public interests?’ (standardised factor loading = 0.81). The only indicator to 
which these statements are positively related is the conviction that ‘the government is taking into 
account the public opinion’. However, further analysis shows that this statement to a greater extent 
relates to features describing the pluralistically legitimising (though passive) orientation ‘everybody 
has equal rights’ and ‘newspapers must support the government’s opinion’. The prevalence of features 
characterising participatory orientation in our society is not high. As few as 25 % of Latvians and 
16 % of people belonging to ethnic minorities gave a positive answer to the question ‘would you 
be able to do something if the government made decisions inconsistent with the public interests?’; 
to the similar question of the possibilities of affecting local government decisions, a positive answer 
was given by 33 % of Latvian and 24 % of non-Latvian respondents. The participatory orientation 
allows judging the individual’s readiness to take part in the political process and contribute to it. 
We see that a considerably greater number of respondents have expressed a negative opinion of 
their ability to influence political decision-making: 64 % of Latvians and 73 % of non-Latvians 
believe that they could not do anything if the government adopted decisions contrary to the public 
interest. If the political culture is explained by employing the dimension of political engagement/
alienation, then we can conclude that alienation from political processes, instead of engagement in 
them prevails in our society. 
A rather disappointing view is unveiled upon comparing the data from the 2004 and 2014 
surveys. There has been a considerable decrease in the number of people who believe that they could 
influence a decision made by a local government. Between both democracy audits, administrative-
territorial reform has taken place in Latvia. The question of how democratic is the co-operation 
of local government institutions with the public is well-founded. In regard to the possibilities for 
affecting government decisions, the expectations of non-Latvians have decreased, whereas the 
Latvians’ opinions have not changed considerably.
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Table 14.7. Statements describing participatory orientation: Dynamics of attitudes  
(2004–2014), %
Participatory orientation Latvians 
2004
Others 
2004
Latvians 
2014
Others 
2014
Would you be able to do something if the government made 
decisions inconsistent with the public interests?
27 25 25 16
Would you be able to do something if local government autho-
rities made decisions inconsistent with the public interests?
52 35 33 24
Source: DA 2005, DA 2014.
(3) Sceptically alienated orientation includes the following indicators: ‘people, who assume 
important public posts, usually are thinking of their own rather than the public good’ (standardised 
factor loading = –0.64), ‘some strong leaders will do more for the good of our country than all 
laws and negotiations’ (–0.3), ‘the conduct of Latvian politicians is unpredictable’ (–0.54). This 
orientation also includes the indicator ‘overall, the government is taking into account the public 
opinion’ showing a positive factor loading of 0.72. Agreement with this statement negatively 
correlates to the other three indicators, as evidenced by the minus signs. It is peculiar that support for 
the capabilities of a strong leader is closely correlating with indicators that describe a rather alienated 
attitude towards the State, such as, the selfishness of the political elite and unpredictability of its 
conduct. If we assess the popularity of these attitudes in our society, it is clear that they are equally 
popular among the Latvians and ethnic minorities: the opinion ‘people, who assume important 
public posts, usually are thinking of their own rather than the public good’ is supported by 81 % of 
Latvian and 81 % of non-Latvian respondents; the opinion that ‘some strong leaders will do more 
for the good of our country than all laws and negotiations’ is supported by 60 % of Latvians and 
61 % non-Latvians, whereas the opinion that ‘the conduct of Latvian politicians is unpredictable’ 
is supported by 71 % Latvians and 70 % non-Latvians. It must be pointed out that alienation from 
political processes and simultaneously shifting accountability onto the shoulders of some strong 
leaders is equally widespread in both of the largest ethnolinguistic groups in Latvian society. If 
we compare the agreement to statements forming the sceptically alienated orientation in 2004 and 
2014, it is evident that the opinion that ‘the government is taking into account the public opinion’ 
has weakened. At the same time, there has been a decline in the number of people, who believe 
that ‘people, who assume important public posts, usually are thinking of their own rather than the 
public good’. This could be  explained by the weakened direct influence of what are known as the 
oligarchs in the legislative process and increased trust in specific honest and successful politicians. 
Table 14.8. Statements describing sceptically alienated orientation: Dynamics of attitudes  
(2004–2014), %
Sceptically alienated orientation Latvians 
2004
Others 
2004
Latvians 
2014
Others 
2014
Overall, the government is taking into account the 
public opinion
39 22 19 15
People, who assume important public posts, usually are 
thinking of their own rather than the public good
88 86 81 81
Some strong leaders will do more for the good of our 
country than all laws and negotiations
59 58 60 61
The conduct of Latvian politicians is unpredictable - - 71 70
Source: DA 2005, 2014.
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Overall, upon assessing the above orientations, it is evident that on the one hand, our society 
widely supports such democratic values as pluralism and competition of opinions, but at the same 
time, the orientation describing an active position, readiness to act in case of decisions made 
deliberately inconsistent with the society’s interests, is relatively weak. At the same time, it must 
be emphasised that our society widely supports attitudes that are typical to sceptically alienated 
orientation (selfishness of the political elite in decision-making, unpredictability of political 
processes, and at the same time relying on a strong leader). This orientation describes an alienated, 
sceptical attitude towards the political processes taking place in the country. It is equally widespread 
among Latvians and non-Latvians alike. There is no doubt that strong leaders are necessary to 
facilitate political processes; however, it is important to understand the context, in which society 
holds such expectations towards such leaders. In this case, we observed reliance on leaders with 
respect to distrust in democratic procedures. As proven in comparative studies, such as the EVS 
(European Values Survey), Latvia is among those European countries where society assigns an 
important role to ‘strong political leaders’. For instance, the results of a 2008 survey showed: the 
opinion that ‘a strong leader who does not need to take into account the Parliament or elections’ to 
govern a country is more often supported by people of post-Soviet and post-communist countries. 
Thus, 74–62 % of people in Romania, Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine, Bulgaria do not support the idea 
Table 14.9. Agreement with the statement ‘a strong leader who does not need to take into 
account the Parliament or elections is necessary to govern a country’ (answers ‘very good’ 
and ‘good’ are included) 
1999 2008 Dynamics (in percentage 
points)
Romania 67 74 +7 
Macedonia – 72 –
Serbia – 68 –
Ukraine – 67 –
Latvia 58 62 +4
Bulgaria 48 62 14
Russia  49 58 +9
Lithuania 56 52 -4
Belgium 31 40 +9
Czech Republic 16 29 +13
Hungary 21 27 +6
Estonia 18 26 +8
France 35 26 -9
Poland 22 21 -1
Norway – 18 –
Germany 16 18 +2
Italy 16 16 0
Sweden 21 16 -5
Denmark 14 15 +1
Finland 17 15 -2
Source: EVS 2010; EVS 2012.
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of a strong leader. Furthermore, a considerable part of the Latvian population (62 %) support the idea 
of a strong leader, and this idea is also popular in Russia (58 %) and Lithuania (52 %). This opinion 
is less prevalent in Western countries: in the Netherlands and Belgium, this idea is supported by 
40 %, whereas in Scandinavian countries, 15–17 % of the population. In other European countries, 
this value does not exceed 30 %. It is peculiar that the idea of a strong leader in Estonia is supported 
by a mere 26 % of the population. If we compare the data from the EVS of 1999 and 2008, it can 
be concluded that the attitude in the Scandinavian countries has not changed; however, in a range 
of Eastern European countries (Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary), support for the 
idea of a strong leader has increased.
It is evident that in Latvia the expectations with regard to the capabilities of a strong leader 
are similar to most post-communist countries; however, they significantly differ from the stances 
of inhabitants in Western countries. We can propose various assumptions to explain this fact, by 
pointing to the historical context and today’s discourse; however, it must be undeniably admitted 
that this issue has not received sufficient attention from academic research because up to now the 
debates on this topic were more associated with specific discussions, such as political debates about 
the consolidation of the authority of the institution of president.
If we look at the above orientations as a whole, another interesting correlation is unveiled. 
It turns out that fewer than 20 % of respondents have voiced agreement with the statement ‘the 
government is taking into account the public opinion’ (Latvians – 19 %, non-Latvians – 15 %). 
At the same time, 77% of Latvians and 59 % of non-Latvians believe that ‘everybody in Latvia 
has equal opportunities to voice their opinions, organise protests, demonstrations’. What we see 
here is that, on the one hand, people perceive ‘the presence’ of democracy and the opportunities 
it offers; however, on the other hand, society is not confident about a successful feedback for the 
part of the political power. We can conclude that this disparity unveils the viewpoint in our society 
of democratic processes in the country as an asymmetric communication, in which one party – 
society – has rather many opportunities for voicing its opinion; however, the level of expectations 
towards the other party – the political power – to engage in communication is rather low.  
It can be claimed that the attitudes towards these indicators describe the attitude towards 
the political process as such – on the one hand, the democratic society has typical opportunities; 
however, on the other hand, the feedback on the part of the authorities is weak. The comparison 
of survey results from 2004 and 2014 shows that this asymmetry in the public eye has increased 
because the number of respondents who believe that ‘everybody in Latvia has equal opportunities 
to voice their opinions, organise protests, demonstrations’ has increased, meanwhile, the number of 
those, who believe that ‘the government is taking into account the public opinion’ has decreased. 
Overall, the main directions of political culture in Latvia create a favourable soil for processes of 
democratisation, and society strongly supports democratic values. 
14.4. To what extent does the mutual perception between the largest 
ethnolinguistic groups in Latvia facilitate the processes of 
democratisation in Latvia? 
Society in Latvia has historically taken an ethnically diverse form – there are representatives 
of about 170 (according to other data, about 150) ethnic groups. However, the percentage of only 
six ethnicities exceeds 1 % in the total number of the residents of Latvia. And namely, these are 
Latvians (59.6 %), Russians (26.9 %), Belarusians (3.4 %), Ukrainians (2.4 %), Poles (2.2 %) and 
Lithuanians (1.3 %). Yet another four ethnicities are represented to the extent of about 0.1 % to 
0.4 %. Among them, are the traditional minorities of Latvia, such as Jews (0.4 %), Roma or Gypsies 
(0.4 %), Germans (0.2 %) and Estonians (0.1 %) (CSB of the Republic of Latvia; OCMA of the 
Republic of Latvia 2014). 
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The respect and protection of differences of the culture of various ethnic groups in the national 
laws and action policy of public authorities of Latvia in this field are regarded in the first part of this 
assessment, in particular in the second chapter. In this section, attention is primarily paid to the fact 
that the democratisation processes in Latvia are very significantly affected by the division of society 
into two large ethnolinguistic groups depending on the language used in daily life and by the mutual 
relations between these groups. Among the non-Latvians of Latvia, the Russian language prevails: 
58 % of non-Latvians who do not consider themselves Russian point out that their native tongue is 
the Russian language, and 82 % of them mostly speak Russian at home. Therefore, the dominance 
of the Russian language among other ethnicities serves as the grounds for the sociolinguistic division 
into Latvians and Russian speakers (BISS (Baltic Institute of Social Sciences) 2005, 13). According 
to the 2011 census, 56.3 % of Latvians speak Latvian on a daily basis, whereas 33.8 % – Russian 
(CBS 2013). The Russian-speaking community in Latvia, in comparison with the Russian-speaking 
communities in Estonia and Lithuania, stand out for having relatively the greatest confidence in their 
power and influence in society. If the self-assessment of a group is placed on a scale of 0 to 1, where 
0 is complete lack of influence, but 1 is a completely dominating influence, the Russian-speakers of 
Latvia give a self-assessment of 0.51, and that is higher than the Russian-speakers’ self-assessment 
in Lithuania (0.49) and Estonia (0.45) (Эхала, Забродская 2011, 30).
Successful progress in democratisation processes in the context of relations between 
ethnolinguistic groups to a great extent depends on the ability of Latvian society to ensure favourable 
conditions for the development of the Latvian language and culture and strengthening the sense of 
belonging to Latvia in the people of other ethnic origins living in Latvia, in other words, integrating, 
uniting the community. In this respect, it is important to emphasise that integration in a modern 
understanding is closely linked to the democratic arrangement of society, and it refers to individuals 
and large ethnolinguistic groups alike. 
In the book ‘How integrated is Latvian society?’ (‘Cik integrēta ir Latvijas sabiedrība?’), 
published in 2010 by the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI) of the Faculty of 
Social Sciences of the University of Latvia, integration is construed as the process of the consolidation 
of ethnically versatile societies, based on intercultural contact, engagement and non-discrimination. 
With regard to intercultural contact, knowledge of the official language has a particular importance 
as a fundamental intercultural competence – the bedrock of successful communication between the 
ethnic groups and a significant prerequisite of socially political inclusion of national minorities. 
Engagement as an important component in the integration process is based in intercultural 
communication and competence; this is closely related to non-discrimination, which prevents people 
being treated differently depending on their ethnic background, language, religious affiliation, skin 
colour or other feature. All of the aforementioned fosters equivalence as well as representation, 
which must provide group representatives with social, economic, cultural, and political influence 
(Muižnieks 2010, 28–30).
Several factors can be mentioned with regard to the relations between the largest ethnolinguistic 
groups of Latvia, acting in the direction of stabilisation and normalisation.
(1) In comparison with, for instance, Estonia, where the ethno-linguistic structure of the 
population is similar to that of Latvia, the non-Latvians are more evenly spread across the 
territory of the country, and this objectively promotes mutual communication possibilities 
between the representatives of different ethno-linguistic groups.
(2) no sharp differences exist between the communities in Latvia in the sense of social and 
economic standing (Hazans 2010, 141).
(3) mixed marriages have been a traditional feature in Latvia. Mixed marriages not only link 
individuals, but also broader social groups, to which the individuals belong. Traditionally, 
the number of mixed marriages in Latvia has been relatively high, and it has not decreased 
significantly after the reinstatement of independence. Quite the contrary – the proportion of 
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Russians, who have married Latvians, has increased significantly: from 16 % in the early 
1990s to 25 % nearly fifteen years later (Monden 2005, 334). In 2012, of all marriages, 
more than 20 % of Latvian men and women married non-Latvians (13.6 % of Latvian men 
and 12 % of Latvian women married respectively a Russian woman/man). 
(4) There are no major differences between Latvians and non-Latvians of Latvia in regard to 
civil values. 
(5) From the viewpoint of social integration, it is important to take into account that the bilingual 
segment of society’s culture in Latvia is significantly greater than that in the neighbouring 
Lithuania and Estonia. According to Ehala, currently in Lithuania and Estonia it covers 
about 18 % of people, whereas in Latvia, more than 40 % of population (Ehala 2012). 
However, it must be borne in mind that there are also several consistent factors in Latvia that 
promote the disassociation between the large ethnolinguistic communities. The central role among 
these factors is attributed to the different perception and assessment of events of the Second World 
War, as well as the traditions for commemorating these events. Furthermore, there are differences 
in opinions concerning the issues of language use (including the language of education). As pointed 
out in the first chapter of the assessment, initiatives to introduce amendments in the Constitution 
in regard to education and language issues and – as paradoxically as it may seem – the process of 
guidelines of social integration adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers in 2011 and the contents of 
these guidelines, where paternalism and ethnocentricity clearly dominated, have promoted public 
polarisation and radicalisation of views. The differences of opinions existing in society were 
clearly demonstrated by the referendum of 18 February 2012 about a draft law ‘Amendments to 
the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia’ prescribing that the Russian language be established as 
a second official language. The 24.88 % of referendum participants, who voted in favour of this 
proposal, approximately correspond to the proportion of the Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia in 
the total number of citizens (CEC of the Republic of Latvia +2012). As pointed out by researchers, 
there is ‘a conflict of ethnopolitical attitudes’ in Latvia, which, nevertheless, is restricted to two 
important aspects: ‘firstly, the ethnopolitical issues are not on the daily agenda of the respondents; 
secondly, if steering clear of the ethnopolitical problems, the opinions of Latvians and non-Latvians 
about today’s public profile are not significantly different. Social and economic problems are identical 
for Latvians and Russians alike’ (BISS 2005). The situation is complicated by the divide in the 
political elite of Latvia – elite groups oriented towards ethnolinguistic groups are taking advantage 
of the existing discord in order to achieve their political aims. Furthermore, there is a perceptible 
significant influence of the mass media of Russia. 
However, despite the aforementioned, the results of the survey conducted for the purposes of 
the audit show that overall both Latvians and the Russian-speakers of Latvia view the inter-ethnic 
relations in Latvia as satisfactory – this is the view of 59.3 % of Latvian respondents and 57.2 % of 
Russian-speaking respondents, whereas 21.2 % of Latvians and 23.6 % of non-Latvians view them 
even as good. When asked about how, in their opinion, relations between Latvians and Russian-
speakers have changed over the last decade, more positive in their assessment were those respondents, 
who speak Russian at home – from among them, nearly three quarters (71.7 %) believed that the 
relations have not deteriorated. Even though most Latvians agree with this opinion, they were more 
cautious in their assessment – from among those speaking Latvian at home, 63.6 % agreed with the 
opinion that the inter-ethnic relations in Latvia over the last decade have not worsened (DA 2014).1 
If the assessment of mutual relations between the ethnolinguistic groups according to 
representatives of these communities is taken into account, then the situation in Latvia is interpreted 
1 The survey data refer to the situation effective in April 2014. Currently, the authors have no data at their 
disposal which would allow drawing conclusions as to how the different perceptions of the aggravation of the 
Ukrainian crisis, the events in Ukraine and of the roles that Russia is playing in these events have changed 
the mood and mutual relations between the main ethnolinguistic groups of Latvian society.
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as the most complicated in comparison with other Baltic States. According to the data from Ehala 
and Zabrodskaya, the ‘small’ minorities of the Baltic States (the Lithuanian Russians and Poles) 
assess the legitimacy of inter-ethnic relations formed in their country respectively with 3.77 and 
3.90 points, namely, above the average on a 6 point scale (where 1 means low, but 6 means high 
legitimacy). Meanwhile, the ‘large’ minorities of the Baltic States – the Russian-speakers of Estonia 
and Latvia – regard the legitimacy of these relations as much lower – with 2.78 and 2.31 points 
respectively. From among the Baltic States, Latvia also shows the highest value of mutual distrust 
between the ethnic groups. Latvians assess their distrust at 3.29 points, which is significantly more 
than the assessment given by Estonians (3.06) and Lithuanians (2.76). The Russian-speakers of Latvia 
show a similar attitude. They assess their mutual distrust at 3.37, which differs significantly from 
the assessment given by the Russian-speakers of Lithuania and Estonia (2.76 and 3.16 respectively) 
(Эхала, Забродская 2011, 36). 
Both of the larger ethnolinguistic groups of Latvia show insecurity, collective ethnic fear (BISS 
2005, 6) and a sense of threat to their ethnolinguistic identity. This is proven, for instance, by the 
Latvians’ self-assessment, which, according to the data from Ehala and Zabrodskaya, is 0.66 on 
a self-assessment scale of 0 to 1 and is considerably lower than that of Lithuanians (0.74) and 
Estonians (0.72). There are also similar differences with regard to the assessment of the title nation 
on the part of the Russian-speaking minority in the respective state. Lithuanians are assessed the 
highest (0.78), followed by Estonians (0.74) and only then Latvians (0.70) (Эхала, Забродская 
2011, 30). Furthermore, in the sense of the relative ethnic potential of title ethnic groups (which 
is calculated by comparing the title nation’s self-assessment with the Russian-speaking minority’s 
ethnic potential in its assessment), Latvians attribute to themselves only a small predominance over 
the Russian-speakers of Latvia (0.10), and in this respect they significantly lag behind Estonians 
(0.23) and Lithuanians (0.20) (Эхала, Забродская 2011, 30). 
This relatively low self-assessment, a peculiar ‘minority complex’ is manifested in the tendency 
of Latvians to disassociate themselves from the Russian-speakers as the second largest ethno-
linguistic group (see BISS 2005, 12). Based on this approach, the excluding political culture is 
widespread in Latvia manifested in the belief popular in the Latvian part of society and in the 
political elite that the post-war immigrants are not entitled to make decisions in strategic matters of 
Latvian development. Only in the early 1990s, 49 % of Latvians believed that only pre-war citizens 
and their posterity should be allowed to participate in the elections of the restored country. For 
comparison, 44 % of Estonians and only 12 % of Lithuanians gave the same answer. This clearly 
points to the link between the level of ‘cultural trauma’ (which in this case is inversely proportional 
to the proportion of the title nation in the total number of population in the final years of the Soviet 
reign) and the support for excluding political culture (Rose, Maley 1994). 
Such orientations of casual beliefs turned out to be viable. For instance, in 2013, 60.3 % of Latvian 
respondents agreed to the statement that the identity and culture of national minorities should be 
supported and strengthened in Latvia. At the same time, only 37.5 % of Latvian respondents agreed 
to the statement that more active participation of other ethnic minorities in state administration would 
promote the development of Latvia (Human Development Report (HDR) 2013). Such dispositions 
only deepen the divide in the Latvian political spectrum due to ethnic features and legitimises the 
inability of Latvian electorate-aimed parties to engage the masses of electorates of other ethnicities, 
as well as pushing the Russian-speaking political representatives back ‘in eternal opposition’.
At the same time, the considered ‘Latvian’ and ‘Russian’ political actors’ model of relations 
leads to adverse consequences with respect to social-political processes in society as a whole. Firstly, 
an inherent decrease of political competition must be mentioned. The narrow range of political actors 
forming the government and the lack of a real alternative to create a government necessarily leads 
to the ‘irreplaceability’ of certain political actors in the processes of forming and functioning of 
governments, as well as to a disproportionate influence on the government’s decisions. This becomes 
one of the causes for instability in the work of governments and impedes the implementation of a 
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consistent, strategically oriented policy. A low level of political competition is also mentioned as 
one of the key causes of the relatively high level of corruption, which, according to the opinion 
of international organisations, in Latvia is by now traditionally higher than that in neighbouring 
Estonia and Lithuania. And finally, weak political competition in combination with the identification 
of ‘the left’ and ‘leftist’ typical for the political culture of Latvia have significantly restricted the 
possibility of the creation of civilised left political actors as an alternative for right wing political 
actors, and the right wing has, for more than 20 years now, dominated the politics of the once more 
independent Latvia. This has become one of the main causes for a disproportionate increase in the 
social and economic inequality during the post-Soviet transformations, which our neighbours have 
not experienced to such a great extent, not to mention such post-communist states as Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia.
One of the most typical recent tendencies in the political and intellectual elite of Latvia 
(originating as a response to the ever increasing success of political actors supported by Russian-
speaking voters’ in the parliamentary and local government elections over the last decade) is an 
increasing emphasis on the priority of Latvian ethnic values as the determinant prerequisite of social 
unity. This is shown, for instance, by differences in the wording of the integration programmes of 
2001 and 2011. The wording of the 2001 integration programme, by justifiably emphasising the 
importance of the Latvian language and culture, nevertheless, brought civil values to the forefront 
(Sabiedrības integrācija Latvijā (‘Integration of society in Latvia’) 2001, 4). According to ‘The 
guidelines for national identity, civic society and integration policy for 2012 –2018’ adopted in 
2011, integration of society, as proposed by the authors of this document, is essentially based in 
Latvian ethnic values, and civil engagement may not be an important pre-requisite or component 
of democratisation and integration processes, but rather a derivative of the integration of people of 
other ethnicities into the Latvian cultural space (‘Pamatnostādnes’ (‘Guidelines’) 2011, 6).
Most inhabitants of Latvia, irrespective of ethnic background, are convinced of the need to 
know the Latvian language and assume that supporting the Latvian language and culture is one of 
the most important tasks of the State of Latvia. In a survey of 2013, 89.7 % of respondents (97.1 % 
Latvians and 76.5 % Russians) agreed to the suggestion that every citizen of Latvia should know the 
Latvian language (HDR 2013, 105; calculations according to the data of a 2013 survey conducted 
by the Faculty of Social Sciences (FSS) of the University of Latvia). However, in regard to the 
Latvian language and culture as the foundation of unity in the society of Latvia, opinions were 
rather disparate. For instance, in a 2013 survey, 90.9 % of Latvian respondents but only 43.1 % 
of Russian respondents agreed to that suggestion. This raises concerns that the introduction of the 
2011 Guidelines can lead to a completely different result than that expected by the authors of the 
document – disassociation of the communities and consolidation of a two-community society.
As shown from history, an emphasis on civil values is a rather effective way for the State to 
include and integrate ethnic minorities, as well as – in the longer term perspective – a much more 
effective measure for approximating the minorities to the majority ethnos than forced measures. 
In today’s context in Latvia, this would lead to a new, more favourable climate between both 
ethnolinguistic communities. Latvia has good pre-requisites for this. The data from the survey 
conducted for the purpose of the audit (DA 2014) show that overall a positive perception of the 
other community dominates in both the Latvian and the Russian-speaking community: 69.3 % of 
respondents answering questions in Latvian believe that they can trust the local Russians, 67.6 % 
believe that the local Russians treat the Latvians well, 62.9 % agree with the suggestion that the 
local Russians wish to co-operate with Latvians. The opinions are similar also in the Russian-
speaking community of Latvia – 74.4 % of respondents answering questions in Russian believe 
that they can trust Latvians, 63.8 % say that Latvians treat Russians well, whereas 64.9 % believe 
that Latvians wish to co-operate with Russians. Only 22 % of those giving answers in Latvian 
and 17 % of those giving answers in Russian consider the representatives of the other community 
as aggressive. 
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These data are confirmed also by the answers given in a 2013 survey, where the respondents 
were asked to choose one of the three scenarios of ethnocultural development of Latvia: the idea of 
‘a Latvian Latvia’ that would include the restriction of other languages and cultures; the integrative 
model that would propose priority development of the Latvian language and culture and at the same 
time providing support for the development of other languages and cultures, and finally ‘the melting 
pot’ model, where relations between languages and cultures would form on the grounds of free 
competition. A convincing majority of respondents having an opinion in this question (71.5 %) were 
in favour of the integrative model; only 8.8 % supported the idea of ‘a Latvian Latvia’ and 19.7 % 
saw the future of Latvia in a free competition of languages and cultures. Moreover, the moderately 
inclined respondents are in an obvious majority both among the Latvian respondents, where this 
model is supported by 78.0 %, and among the respondents of Russian ethnicity (62.4 %) (FSS of 
the University of Latvia 2013). In other words, the sense of society is dominated by an orientation 
towards communication and co-operation between the ethnolinguistic groups. It is important that 
this direction is consistently implemented also at the level of the media and political elite, by 
promoting a dialogue between ethnolinguistic communities and strengthening the internal security 
of Latvian society.
Overall assessment: progress over the last decade
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
14.1. X
14.2. X
14.3. X
14.4. X* X**
* At the level of society 
** At the level of the political elite 
Best features
A positive feature of the political culture of our society is the pluralistically legitimising 
orientation characterising an individual’s attitude towards the political process as pluralistic and 
democratic: press freedom, pluralism of opinions, equality of political rights and observing the law 
is supported. At the same time, it must be admitted that over the last decade this orientation has 
slightly weakened, and a desire for the control of freedom of opinions has strengthened, for instance, 
by agreeing to the statement that ‘the country’s leading newspapers must support the government’s 
opinion’. The attitudes between the two largest ethnolinguistic groups of Latvian society – Latvians 
and Russian-speakers – are essentially favourable towards communication and co-operation between 
the groups. 
Most serious problem
Among problematic features of political culture, we can mention, firstly, the fact that 
participatory orientation confirming an individual’s readiness to engage in a political process and 
to give their contribution has become less frequent in our society. It must be stressed that over the 
last decade, the number of inhabitants who believe that they could affect the decisions made by the 
local governments has considerably decreased. Secondly, society is dominated by relying on the 
influence of an individual strong leader; however, in relation to the low assessment of participation 
effectiveness, that forces us to draw the conclusion that society is becoming more inclined to shift 
the accountability onto the shoulders of a strong leader. Thirdly, there is a widespread perception 
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in Latvian society of the implementation of democracy as an asymmetric communication process, 
in which society has extensive opportunities to voice their opinion; however, no feedback from the 
political elite follows. This is a rather alarming fact, because in a situation where society does not 
see the results of its actions, it starts losing faith in its efficacy, and accordingly, interest in political 
participation decreases. Fourth, the sceptically alienated orientation is rather widespread in society, 
characterised, on the one hand, by support for a strong leader’s abilities, but, on the other hand, by 
the opinion that the political elite is selfish and its conduct unpredictable. This orientation in society 
can facilitate the desire to disassociate oneself from political processes as being something unclear 
and unpredictable. These attitudes are transformed also in a rather scanty spectrum of political 
participation: only one tenth of respondents point out that they try to influence political decisions in 
some other ways as well, apart from elections and referenda. The sense of political powerlessness, 
the wish to shift the accountability to the political leaders, at the same time distrusting them, leads to 
an inefficient alienation from politics, which reduces the prospects of the formation of a developed 
democratic political culture. Latvian political elite groups use the ethnic divide in the political 
spectrum to achieve their political goals. 
Suggested improvements 
It is necessary to increase participatory effectiveness, especially at the municipal level, as well 
as by activating the local community activities. This would allow people to see the positive results 
of their political initiative. It is important to strengthen the feedback of communication between 
society and the political elite, which would ensure the increased efficacy of society. Specific steps are 
necessary for stimulating a broader engagement of individuals and society in political processes; it 
is recommended to establish and develop a municipal referendum institution and prescribe measures 
to facilitate broader opportunities for public debate. It is important to develop and improve the 
existing mechanisms of implementing political participation online (petitions, addressing politicians 
and officials). It is necessary to change the current situation, where, in the matter of relations 
between the largest ethnolinguistic groups of Latvia, the sentiments in the political elite and mass 
media are more radical than those of society as a whole. Mutual trust and a co-operative discourse 
between the ethnolinguistic groups must be developed in society, by stressing civil values and 
political engagement. In this process, particular accountability rests with the political leaders and 
the mass media.
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IV 
DEMOCRACY 
BEYOND THE STATE

15. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 
OF DEMOCRACY
Žaneta Ozoliņa and Toms Rostoks
Are the country’s external relations conducted in accordance with democratic 
norms, and is it itself free from external subordination? 
Introduction 
In assessing the international dimension of democracy for Latvian foreign policy, answers to 
three questions were sought. The first: To what extent is Latvia independent of external agents in 
achieving its foreign and domestic aims and to what extent are the external and internal policies 
implemented without unwarranted intervention by external actors? The second question: To what 
extent does Latvia take public opinion into account when creating and implementing its foreign 
policy; are there mechanisms in place which enable society to influence foreign policy? The third 
question: To what extent is Latvia supporting the spread of democracy across the globe?
One must note that there is no unanimity in the literature devoted to the study of international 
relations concerning the influence of democracy on the foreign policy of a country. Without a doubt, 
most attention has been devoted to research on justifying why liberal democracies have not fought 
among themselves (Doyle 1983; Owen 1994; Layne 1994; Oneal, Russett 1997). Likewise, there is 
no unanimity among researchers when looking into the many links that exist between foreign policy 
and democracy. However, it would be difficult to deny that democracy has a significant influence on 
the foreign policy of liberal democratic states due to the tension that often exists in their relations 
with non-democratic states and to the fact that liberal democracies tend to support democratisation 
processes in non-democratic states.
Manifestations of democracy in Latvia’s foreign policy after joining the European Union (EU) 
have been affected by several factors. The identification of these factors will serve as the point of 
reference for further analysis when assessing the international dimension of Latvian democracy. 
Firstly, since 2005, the consolidation of Latvia’s statehood, and further integration into the EU and 
within the framework of NATO have continued. It means that Latvia has enjoyed greater foreign 
policy autonomy. It must nevertheless be noted that participation in international organisations, in 
which great effort is invested to reach unanimity, and the readiness of states to reach compromises 
have strongly influenced the foreign policy of Latvia. Thus, there is a simultaneous trend to shape a 
more autonomous foreign policy, as well as the need to coordinate this foreign policy with other EU 
and NATO member states. Latvian foreign policy is still heavily influenced by external conditions, 
as Latvia is not only a small country, but it is also included in the group of ‘new’ member states. 
Furthermore, its location next to Russia increases the risk of external influences.
Secondly, the economic crisis has left a considerable impact on Latvia’s foreign policy primarily 
affecting domestic policy and social economy. The extreme reduction of funding for defence and 
foreign affairs has affected the ability of Latvia to achieve its foreign policy aims, such as its wish 
to support democracy in other countries. The public demand to employ foreign policy as one of 
the instruments for overcoming the economic crisis has also increased. Affected by the economic 
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recession, the interest of entrepreneurs to use the foreign affairs services to protect their interests 
has increased significantly. 
Thirdly, the accession to the EU and NATO has encouraged Latvia to integrate the democracy 
support component in its foreign policy. For instance, at the time when Latvia joined the EU 
and NATO, its development co-operation policy was still relatively young, however in 2014 it is 
already 10 years old. Therefore, there are grounds to believe that over the last decade, the element 
of spreading democracy Latvia’s foreign policy has become more pronounced, and therefore more 
attention is paid to it than in the previous audit in 2005. 
15.1 How free is the governance of the country from subordination to 
external agencies, economic, cultural or political? 
This section primarily deals with economic, political, and cultural relations with Russia, including 
soft power and public opinion elements. The previous assessment of the international dimension of 
Latvia’s democracy looked at two of the most important aspects of external influences. Firstly, the 
external pressure exercised by Russia upon Latvia with the aim of fulfilling Russia’s own interests 
was assessed. Secondly, external pressure from international organisations (the UN, EU, OECD, 
NATO, the World Bank, etc.) aiming at fostering the process of consolidation of democracy in 
Latvia was assessed. Since the previous audit of democracy, the pressure exercised by Russia has, 
to a certain extent, even increased, and this is looked at in more detail later in this section. Pressure 
exercised by international organisations, however, has decreased. This can be explained by the 
fact that Latvia is a fully-fledged member of the EU and NATO, and in 2014, negotiations were 
underway on the accession of Latvia to the OECD – the economic organisation bringing together 
the most developed countries of the world. Therefore, external actors have fewer possibilities of 
setting various conditions for Latvia, which, if not fulfilled, would jeopardise Latvia’s integration 
into the said organisations. As the influence of international organisations on the development of 
democracy in Latvia has decreased since 2004, this matter is not looked into in such detail. 
Contrary to what was expected, after joining the EU and NATO, Latvia has still been dominated 
over the last decade by concerns about the impact Russia has on Latvia. Before joining the EU 
and NATO, the priority issues in the relations between Latvia and Russia were related to differing 
interpretations of 20th century history, energy matters, as well as the rights of the Russian-speaking 
population of Latvia (including the non-citizen issue). After 2004, these issues were supplemented 
with concerns about the soft power exercised by Russia on Latvia. It must be noted that, even after 
accession to the EU and NATO, concerns about the external influence of Russia on Latvia, and in 
particular on the Russian-speakers living in Latvia, have not diminished. The Russia–Georgia war in 
August of 2008 and the Ukraine crisis in the spring of 2014 have once again aggravated the concerns 
about the vulnerability of Latvia in the face of attempts by Russia to influence the views of the 
inhabitants of Latvia using the information space. Moreover, the academic community is experiencing 
an ever increasing interest about relations with Russia, resulting in a range of publications, which 
have been prepared since the previous audit of democracy, on which the assessment of Latvian and 
Russian relations to a great extent are based.1 Furthermore, mass media interest in the influence of 
Russia has increased considerably.2 
1 Without striving to offer an exhaustive list of academic publications, we are going to mention a few of the 
most important ones: Muižnieks 2006, 2008, 2011; Lerhis, Kudors, Indāns 2007; Ozoliņa 2007; Sprūds 2012. 
Relations with Russia have also been discussed in many other publications issued in Latvia and abroad, 
analysing Latvia’s foreign and defence policies. 
2 Some examples include the weekly TV shows De Facto and Nekā Personīga, the weekly publication ‘Ir’, as 
well as broadcasts and publications of the Baltic investigative journalism centre Re:Baltica about the interests 
and influence of Russia in Latvia. 
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The fields of economy and politics function independently, for the most part. However, economic 
means can sometimes be used for achieving political goals. Latvia’s economic relations with EU 
member states are mostly non-politicised, however in their economic relations with Russia and 
Belarus, the risk of politicisation is greater. Already in the 1990s, Russia used economic instruments 
against Latvia (Drezner 1999) and it has also widely employed economic instruments against other 
neighbours, such as Lithuania and Ukraine in the second half of 2013, i.e. at a time when Lithuania 
held the presidency of the Council of the EU. 
Unfavourable external impact can be restricted, provided that the intensity of economic relations 
with countries, in which the economic sphere is subject to the risk of political interference, is 
curtailed; however in democratic countries, decisions of this type are to a great extent left to the 
discretion of entrepreneurs. It was emphasised in the international dimension assessment of the 
democracy of Latvia conducted in 2005 that in 2003, 80 % of Latvian export and import was linked 
to the EU (both EU-15 and candidate states), whereas the Russia’s percentage in external trade was 
only 8 % (Ozoliņa, Ziemele 2005, 184). Ten years on – in 2013 – the situation has slightly changed, 
namely, the importance of Russia as an external trade partner has slightly increased (to 10 %), 
whereas external trade with the EU countries has decreased (down to 71 %). It must nonetheless 
be noted that in absolute numbers, the external trade volume with the EU countries has increased, 
whilst trade with Russia has grown faster. Trade with CIS countries increased rapidly in 2012, 
when it grew by 22 %, and this growth continued in 2013 (an increase of 4 %) (LR EM (MoE of 
the Republic of Latvia) 2013, 24–26). One must also take into account that the rapid growth of the 
Latvian economy during the post-crisis period is linked to a rapid increase in its exports – since 
2009, the export volume has seen a nearly twofold increase.
As far as foreign direct investments accumulated in Latvia are concerned, investors from 
EU countries are prevalent, as 71 % of all accumulated foreign direct investments are either 
from the EU-15 or from the relatively new EU member states. In the economic development report 
prepared by the Ministry of Economics, it is said that 42 % of the accumulated foreign direct 
investments consist of investments by entrepreneurs from Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Estonia, Norway, Finland, Russia, and Cyprus (LR EM 2013, 67–69). Lursoft data show that from 
1991 until the end of 2013, Russia was the fifth largest investor in Latvia (total investments reaching 
nearly 300 million lats); however, investments from this country form only slightly more than 6 % 
of the overall investment amount. It must nevertheless be pointed out that in 2013, Russia was 
the third largest investor with investments worth 44 million lats, followed by Cyprus (43 million), 
and Malta (27 million); in 2013, the USA with investments worth 99 million and Lithuania with 
55 million ranked first and second  respectively. The accumulated foreign direct investments last 
year reached 4 849 billion lats (Lursoft 2014a). It must be noted that Russia is conclusively the 
largest foreign investor in Latvia in terms of the number of investors – from 4 March 1991 until 
2 June 2014, 5 156 investors from Russia had made their investments in Latvia (Lursoft 2014b).
However, the economic, political, and cultural influence of Russia does not stop at what is 
publicly visible and numerically calculated. Over the recent years, interest in the economic and 
soft power exercised by Russia in Latvia has considerably increased. In this context, it is worth 
mentioning a range of issues, in which discussions in the Latvian public space have not resulted in 
unanimous conclusions. Firstly, as a result of the economic crisis, discussions increased about the 
growing economic presence of Russia in Latvia. There were announcements in the public space 
giving the information that due to the economic crisis several Latvian companies had been sold to 
Russian investors. In 2011, for instance, the companies Rīgas Piena Kombināts and Valmieras Piens 
were bought by the Russian entrepreneur Andrey Beskhmelnitsky (Diena 2014). The presence of 
Russian entrepreneurs in Latvia can increase the possibilities for these companies to export products 
to Russia. However, should relations between Russia and the EU deteriorate, orientation towards 
the Russian market might lead to significant losses. Moreover, the imposition of economic sanctions 
on Russia within the context of the Ukrainian crisis could decrease the potential of sales or finding 
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investors for several Latvian companies of such as the airline AirBaltic, as the potential buyers and 
investors are from Russia. 
The economic relations of Latvia with Russia are like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
weak economic relations with Russia reduce the economic gains that Latvia would have by being 
linked to an economy that ranks among the world’s top ten. However, on the other hand, intensive 
economic relations raise concerns about economic ties turning into political dependence on Russia. 
Faced with this choice, there have been attempts in Latvia’s foreign policy to establish a balanced 
approach in relations with Russia, however they are not always successful. At the very least, the 
differing orientations of the foreign policy makers and entrepreneurs can potentially cause problems 
as well. The entrepreneurs’ typical view of Russia as an economic opportunity from time to time 
contradicts the view of Russia that is typical for the foreign policy and defence policy makers, 
who see it as a potential threat, and therefore consider that it is important to strive for mutual 
understanding through dialogue. As a result of the economic crisis, significant progress has been 
achieved in this respect. It is possible that this is one of the reasons why, within the context of the 
Ukrainian crisis, the entrepreneurs have, at least initially, received the information about imposing 
economic sanctions on Russia with understanding. 
Secondly, after joining the EU and NATO, discussions about Russia’s soft power have intensified 
in Latvia. This is not surprising, because, as the interest of Russia in soft power increases, their 
neighbours’ concerns are also increasing about the influence of this soft power on the opinions of 
inhabitants of these countries, including Latvia. Additionally, there have been extensive discussions 
on Russia using sport as a tool of soft power. The discussion on this element of soft power was 
related to the establishment of the ice-hockey club Dinamo Riga in 2008 and its participation in the 
Kontinental Hockey League. Much greater concerns have been raised by the issue of the absence 
of protection of Latvia’s informative space, however the discussions up to now have not ended 
with clear conclusions on the measures to be taken in order to better protect this space.3 It must be 
noted that before Latvia joined the EU and NATO, these discussions were primarily about the split 
in Latvia’s domestic informative space. At that time, concerns were already being voiced about the 
presence of Russia in Latvia’s informative space. However the potential consequences, once mass 
media is under state control in Russia, were not apprehended at that time.
After the accession of Latvia to the EU and NATO, decision-makers had increasingly to come to 
the conclusion that the opinion of Russian mass media on many matters of international relations and 
domestic policy issues is radically different from the interpretation offered by Western mass media.4 
Thus, over recent years, the concerns among decision-makers about the influence that Russian mass 
media has on the opinion of the Russian-speaking part of society in Latvia have increased. The 
regular references to a rebirth of the Nazi ideology in Latvia in relation to the events of 16 March, 
the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, as well as the Ukrainian crisis in the spring of 
2014 have served as a strong impulse for bringing this issue to the fore. The results of the survey 
conducted in April 2014 (DA (Audit of Democracy) 2014) show that a considerable percentage of 
Latvian inhabitants receive information from Russian TV channels. 50 % of respondents watch 
primarily Latvian TV channels, whereas 43 % watch primarily Russian TV channels.5 It must be 
3 From time to time, there have been attempts to bring the issue of the protection of Latvian informative space 
to the forefront by the former defence minister Artis Pabriks. This issue has been addressed by the National 
Electronic Mass Media Council (NEMMC). Thus, in April 2014, NEMMC made a decision to request that 
the relay of the Russian TV channel Rossija RTR in Latvia be stopped. See: NEMMC 2014. As a result of the 
events in Ukraine, the company Lattelecom also included the TV channels CNN and BBC World in its economy 
package, in order to increase the representation of Western mass media in the Latvian informative space. 
4 See more information about this issue: Muižnieks 2008. 
5 24 % watch mostly or only Latvian TV channels. 26 % watch Latvian TV channels more often than Russian 
TV channels. 28% watch Russian TV channels more often than Latvian TV channels. 14 % watch mostly or 
only Russian TV channels (DA 2014, Table G3). 
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noted that inhabitants trust Latvian mass media more (in particular the Latvian public radio and 
public television); nevertheless, the level of trust in Russian media is only slightly lower.6 The 
inhabitants of Latvia trust independent Russian media even to a lesser extent than state-controlled 
TV channels of Russia.
What has been the impact of Russia’s soft power on the attitudes of the inhabitants of Latvia; are 
there significant differences between the opinion of Latvians and Russians in matters of international 
relations? There are undoubtedly differences in attitudes between Latvians and Russians; however, it 
is difficult to tell whether they have formed as a result of influence by mass media or if other factors 
are at play, such as an uncritical attitude towards their country of origin. It is worth mentioning 
at least four examples of how the attitudes of inhabitants create grounds for concerns about the 
current and potential impact of Russia on Latvia. Firstly, considerable differences in opinion between 
Latvians and non-Latvians crystallised in the context of the Georgia-Russia war in 2008. The results 
of a study conducted by SKDS showed that 43 % of Latvian respondents sided with Georgia, 
whereas 49 % of Russian-speakers sided with Russia.7 These data show considerable differences 
between Latvians and Russians in the interpretation of the Georgian–Russian war. Secondly, there 
are significant differences between Latvians and Russians in the issue of whether Russia is a threat 
to the independence of Latvia. Between 2002 and 2013, a sizeable percentage of Latvians – about 
30–40 % – have at some point considered that Russia is a threat to the security of Latvia. The 
percentage of Russians thinking the same ranged from 5–10 % (see Fig. 15.1). A higher percentage 
6 On a scale from 1 (fully distrust) to 5 (fully trust), the level of trust in Latvian public radio and public television 
is accordingly 3.68 and 3.66, whereas the level of trust in Russian TV channels (NTV Mir, RTR Planeta, 
REN TV) is 3.12. The level of trust in Western media (CNN, BBC, ARD, ZDF, RTL) is only slightly higher – 
3.20. The level of trust in independent Russian media (Radiostancyja Eho Moskvy, Telekanal Dozdj, Radio 
Svoboda) is 2.94 (DA 2014, Table G2). 
7 It must be added that 10 % of Latvians supported Russia in this conflict, whereas 14 % of Russians supported 
Georgia. 38 % of Latvians and 27 % of Russians did not side with either belligerent (SKDS 2008). A more 
detailed analysis of this issue is available also in the article published by Viktors Makarovs in 2009 about the 
integration of Latvian society in the context of the Georgia-Russia war (Makarovs 2009, 20–21). 
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Figure 15.1. Percentage of respondents agreeing* to the statement that ‘Russia can be perceived 
as a threat to the independence of Latvia’ among Latvian and Russian-speaking** inhabitants, 
2002–2013
Source: SKDS data
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of Latvians and Russians – 49 % and 14 % respectively – agreed to this statement in the SKDS 
survey conducted in August of 2008. The total number of respondents, who do not perceive Russia 
as a threat to the independence of Latvia, during the report period fluctuated between 57 % and 
70 %,8 furthermore, during the period 2010–2013, it was higher than before the Russia–Georgia 
war (SKDS 2002–2013).
Thirdly, the public opinion poll shows that the inhabitants of Latvia have a positive attitude 
towards at Russia and believe that Latvia’s foreign policy should concentrate more on shaping 
relations with Russia. Taking into account the fact that Latvia is a part of the EU and NATO, the 
data of 2008–2013 on the assessment by the inhabitants of Latvia about the EU, USA, and Russia 
are paradoxical. The data summarised in Table 15.2 show that Latvian residents’ attitude towards 
Russia is more positive than their attitude towards the EU and USA. It is also significant that the 
given negative assessment of Russia is on average lower than the negative assessment of the EU and 
USA.9 Furthermore, SKDS data from the public opinion polls show that up until the Ukrainian crisis 
in the spring of 2014, a higher percentage of respondents believed that Latvia should concentrate 
more on shaping relations with Russia and the CIS countries than with Western countries. The data 
8 Only in the August 2008 survey was this indicator lower – at that time, 52 % of respondents believed that 
Russia was not a threat to the independence of Latvia.
9 It is worth mentioning that the inhabitants of Latvia do not trust the European Union: according to the data of 
a survey performed in 2011 by SKDS, 78 % of respondents believe that Latvia is a lower grade EU member 
state. 74 % of respondents believe that the EU leadership does not care what Latvian inhabitants feel. 71 % of 
respondents believe that the Western countries are using Latvia for their own benefit, and 56 % of respondents 
admit that the accession to the EU has fostered economic recession in Latvia. 65 % of respondents believe 
that a closer co-operation with Russia and other CIS countries can save the economy of Latvia. 54 % of 
respondents believe that Latvia, when it was part of the USSR, was rather well off. These data prove that the 
majority of Latvian society distrusts the West (the EU and the USA).
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obtained during the March 2014 survey show that the percentage of those preferring Russia and the 
CIS countries as the Latvia’s foreign policy priority has fallen to 30 %, whilst 39 % of respondents 
prefer the Western countries. Thus, for the first time since 2008, a higher proportion of respondents 
has chosen Western countries as the foreign policy priority instead of Russia or the CIS countries 
(SKDS 2008–2014).
Fourth, there are substantial differences in opinion between Latvians and Russians with respect 
to the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014. When asked ‘In your opinion, is the armed 
intervention of Russia in the events taking place in Ukraine justified or not?’ 61 % of respondents 
answered that armed intervention by Russia is not justifiable, whereas 22 % believed that it is 
justifiable. Overall, the majority of respondents believed that the conduct of Russia is not justifiable, 
however there are substantial differences in opinion on this issue between Latvian and Russian-
speakers. Only 8 % of Latvian-speakers believed that the activities of Russia are justifiable, whereas 
the support for the conduct of Russia was much higher among the Russian-speaking respondents – 
43 % (SKDS 2014). 
The potential of external influence is evidenced not only by the view through rose-coloured 
glasses that a large part of Latvian society has of Russia, but also by the dominant perception in 
Russia of Latvia as a hostile state. It must, however, be noted that the attitude of the inhabitants 
of Russia towards Latvia is not unanimous and over time it has experienced significant changes. 
According to the data of the analytical centre Levada (Russia), since 2005, the number of Russian 
inhabitants who perceive Latvia as a hostile state has considerably decreased. In 2005, 49 % 
of Russian inhabitants considered Latvia to be a hostile state, whereas in 2013 – only 21 % of 
inhabitants. However, Latvia is still regarded as the third most hostile country in the world for 
Russia, after the USA (38 %) and Georgia (33 %). Latvia is followed by Lithuania (17 %) and 
Estonia (16 %). Furthermore, the answers of Russian inhabitants to the question about the groups 
of countries that are considered hostile show that former Soviet Union republics are considered as 
hostile with a constantly decreasing intensity. In 2008, 27 % of Russian inhabitants believed that 
former USSR republics were hostile, whereas in 2012 – a mere 14 % (Levada Center 2013).
It can be concluded that integration into the EU and NATO has reduced the potential of impact 
from external agents on Latvia. However, at the same time, the interest of Russia in influencing 
Latvia using economic and soft power instruments has increased. Where Russia is concerned, an 
intensive use of instruments of soft power in Latvia is observed, however it is still difficult to 
judge the results. It is a positive sign that by 2014 the Russians’ perception of Latvia as a hostile 
country has decreased. In Latvia, however, two stable trends can be observed. Firstly, the opinions 
of Latvians and Russians on various issues of Latvian foreign policy and international relations 
are significantly different. Furthermore, these differences become aggravated under circumstances 
of geopolitical unrest (the war between Russia and Georgia, annexation of Crimea). Secondly, 
there is lack of unanimity in Latvian society with regards to the most important foreign policy 
vectors. Latvians believe that foreign policy should be directed more towards the West, whereas 
the Russian-speakers tend to believe that Latvia’s foreign policy should be more active in relations 
with Russia and former Soviet Union republics. It must be added, though, that these circumstances 
of geopolitical unrest can lead to considerable shifts in the inhabitants’ opinions (SKDS 2014). 
15.2. To what extent are government relations with international 
organisations based on the principles of partnership and transparency?
As Latvia is a member of all of the major international organisations (EP, EU, IMF, NATO, 
OSCE, UN, WB), as well as having started accession talks to join OECD, it can be concluded that 
the State has taken roots in the network of international institutions and has moved on from the 
accession stage to fully-fledged participation in organisations and to the positioning of its interests 
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therein. Therefore, government relations with international organisations are based on principles of 
partnership and transparency fully abiding the regulations and agendas of these organisations. Over 
the last decade, several significant trends in Latvia’s relations with international organisations have 
developed. 
The first trend is related to the financial and economic crisis in Latvia which started in 2008 and 
necessitated external aid in order to minimise economic consequences. The programme to counter the 
crisis was developed jointly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission, 
the World Bank (WB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), several 
EU member states in co-operation with the government of Latvia. The agreement reached with the 
international lenders prescribed the opportunity for Latvia to borrow up to 7.5 billion euros. This 
amount was primarily aimed at re-financing the sovereign debt, ensuring stability of the public 
financial sector and financing the state budget deficit. The terms of agreement envisaged a substantial 
reduction of public expenditure and structural reforms without which the international loan would 
not be made available to Latvia. Even though the requirements set forth by the international lenders 
for Latvia were undoubtedly political, as they entailed certain ideas of state governance and reforms 
to be implemented, they nevertheless were coordinated with the government, as well as approved 
at the highest political level. 
The adopted programme envisaged reducing public expenditure also in the fields where there 
would be a direct impact on an international dimension, namely, in the sector of foreign affairs 
and defence. Even though the budget reduction was significant, it did not lead to fundamental 
changes in Latvia’s foreign policy. As the negotiations between the international lenders and the 
government of Latvia were not easy and the mutually approved reforms rather harsh, they affected 
the public attitude towards the IMF and the WB. The public attitude, in turn, held an important role 
in the Latvian public space during the process of these negotiations. Allegations claiming that the 
introduction of the painful structural reforms was imposed by external bodies became popular within 
the society, who disregarded the government’s role in the development of a mutual programme. 
The influence of these allegations is manifested in public opinion polls: out of all international 
organisations, people trust these two institutions the least – 29.2 % trust the IMF, and 29.5 % of 
the population trust the WB (DA 2014, Table L1).
The second trend was determined by the political processes in Ukraine and the annexation 
of Crimea. Following a direct intervention by Russia in the internal affairs of Ukraine, the issue 
of whether NATO and the EU would be able to aid Latvia in stabilising the security situation in 
crisis conditions became a matter of relevance. Latvia’s geopolitical decision to join the EU and 
NATO is seen by the public eye to be a positive one and it is not questioned. Overall, the people 
believe that the interests of Latvia in these organisations are respected. Trust in these organisations 
is high – 48.9 % of the population trust the European Union, and 52.3 % trust NATO (DA 2014, 
Table L1). Moreover, with regard to the protection of Latvia’s interests within both organisations, 
the inhabitants of Latvia gave favourable answers: 72.6 % believe that the EU fully or partially 
protects the interests of Latvia, and 71.8 % believe the same with regard to NATO (DA 2014). 
Public opinion poll data prove that Latvia’s experience over the last decade as a member state of 
the EU and NATO has improved the perception of these organisations in the eyes of the residents. 
15.3. To what extent does the government support UN human rights treaties 
and respect international law?
The observation of UN human rights instruments and mechanisms is one of the reference points 
of Latvian foreign policy and activities in this field are conducted in several directions. Firstly, Latvia 
has not only adopted a range of important conventions and established institutions, but has also 
ensured, in practice, the implementation of human rights. The ambassador of Latvia to the UN Jānis 
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Mažeiks said in an interview: ‘Since the restoration of independence, there has been considerable 
progress in observing human rights. The most important measure to mention is that Latvia was one 
of the first Eastern European countries to have established institutions for the protection of human 
rights. The Constitutional Court has been established, and the fundamental human rights section has 
been included in the Constitution. Latvia has joined the European Convention on Human Rights 
and has been able to the meet political conditions laid down before joining the EU. The European 
Convention on Human Rights is particularly important, as its conditions are binding. In justifying 
its judgements, the Constitutional Court actively employs international agreements and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (Mažeiks 2014).
Secondly, within the UN, Latvia has intensified its work with issues related to human rights. 
For instance, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) elected Latvia to the Executive 
Board of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women – UN Women for the 
period 2012–2015. Thereby achievements by Latvia in the field of gender equality are recognised, 
manifested both in normative regulations and the adoption of specialised programmes, as well as 
the representation of women in the leading public and private institutions. Since 2003, Anita Ušacka 
has been working at the International Criminal Court. For two years (2011–2012), she was the 
presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber of the Court. Thirdly, Latvia has applied for membership 
of several UN institutions which are directly related to human rights issues. Latvia has proposed its 
candidacy to the UN Human Rights Council, for which the election will take place in 2014 for a 
term of 2015–2017, as well as for the UN Security Council non-permanent membership in 2025 for 
the period 2026–2027. Fourthly, the UN-defined human rights principles are observed by instigating 
and implementing development co-operation projects in Latvia’s priority countries, such as the EU 
Eastern Partnership and Central Asian countries (see Section 15.5).
15.4. To what extent does the government respect its international 
obligations in its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, and how 
free from arbitrary discrimination is its immigration policy? 
Compliance with international commitments with regard to refugees and asylum seekers became 
current shortly before Latvia joined the EU, and it was triggered by two factors. Firstly, Latvia had 
to prepare itself for joining the Schengen area and performing the associated obligations. To ensure 
the conformity of the migration policy to EU provisions and the transfer of national institutions to 
the introduction of a relevant EU procedure in their further development, the government prepared 
and adopted a programme for the development of a single asylum and migration management system 
(2006–2009) (LR IeM (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Latvia) 2006). Secondly, 
forecasts have indicated a possible increase of migrant influx which would require the country to be 
legally and practically prepared, and could also lead to dissatisfaction among the people. The results 
attained over the last ten years prove that Latvia is observing binding international laws referring to 
the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention as well as to the provisions enshrined in EU legal regulation 
applicable to the determination of the status of asylum seekers, refugees and subsidiary protection 
status (criteria, procedures) and rights guaranteed to these persons.
In the field of immigration policy, EU laws determine the requirements for the development of 
Latvian domestic laws and their practical implementation. One of the fundamental principles is not to 
permit any discrimination and to treat all groups of persons equally. Among the most important EU 
laws determining the progress of asylum policy is the Council Directive 2001/55/EC (determining 
the minimum EU standards for giving temporary protection of displaced persons); Council Directive 
2003/9/EC (laying down the minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers); Council 
Directive 2004/83/EC (determining the minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS LATVIA?280
protection); Council Directive 2005/85/EC (on minimum standards on procedures in member states 
for granting or withdrawing refugee status); Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national) (LR PMLP  (Office of 
Citizenship and Migration Affairs of the Republic of Latvia) 2014a). On a national level, the Asylum 
Law was adopted in 2009, which, by transposing EU laws, prescribes the duties and obligations of 
the State of Latvia with regard to refugees and asylum seekers. 
Up until now, Latvia has not had to face large flows of uncontrolled refugee and asylum seekers, 
which would have led to problems at a national or EU level. Between 2005 and 2012, several trends 
crystallised. Even though the number of applications filed in a year is increasing, compared with 
the overall EU situation it remains low – only 935 applications have been received over a period 
of ten years. Furthermore, the number of people having received refugee status has not significantly 
increased either if compared to the total number of applications (see Table 15.1). 
Table 15.1. Asylum seekers and refugees in Latvia10
Year Number of asylum 
seekers
Refugee status 
granted as per Geneva 
Convention
Protection status granted due 
to humanitarian and other 
grounds, equivalent to asylum
2005 20 - -
2006 8 2 8
2007 34 5 3
2008 51 2 1
2009 52 5 6
2010 61 7 18
2011 335 9 18
2012 189 10 20
2013 185 14 21
Total: 935 54 95
Source:  LR PMLP 2014b.
Public attitude towards refugees and asylum seekers is critical, as there are concerns about 
possible mass refugee flows that the state would not be capable of receiving financially or materially 
and that would lead to the overall deterioration of the quality of life among the population. Such 
an attitude could potentially cause problems to the government when making decisions at the EU 
level. In one of the first studies conducted after the accession of Latvia to the EU (‘The attitude 
of Latvian inhabitants, state officials, and NGOs towards asylum seekers’, 2005), it was concluded 
that 52 % of respondents would not want to live next to refugees or asylum seekers (BSZI (Baltic 
Institute of Social Sciences – BISS) 2005, 58). This trend has not changed in subsequent years. 
The study performed by the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute of the University of 
Latvia indicates that 51.5 % of Latvians and 14.2 % of Russian-speakers perceive immigration from 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova as a threat to identity and the development of Latvia (answers 
‘threatened’ and ‘very threatened’ are included). 51.2 % of Latvians and 42.2 % of Russian-speakers 
10 OCMA website: http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/sakums/statistika/patveruma-mekletaji.html (viewed on 
27.04.2016)
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perceive immigrants from Central Asia countries as threatening, and accordingly immigrants from 
the Middle East and North Africa would cause concerns in 46.4 % of Latvians and 55.1 % of 
Russian-speakers, and a labour force from the Far East (China, Southeast Asia) would make 51.5 % 
of Latvians and 51.3 % of Russian-speakers feel threatened (LU SZF (Faculty of Social Sciences 
of the University of Latvia) 2013).
15.5. How consistent is the government in its support for human rights and 
democracy abroad? 
In the Audit of Democracy published in 2005, the attempts of Latvia to support human rights 
and democracy abroad received a decidedly critical evaluation, namely, it was maintained that 
‘Latvia has not been systematically involved in supporting human rights and democracy abroad’ 
(Ozoliņa, Ziemele 2005, 192). This is not surprising, since Latvia’s main task prior to its integration 
into the EU and NATO was to improve democracy at home. However, it could have been predicted 
that along with the consolidation of democracy and membership in the EU and NATO, the element 
of democracy in Latvia’s foreign policy would become more pronounced. This is what has happened 
to a certain extent, however this element in Latvia’s foreign policy has been unstable and dependent 
on the international environment and the interpretation of Latvia’s national interests. Latvian foreign 
policy makers have been aware of that democracy and human rights form only one aspect of foreign 
policy and its presence in the relations of Latvia with other states depends not only on Latvia’s 
stakes, but also on the readiness of other countries, such as Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries 
to discuss these issues and accept help, when Latvia has been ready to give it. As could be expected, 
after joining the EU and NATO, Latvia started to shape relations with the countries outside these 
organisations much more actively (especially with the countries of the post-Soviet space) (see: 
Ozoliņa, Rostoks 2006).
In Latvia’s first fundamental foreign policy document, adopted after joining the EU and NATO, 
‘consolidation of democracy, eradication of global poverty and diseases’ was one of the five most 
important foreign policy aims (see: LR ĀM (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia) 
2006 Section three ‘Fundamental principles and aims of policy’). With regard to this, along with 
accession to the EU, Latvia started to provide aid more extensively and systematically to countries 
on a multilateral basis (contributions to the EU budget) and on a bilateral basis. After 2004, a 
considerable increase can be observed in the volume of aid provided and aimed at the consolidation 
of democracy and the eradication of poverty in other countries.11 It must be noted that an indistinct 
line between provision of development aid and support for the reform process in EU eastern 
neighbour states has been observed. Even though the development co-operation policy of the EU 
member states and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are two separate policies, because 
the EU eastern neighbours are not among the poorest countries in the world, this division, where 
Latvia is concerned, is not exactly relevant, and the support given to such countries as Moldova, 
Georgia, and Ukraine is interpreted as provision of aid. Besides these endeavours, Latvia also got 
involved in the US-led Iraq and Afghanistan operations, which to a certain extent can be perceived 
as support to the spreading and consolidation of democracy. 
Even though the consolidation of democracy in other countries was determined as one of the 
fundamental goals of Latvia’s foreign policy, Latvia’s approach towards this issue, however, has 
been rather pragmatic. Latvia has tried to provide support to those post-Soviet countries which 
have shown readiness to introduce democratic reforms. Therefore, in Latvia’s relations with these 
countries, support for democracy is an important component. However, in relations with countries 
11 However, it must be noted that more than 90 % of aid provided by Latvia has been in the form of mandatory 
contributions to the EU budget, whereas the peak of financing available for bilateral co-operation projects, the 
sum of 580 000 lats, was reached in 2008, shortly before the beginning of the economic crisis. 
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that have not expressed willingness to strengthen democracy, the democracy component in Latvia’s 
foreign policy is practically imperceptible. In relations with these countries, emphasis is placed on 
the implementation of Latvia’s economic interests. This trend is clearly presented in Table 15.2, 
which summarises the development co-operation projects from 2005 until 2010 financed (fully 
or partially) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. The distribution of the 
implemented projects by country and by year points to the fact that Latvia has mostly provided 
aid to those eastern neighbours – Georgia and Moldova – which have progressed the most in 
their relations with the EU. Within the framework of the development co-operation policy Latvia 
has predominantly tried to implement projects related to providing support for implementing state 
governance system reforms and for civic society. The large number of development co-operation 
projects in Georgia and Moldova is indicative of providing support towards the democratisation 
of these states.12 Belarus is the only non-democratic state in this group of four countries, where a 
rather large number of development co-operation projects have been implemented. However, the 
reason for this is the fact that Belarus is a neighbour, with whom Latvia shares a border. If Belarus 
chose the route of democratisation, it can be assumed that Latvia would be implementing the largest 
number of development co-operation projects in this country. 
Table 15.2. Development co-operation projects financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Latvia, 2005–201013 
Year Number of implemented development co-operation projects
Georgia Moldova Ukraine Belarus Other country
2005 3 8 0 0 0
2006 6 9 0 1 0
2007 10 15 9 6 2
2008 8 9 9 6 6
2009 2 0 1 0 0
2010 0 2 0 0 1
Total 29 43 19 13 9
Source: LR ĀM 2014.
What concerns those Eastern Partnership group countries, which up to now have not taken 
convincing steps in the direction of democratisation or which have chosen to stay within the sphere 
of influence of Russia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus), is that in these countries the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Latvia has financed development co-operation projects either to a limited extent 
(Belarus) or has not financed any at all (Armenia, Azerbaijan). However, this does not mean that 
Latvia has not tried to shape active relations with these countries (apart from Belarus, which due 
12 The participation of Moldova and Georgia in the Eastern Partnership policy resulted in an arrangement to 
sign Association Agreements with the EU during the Vilnius summit in November 2013. The Association 
Agreement was signed in June 2014. 
13 The section ‘Other country’ mostly includes development co-operation projects implemented in Afghanistan, 
since Latvian soldiers are participating in the ISAF mission in this country. No development co-operation 
projects financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia have been implemented during the report period 
in Armenia or Azerbaijan (both countries fall within the EU Eastern Partnership policy). It must be noted 
that the table includes only those development co-operation projects, which are fully or partially financed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. Development co-operation projects implemented by other state 
administration authorities and local governments are not included in the table. 
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to the political repressions exercised by the authoritarian regime has found itself in partial political 
isolation). On the contrary – Latvia has tried to intensify relations, based on mutual economic 
interest, with Armenia, and in particular with Azerbaijan (after Latvia joined the EU), as well as 
with Central Asian countries (slightly later). 
Latvia’s interest in intensifying relations with the EU eastern neighbours has been proven with 
the visits of Latvian top state officials (the President, the prime minister, ministers, the speakers 
of the Saeima) to such countries as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan. Top state officials of these countries have also come on official visits to Latvia. 
Latvia’s relations with Azerbaijan have been shaping particularly intensively after integration into 
the EU, with the number of top state officials’ visits significantly exceeding the number of visits 
to any other of the aforementioned countries. It must nevertheless be pointed out that efforts to 
develop more intensive relations with Central Asian countries have resulted in awkward situations 
for Latvian politicians, because journalists and political analysts have inevitably raised questions 
about whether such conduct by Latvia, as a democratic state, is justifiable. It is this context, within 
which the unfortunate statement by the President of the State Andris Bērziņš should be interpreted, 
namely, that people in Turkmenistan are free, because they are free to move between the mountains 
and the Caspian Sea (see: Latvijas Radio (Latvian Radio) 2013). 
Public support is important in implementing democracy aid measures, however the opinions 
of Latvian society on the issue of aiding democracy around the globe are not unanimous. Data 
from the 2014 survey by SKDS (see Table 15.3) show that the respondents are, at best, willing to 
support processes of democratisation in Eastern Partnership states, although even in this issue the 
division between those in favour and those against is similar. In the matter of supporting democracy 
in Central Asian countries, the opinion of the respondents is much more sceptical, and people of 
Latvia are even less ready to support democracy elsewhere in the world. It is difficult to determine 
the reasons why support for aiding democracy in some countries is so low, however there are 
three possible explanations. Firstly, Latvia is a small country; therefore its inhabitants might feel 
sceptical about its capabilities of aiding the spread of democracy around the world. Secondly, Latvia 
is one of the poorest EU countries. Since aiding democracy in other countries is associated with 
additional expenses, the people might be sceptical in relation to the utility of such costs. Thirdly, 
since the Iraq war in 2003, the efforts to spread democracy have been to a certain extent discredited 
in Latvian society, therefore people feel sceptical about them. Hence, democratisation is perceived 
as a domestic process and any support given from the outside should be approached with caution. 
It can be concluded that there is a clear division between two types of neighbour states in 
Latvia’s foreign policy. The first group includes some of the Eastern Partnership policy countries, 
which have taken steps towards democratisation (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine). In relations with these 
Table 15.3. The support of inhabitants for Latvia’s involvement in spreading democracy in 
the world 
Question: To what extent do you support Latvia’s involvement in spreading democracy in the world? 
I support 
it
I do not 
support it
Difficult to tell/
no answer
Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine)
39% 39% 22%
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)
28% 45% 27%
Elsewhere in the world (Asia, Africa, Latin 
America etc.)
21% 52% 27%
Source: DA 2014, Table L2
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS LATVIA?284
countries, the element of democratisation is very important, though not always adequately supported 
financially. The second group includes Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan, where the transfer to 
democracy has not yet taken place. Since democratisation of these countries is not expected in the 
foreseeable future, Latvia has decided not to emphasise the element of democracy in its relations 
with Central Asian countries, instead focusing on strengthening political and economic relations. 
15.6. What measures (if any) are being taken to remedy publicly identified 
problems in this field, and what degree of political priority and public 
support do they have? 
The interaction between foreign policy makers and society is usually indirect, and political 
parties and various stakeholder groups, as well as foreign policy experts act as intermediaries. 
The influence of public opinion in matters of foreign policy is usually limited. For instance, the 
government chose to support the US invasion of Iraq, even though more than 80 % of Latvian 
inhabitants believed that this war should not be supported.14 However, the fact that the inhabitants’ 
opinion does, to some extent, influence the state’s foreign policy is proven by the cautious support 
given by Latvia’s inhabitants to the provision of aid to developing countries. It can be claimed that 
it was simpler for policy makers not to grant bigger financing for the implementation of bilateral 
development co-operation projects, as the public opinion on this issue was split. From 2004 to 
2009, the number of respondents, who believed that Latvia should give systematic aid to developing 
countries, increased from 38 % to 45 %. However, in 2009, there were still 38 % of respondents 
who did not agree to this approach.15 Therefore, it can be claimed that the public opinion background 
to increasing financing for bilateral development aid has been unfavourable.
Even though the engagement of society in the shaping of foreign policy is usually rather limited, 
since 2005, considerable progress has been observed in the interaction between the government 
and society. There are two reasons behind this. Firstly, changes have affected the development of 
fundamental foreign policy documents and organising reports. Within the first few years following the 
restoration of independence, Latvia had not yet developed its foreign policy concept, substantiating 
this with the changing international environment (see: Ozoliņa 1994). The first foreign policy concept 
was developed in 1995, and it marked the foreign policy priorities of Latvia for the upcoming 
10 years. In the following years, the period of validity of Latvia’s foreign policy documents tended 
to decrease. In 2006, the fundamental foreign policy directions were planned for a five-year period, 
whereas in 2011, the foreign policy planning and reporting was ensured with annual foreign policy 
debates in Parliament, initiated by a report about Latvia’s foreign policy issued by the minister for 
foreign affairs. It must be noted that such annual foreign policy reports do not exclude the possibility 
of determining long-term priorities. This is clearly evidenced by the four reports, which have been 
prepared since 2011. Latvia’s preparation, for instance, for the presidency of the Council of the EU 
in the first half of 2015 has already been mentioned in several previous reports. 
The publication of the annual report of the minister for foreign affairs and foreign policy debates 
in the Saeima ensure closer ties with society and perform several other important functions. As 
regards the engagement of the wider public, it must be pointed out that the report of the minister 
for foreign affairs is discussed during its drafting with foreign policy experts and representatives of 
non-governmental organisations, whereas the Saeima debates about foreign policy ensure a broader 
publicity, and therefore better public awareness about the current issues in foreign policy. The 
foreign policy debates at the Saeima, besides guaranteeing the important function of strengthening 
14 The survey conducted by Latvijas Fakti showed that the support of Latvian inhabitants for the Iraq war was 
just below 20 % of respondents, whereas the survey conducted by SKDS showed that slightly less than 10 % 
of respondents were in favour of the Iraq invasion. Newspaper Diena, 2003, 6 Feb.
15 SKDS 2004–2009. See more about this topic: Rostoks 2012b.
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the ties with society, also promote the uniformity of foreign policy, keep the diplomatic staff of 
other countries informed, and ensure government reporting to parliamentarians. The foreign affairs 
debates and the annual report, which give an exhaustive account of what Latvia has done and plans 
to do in foreign policy, enables a broader public to better understand that foreign policy is not 
one-dimensional.16 Latvia is establishing relations with very diverse countries, and it participates in 
many international organisations. Moreover, relations with other countries are not only economic 
and security-related, but are also related to culture, sport, and various other areas. Therefore, regular 
reporting on Latvia’s foreign policy helps to better educate society about the processes and the 
situation in this field. 
Secondly, the experience of an economic crisis has increased entrepreneurs’ interest in how the 
foreign affairs service could promote Latvian exports. Progress in two important matters must be 
mentioned here.
Since 2009, co-operation between entrepreneurs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
improved. One of the measures rolled out in 2009 was a co-operation format ‘Foreign affairs 
service for Latvian exports’; it was planned in the form of regular meetings between the Latvian 
ambassadors with representatives of the most significant sectors of the economy, interested in export 
markets outside Latvia. This format of discussions continued also in 2014 under the name ‘Export 
ABC’. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gathered the biggest export-oriented Latvian businesses and 
informed them about the Ministry’s possibilities of offering assistance in finding partners outside 
Latvia. Overall, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has opened up to co-operation with entrepreneurs. 
Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is only one of the state administration institutions, whose 
task is to promote foreign economic relations, the issue of coordinating representation of foreign 
economic interests is of importance. The Investment and Development Agency of Latvia (IDAL) 
operating under the subordination of the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
deals with the representation of economic interests. The economic crisis created pre-conditions 
for closer practical co-operation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IDAL and for the 
establishment of a more harmonised coordination mechanism. In the spring of 2012, the Foreign 
Economic Policy Coordination Council (FEPCC) was established, chaired by the minister for 
foreign affairs, whereas the vice-chair is the minister for economics. The Council also includes 
ministers from other sectors, representatives from public authorities (including a representative 
from IDAL) and entrepreneurs’ organisations. The goal of FEPCC is ‘to ensure harmonised 
co-operation between state administration institutions and entrepreneurs’ organisations in the 
development and implementation of a successful foreign economic policy for the promotion of 
economic competitiveness and consolidation of exportability of Latvia’, as well as ‘to prevent the 
fragmentation in foreign economic policy support measures in the process of information exchange, 
as well as in the process of making and implementing decisions’ (LR ĀM 2014). 
Latvian exporters have greatly contributed to the recovery of Latvia from the economic crisis. 
Even though it is difficult to determine the extent to which this process was encouraged by closer 
ties between entrepreneurs and the foreign affairs service, it can, nevertheless, be assumed that 
the strengthened co-operation and the establishment of a more effective coordination mechanism 
for representing the foreign economic interests has had a positive impact on Latvia’s economic 
development. It must nevertheless be pointed out that in the long term, the economisation of foreign 
policy17 can turn out to be problematic. The implementation of economic interests in, for instance, 
Central Asian countries, can, in the long term, lead to the typical dilemma between (democratic) 
values and (economic) interests, thereby complicating the relations between Latvia and the West, 
as well as with Central Asian countries.
16 See more on the functions of the foreign policy debates in the Saeima: Rostoks 2012a. 
17 This mostly refers to the non-democratic states of the post-Soviet space, in which Latvian entrepreneurs are 
rather interested.
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Overall assessment: progress over the last decade 
Very good Good Satisfactory Poor Very poor
15.1. X
15.2. X
15.3. X
15.4. X
15.5. X
15.6. X
Best feature
Closing the gap between foreign policy makers and society. Since accession to the EU 
and NATO, Latvia’s foreign policy has undergone significant changes, and many of them must 
be assessed positively. The disassociation of foreign policy from other sectors (economy, culture, 
social spheres) has decreased. Nowadays, Latvian entrepreneurs consider, to a much greater extent, 
foreign policy as a resource to be used for achieving business interests. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Latvia more actively implements public diplomacy and uses social media to inform 
society about foreign policy current affairs. Along with the introduction of the Saeima foreign 
policy debates, public discussions on foreign policy matters have become more regular, and thereby 
they not only inform Latvian society, but also contribute to strengthening the uniformity of foreign 
policy. Co-operation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the non-governmental sector has 
also improved. 
Most serious problem
Insufficient support for democratic reforms in other countries. Even though aiding democracy 
in other countries over the last decade has become an important priority for Latvia’s foreign policy, 
practical support to this priority has been insufficient, and as a result Latvia is significantly lagging 
behind Estonia and Lithuania in terms of provided bilateral development aid. At the same time, the 
element of protecting entrepreneurs’ interests has been consolidated in Latvia’s foreign policy. Even 
though the representation of economic interests in foreign policy as such is not condemnable and 
can even be perceived as positive, there are concerns, however, about the fact that the importance of 
aiding democracy in non-democratic countries, with which Latvian entrepreneurs are co-operating, 
is not properly assessed. Accepting the rules of game proposed by authoritarian regimes over a 
longer time period can backfire, which could harm not only the interests of entrepreneurs but also 
the image of Latvia as a democratic country. 
Suggested improvements
More support to measures of promoting development co-operation and democracy in other 
countries. Even though the financing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs earmarked for bilateral 
development co-operation projects has increased, it is still insufficient. Latvia has few practical 
instruments available, which it could use to strengthen democratisation and good governance in 
its partner states. The positive role that the implementation of development co-operation projects 
could have in such post-Soviet countries, in which Latvian entrepreneurs are interested, is not duly 
appreciated. The democracy component should also be included in such projects. It must nevertheless 
be recognized that further consolidation of democracy within the domestic policy framework is also 
very important. It is important for Latvia to achieve economic growth, social stability, to promote 
social integration, to develop the sector of education and science. It would make the inhabitants more 
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confident in Latvia as a successful state, and thereby democracy would be consolidated in terms 
of domestic policy and preconditions would be created for aiding democracy in other countries. 
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Appendix 2
Comparison of the 2005 and 2014 Latvia Audit 
of Democracy and the 2007 Latvia Monitoring of 
Democracy findings
2014 Audit of Democracy questions 2005
findings 
2007 
findings
2014 
findings
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2007 
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2005 
1  Nationhood and citizenship
1.1 How inclusive is the political nation and 
state citizenship of all who live within 
the territory?  
41, 22 2 41, 22  =
1.2 How far are cultural differences 
acknowledged, and how well are the 
minorities and vulnerable social groups 
protected?
3 3 3 = =
1.3 How much consensus is there on 
state boundaries and constitutional 
arrangements?
43, 34 3 43, 54 = 
1.4 How far do constitutional and political 
arrangements enable major societal 
divisions to be moderated or reconciled?
4 4 41, 22  
1.5 How impartial and inclusive are 
the procedures for amending the 
Constitution? 
4 4 4 = =
2  Rule of law and access to justice
2.1 How far is the rule of law operative 
throughout the territory? 4 4 2 = 
2.2 To what extent are all public officials 
subject to the rule of law and to 
transparent rules in the fulfillment  of 
their functions?
3 3 3 = =
2.3 How independent are the courts and 
the judiciary from the executive, and 
how free are they from all kinds of 
interference?
3 3 3 = =
2.4 How equitable and secure is the 
access of citizens to justice, to due 
process and to redress in the event of 
maladministration?
1 3 2  
1234
1 Legislation.
2 Actual situation.
3 Constitutional arrangements.
4 Boundaries.
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2014 Audit of Democracy questions 2005
findings 
2007 
findings
2014 
findings
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2007 
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2005 
2.5 How far do the criminal justice and 
penal systems observe due rules of 
impartial and equitable treatment in 
their operations?
3 3 3 = =
2.6 How much confidence do people have 
in the legal system to deliver fair and 
effective justice?
2 2 3  
3  Civil and political rights
3.1 How free are all people from physical 
violation of their person, and  from fear 
of it?
3 3 3 = =
3.2 How effective and equal is the 
protection of the freedoms of  
movement, expression, association and 
assembly?
3 3 3 = =
3.3 How secure is the freedom for all to 
practise their own religion, language or 
culture?
3 3 3 = =
3.4 How free from harassment and 
intimidation are individuals and groups 
working to improve human rights?
4 3 4  =
3.5 What measures are implemented to 
prevent publicly identified problems in 
the sphere of civil and political rights, 
and to what extent they are set as a 
political priority and offered public 
support?
3 3 3 = =
4  Economic and Social Rights 
4.1 How far is access to work or social 
security available to all, without 
discrimination?
3 3 3 = =
4.2 How effectively are the basic necessities 
of life guaranteed, including adequate 
food, shelter and clean water?
2 2 3  
4.3 To what extent is the health of the 
population protected, in all spheres and 
stages of life?
1 2 1  =
4.4 How extensive and inclusive is the 
right to education, including education 
in the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship?
4 3 3 = 
4.5 How free are trade unions and other 
work-related associations to organize 
and represent their members’ interests?
3 3 3 = =
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2014 Audit of Democracy questions 2005
findings 
2007 
findings
2014 
findings
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2007 
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2005 
4.6 How rigorous and transparent are the 
rules on corporate governance, and how 
effectively are corporations regulated in 
the public interest?
3 4 3  =
5  Free and fair elections
5.1 How far is appointment to governmental 
and legislative office determined by 
popular competitive election, and how 
frequently do elections lead to change in 
the governing parties or personnel?
5 3 4  
5.2 How inclusive and accessible for all 
citizens are the registration and voting 
procedures, how independent are they 
of government and party control, and 
how free from intimidation and abuse?
4 4 5  
5.3 How fair are the procedures for the 
registration of candidates and parties, 
and how far is there fair access for 
them to the media and other means of 
communication with the voters?
2 2 4  
5.4 How effective a range of choice does 
the electoral and party system allow 
the voters, how equally do their votes 
count, and how closely does the 
composition of the legislature and the 
selection of the executive reflect the 
choices they make?
4 4 4 = =
5.5 How far does the legislature reflect the 
social composition of the electorate? 3 3 4  
5.6 What proportion of the electorate votes, 
and how far are the election results 
accepted by all political forces in the 
country and outside?
5 5 4  
6  The democratic role of political parties
6.1 How freely can political parties be 
formed, attract new members and 
compete for posts?
4 4 4 = =
6.2 How effective is the party system in 
forming and sustaining governments in 
office?
2 2 2 = =
6.3 How freely can opposition and non-
ruling parties form alliances within 
legislature; can they provide efficient 
oversight of the government to ensure 
its accountability?
4 4 4 = =
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2014 Audit of Democracy questions 2005
findings 
2007 
findings
2014 
findings
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2007 
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2005 
6.4 How fair and efficient is legislation 
regulating political party discipline in 
the Saeima?
4 4 4 = =
6.5 How far are parties effective 
membership organizations, and how 
far are members able to influence party 
policy and candidate selection?
2 2 2 = =
6.6 How far does the system of party 
financing prevent the subordination of 
parties to special interests?
1 1 1 = =
6.7 How much support do parties receive 
from various ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic groups?
2 2 2 = =
6.8 What measures have been implemented 
to prevent publicly identified problems 
in party operations?  Are these measures 
a priority, and do they have public 
support?
3 No answer 4 - 
7  Effective and responsive government
7.1 How far is the elected government able 
to influence or control those matters that 
are important to the lives of its people, 
and how well is it informed, organized 
and resourced to do so?
3 3 4  
7.2 How effective and open to scrutiny 
is the control exercised by elected 
leaders and their ministers over their 
administrative staff and other executive 
agencies?
3 3 3 = =
7.3 How open and systematic are the 
procedures for public consultation on 
government policy and legislation, and 
how equal is the access for relevant 
interests to government?
3 3 5  
7.4 How accessible and reliable are public 
services for those who need them, and 
how systematic is consultation with 
users over service delivery?
3 3 4  
7.5 How comprehensive and effective 
is the right of access for citizens to 
government information under the 
constitution or other laws?
2 3 4  
7.6 How much confidence do people have 
in the ability of government to solve the 
main problems confronting society, and 
in their own ability to influence it?
15, 36 15, 26 3  5 6 
5 Government.
6 Municipalities.
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2014 Audit of Democracy questions 2005
findings 
2007 
findings
2014 
findings
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2007 
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2005 
8  The democratic effectiveness of parliament
8.1 How independent is the parliament or 
legislature of the executive, and how 
freely are its members able to express 
their opinions?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
3 - -
8.2 How extensive and effective are the 
powers of the parliament to initiate, 
scrutinize and amend legislation?
2 2 3  
8.3 How extensive and effective are the 
powers of the parliament or legislature 
to oversee the executive and hold it to 
account?
2 3 3 = 
8.4 How rigorous are the procedures for 
approval and supervision of taxation 
and public expenditure?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
4 - -
8.5 How freely are all parties and groups 
able to organize within the parliament 
and contribute to its work?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
4 - -
8.6 How extensive are the procedures of 
the parliament  for consulting the public 
and relevant interests across the range 
of its work?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
3 - -
8.7 How accessible are elected 
representatives to their constituents? 4 No answer 4 - =
8.8 How well does the parliament  provide 
a forum for deliberation and debate on 
issues of public concern?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
3 - -
9  Civilian control of the military and police
9.1 How publicly accountable are the police 
and security services for their activities? 3 3 3 = =
9.2 How far does the composition of the 
army, police and security services 
reflect the social composition of society 
at large?
4 4 4 = =
10  Integrity in public life
10.1 How effective is the separation of 
public office from the personal business 
and family interests of office holders?
2 2 3  
10.2 How effective are the arrangements for 
protecting office holders and the public 
from involvement in bribery?
2 3 3 = 
10.3 How far do the rules and procedures 
for financing elections, candidates and 
elected representatives prevent their 
subordination to sectional interests?
3 2 3  =
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2014 Audit of Democracy questions 2005
findings 
2007 
findings
2014 
findings
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2007 
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2005 
10.4 How far is the influence of powerful 
corporations and business interests 
over public policy kept in check, and 
how free are they from involvement in 
corruption, including overseas?
1 1 2  
10.5 How much confidence do people have 
that public officials and public services 
are free from corruption?
2 2 3  
11  The media in a democratic society
11.1 How independent are the media from 
government, how pluralistic is their 
ownership, and how free are they from 
subordination to foreign governments or 
multinational companies?
3 3 2  
11.2 How representative are the media of 
different opinions and how accessible 
are they to different sections of society?
3 3 3 = =
11.3 How effective are the media and other 
independent bodies in investigating 
government and powerful corporations?
2 3 2  =
11.4 How free are journalists from restrictive 
laws, harassment and intimidation? 2 2 3  
11.5 How free are private citizens from 
intrusion and harassment by the media? 4 4 4 = =
12  Polical participation
12.1 How extensive is the range of voluntary 
associations, citizen groups, social 
movements etc. and how independent 
are they from government?
3 3 3 = =
12.2 How extensive is citizen participation 
in voluntary associations and self-
management organizations, and in other 
voluntary public activity?
3 3 2  
12.3 How far do women participate in 
political life and public office at all 
levels?
3 3 3 = =
12.4 4 How equal is access for all social 
groups to public office and how fairly 
are they represented?
?
13  Decentralization
13.1 How independent are the sub-central 
tiers of government from the centre, 
and how far do they have the powers 
and resources to carry out their 
responsibilities?
3 3 3 = =
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2014 Audit of Democracy questions 2005
findings 
2007 
findings
2014 
findings
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2007 
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2005 
13.2 How far are these levels of government 
subject to free and fair electoral 
authorization, and to the criteria 
of openness, accountability and 
responsiveness in their operation?
4 4 3  
13.3 How extensive is the cooperation of 
government at the most local level  
with relevant partners, associations 
and communities in the formation and 
implementation of policy, and in service 
provision? 
3 3 4  
14  Political culture and democracy
14.1  According to the population of Latvia, 
what is the extent of the politicians’ 
and officials’ responsiveness and the 
people’s ability to influence political 
decisions in the country?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
2 - -
14.2 To what extent are the inhabitants 
of Latvia certain of their ability to 
influence political decisions?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
2 - -
14.3 To what extent do the basic tendencies 
of political culture in Latvia create 
a favourable environment for 
democratisation processes?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
4 - -
14.4 To what extent does the mutual 
perception between the largest 
ethnolinguistic groups in Latvia 
facilitate the processes of 
democratisation in Latvia?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
37, 28 - -
15  International dimensions of democracy
15.1 How free is the governance of the 
country from subordination to external 
agencies, economic, cultural or 
political?
3 4 3  =
15.2 To what extent are government relations 
with international organisations based 
on the principles of partnership and 
transparency? 
4 4 4 = =
15.3 To what extent does the government 
support UN human rights treaties and 
respect international law?
3 4 4 = 
7 8 
7 Society level.
8 Political elites level.
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2007 
findings
2014 
findings
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2007 
2014 in 
compari-
son with 
2005 
15.4 To what extent does the government 
respect its international obligations in 
its treatment of refugees and asylum 
seekers, and how free from arbitrary 
discrimination in its immigration 
policy?
3 4 4 = 
15.5 How consistent is the government in its 
support for human rights and democracy 
abroad?
3 4 3  =
15.6 What measures (if any) are being taken 
to remedy publicly identified problems 
in this field, and what degree of political 
priority and public support do they 
have?
Not asked in 
the following 
form
Not asked in 
the following 
form
4 - -
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Appendix 3
Information about the survey of Latvian residents for 
the “Audit of Democracy 2005–2014” 
Technical information about the survey
SURVEY PERFORMED BY 
GENERAL POPULATION 
PLANNED SAMPLE SIZE 
Research Centre SKDS
Permanent residents of Latvia aged between 18 and 74 
1000 respondents (sample representative of the general 
population) 
ACHIEVED SAMPLE VOLUME 1000 respondents (incl. 825 citizens of the Republic of Latvia)
SAMPLE METHOD Stratified random sampling
STRATIFICATION FEATURES Administrative territorial 
SURVEYING METHOD Direct interviews at respondents’ homes 
GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE: All regions of Latvia (125 sampling points) 
SURVEY CONDUCTED 4–16 April 2014
COMPARISON OF ACHIEVED SAMPLE WITH POPULATION STATISTICS
The number of 
respondents in the 
sample (%) before 
weighing
Number of 
respondents in the
sample (%) after
weighing
LR Min. of Int. Off. 
of Cit. Mig. Aff. 
Pop. Reg. data as of 
07.02.2014.
KOPĀ 100.0 100.0 100.0
REGIONS
Riga 31.3 32.3 32.3
Riga region 18.1 17.8 17.8
Vidzeme 11.3 10.1 10.1
Kurzeme 12.6 12.9 12.9
Zemgale 11.1 12.2 12.2
Latgale 15.6 14.7 14.7
SEX
Male 43.1 47.5 47.5
Female 56.9 52.5 52.5
ETHNICITY
Latvian 56.4 58.3 58.3
Other 43.6 41.7 41.7
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Age
18 - 24 g.v. 11.8 11.9 11.9
25 - 34 g.v. 17.9 20.6 20.6
35 - 44 g.v. 17.5 18.7 18.7
45 - 54 g.v. 19.5 19.1 19.1
55 – 74 g.v. 33.3 29.7 29.7
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Unemployed 57.3 59.6
Employed 42.7 40.4
Education
Primary education 11.4 11.2
Secondary, vocational 64.6 64.3
Higher 24.0 24.5
Citizenship
LR citizen 82.5 83.7
Respondents 
without LR 
citizenship 
17.5 16.3
The questionnaire and socio-demographic groups distribution information is available from the LU 
Faculty of Social Sciences website www.szf.lu.l

Latvijas Universitātes Akadēmiskais apgāds
Baznīcas ielā 5, Rīgā, LV-1010
Tālr. 67034535
Iespiests SIA “Latgales druka”
Baznīcas ielā 28, Rēzeknē, LV-4601
Tālrunis/fakss: 64625938
HOW DEMOCRATIC 
IS LATVIA?
AUDIT of DEMOCRACY 2005–2014
The Advanced Social and Political Research Institute 
(ASPRI) of the Faculty of Social Sciences (SZF) was 
established in 2004 at the University of Latvia to 
facilitate high quality research of essential social development issues and to 
promote cooperation of Latvian social scientists and their participation in 
international research networks. In 2004–2005 Democracy Audit  was the first 
significant project executed by the ASPRI using the methodology of the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). This 
assessement was prepared  within  the framework of the  National Research 
Programme “National Identity”. An expert group was formed under the 
auspices of the ASPRI. In addition to researchers from the SZF, this group also 
included experts from the Latvian Centre for Human Rights, Centre for Public 
Policy PROVIDUS, Faculty of Economics and Management of the University of 
Latvia, and Vidzeme University of Applied Sciences. Audit of Democracy 
2005–2014 assesses democracy in Latvia over the ten-year period spent as a 
member state of NATO and the EU.
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